




































The	 New	 Zealand	 Human	 Rights	 Act	 1993	 (HRA)	 prohibits	 discrimination	 in	
employment	on	the	ground	of	disability,	which	includes	mental	illness.	However,	
what	is	unclear	is,	if	an	employee	develops	a	mental	illness	during	employment	
and	 their	 performance	 is	 compromised,	 to	 what	 extent	 does	 the	 legislation	
require	the	employer	to	accommodate	(or	tolerate)	this	poor	performance.	The	
question	 arises	—	 if	 an	 employee	 could	 otherwise	 be	 justifiably	 dismissed	 for	




employer,	 and	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee.	 In	 addition,	 this	 thesis	





to	 interpretation	 to	 analyse	 the	 relevant	 provisions.	 This	 analysis	 exposes	
several	 interpretive	 issues	 within	 the	 current	 legislation	 for	 disability	
discrimination,	 and	 reveals	 that	 the	 legislation	may	not	 be	 sufficient	 to	 ensure	
New	Zealand	is	meeting	its	obligations	under	the	UNCRPD.			
These	 interpretive	 issues	 arise	 as	 key	 terms	 in	 the	 legislation	 are	 not	 defined,	





the	 UNCRPD	 to	 ensure	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 disability	 is	 provided	 in	
employment.	 Instead,	 the	 so-called	 ‘reasonable	 accommodation’	 provisions	 of	
the	 HRA	merely	 provide	 a	 defence	 against	 a	 claim	 of	 discrimination,	 and	 any	
obligation	of	reasonable	accommodation	is	only	inferred	from	this	defence.		
Furthermore,	 despite	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 HRA	 being	 to	 better	 protect	 human	
rights	‘in	general	accordance’	with	United	Nations	Conventions	on	human	rights,	
it	 is	 difficult	 to	 interpret	 the	HRA	 in	 accordance	with	 the	UNCRPD.	This	 thesis	
argues	that	this	is	because	the	HRA	is	premised	on	a	medical	model	of	disability,	
and	on	the	idea	of	formal	equality,	whereas	the	UNCRPD	is	premised	on	a	mixed	
medical-social	model	 of	 disability	 and	 aims	 to	 achieve	 substantive	 equality	 for	
those	with	disabilities.		
As	a	consequence,	even	with	 the	best	possible	 interpretation	of	 the	provisions,	
the	lack	of	a	positive	duty	to	accommodate	the	disabled	employee,	the	emphasis	
on	 formal	 rather	 than	 substantive	 equality,	 and	 the	 failure	 to	 utilise	 the	 social	
model	 of	 disability,	 means	 New	 Zealand	 legislation	 provides	 inadequate	





for	 disability	 discrimination	 in	New	Zealand,	 and	proposes	 a	 series	 of	 changes	













the	 end.	 Midway,	 you	 know	 how	 far	 you	 have	 come,	 but	 you	 also	 know	 how	
much	 further	 there	 is	 to	 go.	 There	 is	 a	 seemingly	 never-ending	 series	 of	 high	
points	and	lows.	Every	climb	is	exhausting,	but	every	step	takes	you	closer	to	the	
next	 aid	 station,	 where	 sustenance	 and	 support	 await.	 Persevere	 long	 enough	
and	the	finish	line	looms,	and	miraculously,	the	pain	is	forgotten.		
For	 my	 PhD,	 the	 aid	 stations	 were	 provided	 by	 my	 supervisors,	 family	 and	
friends,	 and	 I	 acknowledge	 the	 important	 part	 they	 have	 played	 in	 getting	me	
through	this	event.		
First	 and	 foremost	 I	 wish	 to	 thank	 Professor	 John	 Dawson,	 my	 primary	
supervisor,	 for	 his	 unstinting	 support	 through	my	 thesis	 journey,	 in	 particular	
for	 his	 prompt,	 insightful,	 and	 thorough	 feedback,	 and	 for	 his	 never-ending	
patience.	 To	 Professor	 Jessica	 Palmer,	 my	 secondary	 supervisor,	 my	 grateful	
thanks	 for	 your	 unswerving	 support,	 reassurance	 and	 valuable	 feedback	




offered	 encouragement	 and	 reassurance,	 and	 provided	 invaluable	 feedback	
during	the	seminar	and	workshop.	In	particular	I	wish	to	acknowledge	Professor	
Paul	Roth,	for	his	advice	and	assistance	on	all	things	related	to	employment	law.		
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ERA		 	 	 Employment	Relations	Act	2000	(New	Zealand)	
HRA		 	 	 Human	Rights	Act	1993	(New	Zealand)	











Mental	Disability		 Means	 all	 non-physical	 disabilities	
included	in	section	21	of	the	HRA	
Potential	accommodation	provisions	 Human	Rights	Act	1993,	ss29,	35	
Permitted	exceptions		 	 	 Human	Rights	Act	1993,	s29	
Unreasonable	to	provide	special		
assistance	defence			 	 	 Human	Rights	Act	1993,	s29,	(1)(a)	
Unreasonable	risk	of	harm	defence		 Human	Rights	Act	1993,	s29(1)(b)	
Task	reallocation	proviso			 	 	 Human	Rights	Act	1993,	s35	









































































Professor	 Smith,	 a	 well-known	 and	 respected	 Professor	 at	 a	 prestigious	
University	 in	New	Zealand,	 develops	 depression.	 	 She	 loses	motivation,	 cannot	
think	clearly	and	has	difficulty	concentrating.	She	has	memory	problems	and	is	
increasingly	 intolerant	 of	 her	 students’	 shortcomings.	 Over	 time,	 her	 ability	 to	
research	 becomes	 compromised,	 and	 she	 stops	 submitting	 articles	 for	
publication.	Her	 supervision	of	 post-graduate	 students	becomes	desultory,	 and	
although	 she	 manages	 to	 teach	 her	 undergraduate	 classes,	 she	 does	 this	 by	
relying	 on	 her	 vast	 experience,	 and	 previous	 years’	 notes	 (which	 fortunately	
remain	 valid).	 Other	 staff	 members	 find	 her	 uncommunicative	 and	 unhelpful,	





The	University	knows	 that,	 for	 it	 to	be	 lawful,	 the	dismissal	of	Professor	Smith	




This	 type	 of	 situation	 is	 not	 uncommon	 in	 the	 workplace,	 and	 is	 a	 cause	 of	
concern	for	both	employers	and	mentally	disabled	employees,	who	are	unsure	of	
their	 respective	 obligations	 and	 rights.	 Therefore,	 this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 clarify	
when	 a	 dismissal	 (or	 adverse	 treatment)	 of	 an	 employee,	 who	 has	 a	 mental	
disability,	would	be	discrimination.	 	 It	 is	particularly	concerned	with	situations	
in	which	the	performance	of	a	current	employee	falls	during	the	course	of	their	
employment,	 due	 to	 the	 development	 of	 a	 mental	 disability,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Professor	 Smith	 above.	 Does	 such	 a	 person	 remain	 ‘qualified’	 for	 their	 job?	
Would	their	dismissal	constitute	discrimination	against	them	‘by	reason	of’	their	
disability?	To	which	other	employee	 should	 the	disabled	employee’s	 treatment	
be	compared	with?	And	to	what	extent	is	the	employer	obliged	to	accommodate	
the	disabled	employee?	These	difficult	questions	will	be	addressed	in	the	context	
of	New	Zealand’s	 anti-discrimination	 law,	 seeking	 the	 correct	 interpretation	 of	
the	anti-discrimination	legislation	—	the	HRA.	This	thesis	will	evaluate	whether	
the	provisions	 in	this	Act	 fulfil	 the	purposes	of	disability	discrimination	 law,	or	
whether	 reform	 is	 required,	 particularly	 to	 ensure	 New	 Zealand	 law	 is	 in	 line	
with	 the	 United	Nations	 Convention	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 Persons	with	Disabilities	
(UNCRPD).	Thus,	the	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	clarify	the	law	in	this	contentious	and	







it	 is	 estimated	 that	 one-third	 of	 the	 population	 has	 a	 mental	 disability,1	with	
conservative	estimates	suggesting	 that	 this	 includes	10-18%	of	 the	workforce.2	
In	 New	 Zealand,	 one	 in	 six	 adults	 (16%)	 has	 been	 diagnosed	 with	 a	 common	
mental	 disability	 at	 some	 time	 in	 their	 lives3	and	 the	 rate	 of	 labour	 force	
participation	for	those	with	a	mental	health	disability	is	reported	at	52%.4			
Although	 many	 people	 with	 mental	 disability	 work	 productively	 and	
competently,	there	are	some	employees	who	will	develop	a	mental	disability,	or	
have	 a	 recurrence	 of	 an	 existing	 condition,	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 affects	 their	
performance.		This	may	negatively	impact	the	employer’s	business.		
Lack	 of	 performance	 by	 the	 affected	 employee	 may	 manifest	 in	 either	
presenteeism	or	absenteeism.		
Presenteeism,	as	a	result	of	mental	 illness,	may	manifest	as	 loss	of	productivity	
or	 impaired	 performance,	 due	 to	 diminished	 concentration	 and	 impaired	
decision-making	 skills,	 while	 still	 being	 present	 in	 the	 workplace.	 Depressive	
conditions	may	 result	 in	 a	 loss	 of	motivation,	 forgetfulness,	 tardiness,	 physical	
and	mental	 slowness,5	whereas	mania	may	 result	 in	hyperactivity	and	 inability	
to	 focus.	 Other	 conditions	 may	 manifest	 with	 paranoia,	 hyper-vigilance	 and	
disturbed	 thinking.	 The	 individual	 may	 make	 poor	 business	 or	 management	
decisions,	and	may	alienate	customers	or	contractors.	All	of	 these	sequelae	can	
impact	on	the	 individual’s	ability	 to	perform	effectively	 in	many	—	if	not	all	—	
aspects	of	their	job.	The	flow-on	effect	of	this	will	depend	upon	the	individual’s	
role,	 but	 if	 other	 employees	 find	 themselves	 ‘carrying’	 the	 individual,	 this	may	
impact	on	their	own	performance,	or	the	productivity	of	the	business	as	a	whole.	





Mental	 Illness	 in	 the	Workplace:	 Psychological	 Disability	Management	 (Ashgate,	
Farnham,	2014).		




4	The	Labour	 force	participation	rate	 is	defined	as	 the	number	of	people	 in	 the	
labour	 force	 as	 a	 percentage	 of	 the	 number	 of	 people	 in	 the	 working-age	
population.	










(often	 lengthy)	 make	 it	 difficult	 for	 the	 employer	 to	 effectively	 manage	 the	
workforce,	 with	 consequent	 loss	 of	 productivity.	 	 In	 particular,	 stress	 related	
disorders	 (including	 anxiety	 and	 depression)	 are	 one	 of	 the	 major	 causes	 of	
absenteeism,	 with	 rates	 quoted	 internationally	 at	 30%	 of	 all	 work-related	
absences.8		
As	with	presenteeism,	absenteeism	may	cause	increased	pressure	and	stress	on	
remaining	 staff.	 The	 economic	 cost	 to	 the	 employer	 may	 be	 substantial	 with	
decreased	 productivity,	 the	 cost	 of	 sick	 leave	 entitlements	 or	 the	 cost	 of	
employing	and	training	short-term	replacements.9	Therefore	the	employer	often	
has	 good	 reason	 to	 want	 to	 “performance	 manage	 out”	 (i.e.	 dismiss	 on	 the	
grounds	of	poor	performance)	the	affected	employee.	
Nevertheless,	 there	 are	 both	 social	 and	 economic	 benefits	 in	 continuing	 the	
employment	 of	 someone	 with	 a	 mental	 disability.10	An	 experienced	 or	 skilled	
worker	 may	 be	 difficult	 to	 replace,	 and	 training	 may	 be	 time	 consuming	 and	
expensive.	 Additionally,	 there	 is	 anecdotal	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 retained	
















10 	Michael	 Ashley	 Stein	 "Labor	 Markets,	 Rationality,	 and	 Workers	 with	
Disabilities"	(2000)	21(1)	Berkeley	J	Employ	Labor	Law	314.	Stein	suggests	the	
failure	of	 the	market	 to	 employ	 those	with	disabilities	 is	 irrational,	 as	 it	 is	 not	
based	on	accurate	information.		
11		 Sarah	 Von	 Schrader,	 Valerie	 Malzer	 and	 Susanne	 Bruyère	 "Perspectives	 on	









As	 Gault	 J	 stated	 in	 Quilter	 v	 Attorney-General,	 discrimination	 defies	 precise	
definition. 15 	In	 one	 sense,	 to	 discriminate	 is	 to	 recognise	 a	 distinction	 or	
differentiation	 between	 individuals.	 In	 human	 rights	 law,	 discrimination	 is	 a	
pejorative	 term	 denoting	 the	 unfair	 treatment	 of	 people	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	
irrelevant	feature,	such	as	race,	colour	or	gender.	There	is	a	moral	element	to	the	
judgment,	as	Smith	explains:16		
Commentators…	 still	 argue	 about	 what	 amounts	 to	
"discrimination".	 It	 is	 a	 factual	 question	 whether	 people	 have	
been	 treated	 differently	 on	 certain	 grounds,	 but	




According	 to	 Shin, 17 	the	 best	 moral	 explanation	 of	 the	 legal	 concept	 of	
discrimination	 is	 that	 it	 expresses	 society’s	 commitment	 to	 ‘identify,	 disavow,	
and	 disallow’	 the	 practices	 and	 actions	 that	 perpetuate	 historic	 and	 persistent	
patterns	of	unjust	inequalities.		
The	 aim	of	 anti-discrimination	 law,	 in	 general,	 is	 to	promote	 equality.	 Equality	
involves	 treating	 people	with	 equal	 concern	 and	 respect,18	as	 all	 persons	 have	










16	Nicholas	 Smith	 "A	 Critique	 of	 Recent	 Approaches	 to	 Discrimination	 Law"	
(2007)		NZ	L	Rev	499	at	502.		
17	Patrick	Shin	“Is	there	a	Unitary	Concept	of	Discrimination”	in	Deborah	Hellman	
and	 Sophia	 Moreau	 (eds)	 Philosophical	 Foundations	 of	 Discrimination	 Law	
(Oxford	Scholarship	Online,	2013).	
18	At	28-50.	
19	Denise	Reaume	 "Dignity,	 Equality	 and	Comparison"	 in	Deborah	Hellman	and	





of	 Human	 Rights"	 (2008)	 19(4)	 EJIL	 655).	 Nonetheless,	 dignity	 is	 culturally	







However,	 whether	 anti-discrimination	 law	 should	 be	 grounded	 on	 ideals	 of	
equality	alone,	or	also	on	ideals	of	dignity,	autonomy	or	liberty	is	the	subject	of	
much	academic	writing.23	The	relevance	becomes	apparent	when	one	sees	how	
cases	 are	 decided	 in	 different	 jurisdictions,	 as	 the	 application	 of	 anti-
discrimination	 law	 depends,	 in	 part,	 on	 the	 philosophical	 foundations	 used	 to	
define	discrimination.	Thus,	 in	Canada,	 the	Supreme	Court	 says	 the	purpose	of	
anti-discrimination	 law	 is	 ‘to	 prevent	 the	 violation	 of	 dignity	 and	 freedom’.24	
Therefore,	if	the	dignity	of	the	person	is	not	affected,	then	the	treatment	may	not	
amount	 to	 discrimination.25	Alternatively,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 (traditionally)	
focuses	 on	 formal	 equality	 —	 although	 equal	 treatment	 does	 not	 necessarily	
afford	 equal	 benefits.	 As	 Anatole	 France26	famously	 summarised:	 the	 ‘majestic	
even-handedness	of	the	law	forbids	rich	and	poor	alike	to	sleep	under	bridges,	to	
beg	in	the	streets	and	to	steal	bread.'		




21	Denise	 G	 Reaume	 "Discrimination	 and	Dignity."	 (2003)	 63(3)	 La	 L	 Rev	 645;	
Gay	Moon	 and	 Robin	 Allan	 "Dignity	 Discourse	 in	Human	Rights	 Law:	 A	 Better	
Route	to	Equality?"	(2006)	11	EHRLR	610.		
22	General	 Assembly	 of	 the	United	Nations	The	Universal	Declaration	of	Human	
Rights	(General	Assembly	of	United	Nations,	1948)	.		
23	For	example	see	Nicholas	Smith	Basic	Equality	and	Discrimination:	Reconciling	







Misplaced	 and	 a	 Right	 Misunderstood"	 (1998)	 14	 SAJHR	 ;	 Reaume,	 above	 n;	
Sandra	 Fredman	Discrimination	Law	 (2nd	 ed,	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 Oxford,	
United	 Kingdom,	 2011);	 Marshall	 Cohen	 and	 others	 Equality	 and	 Preferential	
Treatment	 (Princeton	 University	 Press,	 Princeton	 NJ,	 1977);	 Peter	 Vallentyne	
"Left	Libertarianism	and	Private	Discrimination"	(2006)	43	San	Diego	L	Rev	981;	
Catherine	Barnard	and	Bob	Hepple	"Substantive	Equality"	(2000)	59	Cambridge	
LJ	 562;	 Richard	 Arneson	 "What	 is	 Wrongful	 Discrimination?"	 (2006)	 43	
SanDiego	L	Rev	775;	Reaume,	above	n21.		
24	Miron	v	Trudel	[1995]	2	SCR	418	at	133.		
25	See	 Gosselin	 v	 Quebec	 (Attorney	 General)	 [2002]	 SCC	 84.	 In	 this	 case	 the	











Secondly,	disability	 impairment	comes	 in	many	 forms	with	differing	degrees	of	
impact	on	capacity,	capability	and	needs.			
Thirdly,	 unlike	 other	 grounds	 of	 discrimination,	 where	 different	 treatment	 is	
based	 on	 a	 feature	 that	 is	 generally	 considered	 to	 be	 irrelevant	 to	 a	 person’s	
ability	 to	 work	 (such	 as	 colour	 or	 gender),	 with	 disability	 the	 feature	may	 be	
relevant,	because	it	genuinely	impacts	on	the	disabled	person’s28	ability	to	work.	
Thus,	 the	 disabled	 employee	 may	 require	 additional	 measures	 or	 services	 to	
enable	 them	 to	perform	some	 functions.	As	 summarised	by	McHugh	and	Kirby	
JJ:29	
Disability	 discrimination	 is	 also	 different	 from	 sex	 and	 race	
discrimination	 in	 that	 the	 forms	 of	 disability	 are	 various	 and	
personal	to	the	individual	while	sex	and	race	are	attributes	that	
do	 not	 vary.	 The	 elimination	 of	 discrimination	 against	 people	
with	 disabilities	 is	 not	 furthered	 by	 “equal”	 treatment	 that	
ignores	their	individual	disabilities.	
Consequently,	 to	 effectively	 participate	 in	 the	 workforce	 (and	 society),	 the	
mentally	 disabled	 employee	 may	 require	 different	 treatment,	 or	 reasonable	
accommodation	 of	 their	 disability	—	 and	 disability	 discrimination	 law	 should	
reflect	 this.	 Discrimination	 law	 is	 therefore	 about	 ensuring	 the	 ‘equal	
opportunity	for	people	with	disabilities	to	meet	their	own	needs.’30		
Accordingly,	 a	philosophical	 approach	based	on	 formal	 equality,	which	may	be	
appropriate	 for	other	prohibited	grounds	of	discrimination,	may	not	be	apt	 for	





1993,	 s21	and	 include	sex,	marital	 status,	 religious	belief,	 ethical	belief,	 colour,	






of	 Disability	 Influence	 the	 Outcome?"	 (2005)	 24	 Social	 Policy	 Journal	 of	 New	







1.2 The	 Problem	 with	 Discrimination	 Law	 in	 Employment	 for	
Disability	
As	Mummery	LJ	said:31	
Anyone	 who	 thinks	 that	 there	 is	 an	 easy	 way	 of	 achieving	 a	
sensible,	 workable	 and	 fair	 balance	 between	 the	 different	
interests	 of	 disabled	persons,	 of	 employers	 and	of	 able-bodied	
workers,	 in	 harmony	 with	 the	 wider	 public	 interest	 in	 an	
economically	 efficient	 workforce,	 in	 access	 to	 employment,	 in	
equal	treatment	of	workers	and	in	standards	of	fairness	at	work,	
has	probably	not	given	much	serious	thought	to	the	problem.		
It	 is	 not	 surprising	 then,	 that	 this	 thesis	 identifies	 several	 areas	of	 concern	 for	
disability	 discrimination	 in	 employment	 in	 New	 Zealand.	 One	 major	 area	 of	
concern	is	the	lack	of	clarity	and	certainty	in	the	law,	as	the	meaning	and	ambit	
of	the	discrimination	in	employment	provisions	in	the	HRA	are	unclear.	A	second	
area	 of	 concern	 is	 whether,	 under	 the	 HRA,	 disabled	 employees	 can	 hope	 to	
achieve	 substantive	 equality	 (a	 goal	 of	 disability	 discrimination	 law),	 through	
reasonable	accommodation	of	their	disability.	Given	the	purposes	of	the	HRA	are	









parties,	 so	 they	 have	 certainty	 as	 to	 their	 respective	 positions	 in	 advance.	
Currently,	 it	 is	submitted,	 the	 law	does	not	provide	enough	clarity	 to	meet	 this	
position.	 This	 is	 due	 in	 part	 to	 the	 interpretive	 difficulties	 arising	 from	 the	
discrimination	in	employment	provisions	for	disability	discrimination,	and	this	is	
compounded	 by	 the	 dearth	 of	 case	 law	 on	 point.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 unclear	
whether,	 or	 to	 what	 extent,	 there	 is	 an	 obligation	 in	 New	 Zealand	 for	 an	
employer	 to	 reasonably	accommodate	 the	mentally	disabled	employee,	as	New	
Zealand’s	 HRA	 does	 not	 specifically	 require	 employers	 to	 reasonably	
accommodate	 persons	with	 disabilities.	 Rather	 the	 law	 provides	 the	 employer	
with	a	defence	(or	exception)	against	a	claim	of	discrimination,	where	 it	would	
be	unreasonable	 for	 them	to	provide	certain	 types	of	accommodations	 that	 the	
employee	might	require.	The	precise	effect	of	these	provisions	is	also	unclear.		








strive,	 which	 embody	 what	 he	 calls	 the	 inner	 morality	 of	 the	 law.33	These	





linguistic	 facet	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 lay-person,	 such	 as	 the	 employer,	 to	
understand	 the	 law,	while	 the	 legal	 facet	 is	 necessary	 for	 foreseeability	 and	 to	
avoid	arbitrariness.	As	Wacks	summarised	it,	‘the	judge’s	powers	broaden	to	the	
detriment	of	the	legislator's	where	vague	wording	is	concerned’.35	In	the	context	
of	 this	 thesis	 we	 will	 see	 that	 there	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 clarity	 in	 New	 Zealand	 law	
generally	in	this	area.				
In	addition,	consistency	necessitates	that	change	does	not	happen	with	what	has	
been	 described	 as	 ‘disorientating	 frequency’.36	Therefore,	 the	 law	 should	 be	
applied	 consistently,	 with	 adherence	 to	 the	 doctrine	 of	 precedent.	 However,	
given	the	 imponderable	policy	considerations	and	the	contextual	application	of	
employment	 law	 and	 human	 rights	 law,	 this	may	 prove	 difficult.	 For	 example,	
while	 it	may	be	appropriate	to	apply	stringent	standards	to	a	 large	state	sector	
employer,	 the	 same	 standards	may	 be	 unfair	 when	 applied	 to	 a	 small	 private	
employer.	 However,	 deciding	 such	 matters	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis	 may	
introduce	retroactivity	into	the	law,	by	not	determining	the	rules	that	apply	until	










the	 possibility	 that,	 by	 distinguishing	 a	 case,	what	would	 have	 been	 a	 justified	
dismissal	 becomes	 discrimination.	 Nonetheless,	 Fuller	 contends	 that,	 although	
there	 are	 difficulties	 in	 analysis	 of	 retroactivity,	 the	 ‘difficulties	 and	 nuances	


















employment,	 on	 the	 prohibited	 ground	 of	mental	 disability,	 is	 unclear.	 This	 is	
because,	not	only	 is	 the	text	of	provisions	unclear,	but	policy	considerations	—	
such	 as	 the	 purposes	 of	 employment	 law	 and	 human	 rights	 law,	 and	 the	
consideration	of	the	conflicting	interests	of	the	employer	and	employee	—	may	
influence	 how	 the	 law	 in	 this	 area	 is	 interpreted.	 Furthermore,	 these	
considerations	 have	 a	 contextual	 element,	which	may	 influence	 interpretation.	
For	 example,	 state	 sector	 employers	 (who	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 ‘good	 employer’	
provisions	 of	 the	 State	 Sector	 Act	 1988	 (SSA)),39	or	 large	 corporate	 employers	
with	 substantial	 resources	 to	 draw	 upon,	 may	 find	 they	 are	 held	 to	 a	 higher	
standard	 (i.e.	 to	 be	 more	 accommodating	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee)	 than	 the	
small	 employer	 with	 limited	 resources.	 Moreover,	 as	 the	 discrimination	 in	
employment	 provision	 (section	 22	 of	 the	 HRA)	 is	 generic	 for	 all	 grounds	 of	
prohibited	 discrimination,	 it	 does	 not	 readily	 cope	 with	 the	 special	 nature	 of	
disability	discrimination.				




One	 major	 difficulty	 with	 New	 Zealand	 discrimination	 law,	 for	 disability,	
concerns	 the	model	 of	 ‘equality’	 upon	which	 it	 appears	 to	 be	 based.	 The	 HRA	
appears	 to	 be	 based	 on	 a	 formal	model	 of	 equality,	when	what	 is	 required	 for	
disability	 discrimination	 is	 a	model	 of	 substantive	 equality,	 particularly	 if	New	
Zealand	 is	 to	 meet	 its	 obligations	 under	 the	 UNCRPD.	 A	 fundamental	 aim	 for	
those	 with	 disabilities	 is	 to	 be	 able	 to	 enjoy	 their	 rights	 and	 fundamental	
freedoms,	and	participate	in	society	on	an	equal	basis	with	non-disabled	persons.	
However,	because	of	barriers	—	both	physical	and	social	(such	as	prejudice	and	
stereotyping)	 —	 this	 goal	 is	 not	 easily	 attained.	 Therefore,	 a	 major	 aim	 of	
disability	discrimination	law	should	be	to	counteract	these	barriers.			




irrelevant	 to	 their	 work,	 and	 formal	 equality	 will	 prevent	 discrimination	 by	
ensuring	 they	 are	 treated	 equally	 with	 non-disabled	 persons.	 But	 when	 the	
disability	 affects	 the	 employee’s	 ability	 to	 perform	 the	 duties	 of	 their	 position,	
then	 it	 is	 not	 an	 irrelevant	 consideration,	 and	 equality	 of	 treatment	 may	 not	
achieve	 the	 desired	 outcome.	 If,	 for	 example,	 an	 employer	 dismisses	 all	








This	 different	 treatment	 (or	 reasonable	 accommodation),	 would	 allow	 the	
disabled	 employee	 to	 achieve	 the	 same	 overall	 outcome	 as	 non-disabled	




outcome.	 Both	 these	 approaches	 would	 require	 different	 and	 individualised	
treatment	 of	 disabled	 persons	 (i.e.,	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 their	
disability).		
The	 concept	of	 equality	of	opportunity	 recognises	 that	past	discrimination	and	
structural	 discrimination	place	 individuals	 at	 a	 disadvantage.	 Thus,	 to	 equalise	
opportunity,	their	‘starting	point’	must	be	equalised	(like	competitors	in	a	race),	
after	 which	 gains	 are	 due	 to	 individual	 merit.	 However,	 this	 concept	 fails	 to	
consider	 whether,	 once	 the	 starting	 point	 is	 equalised,	 the	 ‘competitors’	 are	
genuinely	able	to	compete	on	an	equal	basis.	Therefore,	equality	of	opportunity	
does	not	guarantee	equality	of	results.41	Admittedly,	a	person’s	choices,	may	also	
affect	 the	 opportunities	 available	 to	 them	 —	 making	 opportunity	 difficult	 to	
equalise.	 For	 example,	 the	 opportunity	 to	 work	 may	 be	 limited	 by	 the	
circumstance	of	having	a	disability,	but	choosing	to	refuse	medication	may	also	
affect	that	person’s	opportunities.42	Roemer,	in	his	theory	of	distributive	justice,	
attempts	 to	 take	 these	 personal	 choices	 into	 account.	 He	models	 an	 algorithm	
that	analyses	equality	of	opportunity,	taking	into	account	personal	responsibility	
—	which,	 he	 argues,	will	 reduce	 the	 debate	 over	 equality	 of	 opportunity	 from	
one	of	social	policy,	to	one	of	individual	accountability.43	
However,	substantive	equality,	viewed	as	equality	of	outcome	(or	result)	looks	at	
the	 end	 goal.	 Using	 the	 analogy	 of	 a	 race,	 equality	 of	 outcome	 looks	 not	 to	
equalise	the	starting	point	alone,	but	also	to	smooth	out	the	humps	and	hollows	
in	the	racetrack.	The	outcome	may	be	equal	ability	to	continue	working	despite	
having,	 or	 developing,	 a	 disability	 during	 employment.	 This	 may	 be	 achieved	
through	accommodating	the	disability	(i.e.,	flattening	the	humps	on	the	track).		
																																																								
40	Sandra	Fredman	 "Substantive	Equality	Revisited"	 (2016)	14(3)	 International	
Journal	 of	 Constitutional	 Law	 712.	 Fredman	 points	 out	 that	 there	 are	 various	
core	 meanings	 given	 to	 substantive	 equality	 including	 equality	 of	 results,	
equality	of	opportunity	and	dignity.	Different	jurisdictions	reflect	these	concepts	
in	 their	 legislation	 for	 direct	 and	 indirect	 discrimination,	 reasonable	
accommodation	and	harassment.		
41	At	723.		
42	For	 a	 full	 discussion	 on	 the	 problem	 of	 personal	 choice	 and	 involuntary	
circumstances,	 see	 John	E.	Roemer	Equality	of	Opportunity	 (Harvard	University	
Press,	Cambridge,	USA,	2000)	and	the	rebuttal	in	Mathias	Risse	"What	Equality	of	
Opportunity	Could	Not	Be"	(2002)	112(4)	Ethics	720.		
43 	Roemer	 differentiates	 between	 merit	 and	 dessert.	 An	 individual	 merits	
something	 because	 of	 the	 attributes	 they	 have	 (such	 as	 a	 high	 IQ,	 or	 sporting	
ability);	dessert,	however,	is	something	given	as	a	reward	for	the	effort	put	in.	In	




The	 advantage	 of	 this	 model	 of	 substantive	 equality	 is	 the	 intent	 of	 the	




that	 is,	 the	 ability	 to	 participate	 in	 society	 and	 employment	 on	 an	 equal	 basis	




Instead,	 the	 focus	 on	 equal	 treatment	 in	 the	 HRA	 suggests	 it	 is	 premised	 on	
formal	 equality.	 Thus,	 as	 this	 thesis	 will	 demonstrate,	 it	 is	 difficult	 for	 the	
legislation	to	be	interpreted	in	a	manner	that	would	achieve	greater	substantive	
equality	for	disabled	employees,	and	for	it	to	be	interpreted	in	accordance	with	
the	 principles	 of	 the	United	Nations	 Convention	 on	 the	Rights	 of	 Persons	with	
Disabilities	 (UNCRPD),	 which	 New	 Zealand	 ratified	 in	 2008.	 To	 achieve	 these	
aims	would	require	law	reform,	as	the	final	chapter	of	this	thesis	will	discuss.		
1.2.3 The	Competing	Interests	of	the	Employer	and	Employee	
	Another	difficulty	 in	determining	 the	proper	 shape	of	disability	discrimination	
law	 in	 the	 field	of	 employment	 is	 the	 conflicting	 interests	of	 the	 employer	 and	
employee.		
As	Anderson	states:46		
At	 the	 risk	of	oversimplification,	 it	 is	possible	 to	 say	 that	 the	aim	of	
employing	 labour	 is	 to	extract	 the	maximum	amount	of	work	at	 the	
least	 possible	 cost;	 the	 aim	 of	 working	 is	 to	 achieve	 the	 maximum	
return	for	the	provision	of	one’s	labour.		













does	 equality	of	 result	necessarily	bring	about	 structural	 change,	 and	 this	may	
perpetuate	discrimination	 (particularly	 if	positive	discrimination	or	affirmative	
action	 is	 used).	 Nor,	 she	 contends,	 does	 it	 resolve	 issues	 of	 ‘leveling	 down’	
(where	everyone	is	equalized	at	a	lower	level)	(at		722-724).			





a	 period	 of	 time,	 for	 a	 small	 employer,	 or	 those	working	 in	 highly	 specialised	
areas,	decreased	productivity	can	put	a	business	at	risk.	Therefore,	an	employer	
may	 have	 valid	 concerns	 about	 employing	 a	 symptomatic	 mentally	 disabled	
person.		
However,	 for	 the	mentally	 disabled	 employee,	 the	 benefits	 of	 employment	 are	
psychological,	 social	 and	 financial.	 Even	 for	 those	 without	 mental	 health	
problems,	 unemployment	 is	 associated	 with	 poor	 health	 and	 increased	
psychological	 stress.47	Income,	 time	 structure,	 social	 contact,	 being	 part	 of	 a	







or	 discrimination	 results	 in	 unwillingness	 to	 disclose	 the	 presence	 of	 mental	
disability	to	employers.51	The	fear	that	disclosure	of	their	disability	may	put	their	
job	 at	 risk	 places	 additional	 stress	 on	 the	 employee	 and	 may	 lead	 to	 further	
decline	 in	mental	 health.52	As	 a	 result,	 the	 employee	may	 become	 increasingly	











A	 Comprehensive	 Report	 on	 the	 Duty	 to	 Accommodate	 Mental	 Illness	 in	
Canadian	 Workplaces”	 (February	 1,	 2015).	 Available	 at	 SSRN:	
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2851152	at	4.		
51	Heather	Stuart	"Mental	Illness	and	Employment	Discrimination"	(2006)	19(5)	





costs	 ranging	 from	 £17bn	 –	 £26bn	 and	 turnover	 costs	 of	 £8bn	 (Elizabeth		
Hampson	 and	 others	 Mental	 Health	 and	 Employers:	 The	 Case	 for	 Investment.	
Supporting	Study	 for	 the	 Independent	Review	 (Deloitte,	 2017)	 at	 01).	 Data	 does	
not	 appear	 to	 be	 available	 for	 the	 situation	 in	 New	 Zealand,	 although	 the	
“Wellness	in	the	Workplace	Survey	2017”	found	that	more	than	40%	of	staff	turn	
up	 for	work	when	 physically	 or	mentally	 ill	 and	 approximately	 20%	 of	 illness	
related	 absences	 were	 due	 to	 stress,	 anxiety	 or	 depression	 (Business	 New	
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The	employer,	whose	 interest	 lies	 in	maintaining	 their	businesses	productivity,	









mental	 disability,	 then	 the	 question	 arises:	—	 would	 such	 a	 dismissal	 still	 be	
lawful,	if	the	poor	performance	was	due	to	mental	disability?	Could	the	disability	












The	 focus	of	 this	 thesis	 is,	 therefore,	on	 the	disabled	employee	who	develops	a	
mental	 disability	 (or	 has	 a	 recurrence	 of	 a	 pre-existing	 condition)	 during	
employment,	 but	 continues	 to	 attend	 work.	 The	 issue	 is	 one	 of	 presenteeism	
rather	than	absenteeism.55	In	particular,	the	thesis	addresses	the	situation	where	
																																																																																																																																																														
Zealand	 and	 Southern	 Cross	 Health	 Society	 Wellness	 in	 the	 Workplace	 2017	
(Business	New	Zealand,	2017)	).			
54	The	 Human	 Rights	 Act	 1993	 s21(2)(b)(ii)	 states	 disability	 is	 a	 prohibited	
ground	of	discrimination	if	it	‘is	suspected	or	assumed	or	believed	to	exist	or	to	
have	 existed	 by	 the	 person	 alleged	 to	 have	 discriminated’.	 This	 raises	 issues	
around	when	an	employer	might	‘assume’	or	‘suspect’	the	employee	has	a	mental	
disability.	 There	 are	 further	 issues	 around	when	 (and	 if)	 the	 employee	 should	
disclose	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 mental	 disability	 to	 their	 employer,	 or	 potential	
employer.	 As	 this	 is	 a	 vast	 topic,	 this	 thesis	 is	 limiting	 its	 scope	 to	 current	
employees,	 who	 develop	 or	 have	 a	 recurrence	 of	 a	mental	 disability,	 which	 is	
disclosed	to	their	employer.	
55	As	 the	 law	 surrounding	 dismissal	 for	 absenteeism	 seems	 less	 controversial,	
this	thesis	is	not	addressing	it	specifically.	However,	many	of	the	issues	that	are	
discussed	 regarding	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 discrimination	 in	 employment	
provisions	in	the	situation	of	employee	presenteeism,	would	apply	equally	to	an	
employee	 who	 is	 dismissed	 for	 absenteeism.	 In	 general,	 however,	 when	 an	
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the	mentally	 disabled	 employee’s	 performance	 drops	 to	 the	 extent	 that,	 under	
employment	law,	a	dismissal	might	be	substantively	 justified	on	the	grounds	of	
poor	 performance.	 What,	 then,	 if	 the	 poor	 performance	 is	 due	 to	 mental	
disability?56		
This	thesis	examines	the	question	largely	in	the	context	of	New	Zealand	law,	and	
ultimately	 argues	 that	 for	 disability,	 the	 HRA,	 with	 its	 multiple	 interpretive	
difficulties,	lacks	the	clarity	to	answer	this	question	with	any	certainty.		
Furthermore,	 the	 HRA,	 with	 its	 focus	 on	 equality	 of	 treatment,	 does	 not	
adequately	 protect	 those	 with	 a	 mental	 disability	 from	 dismissal	 when	 their	
performance	is	compromised.	In	particular,	the	lack	of	a	specific	requirement	for	
employers	 to	 accommodate	 disability	 leaves	 the	 employee	 vulnerable.	




inferred	 from	 the	 defences	 that	 the	 law	 grants	 the	 employer	 to	 a	 claim	 of	
discrimination,57	this	 thesis	 contends	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 specific	 duty	 to	 reasonably	
accommodate	 the	 employee	 means	 the	 law	 is	 uncertain.	 That	 is,	 even	 if	 an	
obligation	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	 a	 disabled	 employee	 may	 be	 inferred	
from	the	defences,	the	ambit	of	this	obligation	is	unclear.		
Thus,	this	thesis	argues,	the	current	law	needs	to	be	reformed	to	both	adequately	




work,	 the	 employer	 ‘may	 fairly	 call	 halt’	 (and	 justifiably	 dismiss)	 the	 disabled	
employee	(Hoskin	v	Coastal	Fish	Supplies	Limited	[1985]	ACJ	124	(AC)	at	4).			
56	In	 this	 thesis	 the	 term	 mental	 disability	 is	 used	 to	 cover	 all	 the	 forms	 of	
disability	 that	 fall	 within	 section	 21(1)(h)	 of	 the	 HRA,	 that	 relate	 to	 a	 mental	
rather	 than	 physical	 condition,	 that	 is:	 psychiatric	 illness;	 intellectual	 or	
psychological	disability	or	impairment;	and	loss	or	abnormality	of	psychological	
function.	 These	 would	 include	 significant	 depression,	 anxiety	 disorders,	 and	
diagnosed	 psychiatric	 illnesses	 (such	 as	 bipolar	 disorder,	 schizophrenia	 and	
dementia).	A	full	study	of	the	scope	of	the	term	disability	as	used	in	the	Human	
Rights	Act	would	require	another	thesis.	It	is,	for	example,	unclear	if	alcoholism	
and	 substance	 addiction	 would	 be	 included.	 The	 discussion	 in	 this	 thesis	




of	 goods	 and	 services	 to	 a	 disabled	 woman.	 Although	 the	 HRA	 contains	 no	
positive	 obligation	 to	 supply	 goods	 or	 services	 to	 the	 disabled,	 the	 Court	 of	
Appeal	held,	that,	as	there	is	a	defence	available	that	it	is	‘too	onerous’	to	provide	
certain	goods	or	services,	it	can	be	inferred	that	there	is	a	duty	to	provide	these	




Finally,	 this	 thesis	 suggests	 that	New	Zealand’s	 current	model	of	 law	does	not,	















The	employer	does	not	have	unbridled	power	 in	 the	 employment	 relationship,	
but	 is	 fettered	 by	 labour	 law	 designed	 to	 protect	 the	 employee.	 International	
covenants	 and	 domestic	 law	 recognise	 wrongful	 dismissal	 on	 a	 number	 of	
grounds	 —	 including	 being	 without	 just	 cause,	 unfair	 or	 discriminatory.	 The	
International	 Labour	 Organisation	 (ILO)	 ‘Termination	 of	 Employment	
Convention’	states:60	
The	 employment	 of	 a	 worker	 shall	 not	 be	 terminated	 unless	
there	is	a	valid	reason	for	such	termination	connected	with	the	
capacity	or	 conduct	of	 the	worker	or	based	on	 the	operational	
requirements	of	the	undertaking,	establishment	or	service.	
This	means	 that	dismissal	on	 the	grounds	of	 incapacity	 is	valid	 internationally.	
However,	 what	 is	 less	 clear	 is	 the	 level	 or	 degree	 of	 incapacity	 at	 which	 it	
becomes	valid	to	dismiss	the	employee.		
Generally,	in	New	Zealand,	an	employee	who	is	not	fit	and	able	to	work	may	be	
justifiably	dismissed.61	However,	 it	may	be	wrongful	 (unjustified)	 to	dismiss	an	
employee	(regardless	of	their	mental	health	status)	for	poor	performance,	if	they	
are	 still	 able	 to	 perform	 the	 essential	 functions	 of	 their	 position.	Nevertheless,	
when	 the	 level	of	poor	performance	reaches	 the	stage	where	dismissal	 is	what	
																																																								
58	Such	 as	 Employment	 Relations	 Act	 2000;	 Human	 Rights	 Act	 1993;	 Wages	
Protection	 Act	 1983;	 Holidays	 Act	 2003;	 Parental	 Leave	 and	 Employment	
Protection	 Act	 1987;	 Act	 Minimum	 Wage	 Act	 1983;	 Equal	 Pay	 Act	 1972;	
Kiwisaver	Act		2006;	State	Sector	Act	1988;	and	others.		
59	Employment	Relations	Act	200,	s189.	








fair	process	 is	 followed.	Following	an	unfair	process,	on	 the	other	hand,	would	
constitute	an	unjustified	dismissal	on	procedural	grounds.63		
Nevertheless,	 there	 is	 a	 second	 —	 and	 distinguishable	 —	 type	 of	 ‘wrongful	
dismissal’	 or	 unlawful	 treatment	 of	 an	 employee:	 this	 is	 dismissal	 or	 adverse	
treatment	 based	 on	 a	 prohibited	 ground	 of	 discrimination,	 such	 as	 disability.	
When	 a	 claim	 of	 discrimination	 is	 raised,	 the	 ‘test	 of	 justification’	 (discussed	
above)	does	not	apply.	The	upshot	is	that,	even	if	an	employer	has	dismissed	the	
employee	 for	 poor	 performance,	 where	 that	 poor	 performance	 is	 due	 to	 a	
disability,	the	mentally	disabled	employee	may	claim	their	dismissal	was	due	to	
their	 disability,	 and	 therefore	 unlawful	 discrimination.	 They	 may	 then	 raise	 a	









but,	 at	 common	 law,	 the	 substantive	 categories	 include	 misconduct,	 lack	 of	
capacity,	 poor	 performance	 and	 redundancy.66	In	 addition,	 the	 employer	 must	
follow	a	fair	process	during	the	dismissal.			
Once	 a	 claim	 of	 unjustified	 dismissal	 is	 raised	 as	 a	 PG,	 the	 onus	 is	 on	 the	
employer	to	show	their	actions	were	justified.	As	discussed,	this	is	judged	against	






62	The	 ‘test	 of	 justification’	 in	 s103A	 of	 the	 Employment	 Relations	 Act	 2000	
(ERA)	assesses	the	dismissal	against	this	standard.		
















• Whether	 the	 employer	 raised	 the	 concerns	 the	 employer	 had	 with	 the	
employee	before	dismissing	them.	
• Whether	 the	 employer	 gave	 the	 employee	 a	 reasonable	 opportunity	 to	
respond	to	these	concerns.	
• Whether	the	employer	genuinely	considered	the	employee’s	explanation	
(if	 any)	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 allegations	 against	 the	 employee	 before	
dismissing	them.		






consider	 the	 employee’s	 explanation	 for	 their	 performance 72 	means	 the	
employer	 must	 consider	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 employee’s	 mental	 disability.	
Furthermore,	 before	 instigating	 performance	 management	 processes	 for	 poor	
performance	 (whether	 or	 not	 due	 to	 disability),	 the	 employer	must	 raise	 their	
concerns	with	the	employee,	and	give	the	employee	an	opportunity	to	respond.73	
Nonetheless,	in	certain	professions	(including	the	police,	health	professions	and	
teaching	 (public	or	private)),	 statutory	standards	of	 competence	and	capability	
apply.74	In	 these	professions,	 if	poor	performance	reflects	a	 lack	of	competence	
or	capability,	then	a	(procedurally	fair)	dismissal	is	justified.		
Assuming	 the	 employer	 has	 followed	 a	 procedurally	 sound	 process	 (including	
giving	 the	 employee	 the	 opportunity	 to	 improve	 their	 performance),	 the	
justifiability	 of	 the	 dismissal	 will	 then	 turn	 on	 what	 a	 fair	 and	 reasonable	
employer	 could	 have	 done	 in	 the	 circumstances.75	Therefore,	 under	 this	 test,	











74 	These	 standards	 are	 contained	 respectively	 in	 the	 Health	 Practitioners	
Competence	Assurance	Act	2003,	Policing	Act	2008,	and	Education	Act	1989.	






conduct)	 are	 incorporated	 (by	 reference)	 into	 the	 ERA.77	In	 this	 way,	 the	 two	
pieces	of	 legislation	are	partly	dovetailed.	An	employee	who	believes	they	have	
been	 the	 victim	 of	 discriminatory	 treatment	 must	 then	 select	 the	 Act	 under	
which	 to	 raise	 their	 complaint	 of	 discrimination.	 The	 Acts	 have	 different	
processes.	 Complaints	 under	 the	 HRA	 are	 made	 to	 the	 Human	 Rights	








be	made	 are	 very	 similar	 under	 the	 two	 Acts,	 and	 have	 the	 same	 defences	 or	
exceptions	upon	which	an	employer	may	rely.	In	both	cases,	the	nub	of	the	claim	
is	 that	 the	 employee	 has	 suffered	 adverse	 treatment,	 based	 on	 the	 prohibited	
ground	 of	 discrimination,	 that	 other	 employees	 would	 not	 suffer,	 and	 the	
employer	has	no	lawful	justification	or	excuse.	
A	 full	 treatment	 of	 this	 subject	 would	 involve	 close	 examination	 of	 the	
discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions	 of	 both	 the	 ERA	 and	HRA.	 However,	
there	 is	 much	 overlap	 between	 the	 relevant	 provisions.	 Therefore,	 for	 the	
purposes	 of	 this	 thesis,	 to	 contain	 the	 analysis	 within	 reasonable	 bounds,	 the	
main	focus	will	be	on	the	provisions	of	the	HRA.		








Discrimination	 in	 employment	 (under	 the	 ERA)	 occurs	 when	 the	 employer,	
directly	 or	 indirectly	 by	 reason	 of	 disability,	 dismisses	 the	 employee	 in	
circumstances	in	which	other	employees	employed	by	that	employer	on	work	of	
that	description	would	not	be	dismissed.79	
Similarly,	 under	 the	 HRA,	 it	 is	 unlawful	 to	 terminate	 the	 employment	 of	 an	
employee	 who	 is	 qualified	 for	 work,	 by	 reason	 of	 a	 prohibited	 ground	 of	
discrimination	 (e.g.	 disability),	 in	 circumstances	 in	 which	 other	 employees	









The	 tests	 for	discrimination	are	 therefore	similar	—	but	not	 identical	—	under	
the	 two	Acts.	For	example,	 the	HRA	also	requires	 the	employee	to	be	 ‘qualified	
for	work’	whereas	 the	ERA	has	no	such	proviso;	and	 the	ERA	 includes	 indirect	
discrimination	 in	 its	 provisions,	whereas	 the	HRA	does	not.81	These,	 and	 other	
differences,	are	discussed	in	Chapter	2.		
Nevertheless,	the	employee	cannot	raise	a	personal	grievance	for	discrimination	
in	 employment	with	 the	Authority	and	 lay	 a	 complaint	with	 the	Human	Rights	
Commission	on	the	same	ground,	but	must	proceed	under	one	or	other	route.82	
Although	there	are	good	policy	reasons	for	this	requirement	for	the	employee	to	










To	 determine	whether	 the	 different	 treatment	 was	 due	 to	 their	 disability,	 the	
mentally	 disabled	 employee	 must	 be	 compared	 with	 other	 employees	 in	 the	
same	 circumstances.	 Thus,	 a	 comparator	 must	 be	 selected.	 This	 choice	 of	
comparator	 is	 a	 contentious	 area,	 and	 subject	 to	 much	 academic	 and	 judicial	
debate,	 but	when	different	 treatment	 ‘by	 reason	of’	 disability	 is	 demonstrated,	
discrimination	is	established.84		
However,	 this	 different	 treatment	 is	 still	 permissible	under	 the	HRA	 in	 limited	
circumstances	 (referred	 to	 in	 this	 thesis	 as	 the	 ‘permitted	 exceptions’).	 These	
permitted	exceptions	allow	different	 treatment	of	 the	disabled	employee	when	




81 However,	 the	 HRA	 does	 have	 a	 separate	 provision	 making	 indirect	
discrimination	unlawful	(HRA	s65).	
82	Employment	Relations	Act	2000,	s112;	Human	Rights	Act	1993,	s79A.		
83	New	 Zealand	 is	 not	 the	 only	 country	 where	 the	 employee	 has	 the	 right	 of	
election	 between	 anti-discrimination	 legislation	 or	 employment	 legislation.	 In	






and	 may	 be	 particularly	 useful	 when	 issues	 relating	 to	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	
Tribunals	arise.	








a	 further	 ‘qualification	 to	 exceptions’	 (referred	 to	 in	 this	 thesis	 as	 the	 ‘task	
reallocation	proviso’)	whereby,	 if	 some	of	 the	employee’s	duties	 fall	within	 the	
permitted	 exceptions,	 but	 another	 employee	 is	 able	 to	 perform	 those	 duties	
without	 undue	 disruption	 to	 the	 business,	 then	 the	 permitted	 exception	 no	
longer	 applies.	 Different	 treatment	 or	 dismissal	 in	 these	 circumstances	 would	
then	be	discriminatory.		
These	provisions	governing	 the	permitted	exceptions,	and	the	 task	reallocation	
proviso,	 will	 be	 collectively	 described	 in	 this	 thesis	 as	 the	 ‘potential	






In	 particular,	 this	 thesis	 aims	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 elements	 of	
discriminatory	 dismissal,	 established	 by	 the	 HRA,	 would	 be	 satisfied	 in	
circumstances	 where	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 is	 dismissed	 for	 poor	
performance,	which	is	a	result	of	their	disability.	To	address	this	matter,	several	
questions	 related	 to	 the	 definition	 of	 discrimination	 in	 s22	 HRA	 require	
consideration.	These	are:	
• When	is	an	employee	‘qualified	for	work’?	






• When,	 or	 to	 what	 degree,	 is	 there	 is	 requirement	 for	 the	 employer	 to	
accommodate	the	affected	employee	in	their	employment?		
Answering	 these	questions	will	 require	 careful	 analysis	 of	 the	 text	 of	 the	HRA,	
consideration	 of	 matters	 of	 policy,	 including	 the	 underlying	 purposes	 of	
employment	 and	 human	 rights	 legislation,	 and	 consideration	 of	 the	 balance	
between	the	competing	interests	of	the	employee	and	employer.		
Furthermore,	 as	 the	 long	 title	 of	 the	 HRA	 states	 the	 Act	 is	 ‘to	 provide	 better	
protection	 of	 human	 rights	 in	New	Zealand	 in	 general	 accordance	with	United	
																																																								
85	Employment	Relations	Act	2000,	 s106(1)(f)	effectively	 incorporates	 the	HRA	
exceptions	to	discrimination	into	the	ERA.	
86	As	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	 following	 chapters,	 this	 thesis	 contends	 that	 the	
HRA	 does	 not	 contain	 a	 positive	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation,	 and	




Nations	 Covenants	 or	 Conventions	 on	 Human	 Rights’,87	this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	
establish	 whether	 New	 Zealand	 is	 meeting	 its	 obligations	 in	 this	 area,	 and	 in	
particular,	those	under	the	UNCRPD	which	was	ratified	by	New	Zealand	in	2008.		
1.3.3 Applicability	of	the	New	Zealand	Bill	of	Rights	Act		
The	 New	 Zealand	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 Act	 1990	 (NZBORA)88	also	 grants	 the	 right	 to	





Accordingly,	 this	 thesis	 will	 not	 discuss	 any	 interpretive	 issues	 arising	 for	
discrimination	under	the	NZBORA.		
1.4 Resolving	the	Problems:	Interpret,	Reform	or	Remodel	the	Law?		
The	 central	 question	 of	 this	 thesis	 is:	 When	 an	 employee	 is	 dismissed	 on	
performance	grounds,	in	a	seemingly	justifiable	manner,	could	this	nevertheless	be	
unlawful	 discrimination	 if	 the	 poor	 performance	 is	 due	 to	 the	 employee’s	mental	
disability?		
Thus,	 the	main	task	of	 this	thesis	 is	 to	 identify	the	correct	 interpretation	of	 the	
discrimination	 provision	 of	 HRA,	 to	 determine	 if	 dismissal	 in	 circumstances	
where	 the	 employee	 has	 a	 mental	 disability	 could	 constitute	 discrimination	
under	that	Act.90	In	addition,	this	thesis	explores	the	issue	of	whether	the	current	
law	is	capable	of	being	interpreted	in	a	manner	that	achieves	the	proper	goal	of	
disability	discrimination	 law,	which	 is	 to	achieve	greater	substantive	equability	
for	disabled	persons.			
However,	 this	 thesis	will	demonstrate	 that	even	 the	 ‘best’	 interpretation	of	 the	




Nonetheless,	 even	 with	 these	 amendments,	 several	 issues	 remain.	 Therefore,		
this	 thesis	 will	 comment	 on	 whether	 the	 current	 model	 of	 law	 for	 disability	





88	NZBORA	 applies	 only	 to	 acts	 done	 by	 the	 legislative,	 executive,	 or	 judicial	










Chapter	 2	 therefore	 outlines	 in	more	 depth	 the	 discrimination	 in	 employment	
provisions	of	the	HRA,	and	identifies	the	interpretive	issues	that	arise.		
Chapter	 3	 examines	 various	 possible	 approaches	 to	 statutory	 interpretation,	
establishing	the	preferred	approach	for	interpreting	these	particular	provisions.	
This	 thesis	 finds	 this	 to	be	 the	spiral	approach	 to	 interpretation	as	outlined	by	
Justice	Glazebrook	of	the	New	Zealand	Supreme	Court.91			
Chapter	 4,	 5	 and	 6	 then	 apply	 the	 preferred	 interpretive	 approach	 to	 the	
discrimination	in	employment	provisions,	the	permitted	exceptions	and	the	task	
reallocation	 proviso.	 Nonetheless,	 as	 will	 become	 apparent,	 even	 using	 the	




accommodate	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee,	 the	 consequent	 failure	 of	 the	


















“Laws	 should	 be	 like	 clothes.	 They	 should	 be	 made	 to	 fit	 the	
people	they	are	meant	to	serve.”		
	 	 	 	 Clarence	Darrow	
2.1 Introduction	
The	 previous	 chapter	 outlined	 the	 difficulties	 that	 persons	 with	 mental	
disabilities	 face	 in	 the	 employment	 relationship.	 It	 identified	 three	 general	
problems	 for	disability	discrimination	 in	employment.	These	were	problems	of	
clarity	(and	therefore	certainty)	in	the	law,	the	difficulty	in	achieving	substantive	
equality,	 and	 the	problem	of	 the	 conflicting	 interests	 of	 the	disabled	 employee	
and	their	employer.	
This	chapter	examines	the	legislation,	particularly	the	provisions	of	the	HRA,	to	
determine	 if	 it	 is	 clear	when	 adverse	 treatment	 of	 a	mentally	 disabled	 person	
would	be	unlawful.	 If	 the	 legislation	 is	clear,	 it	should	determine	the	answer	to	
the	 central	 question	 this	 thesis	 asks:	 When	 an	 employee	 is	 dismissed	 on	
performance	grounds,	in	a	seemingly	justifiable	manner,	could	this	nevertheless	be	
unlawful	 discrimination	 if	 the	 poor	 performance	 is	 due	 to	 the	 employee’s	mental	
disability?	
The	 answer	 to	 this	 depends	 on	 interpretation	 of	 the	 discrimination	 in	
employment	provisions	of	the	HRA.	So	this	chapter	outlines	the	core	elements	of	
these	provisions,	and	summarises	the	interpretive	issues	that	arise,	particularly	
in	 relation	 to	 disability	 discrimination.	 These	 issues	 include	whether	 the	 HRA	
can	 be	 interpreted	 in	 accordance	 with	 New	 Zealand’s	 obligations	 under	 the	
UNCRPD,	and	can	be	interpreted	in	a	manner	that	promotes	substantive	equality	
for	disabled	employees.		




Section	 22	 of	 the	 HRA	 prohibits	 adverse	 treatment	 in	 employment	 on	 the	
prohibited	 ground	 of	 disability. 92 	Disability	 includes:	 psychiatric	 illness;	
psychological	 disability	 or	 impairment;	 and	 any	 loss	 or	 abnormality	 of	
psychological	 structure	 or	 function.	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis,	 the	 term	
‘mental	disability’	will	cover	these	conditions.			
As	 the	 interpretation	 of	 section	 22	 is	 central	 to	 this	 thesis,	 it	 is	 set	 out	 in	 full	
below.	It	reads:	
																																																								







or	 any	 person	 acting	 or	 purporting	 to	 act	 on	 behalf	 of	 an	
employer,—	
(a)	 to	 refuse	 or	 omit	 to	 employ	 the	 applicant	 on	work	 of	 that	
description	which	is	available;	or	
(b)	 to	 offer	 or	 afford	 the	 applicant	 or	 the	 employee	 less	
favourable	 terms	 of	 employment,	 conditions	 of	 work,	
superannuation	or	other	 fringe	benefits,	 and	opportunities	
for	 training,	 promotion,	 and	 transfer	 than	 are	 made	
available	 to	 applicants	 or	 employees	 of	 the	 same	 or	
substantially	 similar	 capabilities	 employed	 in	 the	 same	 or	
substantially	 similar	 circumstances	 on	 work	 of	 that	
description;	or	
(c)	to	terminate	the	employment	of	the	employee,	or	subject	the	
employee	 to	 any	detriment,	 in	 circumstances	 in	which	 the	
employment	of	other	employees	employed	on	work	of	that	






(2)	 It	 shall	 be	 unlawful	 for	 any	 person	 concerned	 with	 procuring	
employment	 for	other	persons	or	procuring	employees	 for	any	
employer	 to	 treat	 any	 person	 seeking	 employment	 differently	
from	 other	 persons	 in	 the	 same	 or	 substantially	 similar	
circumstances	 by	 reason	 of	 any	 of	 the	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	
discrimination.	







However,	 under	 section	 29,	 the	 treatment	 may	 be	 defended	 if	 one	 of	 the		
‘exceptions	relating	to	disability’93	applies	(which	this	thesis	calls	the	‘permitted	
exceptions’).	 These	permitted	 exceptions	 are	 then	 subject	 to	 a	 further	 ‘general	
qualification	 on	 exceptions’	 provision 94 	(which	 this	 thesis	 calls	 the	 ‘task	







within	 them	 and	 another	 employee	 could	 carry	 out	 those	 duties,	 without	
unreasonable	disruption	 to	 the	employer’s	activities.	The	 implication	 is	 that,	 in	
that	 situation,	 the	 employer	 should	 reallocate	 those	 duties	 to	 the	 other	
employee.			
However,	this	thesis	identifies	several	interpretive	issues	that	might	arise	when	
an	 employer	 treats	 a	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 adversely,	 who	 is	 poorly	
performing	due	to	their	disability.	They	arise	when	defining	the	core	elements	of	
discrimination,	 in	 ascertaining	 the	 ambit	 of	 the	 permitted	 exceptions,	 and	
regarding	the	application	of	the	task	reallocation	proviso.		
2.2.1 Issues	in	the	Core	Elements	of	Discrimination	in	Employment	
Whether	 a	 disabled	 employee’s	 dismissal	 is	 discriminatory	will	 depend	 on	 the	
interpretation	 of	 the	 core	 elements	 of	 discrimination,	 as	 set	 out	 in	 section	 22:	




Section	 22	 applies	 to	 an	 employee	 who	 is	 ‘is	 qualified	 for	 work	 of	 any	
description’.	 	 If	not	 ‘qualified	 for	work’	of	 that	description,	 the	employee	 is	not	
protected	by	the	anti-discrimination	provision.		
However,	 what	 counts	 as	 being	 ‘qualified’	 is	 not	 defined	 in	 the	 HRA,	 and	 this	
results	in	several	interpretive	dilemmas.	Some	matters	are	reasonably	clear.	The	




…an	 employee	 is	 “qualified	 for	 work	 of	 any	 description”	 if	 that	
employee	 is	 capable	 of,	 and	 in	 the	 case	 of	 jobs	 requiring	 formal	






95	Director	 of	 Human	 Rights	 Proceedings	 v	 Goodrum	 and	 City	 and	 Country	 Real	




96	Smith	 v	Air	New	Zealand	Ltd	 [2000]	 2	 ERNZ	 376	 (EC)	 at	 [97].	 Although	 this	
complaint	 was	 raised	 under	 the	 Employment	 Contracts	 Act	 1991,	 the	 Court	
considered	the	discrimination	claim	under	the	HRA’s	provisions.	The	Court	held	
that,	if	‘qualified	for	work	of	any	description’	included	age,	this	would	make	s30	













for	 the	 benefit	 of	 "qualified"	 employees	 or	 applicants,	 so	 the	
question	who	is	"qualified"	is	very	important.	
This	becomes	particularly	relevant	when	the	employee	is	poorly	performing,	or	
only	 part-performs	 the	 duties	 of	 the	 position.	 The	 question	 then	 is:	 does	 the	
interpretation	 of	 ‘qualified’	 merely	 mean	 the	 employee	 needs	 to	 have	 the	
appropriate	 credentials	 for	 the	 position	 —	 or	 does	 it	 require	 the	 continued	
ability	to	fully	perform	the	role?	
Furthermore,	 once	 the	 employee	 is	 poorly	 performing	 because	 of	 their	mental	
disability,	is	this	the	most	appropriate	time	to	assess	whether	they	are	‘qualified	
for	work’?	 Taking	 into	 account	 the	 protective	 purpose	 of	 human	 rights	 law,	 it	
may	be	more	 appropriate	 to	 assess	 if	 the	disabled	 employee	was	 ‘qualified	 for	
work’	when	commencing	 the	position	 (time	T1),	 rather	 than	at	 the	 time	of	 the	
alleged	discriminatory	treatment	(time	T2).		
Thus,	 the	 time	at	which	 ‘qualified’	 is	 assessed	becomes	 relevant.	 If	 assessed	 at	
time	 T1	 (when	 the	 employee	 commenced	 the	 position	 and	 was	 performing	
normally)	then	they	would	be	 ‘qualified	for	work’.	However,	 if	assessed	at	time	
T2	 (time	of	 the	 alleged	discrimination,	when	 they	 are	poorly	performing)	 they	
may	not	be.		
Of	 potential	 relevance	 is	 that	 the	 HRA‘s	 discrimination	 provisions	 appear	 to	
contemplate	an	employee	being	able	to	only	part-perform	a	position,	with	some	
duties	being	reallocated	to	another	employee.	This	might	suggest	that	the	matter	
of	 qualification	 should	 be	 assessed	 at	 time	 T2,	 and	 after	 any	 such	 task	
reallocation	has	been	undertaken.	This	obligation	to	reallocate99	applies	to	duties	
that	 fall	within	 the	permitted	 exceptions100	(so	 acts	 as	 a	 proviso	 to	 a	 defence).	
However,	it	is	not	clear	whether	or	not	this	reallocation	of	duties	extends	to	the	
essential	 duties	 of	 a	 position,	 which	 under	 employment	 law,	 the	 employee	 is	
																																																								
98	Paul	Rishworth	 "The	Human	Rights	Act	 1993	 and	Consistency	2000"	 (1999)	
(4)	NZ	L	Rev	457	at	464.		
99	Human	Rights	Act	1993,	s35.	This	reallocation	of	duties	applies	when	some	of	
the	 duties	 fall	within	 the	 permitted	 exceptions,	 providing	 the	 adjustment	 does	
not	cause	unreasonable	disruption	to	the	employer’s	activities.		






required	 to	 be	 able	 to	 perform. 101 	Nonetheless,	 as	 the	 HRA	 appears	 to	
contemplate	part-performance	by	the	employee,	 this	may	affect	the	meaning	of	
‘qualified’,	and	when	it	should	be	assessed.		
Accordingly,	 these	 considerations	 (whether	 ‘qualified’	 simply	 refers	 to	 having	
the	necessary	certification	or	training;	the	time	at	which	qualification	should	be	
assessed;	 and	 whether	 or	 not	 the	 employee	 must	 be	 able	 to	 perform	 all	 the	









Discrimination	 is	 a	 comparative	 exercise,102	and	while	 the	 HRA	 contains	 some	
absolute	prohibitions	on	conduct,	that	do	not	involve	a	comparative	element,103	
the	 remaining	 provisions	 require	 a	 comparator.	 That	 is,	 the	 alleged	
discriminatory	 treatment	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee	 must	 either	 be	 ‘less	
favourable’	compared	to	employees	of	similar	capabilities,	in	the	same	or	similar	
circumstances	(HRA	s22(1)(b));	or,	the	employee	must	be	subject	to		‘detriment’	
or	have	 their	 employment	 terminated	when	other	 employees,	 employed	 in	 the	
same	or	substantially	similar	circumstances	on	work	of	 that	description,	would	
not	be	treated	that	way	(HRA	s22(1)(c)).		
Thus,	 the	comparator	 in	both	provisions	 is	an	employee,	employed	on	 ‘work	of	











101	An	employee	may	be	 justifiably	dismissed	 if	 they	are	unable	 to	perform	the	





and	 only	 require	 that	 there	 is	 an	 omission	 to	 employ,	 or	 requirement	 for	 the	






comparator	would	be	a	normally	 functioning	employee.	Then,	 if	 that	 employee	
would	not	have	been	treated	adversely,	in	comparison	to	the	disabled	employee,	
the	latter’s	treatment	(i.e.,	their	dismissal)	would	be	‘less	favourable’.		
However,	 if	 capability	 is	 assessed	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 employee’s	 current	 poor	
performance,	then	the	appropriate	comparator	would	be	an	employee	of	equally	
poor	performance,	but	absent	the	disability	(e.g.	someone	who	is	inexperienced,	
new	 to	 the	 position,	 or	 lazy).	 Less	 favourable	 treatment	 would	 then	 only	 be	
established	if	that	comparator	employee	would	not	be	treated	adversely	in	those	
circumstances.	 	 If,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 comparator	 employee	would	 also	 be	
treated	adversely,	then	in	comparison	to	them,	the	disabled	employee	would	not	
be	treated	less	favourably	—	and	this	would	not	be	discrimination.		
Alternatively,	 a	 “mirror-image	 comparator”	 may	 be	 selected.	 A	 mirror-image	
comparator	exhibits	the	same	manifestations	or	salient	features	as	arise	from	the	
disability	 (that	 is,	 the	poor	performance)	 in	circumstances	 that	mirror	 those	of	
the	 disabled	 employee,	 but	 without	 the	 disability	 being	 the	 cause.	 In	 this	
situation,	 the	 comparator	 employee	 would	 be	 a	 previously	 capable	 employee,	
without	a	mental	disability,	whose	performance	has	also	declined	(perhaps	due	




capabilities,	but	 is,	 like	s22(1)(b),	with	an	employee	employed	 ‘on	work	of	that	
description’.		
A	 comparator	 for	 ‘work	 of	 that	 description’	 could	 encompass	 roles	 that	 are	
broadly	similar	 in	nature	 (e.g.	 café	workers),	or	 limited	 to	work	of	an	 identical	
nature	(e.g.	baristas).	Accordingly,	there	may	be	a	range	of	possible	comparator	
positions	that	might	be	selected.	If	there	are	different	performance	expectations	
between	 the	 possible	 comparator	 positions,	 this	 may	 affect	 whether	 the	
treatment	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee	 is	 adverse	 or	 not.	 That	 is,	 the	 level	 of	
performance	at	which	disciplinary	proceedings	 for	poor	performance	might	be	
instigated	 may	 vary	 between	 positions.	 Accordingly,	 the	 selection	 of	 the	
comparator	 position	 may	 determine	 if	 the	 disabled	 employee’s	 treatment	 is	
adverse	or	not.		





104	This	 provision	 refers	 to	 dismissal	 or	 detriment.	 Athough	 ‘detriment’	 is	 not	
defined	 in	 the	 HRA,	 section	 104(2)	 of	 the	 ERA	 defines	 detriment	 as	 including	






in	McAlister	 v	 Air	 New	 Zealand.105	The	 circumstances	 there	 were,	 that,	 due	 to	
American	flying	regulations,	McAlister,	after	reaching	the	age	of	60	was	unable	to	




age	 of	 60	 with	 no	 such	 restrictions?	 The	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 selected	 the	 former	
comparator	pilot.	As	the	comparator	pilot	would	be	unable	to	fly	in	US	airspace,	







To	 summarise,	 then:	 whether	 the	 comparator	 includes	 or	 excludes	 the	 salient	
features	 of	 the	 disability	 (e.g.	 poor	 performance)	 will	 determine	 whether	 the	
employer’s	conduct	is	adverse.			
For	 example,	 the	 comparator,	 for	 an	 employee	with	 a	mental	 disability	whose	
performance	declines	over	time,	could	be:		
i) a	non-disabled	employee	who	has	always	been	poorly	performing;	or	
ii) a	 non-disabled	 employee	 whose	 performance	 becomes	 poor	 over	
time;	or	
iii) an	 employee	 with	 a	 different	 type	 of	 disability	 (e.g.	 a	 physical	









i) a	 non-disabled	 productive	 employee	 (effectively	 the	 affected	
employee	before	they	became	unwell);	or	
ii) an	employee	with	 a	different	 type	of	disability	 (e.g.	 physical)	who	 is	
nevertheless	productive.	
Compared	 to	 these	 employees,	 the	 affected	 employee	 is	 treated	 adversely	 if	





‘general	 qualification	 to	 exceptions’)	 would	 be	 redundant.	 Whether	 the	 same	










Nonetheless,	 for	 adverse	 treatment	 to	 be	unlawful,	 it	must	 be	 ‘by	 reason	of’107	
the	prohibited	ground	of	discrimination	(e.g.	mental	disability).	Thus,	when	the	
cause	 of	 the	 poor	 performance	 is	 mental	 disability,	 the	 issue	 is	 whether	 any	




job,	 for	 some	 with	 a	 mental	 disability,	 their	 disability	 may	 be	 relevant	 if	 its	
manifestations	 cause	 poor	 performance.	 Under	 general	 employment	 law,	 an	




Although	 the	 HRA	 provides	 no	 guidance	 as	 to	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘by	 reason	 of’,	
Tipping	 J	 in	McAlister	 v	 Air	New	 Zealand109	determined	 that	 the	 phrase	 meant	
that	the	prohibited	ground	must	be	a	‘material’	factor	in	the	decision.		
For	 this	purpose,	 the	manifestations	or	 consequences	of	 the	disability	 (such	as	
poor	performance)	might	be	considered	part	(or	a	feature)	of	the	disability.	If	so,	
and	the	employee	 is	 treated	adversely	because	of	 their	poor	performance,	 then	
the	material	reason	for	the	treatment	would	be	the	disability.	That	is,	as	the	poor	
performance	 is	 part	 of	 the	 disability,	 then	 the	 adverse	 treatment	would	be	 ‘by	
reason	of’	disability	—	and	would	be	discrimination.		
However,	 if	the	manifestations	of	the	disability	are	considered	ancillary	to	(and	
not	 a	 feature	 of)	 the	 disability,	 then	 the	 real	 reason	 for	 the	 treatment	 of	 the	
employee	would	simply	be	their	poor	performance.	That	is,	the	mental	disability	
would	 be	 considered	 irrelevant	 to,	 or	 not	 a	 material	 reason	 for,	 the	 decision.	







108	This	will	be	justified	if	 it	 is	what	a	 ‘fair	and	reasonable	employer	could	have	
done	in	the	circumstances’	following	a	fair	procedure	(section	103A	ERA).		
109	McAlister	 v	 Air	 New	 Zealand	 Ltd,	 above	 n97	 at	 [49].	 Tipping	 J	 overruled	










treated.	 Further	 potential	 ‘good	 causes’	 are	 revealed	 in	 s29	 (the	 permitted	
exceptions).	 These	 ‘excuse’	 the	 adverse	 treatment,	 meaning	 it	 is	 not	 unlawful	
discrimination,	in	stipulated	circumstances.		
Nonetheless,	 as	 there	 is	 little	 case	 law	 on	 point	 in	 New	 Zealand,	 it	 remains	
unclear	when	the	adverse	treatment	 is	 to	be	viewed	as	 ‘by	reason	of’	disability	
and	not	poor	performance.	This	issue,	and	the	extent	to	which	the	manifestations	
of	 a	 mental	 disability	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	 assessing	 adverse	




Further	 interpretive	 difficulties	 are	 generated	 by	 the	 permitted	 exceptions.112	
These	 exceptions	 provide	 a	 defence	 to	 an	 employer	 for	 otherwise	 unlawful	
treatment,	in	certain	circumstances.		




(1)	 Nothing	 in	 section	 22	 shall	 prevent	 different	 treatment	
based	on	disability	where—	
(a)	 the	 position	 is	 such	 that	 the	 person	 could	 perform	 the	
duties	of	the	position	satisfactorily	only	with	the	aid	of	
special	 services	or	 facilities	 and	 it	 is	not	 reasonable	 to	
expect	 the	 employer	 to	 provide	 those	 services	 or	
facilities;	or	
(b)	the	environment	in	which	the	duties	of	the	position	are	
to	 be	 performed	 or	 the	 nature	 of	 those	 duties,	 or	 of	




(2)	 Nothing	 in	 subsection	 (1)(b)	 shall	 apply	 if	 the	 employer	










conditions	 of	work	 that	 are	 set	 or	 varied	 after	 taking	 into	
account—	
(a)	 any	 special	 limitations	 that	 the	 disability	 of	 a	 person	
imposes	on	his	or	her	capacity	to	carry	out	the	work;	and	





facilities	 that	 the	 employee	 requires,	 or	 there	 is	 an	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	 harm	
that	 cannot	 be	 reduced	 to	 normal	 without	 unreasonable	 disruption	 to	 the	
employer.		
These	 provisions	 form	 part	 of	 what	 are	 known	 as	 the	 ‘reasonable	
accommodation’	provisions.	However,	as	they	act	as	a	defence	against	a	claim	of	
discrimination	 rather	 than	 imposing	 a	 positive	 obligation	 to	 accommodate	 the	
employee,	this	thesis	contends	that	any	such	obligation	of	accommodation	is,	at	




facilitated	 by	 varied	 terms	 or	 conditions,	 from	 later	 raising	 a	 claim	 of	
discrimination.	 Alternatively,	 it	 could	 be	 to	 stop	 non-disabled	 employees	









or	 ‘facilities’	 could	 incorporate	 other	 requirements,	 such	 as	 extra	 supervision,	
counselling	 sessions,	 or	 variation	 to	work	 hours,	 is	 less	 clear.115	More	 esoteric	
























The	 ‘risk	 of	 harm’	 exception	 poses	 further	 interpretive	 issues.120	One	 issue	 is:	
does	 ‘risk	 of	 harm’	 include	psychological	 harm	 to	 the	 employee	—	or	 to	 other	
employees	as	a	result	of	increased	workplace	stress	(from	‘carrying’	the	affected	
employee)?		








working	 with	 someone	 with	 difficult	 personality	 traits,	 may	 lead	 to	 increased	
																																																								
116	Contrast	 this	 to	 the	 Disability	 Discrimination	 Act	 1992	 (Australia),	 which	
defines	 ‘reasonable’	 adjustment	 as	 an	 adjustment	 that	 would	 not	 impose	










120	Human	 Rights	 Act	 1993,	 s29(1)(b):	 Nothing	 in	 section	 22	 shall	 prevent	

















treatment	 is	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	 disability,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 these	 uncertain	
elements	determines	the	lawfulness	of	the	employer’s	conduct.		
Thus,	 to	 answer	 the	 central	 question	 this	 thesis	 asks	—	When	 an	 employee	 is	
dismissed	 on	 performance	 grounds,	 in	 a	 seemingly	 justifiable	manner,	 could	 this	
nevertheless	 be	 unlawful	 discrimination	 if	 the	 poor	 performance	 is	 due	 to	 the	
employee’s	mental	disability	—	will	depend	on	a	number	of	 factors.	Even	 if	 it	 is	
found	 that	 the	dismissal	of	a	disabled	employee,	on	performance	grounds,	was	
less	favourable	treatment	by	reason	of	their	disability,	and	hence	discrimination	




However,	even	 if	 this	defence	 is	made	out,	 it	 is	still	possible	that	 the	treatment	
will	 be	 unlawful.	 This	 is	 because	 these	 permitted	 exceptions	 are	 subject	 to	
section	35,	the		‘task	reallocation	proviso’.		
2.2.3 Issues	in	the	Task	Reallocation	Proviso		
The	 last	 provision	 that	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 this	 preliminary	 overview	 of	 the	





in	 this	Part,	 to	accord	 to	any	person	 in	 respect	of	 any	position	
different	 treatment	 based	 on	 a	 prohibited	 ground	 of	
discrimination	even	 though	some	of	 the	duties	of	 that	position	
would	 fall	 within	 any	 of	 those	 exceptions	 if,	 with	 some	
adjustment	 of	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 employer	 (not	 being	 an	
adjustment	 involving	 unreasonable	 disruption	 of	 the	 activities	
of	 the	 employer),	 some	 other	 employee	 could	 carry	 out	 those	
particular	duties.	
The	 general	 effect	 of	 this	 provision	 is	 that,	 if	 only	 some	 of	 the	 disabled	
employee’s	duties	fall	within	the	permitted	exceptions,	the	employer	cannot	rely	
																																																								
123	Prior	 to	 the	 HWSA,	 the	 Health	 and	 Safety	 in	 Employment	 Act	 1992,	 s2	
exhaustively	defined	‘harm’:	 ‘(a)	means	illness,	 injury,	or	both;	and	(b)	includes	
physical	or	mental	harm	caused	by	work-related	stress.’	With	 this	definition	of	










of	 the	 duties	 of	 the	 position’.	 Duties	 of	 a	 position	 may	 be	 considered	 either	
essential	 or	 peripheral	 to	 the	 role.	 At	 common	 law	 an	 employee	 who	 cannot	
perform	the	essential	duties	of	a	position	may	be	justifiably	dismissed.	However,	
it	 is	 unclear	 whether	 the	 ‘duties’	 referred	 to	 in	 section	 35	 include	 not	 just	
peripheral	 duties,	 but	 also	 ‘essential’	 duties	 of	 the	 position.	 As	 commentators	
point	 out,	 if	 essential	 duties	 are	 not	 included	 in	 the	 duties	 that	 could	 be	
reallocated	 in	 accordance	with	 section	35,	 the	 employer	may	declare	 any	duty	
that	 the	 disabled	 employee	 cannot	 perform	 as	 ‘essential’	 to	 the	 position.	 This	
would	 absolve	 them	 of	 the	 requirement	 to	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	
employee.124				
Furthermore,	 the	 HRA	 contemplates	 ‘some	 adjustment’	 of	 the	 employer’s	
activities	being	made	 to	 enable	 another	employee	 to	undertake	 the	duties	 that	
the	disabled	employee	 cannot	perform.	This	 requirement	 that	 ‘adjustments’	be	
made	may	suggest	that	the	‘duties’	that	would	be	reallocated	may	be	more	than	
peripheral	 ones.125	However,	 the	 question	 that	 remains,	 is:	 how	 much	 of	 an	
‘adjustment’	is	it	reasonable	to	expect	an	employer	to	make?			
A	 further	 interpretive	 issue	 is	 the	 proportion	 of	 the	 duties	 that	 is	 meant	 by	
‘some’.	 If	 an	 employee	 only	 has	 two	 main	 duties,	 and	 cannot	 perform	 one	 of	









Furthermore,	 the	 term	 ‘some	 of	 the	 duties’	 suggests	 discrete	 duties.	 However,	
the	Authority	has	interpreted	‘some	of	the	duties’	to	encompass	all	of	the	duties	
of	 a	 position,	 but	 for	 a	 specific	 period	 of	 time	—	 such	 as	 night	 shifts.126	This	
suggests	that	the	Court	or	Authority	may	interpret	this	section	liberally.		
																																																								
124 	Human	 Rights	 Law	 (Westlaw	 NZ	 (Thomson	 Reuters),	 Wellington,	 2008)	
Westlaw	commentary	at	HR29.04	(5).		
125 	Equally,	 commentators	 have	 suggested	 that	 this	 would	 apply	 only	 to	
peripheral	 duties	 of	 the	 position.	 See	 "HR35.01	 Adjustment	 of	 Employer’s	
Activities"	in		Brooker’s	Human	Rights	Law	(Westlaw	NZ	On-line,	2008).		
126	Atley	 v	 Southland	District	Health	 Board,	 above	 n84.	 Atley	 had	mild	 bi-polar	







The	 scope	 of	 ‘some	 adjustment’	 and	 ‘unreasonable	 disruption’	 is	 also	 unclear.	





Section	 28(3)	 requires	 an	 evaluative	 analysis	 of	 the	
reasonableness	 or	 proportionality	 of	 the	 employer’s	 response.	
As	recognised	in	Smith	v	Air	New	Zealand	Ltd	at	[161]	(although	








ground	 of	 discrimination	 as	well	 as	 the	 factual	 situation.	 Indeed,	 arguably,	 the	
prohibited	grounds	of	discrimination	in	the	HRA	vary	as	to	the	requirements	in	
their	accommodation	provisions.	For	example,	 section	28(3)	 (exception	 for	 the	





For	 disability	 at	 least,	 then,	 these	 interpretive	 difficulties	 may	 mean	 the	 task	
reallocation	 proviso	 (which	 provides	 the	 HRA’s	 only	 positive	 obligation	 to	
reasonably	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	 in	 employment)	 will	 not	 necessarily	
protect	the	disabled	employee.		
Thus,	 a	 further	 issue	 also	 arises:	 in	 enacting	 and	 applying	 these	 provisions,	 is	
New	Zealand	meeting	its	obligations	under	the	UNCRPD	to	ensure	the	reasonable	
accommodation	 of	 the	 employee	 in	 the	 workplace?	 This	 question	 will	 be	 the	
focus	of	chapter	7.		
	A	further	complication	is	that	complaints	of	discrimination	may	be	raised	under	
either	 the	 ERA	 or	 under	 the	HRA.	 The	 ERA’s	 provisions	 for	 discrimination	 are	




the	 prohibited	 ground	 of	 discrimination	 was	 religion,	 the	 same	 section	 35	








The	discrimination	provisions	of	 the	HRA	are	the	 focus	of	 this	 thesis.	However,	







(1)	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 section	 103(1)(c),	 an	 employee	 is	
discriminated	 against	 in	 that	 employee’s	
employment	 if	 the	 employee’s	 employer	 or	 a	
representative	 of	 that	 employer,	 by	 reason	 directly	 or	




same	 terms	of	 employment,	 conditions	 of	work,	 fringe	
benefits,	 or	 opportunities	 for	 training,	 promotion,	 and	
transfer	 as	 are	made	 available	 for	 other	 employees	 of	
the	 same	 or	 substantially	 similar	 qualifications,	
experience,	 or	 skills	 employed	 in	 the	 same	 or	
substantially	similar	circumstances;	or	
(b)	 dismisses	 that	 employee	 or	 subjects	 that	 employee	 to	
any	 detriment,	 in	 circumstances	 in	 which	 other	
employees	employed	by	that	employer	on	work	of	that	
description	 are	 not	 or	 would	 not	 be	 dismissed	 or	
subjected	to	such	detriment;	or	
(c)	 retires	 that	 employee,	 or	 requires	 or	 causes	 that	
employee	to	retire	or	resign.	
(2)	 For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 section,	 detriment	 includes	
anything	 that	 has	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 the	 employee’s	
employment,	job	performance,	or	job	satisfaction.	
















The	 HRA	 comparator	 is	 a	 person	 with	 the	 same	 or	 substantially	 similar	
capabilities,	 whereas	 the	 comparator	 in	 the	 ERA	 is	 someone	with	 the	 same	 or	
substantially	similar	qualifications,	skills	or	experience.131	However,	 the	HRA	has	
the	initial	proviso	that	the	employee	must	be	‘qualified	for	work’.	The	existence	
of	 this	 proviso	 may	 equate	 the	 provisions,	 making	 them	 both	 subject	 to	 a	
‘qualification’	 requirement.	 Nonetheless,	 this	 difference	 between	 the	 Acts	 was	
the	subject	of	much	 judicial	discussion	by	 the	Supreme	Court	 in	McAlister	v	Air	
New	Zealand.	The	problem	was	that,	for	age	discrimination,	there	is	a	defence	of	
age	 being	 a	 ‘genuine	 occupational	 qualification’	 (GOQ).	 However,	 this	 defence	
does	 not	 apply	 in	 the	 same	 manner	 to	 the	 equivalent	 provisions	 in	 the	 two	
Acts.132	The	 Court	 compared	 the	 provisions	 in	 the	 HRA	 and	 the	 ERA,	 and	
summed	up	the	differences	in	the	following	way:133	
Section	104(1)(a)	 [ERA]	 concerns	 the	obligation	 to	 employ	 for	




Authority	 or	 Court	 establishes	 the	 occurrence	 of	 prima	 facie	 discrimination,	
which	 is	 then	either	confirmed	or	repudiated.	 If	 repudiated,	 it	 is	not	viewed	as	
actual	discrimination.	The	approach	taken	by	the	HRRT	(under	the	HRA)	reflects	
the	wording	of	the	Act	which	states	that	it	‘shall	be	unlawful	for	the	employer’	to	
treat	 the	 employee	 differently	 on	 a	 prohibited	 ground	 of	 discrimination.	 Thus,	
the	HRRT	is	looking	at	the	lawfulness	of	the	discrimination	and	focussing	on	the	
available	justifications.	Section	104	of	the	ERA,	however,	states	that	an	employee	
‘is	 discriminated	 against’	 in	 their	 employment.	 Therefore,	 under	 the	 ERA,	 the	
Court	or	Authority	for	the	purposes	of	determining	a	PG,	looks	at	similar	issues	
in	the	context	of	deciding	 if	discrimination	has	occurred	at	all.	Therefore,	cases	
under	 the	 ERA	 establish	prima	 facie	 discrimination	 and	 then	 confirm	 or	 rebut	
that	 finding.	 Overall,	 this	 difference	 between	 the	 Acts	 has	 little	 practical	




131	Human	 Rights	 Act	 1993,	 s22(1)(b)	 and	 Employment	 Relations	 Act	 2000,	
s104(1)(a).		
132	McAlister	v	Air	New	Zealand	Ltd,	 above	 n97.	 The	 discussion	 centred	 around	
the	 interpretation	 of	 ss104(1)(a)	 and	 (b)	 and	 the	 equivalent	 provisions	 in	 the	






is	 a	qualified	employee	of	 similar	 capabilities	 (arguably,	 this	 is	merely	 another	
employee	who	 is	able,	or	capable,	of	performing	the	duties,	but	not	necessarily	
highly	 experienced	 or	 skilled	—	 which	 may	 affect	 performance	 expectations).	
For	example,	a	comparator	for	a	highly	experienced	radiologist	would	be	another	
radiologist.	However,	 this	 comparator	 radiologist	 only	 needs	 to	 have	 the	 same	
‘capabilities’,	or	ability	to	perform	the	duties	of	the	position,	but	not	necessarily	
with	the	same	level	of	skill	or	experience.	Therefore,	the	comparator	radiologist	
might	 be	 inexperienced,	 and	 thus	 less	 skilful	 —	 and	 their	 performance	
expectations	would	 reflect	 this.	 So,	 although	 capable,	 for	 example,	 of	 reporting	
the	 same	 images,	 or	 performing	 the	 same	 procedures,	 they	would	 do	 so	more	
slowly.	If	the	experienced	radiologist	is	now,	due	to	mental	disability,	working	at	
a	 similar	 lower	 level	 of	 performance,	 then	 subjecting	 them	 to	 a	 PIP	would	 be	
adverse	treatment	—	as	the	inexperienced	radiologist	would	not	be	subjected	to	
a	PIP	at	that	level	of	performance.		
However,	 the	 ERA	 comparator	 is	 a	 person	 with	 substantially	 the	 same	
qualifications,	 skill	 or	 experience	 —	 thus,	 mirroring	 the	 qualification,	 skill	 or	
experience	 of	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee.	 Therefore,	 for	 the	 highly	
experienced	 and	 skilful	 radiologist,	 the	 mirror-image	 comparator	 would	 be	
someone	 equally	 highly	 experienced	 and	 skilled.	 Consequently,	 there	might	 be	
higher	performance	expectations	 from	this	comparator,	and	they	might	also	be	
subjected	 to	 PIP	 if	 their	 performance	 were	 to	 diminish	 to	 the	 level	 of	 the	
mentally	disabled	 radiologist.	Thus,	with	 this	 comparator,	 the	 treatment	of	 the	
mentally	disabled	radiologist	would	not	necessarily	be	adverse.		
Nonetheless,	 given	 the	 (previously	 outlined)	 interpretive	difficulties	 associated	
with	 the	 terms	 ‘capabilities’	 and	 ‘qualified’	 in	 the	 HRA,	 it	 is	 uncertain	 what	
comparator	would	 be	 selected.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 unclear	whether	 this	 difference	
between	the	Acts	will	have	a	discernable	impact.		
The	‘Same’	and	‘Less	Favourable’	Terms	and	Conditions		




This	 is	 potentially	more	 than	 just	 a	 semantic	 difference,	 as	 a	 different	 term	or	
condition	 may	 not	 necessarily	 be	 unfavourable.	 Therefore,	 under	 the	 ERA,	
different	 treatment	of	 a	mentally	disabled	employee,	 in	 comparison	 to	another	
similarly	 situated	 employee,	 may	 prove	 discriminatory,	 but	 under	 the	 HRA	 it	
might	 not.	 For	 example,	 the	 employer	 might	 argue	 that	 moving	 a	 mentally	
disabled	employee	 into	a	 separate	office	 (away	 from	a	main	pool)	 is	not	a	 less	
favourable	 condition	 of	 work,	 and	 therefore,	 under	 the	 HRA	 is	 not	







Although	 these	 differences	 appear	 relatively	 inconsequential,	 potentially	 they	
may	 affect	 the	 outcome	 in	 a	 particular	 fact	 scenario,	 and	 might	 therefore	
influence	 which	 Act	 an	 employee	 chooses	 to	 pursue	 their	 complaint	 under.	
Nonetheless,	 to	 avoid	 over-complicating	 the	 analysis,	 and	 because	 the	
differences	 appear	 more	 semantic	 than	 substantive,	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	
thesis,	the	focus	will	be	on	the	provisions	of	the	HRA.		
2.4 The	 HRA	 and	 Indirect	 Discrimination:	 Overview	 and	
Interpretive	Issues	
Until	now,	this	thesis	has	not	considered	the	issue	of	indirect	discrimination.	The	
central	 question,	 as	 posed,	 contemplates	 the	 adverse	 treatment	 of	 the	 poorly	
performing	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 as	 one	 of	 direct	 discrimination.	
However,	in	the	interests	of	completeness,	a	brief	discussion	follows,	concerning	
whether	performance	 criteria	 indirectly	discriminate	 against	mentally	disabled	
employees.134		
Indirect	 discrimination	 arises	 where	 a	 facially	 neutral	 process	 has	 a	




procedures	 and	 other	 structurally	 unjust	 arrangements)	 that	 stop	 disabled	
persons	 from	 achieving	 full	 participation	 in	 society.136	As	 Mize	 argues,	 rather	
than	 uncovering	 hidden	 intentional	 discrimination,	 indirect	 discrimination	 is	
aimed	 at	 removing	 unnecessary	 barriers	 to	 employment	 to	 achieve	 greater	
																																																								
134	Indirect	discrimination	is	a	vast	topic	 in	 its	own	right,	and	generally	beyond	
the	 scope	 of	 this	 thesis.	 Therefore,	 this	 discussion	 will	 merely	 identify	 some	
issues	 that	 may	 be	 relevant	 without	 fully	 exploring	 them	 in	 any	 depth.	 These	
issues	may	benefit	from	further	research	or	consideration	in	the	future.		
135	There	 are	 two	 possible	 approaches	 to	 assessing	 the	 negative	 impact	 of	 a	
practice	 or	 requirement	 on	 a	 protected	 group	 (such	 as	 the	 requirement	 for	
reasonable	 performance	 by	 employees).	 The	 first	 approach	 is	 that	 all	 the	
members	of	the	group	(i.e.	all	mentally	disabled	employees)	must	be	affected	by	
the	requirement.	This	would	be	an	extremely	rare	situation,	making	a	finding	of	
indirect	discrimination	virtually	 impossible.	 	The	second	approach	 is	 that	 there	
must	be	 a	disproportionate	negative	 effect	 on	 the	mentally	disabled	—	 that	 is,	
not	 all	 mentally	 disabled	 employees	 must	 be	 disadvantaged,	 but	 a	 greater	




Policy	 Support	 through	 Awareness	 of	 Structural	 Discrimination"	 (2017)	 73(2)	
Journal	 of	 Social	 Issues	 413.	 Additionally,	 Khaitan	 suggests	 that	 substantive	
equality	results	because	the	focus	of	indirect	discrimination	is	on	the	impact	on	





participation	 and	 equality.137	Thus	 the	 prohibition	 of	 indirect	 discrimination	
accords	 with	 the	 principle	 of	 substantive	 equality	 and	 the	 philosophy	 of	 the	
UNCRPD.		This	concept	is	closely	linked	with	the	concept	of	a	social	construct	of	
disability,	 and,	 as	 Dirth	 argues,	 adopting	 a	 social	 construct	 of	 disability	 raises	
awareness	 of	 the	 disabling	 effects	 of	 structural	 barriers	 for	 those	 with	
disabilities.	This,	he	contends,	will	help	eliminate	indirect	discrimination	because	





Where	 any	 conduct,	 practice,	 requirement,	 or	 condition	 that	 is	
not	apparently	in	contravention	of	any	provision	of	this	Part	has	
the	effect	of	treating	a	person	or	group	of	persons	differently	on	
1	 of	 the	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	 discrimination	 in	 a	 situation	
where	such	treatment	would	be	unlawful	under	any	provision	of	
this	 Part	 other	 than	 this	 section,	 that	 conduct,	 practice,	
condition,	 or	 requirement	 shall	 be	 unlawful	 under	 that	






These	 elements	 are:	 firstly,	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 particular	 conduct,	 practice,	
requirement,	 or	 condition;	 secondly,	 that	 the	 conduct	 etc.	 is	 not	 apparently	
discriminatory;	 thirdly,	 that	 this	conduct	has	 the	effect	of	 treating	 the	claimant	
(or	 group)	 differently	 (and	no	 permitted	 exceptions	 apply140);	 and	 finally,	 that	
the	 different	 treatment	 is	 based	 on	 one	 of	 the	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	
discrimination.141		
																																																								
137	Mize,	 above	 n134	 at	 36.	 Thus	 the	 prohibition	 of	 indirect	 discrimination	
accords	 with	 the	 philosophy	 of	 the	 UNCRPD,	 and	 its	 creed	 of	 substantive	
equality.			
138	Dirth	 and	 Branscombe,	 above	 n136.	 This	 article	 examines	 the	 impact	 of	
changing	from	a	medical	model	of	disability	to	a	social	one,	arguing	the	change	in	










The	 provision,	 within	 the	 same	 sentence,	 also	 contains	 a	 defence	 against	 a	
complaint	of	indirect	discrimination.	This	is	made	out	if	the	person	can	establish	
a	‘good	reason’	for	the	conduct	or	practice	complained	of.142		
No	 complaints	 of	 indirect	 discrimination	 for	 disability	 appear	 to	 have	 come	
before	 the	 HRRT.143	Therefore,	 any	 particular	 interpretive	 issues	 for	 disability	




a	 seemingly	 neutral	 requirement,	 for	 disability	 this	 could	 arise	 in	 a	 number	 of	
situations.	 For	 example,	 a	 compulsory	 early	 start	 could	 indirectly	 discriminate	
against	mentally	disabled	 employees,	who,	 due	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 both	 the	 illness	
and	side	effects	of	some	psychotropic	medicines,	struggle	with	early	starts,	and	
are	 more	 likely	 to	 be	 late	 for	 work,	 and	 therefore	 subject	 to	 disciplinary	
proceedings.	 However,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 raising	 a	 complaint	 for	 indirect	
discrimination	 on	 these	 grounds	would	 gain	much	 traction.	 It	 is	 likely	 that,	 as	
Mize	 argues,	 to	 forestall	 ‘incessant	 challenges’	 for	 trivial	 matters,	 the	 indirect	
discrimination	provisions	would	not	be	interpreted	too	liberally.146	Furthermore,	
as	the	defence	of	a	‘good	reason’	is	likely	to	be	construed	broadly	(for	example,	to	
include	 commercial	 expediency),	 a	 claim	 that	 regular	 work	 hours	 are	
discriminatory	is	unlikely	to	be	successful.147		
In	 employment,	 the	 ‘good	 reason’	 defence	 provides	 the	 balance	 between	 the	
human	 rights	 of	 the	 protected	 group	 and	 the	 managerial	 prerogative	 of	 the	
employer.	Thus,	sufficient	weight	must	be	given	to	an	employer’s	reason	for	the	
																																																								
142	The	disproportionate	 impact	 establishes	prima	facie	 indirect	discrimination.	
Establishing	the	‘good	reason	for	it’	act	as	an	‘end-stage	proportionality	analysis’,	




the	 basis	 of	 nationality	 (Northern	 Regional	 Health	 Authority	 v	 Human	 Rights	
Commission	[1998]	2	NZLR	218	(HC)).		









than	 discrimination.	 The	 chosen	 means	 must	 meet	 a	 genuine	 need	 of	 the	
enterprise,	 they	 must	 be	 suitable	 for	 attaining	 that	 objective	 (that	 is,	
proportional),	and	they	must	be	"necessary"	for	achieving	that	purpose.’	
147	However,	under	s69AA	ERA,	the	employee	has	the	right	to	request	a	variation	




policy	 or	 requirement.	 In	 one	 case,	 the	 High	 Court	 overturned	 a	 finding	 of	
indirect	discrimination	by	the	HRRT,	as	insufficient	weight	had	been	given	to	the	
employer’s	 ‘good	 reason’	 for	 their	 requirement	 that	 the	 employee	 work	 full-
time. 148 	In	 that	 case,	 the	 HRRT	 found	 that	 the	 requirement	 was	 indirect	
discrimination	 on	 the	 prohibited	 ground	 of	 family	 status,	 as	 employees	 with	
children	 were	 less	 likely	 to	 be	 able	 to	 work	 full-time,	 and	 would	 be	 unfairly	
disadvantaged	by	the	requirement.149	However,	 the	High	Court	overturned	this,	
holding	 there	 was	 a	 clear	 business	 need	 for	 the	 company	 to	 have	 a	 full-time	
employee.150	
Another	 controversial	 issue	 is	 whether	 random	 drug	 testing	 in	 the	 workplace	
generates	 indirect	 disability	 discrimination.	 Drug	 and	 alcohol	 dependency	
constitute	a	disability.	In	addition,	there	is	the	possibility	that	therapeutic	drugs	






interpretive	 issues	 for	disability	discrimination	 in	employment,	 leaving	 the	 law	
unclear	 and	 contentious.	 The	 effect	 of	 these	 interpretive	 difficulties	 (for	 both	
direct	and	indirect	discrimination)	is	illustrated	below.		
2.5 Illustrating	the	Issues:	A	Scenario	
A	 number	 of	 the	 interpretive	 issues	 arising	 under	 the	 HRA	 can	 be	 usefully	
illustrated	using	the	scenario	raised	at	the	start	of	this	thesis.	Using	this	scenario,	
the	 interpretive	 issues	 discussed	 above	 will	 be	 explored	 in	 the	 following	
chapters,	 to	ascertain	how	to	best	 interpret	the	HRA	in	relation	to	disability,	 in	
order	 to	 answer	 the	 central	 question	 this	 thesis	 asks:	 When	 an	 employee	 is	
dismissed	on	performance	grounds,	in	a	seemingly	justifiable	manner,	could	this	
nevertheless	 be	 unlawful	 discrimination	 if	 the	 poor	 performance	 is	 due	 to	 the	
																																																								
148	Claymore	Management	Ltd	v	Anderson	above	n141.		
149	Anderson	v	Claymore	Management	Ltd	 6	 NZELC	 96,	 624	 (CRT)	 at	 [21].	 This	










positive	 test	 would	 be	 disabled	 (the	 rest	 would	 only	 be	 suffering	 from	 a	
temporary	 condition	 due	 to	 the	 after	 affects	 of	 taking	 drugs),	 the	 drug	 testing	





employee’s	 mental	 disability?	 This	 thesis	 will	 then	 assess	 if	 various	
interpretations	provide	adequate	protection	for	the	mentally	disabled	employee,	
who	 is	 poorly	 performing	 due	 to	 their	 disability,	 in	 accordance	 with	 New	
Zealand’s	obligations	under	the	UNCRPD.		
The	Scenario	
New	Zealand	Universities	 rely	on	performance	based	 research	 funding	 (PBRF),	
which	 is	 evaluated,	 among	other	 things,	on	 the	quality	and	volume	of	 research	




publishing	 frequently	 in	 well-known	 and	 respected	 peer-reviewed	 journals.	
Eventually	 she	 is	 promoted	 to	 Professor	 and	 continues	 in	 her	 role	 as	 a	 highly	




motivation,	 decreased	 productivity,	 memory	 problems,	 low	 mood,	 and	
irritability	(with	decreased	tolerance	of	students).		










accepts	 she	 is	 still	 able	 to	 work	 as	 a	 lecturer,	 they	 believe	 that,	 as	 her	 job	
description	 includes	 the	 requirement	 for	publishing	 and	active	participation	 in	














credentials	 for	 a	 Professorship,	 and	 is	 qualified	 for	 work.	 If	 the	 latter,	 then	
Professor	Smith,	while	only	part	performing,	may	no	longer	be	‘qualified’.		
Additionally,	 the	 time	at	which	 ‘qualified’	 is	 assessed	 is	 relevant.	 If	 assessed	at	






comparator,	 which	 depends	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 capabilities	 of	 the	
employee	and	the	‘circumstances’	in	which	other	employees	who	are	engaged	‘on	
work	of	that	description’	would	not	be	dismissed.		
If	 the	 appropriate	 comparator	 is	 a	 Professor	 of	 Professor	 Smith’s	 former	
capability,	 then	Professor	Smith	was	treated	less	favourably	by	being	subjected	
to	a	PIP,	when	the	non-disabled	Professor	would	not	be.				
However,	 if	 capability	 is	 taken	 at	 Professor	 Smith’s	 current	 poor	 level	 of	
performance,	 then	 the	 appropriate	 comparator	 is	 a	 Professor	 of	 equally	 poor	
performance,	 but	 absent	 the	 disability	 (e.g.	 someone	 whose	 performance	 has	
never	 been	 outstanding,	 perhaps	 due	 to	 laziness,	 or	 a	 general	 lack	 of	




Similarly,	 a	 mirror	 image	 comparator	 could	 be	 selected,	 and	 this	 comparator	
would	exhibit	the	manifestations	or	salient	features	of	the	disability	(that	is,	the	
poor	 performance)	 in	 the	 same	 manner	 as	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee’s	
disability	manifested	itself.	That	is,	for	example,	the	comparator	employee	would	
mirror	 the	 disabled	 employee’s	 diminishing	 performance	 (rather	 than	 the	
comparator	 being	 an	 employee	who	has	never	 performed	well).	 Therefore,	 for	
Professor	 Smith,	 the	 mirror-image	 comparator	 would	 be	 a	 previously	 highly	
capable	Professor,	without	a	mental	disability,	whose	performance	has	declined	
over	 time	(perhaps	because	 they	have	 lost	 interest	 in	 their	 job,	or	are	coasting	
toward	retirement).	If	this	comparator	would	be	subject	to	a	PIP,	then	Professor	
Smith’s	 treatment	 would	 not	 be	 less	 favourable	 compared	 to	 them,	 so	 again	
would	not	be	discrimination.	
‘By	Reason	of’	Disability	
If	 the	manifestation	 or	 feature	 of	 the	 disability	 (such	 as	 poor	 performance)	 is	
considered	 part	 of	 the	 disability,	 then	 adverse	 treatment	 because	 of	 this	
manifestation	 or	 feature,	 is	 adverse	 treatment	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	 disability.	 As	
Professor	 Smith’s	 depression	 has	 caused	 her	 poor	 performance,	 then	 poor	
performance	is	a	manifestation	or	feature	of	her	disability.	Therefore,	arguably,	a	









Could	 the	 University’s	 treatment	 be	 lawfully	 excused	 by	 the	 permitted	
exceptions?	 For	 example,	 would	 providing	 Professor	 Smith	 with	 a	 research	
assistant	be	interpreted	as	a	‘service	or	facility’	that	the	university	might	provide		
—	and	could	the	University	defend	their	treatment	on	the	ground	that	this	would	
be	 ‘unreasonable’?	 Could	 the	 interpretation	 of	 ‘special	 services	 or	 facilities’	
include	 such	 things	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 additional	 paid	 sick	 leave,	 or	 the	
(temporary)	acceptance	of	her	poor	performance?		
How	 does	 the	 ‘risk	 of	 harm’	 exception	 apply	 to	 this	 scenario?153	Does	 ‘risk	 of	















Problematically,	 for	 Professor	 Smith,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 requirement	 to	
publish	 research,	 even	 if	 the	 exception	 applied	 (that	 is,	 if	 a	 temporary	 release	
from	 the	 requirement	 to	 publish	 was	 found	 to	 be	 a	 ‘facility’	 that	 could	 be	
provided	under	section	29),	a	further	issue	arises.	As	no	one	can	publish	in	her	





will	 be	 drawn	 on	 in	 the	 following	 chapters	 to	 illustrate	 the	 effect	 of	 different	
interpretations	of	the	relevant	provisions.		
																																																								
153	Human	 Rights	 Act	 1993,	 s29(1)(b):	 Nothing	 in	 section	 22	 shall	 prevent	








Could	 the	 practice	 of	 instituting	 a	 PIP	 for	 poor	 performance	 be	 indirectly	
discriminatory?	Undoubtedly,	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 employee	meet	 certain	
performance	 criteria	 could	 be	 considered	 a	 ‘conduct,	 practice,	 requirement,	 or	
condition’.	 Secondly,	 it	 does	 appear	 to	 be	 facially	 neutral,	 as	 all	 employees	 are	
expected	to	work	to	the	same	(reasonable)	level	of	performance.	 	However,	the	








establish	 the	 true	 number	 of	 employees	 in	 the	 workforce	 who	 suffer	 from	 a	
mental	 disability,157 	and	 how	 many	 of	 those	 employees	 are	 then	 adversely	
affected	by	a	performance	requirement.	Secondly,	 there	are	numerous	 types	of	
mental	disability.	The	nature	and	severity	of	these	vary,	and	so	does	the	extent	to	
which	 they	 impact	 on	 the	 employee’s	 ability	 to	 work.	 Furthermore,	 every	
individual’s	 experience	 of	 mental	 illness	 varies,	 so	 it	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	
establish	that	even	those	with	the	same	mental	illness	will	experience	the	same	
consequences,	 such	 as	 poor	 performance	 (for	 example,	 someone	 with	 bipolar	
disorder	 may	 exhibit	 mild	 depressive	 symptoms	 that	 do	 not	 impact	 on	 their	
																																																								
154	The	 differences	would	 need	 to	 be	 real	 and	 significant	 and	not	 co-incidental	
(Mize,	above	n134	at	44).		
155	The	comparator	exercise	 is	not	as	straightforward	as	 this	scenario	suggests.	
Although	 the	 comparator	 group	 would	 be	 employees	 without	 disabilities,	 the	
pool	where	the	group	is	taken	from	is	less	clear.	That	is,	should	the	comparator	
group	 be	 the	 employees	 in	 the	 employer’s	 workforce,	 or	 in	 the	 workforce	 in	
general	(that	is,	all	those	currently	employed	in	New	Zealand)?	Khaitan	suggests	
the	Court	must	select	the	relevant	group	by relying on the Court’s	ability	to	deem	
which	 facts	 would	 be	 legally	 acceptable,	 considering	 what	 data	 is	 readily	
available,	the	relative	position	of	the	party	which	bears	the	evidentiary	burden,	
and	 the	 broader	 objectives	 that	 discrimination	 law	 seek	 to	 achieve	 (Khaitan,	
above	n136	at	34.)	
156	The	 2013	 Disability	 Survey	 (Statistics	 New	 Zealand	 Key	 Findings	 from	 the	
2013	New	Zealand	Disability	Survey	(Statistics	New	Zealand,	2014)		showed	those	
with	psychosocial	impairments	have	a	higher	workforce	participation	than	other	




157	Those	 in	 employment	may	 prefer	 not	 to	 disclose	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 mental	
health	 problem	 due	 to	 fear	 of	 stigma	 or	 discrimination,	 including	 a	 fear	 of	 an	
increased	 likelihood	 of	 termination,	 reduced	 chance	 of	 promotion,	 or	 that	





work).	 Thirdly,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	what	 proportion	 of	 disabled	 employees	must	 be	
negatively	 impacted	before	 it	 is	 considered	a	disproportionate	negative	 impact	
(i.e.,	if	55%	of	those	facing	PIPs	for	poor	performance	are	mentally	disabled	and	
only	45%	non-disabled,	 is	 this	disproportionate	enough?).158	The	answer	 is	not	
clear	from	the	legislation	or	case	law	in	New	Zealand.		
Finally,	 the	 last	 requirement	 for	 a	 claim	 of	 indirect	 discrimination	 is	 that	 the	
different	treatment	be	based	on	one	of	the	prohibited	grounds	of	discrimination.	





High	 Court	 held	 in	 in	 Claymore	 Management	 Ltd	 v	 Anderson	 that	 the	 correct	
approach	for	assessing	a	good	reason	is:159	
…weighing	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 an	 employer's	 economic,	
administrative,	 and	 operational	 imperatives	 and	 assessing	 the	
extent	to	which	they	are	genuine	against,	on	the	other	hand,	an	
alleged	ground	of	discrimination.	
Thus,	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 good	 business	 reason	 for	 the	 conduct	 may	 provide	 a	
defence.	In	a	situation	of	poor	performance,	it	is	likely	that	this	defence	would	be	
successful,	 as	 poor	 performance	 will	 affect	 the	 employer’s	 profitability	 and	
operational	matters.	Restricting	the	employer’s	right	to	set	performance	criteria	
might	 impact	 unduly	 on	 their	 business	 efficacy.160	Nonetheless,	 in	 Northern	
Regional	 Health	 Authority	 the	 High	 Court	 held	 that	 a	 ‘good	 reason’	 for	 the	
practice	would	be	insufficient	if	there	was	a	non-discriminatory	mechanism	that	








159	Claymore	 Management	 Ltd	 v	 Anderson	 above	 n141	 at	 125.	 Nonetheless,	 in	
Northern	Regional	Health	Authority	v	Human	Rights	Commission,	 above	n143	 at	
217	the	High	Court	held,	that	a	economic	factors	alone	are	not	enough,	a	policy	
‘…	 must	 none	 the	 less	 be	 based	 on	 objectively	 justified	 factors	 which	 are	
unrelated	 to	 any	 prohibited	 form	 of	 discrimination…otherwise	 any	 prohibited	
form	of	discrimination	could	be	justified	by	claims	of	economic	necessity.’		
160	As	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	chapters,	one	of	the	purposes	of	the	HRA	








Thus,	 although	 it	 appears	 possible	 that	 the	 requirement	 to	meet	 performance	
standards	may	form	the	basis	of	a	claim	of	indirect	discrimination	by	those	with	
mental	disabilities,	it	is	unlikely	such	a	claim	would	succeed.	Therefore,	the	best	
approach	 for	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 is	 to	 pursue	 a	 claim	 of	 direct	











example,	 section	22(1)	 is	a	somewhat	convoluted	192	word	sentence),	and	 the	
lack	of	definitions	of	key	terms	or	phrases.	Furthermore,	the	scheme	of	the	HRA	
reveals	a	complex	interweaving	of	the	provisions,	so	the	interpretation	of	a	later	
provision	may	 influence	the	meaning	of	an	earlier	one.	The	 implications	of	 this	
will	be	discussed	in	the	following	chapters.		
Additionally,	 the	 HRA	 has	 dual	 purposes	 —	 to	 protect	 the	 managerial	




A	 further	 source	 of	 uncertainty	 regarding	 the	 correct	 interpretation	 of	 the	
various	provisions	 is	 the	dearth	of	 case	 law	 in	New	Zealand	 relating	 to	mental	
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may	be	unable	 to	work	certain	days,164	or	a	pilot	may	 turn	60	and	 then	not	be	
able	to	be	pilot-in-command	in	some	situations.165		However,	 they	are	not	truly	
analogous	to	disability,	as,	in	general,	such	characteristics	do	not	affect	the	actual	
performance	 of	 the	 duties,	 just	 when	 or	 where	 they	 can	 be	 performed.		
Therefore,	 how	 the	 Court	 has	 interpreted	 the	 discrimination	 in	 employment	
provisions	 for	 these	 other	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	 discrimination	 may	 not	 be	
relevant	to	disability.		
Furthermore,	the	exceptions	(or	defences)	available	under	the	HRA	for	age	and	
religious	 discrimination	 differ	 to	 those	 of	 disability,	 and	 this	 may	 influence	
interpretation	of	 the	provisions.	For	example,	 the	HRA	 imposes	a	positive	duty	
on	the	employer	to	accommodate	religious	practice	(to	the	point	of	unreasonable	
disruption). 166 	This	 may	 influence	 how	 ‘some	 of	 the	 duties’	 in	 the	 task	
reallocation	 proviso	 is	 interpreted,	 so	 that	 it	might	mean	 all	 of	 the	 duties	 of	 a	
given	day.	This	exception	may	also	affect	how	the	term	‘qualified’	is	interpreted	
—	 so	 the	 employer	 cannot	 claim	 that	 being	 ‘qualified’	 for	 work’	 of	 that	
‘description’	 means	 the	 employee	 must	 be	 able	 to	 work	 certain	 days	 (e.g.	
Saturdays).	Similarly,	age	discrimination	has	a	defence,	where	being	a	certain	age	




Accordingly,	 matters	 of	 interpretation	 are	 complicated	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
Court’s	interpretation	concerning	the	other	prohibited	grounds	of	discrimination	
may	 not	 be	 applicable	 to	 disability	 discrimination.	 Therefore,	 if	 the	 text	 is	
unclear	 for	 disability	 discrimination,	 other	 approaches	 to	 statutory	
interpretation	will	need	to	be	utilised.				
	





For	 those	 with	 disabilities,	 the	 goal	 of	 anti-discrimination	 law	 is	 substantive	
equality,	 or	 equality	 of	 outcome,	 with	 the	 non-disabled	 population.	 For	 the	





certain	 countries,	 such	 as	 the	 USA.	 See	McAlister	v	Air	New	Zealand	Ltd,	 above	
n97.		
166	Human	Rights	Act	1993,	s28(3).	




with	 non-disabled	 employees,	 but	 tolerance,	 or	 individualised	 reasonable	
accommodation	of	their	disability.	As	McHugh	and	Kirby	JJ	stated:168	
The	 elimination	 of	 discrimination	 against	 people	 with	
disabilities	 is	 not	 furthered	 by	 “equal”	 treatment	 that	 ignores	
their	individual	disabilities.	
However,	the	focus	of	the	discrimination	in	employment	provisions	of	the	HRA169	
is	 equal	 treatment	 of	 all	 employees.	 This	 is	 because	 section	 22	 applies	 to	 all	
prohibited	 grounds	 of	 discrimination,	 and	 generally,	 regarding	 the	 other	
prohibited	grounds,	equal	treatment	will	eliminate	discrimination.		
For	 those	 with	 disabilities,	 however,	 this	 underlying	 emphasis	 on	 equal	
treatment	 may	 not	 achieve	 the	 desired	 outcome	 of	 substantive	 equality.	 An	
example,	 discussed	 earlier,	 illustrates	 this.	 If	 a	 non-disabled	 employee’s	
performance	diminishes,	 they	may	be	subjected	to	a	PIP.	Then,	 if,	as	a	result	of	
their	 disability,	 a	 disabled	 employee’s	 performance	 also	 diminishes,	 equal	
treatment	would	suggest	that	they	too	could	be	subjected	to	a	PIP.	To	avoid	this	
outcome,	 it	 is	 not	 equal	 treatment	 with	 their	 non-disabled	 colleagues	 that	 is	
required,	but	accommodation	of	their	disability-induced	performance	issues.		
However,	despite	the	focus	on	equal	treatment,	a	stated	purpose	of	the	HRA	is	to	
better	 protect	 human	 rights	 in	 general	 accordance	 with	 United	 Nations	
Conventions.170	The	 UNCRPD	 promotes	 substantive	 equality.	 The	 Convention	
recognises	 the	 disabled	 person’s	 right	 to	 work,	 and	 imposes	 an	 obligation	 on	
member	 parties	 to	 ensure	 the	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 the	 disabled	 in	
employment. 171 	Reasonable	 accommodation	 involves	 making	 necessary	 and	
appropriate	 adjustments,	 where	 needed,	 to	 ensure	 persons	 with	 disabilities	
enjoy	 or	 exercise	 all	 human	 rights	 on	 an	 equal	 basis	 with	 others.172	Thus,	 for	













172 	At	 Article	 2.	 The	 full	 definition	 is:	 ‘“Reasonable	 accommodation”	 means	
necessary	 and	 appropriate	 modification	 and	 adjustments	 not	 imposing	 a	
disproportionate	or	undue	burden,	where	needed	in	a	particular	case,	to	ensure	




Nonetheless,	 as	 will	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	 following	 chapters,	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
reconcile	 the	 text	 of	 the	HRA	with	 the	 obligations	 imposed	 by	 the	UNCRPD.173	
Therefore,	 another	 issue	 this	 thesis	 seeks	 to	 clarify	 is	whether	New	Zealand	 is	
meeting	its	obligations	under	that	Convention.		
2.6.4 Textual	Differences	between	the	ERA	and	HRA	
Another	 potential	 source	 of	 interpretive	 difficulties	 arises	 from	 the	 slightly	
differing	 discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions	 of	 the	 ERA	 and	 HRA.	
Consequently,	interpretation	of	a	provision	under	one	piece	of	legislation	might	
not	 provide	 appropriate	 guidance	 for	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 similar,	 but	 not	
identical,	 provision	 in	 the	 other	 Act.	 However,	 if	 interpreted	 differently,	 this	
raises	 the	 possibility	 of	 different	 outcomes	 being	 reached	 under	 the	 different	
Acts	for	similar	provisions	—	leading	to	additional	uncertainty.	
	
2.7 Conclusion:	The	Need	 for	 a	Disability	 Specific	 Interpretation	of	
the	Provisions			
This	 thesis	 therefore	 seeks	 to	 establish	 the	most	 appropriate	 interpretation	 of	
the	 discrimination	 provisions	 for	 mental	 disability,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	
purposes	 of	 the	 HRA,	 the	 goal	 of	 substantive	 equality,	 and	 New	 Zealand’s	
obligations	under	 the	UNCRPD.	Accordingly,	 the	next	 chapter	will	 consider	 the	
relevant	 principles	 of	 statutory	 interpretation	 that	 should	 be	 adopted	 in	 this	
analysis	 discussing	 several	 possible	 approaches,	 before	 deciding	 on	 the	 most	
appropriate	method.	
This	method	will	 then	be	used	to	 interpret	 the	different	sections	 in	 the	HRA	 in	












“…the	 meaning	 of	 a	 sentence	 may	 be	 more	 than	 that	 of	 the	





The	 previous	 chapter	 identified,	 in	 brief,	 certain	 issues	 concerning	 the	
interpretation	 of	 the	 HRA’s	 discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions,	 when	
applied	 to	 disability.	 One	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 try	 to	 establish	 the	 ‘best’	
interpretation	 of	 the	 discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA	 for	
disability	 discrimination.	 This	 chapter	 examines	 how	 different	 interpretive	
approaches	may	assist	(or	hinder)	their	correct	interpretation	(for,	as	Greenberg	
said,	 ‘what	makes	 a	method	 of	 legal	 interpretation	 correct	 is	 that	 it	 accurately	
identifies	the	law’174).	
The	chapter	concludes	that	each	approach	examined	has	 limitations	and,	on	 its	








situation.	 However,	 ambiguity	 arises	 when	 provisions,	 seemingly	 clear	 in	 the	






but	 it	 becomes	 unclear	 whether	 the	 same	 adverse	 treatment	 of	 a	 poorly	
performing	 employee	 is	 discrimination,	when	 that	 poor	 performance	 is	 due	 to	
their	mental	disability.		










meaning. 176 	However,	 words	 may	 be	 interpreted	 individually	 (an	 ‘additive’	
approach)	 so	 that	 the	 meaning	 of	 each	 word	 within	 a	 phrase	 retains	 its	 full	
meaning	 irrespective	 of	 other	 words	 within	 that	 phrase;	 or	 a	 ‘consolidated’	
approach	 may	 be	 taken,	 treating	 the	 phrase	 as	 an	 integral	 whole,	 generally	
narrowing	 the	meaning	of	 individual	words.177	Consequently,	depending	on	 the	
approach	taken,	the	meaning	of	a	term	or	phrase	may	differ.		
Furthermore,	 a	 provision’s	 linguistic	 meaning	 may	 differ	 from	 the	 intended	
meaning	 or	 content	 of	 the	 law.178	The	 latter	 requires	 knowledge	 of	 the	 legal	
intention	(or	purpose)	of	the	Legislature	when	promulgating	it.	In	New	Zealand,	
the	 Court’s	 main	 role	 in	 interpretation	 is	 to	 discover,	 and	 give	 effect	 to,	 that	
intention.179	To	ascertain	this,	several	different	approaches	to	interpretation	may	
be	 adopted.	 These	 include	 the	 purposive,	 contextual,	 schematic	 and	 spiral	
methods.		
3.2.1 The	Current	Approaches	Taken	by	the	Courts	and	HRRT		
Interpretation	 of	 New	 Zealand	 legislation	 is	 guided	 by	 the	 Interpretation	 Act	
1999.180	This	Act	adopts	a	hybrid	approach,	stating	the	meaning	of	an	enactment	
is	ascertained	from	its	text	(a	schematic	approach)	and	in	light	of	its	purpose	(a	
purposive	 approach). 181 	In	 addition	 to	 these	 ‘twin	 pillars’	 of	 statutory	





‘use	 of	 a	 firearm’.	 An	 additive	 approach	would	 allow	 the	word	 ‘use’	 to	 have	 a	
wide	meaning,	 allowing	 the	 phrase	 to	mean	 trading	 the	 firearm	 for	money.	 A	








179	Interpretation	 Act	 1999.	 An	 alternate	 (and	 controversial)	 view	 of	 statutory	
interpretation	 (associated	with	 the	 Realist	 school	 of	 jurisprudence)	 is	 that	 the	
judiciary	 identify	 the	 most	 appropriate	 outcome	 in	 the	 circumstances,	 and,	
taking	 into	 account	 what	 the	 legislature	 enacted,	 weigh	 up	 the	 relevant	
considerations	 (identified	 using	 statutory	 interpretation	 rules)	 to	 reach	 the	
appropriate	outcome.	Thus,	assessing	and	weighing	the	relevant	considerations,	










provision	 in	 the	 NZBORA.	 Likewise,	 interpretation	 of	 the	 discrimination	
provisions	 in	 the	 HRA	 and	 ERA	 has	 not	 been	 without	 controversy.	 This	 was	
demonstrated	 in	 McAlister	 v	 Air	 New	 Zealand,184 	where	 the	 Supreme	 Court	
judgments	 demonstrate	 substantial	 disagreement	 as	 to	 interpretation	 of	 the	
provisions	(in	both	the	ERA	and	HRA)	in	relation	to	age	discrimination.185	
The	 HRRT	 has	 adopted	 a	 purposive	 and	 contextual	 approach	 toward	
interpretation,	 emphasing	 application	 of	 the	 principles	 of	 international	
covenants.	 In	 Nakarawa	 v	 AFFCO, 186 	the	 HRRT	 considered	 the	 approach	
recommended	by	the	UN	Human	Rights	Committee	to	interpretation	of	Article	18	





will	 provide	 the	 international	 framework	 and	 understanding	
which	will	illuminate	and	assist	local	decision	making.	
Nonetheless	Cartwright	J	then	went	on	to	say:189	
Any	 such	 assistance	 as	 can	 be	 derived	 is	 just	 that:	 assistance.	
None	 of	 the	 principles	 or	 statements	 are	 binding	 on	 New	
Zealand	 Courts.	 They	 do,	 however,	 paint	 a	 backdrop	 against	
which	New	Zealand's	obligations	and	compliance	can	be	placed.	
Moreover,	when	 the	ancestry	of	 the	New	Zealand	 legislation	 is	
understood	it	 is	 inevitable	that	it	must	be	read	as	broadly	as	is	
necessary	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 overarching	 themes	 promoting	
and	protecting	human	rights.	
The	Employment	Court	has	also	considered	the	correct	approach	to	interpreting	




for	 the	 application	 of	 the	 genuine	 occupational	 qualification	 exception	 for	 age	
discrimination.	 This	 led	 to	 differing	 conclusions	 as	 to	 the	 intent	 of	 Parliament	
and	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 legislation.	 Interestingly,	 Tipping	 and	McGrath	 JJ,	 who	
both	 looked	 to	 the	 legislative	 history	 of	 the	 Acts	 and	 other	 extrinsic	 evidence	
such	as	select	committee	reports,	both	concluded	 the	ERA	contained	a	drafting	
error,	but	differed	as	to	what	the	error	was	(thus	finding	different	intent	behind	
the	 legislation).	 In	 contrast,	 the	 majority	 held	 that	 although	 the	 drafting	 was	
‘hardly	a	model	of	clarity,’	 the	 legislative	history	was	of	no	assistance.	On	their	











Authority,191	held	 that	 such	 legislation	 should	 construed	 ‘beneficially	 and	 not	
narrowly.’192		
Although	 the	 interpretive	 approach	 is	 not	 often	 addressed	 in	 decisions	 of	 the	
Authority	or	Employment	Court,193	the	approach	 taken	by	 them,	 the	HRRT	and	
higher	courts	appears	generally	consistent.		
Thus,	 the	 current	 interpretive	 approach	 is	 to	 give	 the	 legislation	 a	 broad	 and	




unfair	 dismissal,	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 discrimination	 provision	 was	
influenced	by	the	interpretation	of	the	‘test	of	justification’.	While	the	Authority	
acknowledged	that	 there	appeared	to	be	two	different	standards	against	which	
to	 judge	 the	 conduct	 (i.e.	 the	 reasonableness	 standard,	 for	 accommodating	 the	
disability,	where	 the	 issue	 is	 one	 of	 discrimination	 under	 s103(1)(c)	 ERA;	 and	
what	 the	 fair	 and	 reasonable	 employer	 could	 have	 done,	 for	 the	 claim	 of	
disadvantage	 in	 employment,	 under	 s103(1)(b)ERA),	 it	 held	 that,	 for	 practical	
purposes,	the	test	was	the	same.	Thus,	the	test	of	justification	for	the	unjustified	
disadvantage	(when	could	the	reasonable	employer	cease	tolerating	the	on-going	
incapacity	 of	 the	 employee?)	 was	 judged	 as	 being	 the	 same	 standard	 as	 the	
requirement	to	reasonably	accommodate	the	disability.		
However,	 what	 the	 employer	 ‘could	 have	 done’	 covers	 a	 wider	 range	 of	
reasonable	responses	than	what	is	required	to	accommodate	an	employee	under	
the	 discrimination	 provisions.	 Arguably,	 this	 resulted	 in	 less	 liberal	








190	Smith	 v	 Air	 New	 Zealand	 Ltd,	 above	 n97.	 This	 case	 was	 intially	 raised	 as	 a	
breach	 of	 contract	 under	 the	 Employment	 Contracts	 Act	 1991	 (ECA)	 and	 the	
defendants	 sought	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 exceptions	 to	 discrimination	 in	 the	HRA	 as	 a	
defence.	 It	was	decided	under	 the	provisions	of	 the	HRA,	not	 the	ECA.	Like	 the	
ERA,	the	provisions	of	the	ECA	were	similar	but	not	identical	to	those	of	the	HRA.		
191	Northern	Regional	Health	Authority	v	Human	Rights	Commission,	above	n143.		













A	 purposive	 approach	 to	 interpretation	 may	 help	 ‘defeat	 the	 tyranny	 of	
language’.196	Focussing	on	ascertaining	the	objective(s)	of	 the	Act,	 to	give	effect	
to	 Parliament’s	 intentions,	 this	 approach	 is	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 democratic	
theory	 that	 the	 Court	 should	 cooperate	 with,	 and	 not	 frustrate,	 the	 will	 of	
Parliament.197	
Although	 the	 HRA	 does	 not	 have	 a	 specific	 ‘objectives’	 section,	 the	 purpose	 is	
indicated	 in	 the	 long	title198	—	to	 ‘provide	better	protection	of	human	rights	 in	




HRA	 should	 be	 liberally	 construed	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 disabled	 persons.	
Nevertheless,	 a	 close	 reading	 of	 the	HRA	 suggests	 another	 purpose	 to	 the	Act.	
This	 is	 to	 protect	 the	 employer’s	 managerial	 prerogative.	 This	 may	 suggest	
interpretation	should	be	less	liberally	construed	toward	the	disabled	employee.		
This	 reveals	a	general	difficulty	with	 the	purposive	approach	 to	 interpretation:	
that	an	Act	may	have	more	 than	one	purpose,	and	these	may	point	 in	different	
directions	 in	 a	 particular	 fact	 situation.	 Arguably,	 this	 is	 the	 case	 with	 the	
discrimination	in	employment	provisions	in	the	HRA.		
Furthermore, although the purposive approach permits reference	 to	 extrinsic	
materials	—	such	as	Hansard,	and	explanatory	notes	to	Bills	—	to	ascertain	the	
intention	of	Parliament200	and	the	purpose	of	a	statute,	 in	general	this	provides	
little	 enlightenment	 for	 interpreting	 New	 Zealand’s	 disability	 discrimination	
provisions.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 debates	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 HRA’s	 enactment	
focussed	 on	 some	 of	 the	 other	 newly	 added	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	
discrimination,	with	only	cursory	(and	laudatory)	mention	of	disability.201	When	











201	Much	 debate	 was	 focused	 on	 the	 inclusion	 of	 ‘the	 presence	 in	 the	 body	 of	
organisms	 capable	 of	 causing	 illness’	 and	 ‘sexual	 orientation’	 as	 prohibited	
grounds	 of	 discrimination	 —	 reflecting	 conflicting	 viewpoints	 about	 sexual	
orientation,	and	the	fear	of	transmission	of	HIV/AIDS,	prevalent	at	the	time.		
202 	Disability	 (United	 Nations	 Convention	 On	 The	 Rights	 Of	 Persons	 With	
Disabilities)	 Bill	 2008.	 This	 Bill	 introduced	 changes	 to	 multiple	 statutes	
	
	58	
the	 reasonable	 accommodation	 requirements	 of	 the	 UNCRPD,	 prior	 to	 its	
ratification	by	New	Zealand.203	Departmental	 reports	and	Hansard	confirm	 this	
was	Parliament’s	intention.	Thus,	for	the	reasonable	accommodation	provisions	




rights	 of	 those	 with	 disabilities.	 Existing	 human	 rights	 conventions	 provided	
general	 protection,	 but	 had	 limited	 success	 in	 ensuring	 the	 disabled	 could	
exercise	 those	 rights. 204 	As	 Harpur	 argues,	 for	 employment,	 although	 the	
Universal	Declaration	of	Human	Rights	(UDHR)	and	the	 International	Covenant	




to	 work,	 and	 will	 prohibit	 discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 disability	 (including	
disability	acquired	during	employment)	 in	all	matters	 concerning	employment,	
including	the	continuance	of	employment.206			
In	 addition,	 the	 UNCRPD	 requires	 State	 Parties	 to:	 provide	 the	 disabled	 with	
assistance	 in	 ‘obtaining,	maintaining	and	returning’	 to	employment;207	promote	




























However,	 taking	 this	 approach	 requires	 a	 clear	 understanding	 of	 what	
constitutes	 ‘disability’.	How	 ‘disability’	 is	 conceptualised	has	differed	over	 time	
and	 between	 jurisdictions.	 Historically	 disability	was	 thought	 to	 represent	 the	
individual’s	 sinfulness	 and	moral	 impurity,	 and	 sufferers	were	often	 subject	 to	
segregation	and	punishment.212	The	impact	of	injured	returned	servicemen	after	
the	 Second	 World	 War	 resulted	 in	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 economic	 model	 of	
disability,	 wherein	 disability	 was	 assessed	 by	 the	 limitations	 placed	 on	 the	




The	 biomedical	model	 individualises	 disability,	 viewing	 it	 as	 the	 presence	 of	 a	
mental	or	physical	impairment,	resulting	in	an	objectively	measurable	functional	
incapacity.	 The	 expectation	 is	 that	 the	 disabled	 person	 requires	 medical	
amelioration	 and	 rehabilitation.215	In	 this	 model,	 the	 individual	 nature	 of	 the	
impairment	 is	 emphasised,	with	 no	 account	 taken	 of	 the	 social	 implications	 of	
disability,	or	the	role	of	society	in	determining	disability.		
In	 contrast,	 the	 social	model	 views	 disability	 as	 a	 social	 construct.216	Although	
the	impairment	may	be	physical	or	mental,	the	social	construct	considers	that	it	
is	 the	hostile	or	 inhospitable	social	environment	 that	stops	 the	 individual	 from	
enjoying	full	and	equal	participation	in	society	that	creates	the	disability.217		
The	 UNCRPD	 encapsulates	 both	 the	 social	 and	 medical	 models	 by	 defining	
disability	in	the	following	way:218	
Persons	 with	 disabilities	 include	 those	 who	 have	 long-term	
physical,	mental,	 intellectual	 or	 sensory	 impairments	which	 in	






















e)	 Recognizing	 that	 disability	 is	 an	 evolving	 concept	 and	 that	
disability	 results	 from	 the	 interaction	 between	 persons	 with	
impairments	 and	 attitudinal	 and	 environmental	 barriers	 that	
hinders	 their	 full	 and	 effective	 participation	 in	 society	 on	 an	
equal	basis	with	others.	
The	 social	 model	 promotes	 a	 holistic	 approach	 to	 health	 and	 impairment,	 by	
rejecting	an	idea	of	‘normalcy’	and	encouraging	and	promoting	diversity.220		
As	 Pothier221	argues,	 the	 social	 model	 of	 disability	 impacts	 on	 the	meaning	 of	
‘disability’	 and	 on	 discrimination.	 The	 social	 model	 suggests	 that	 anti-
discrimination	laws	should	advance	human	rights	through	ensuring	people	with	
disabilities	become	an	integral	part	of	society	and	not	an	anomaly	to	normalcy.	
The	 focus	 is	 on	 fixing	 the	 environment,	 not	 fixing	 the	 disabled	 worker.222	






and	 active	 promotion	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 the	 disabled	 to	 enable	
their	 full	 participation	 in	 the	 workplace,	 and	 thus	 achieve	 greater	 substantive	
equality.225		
Conversely,	 anti-discrimination	 laws	 based	 on	 the	 medical	 model	 define	
disability	in	solely	medical	terms,	and	the	individual	must	fit	within	this	medical	
definition	to	be	protected	by	the	law.	Moreover,	as	the	employee’s	conduct	may	
be	 considered	 separate	 to,	 rather	 than	 part	 of,	 the	 disability,226 	or	 as	 the	
disability	 may	 not	 be	 viewed	 as	 causally	 connected	 to	 their	 conduct,	 it	 may	
justify	 dismissal.	 How	 the	 work	 environment	 affects	 the	 employee’s	 conduct	
might	not	be	considered,	or	considered	sufficiently.	Clough	argues:227	
By	artificially	separating	the	conduct	of	an	employee	with	BPD	








Society	 (Open	University	 Press,	 Buckingham,	 England;	 Philadelphia,	 PA,	 2003);	
Harpur,	above	n204	at	4.		
224	Harpur,	above	n204	at	4.	
225	B.	 Clough	 "'People	 like	 that':	 Realising	 the	 Social	 Model	 in	Mental	 Capacity	
Jurisprudence"	(2015)	23(1)	Med	Law	Rev	53.	
226	Samantha	Fairclough	and	others	"In	Sickness	and	in	Health:	Implications	for	








In	 finding	 much	 employee	 conduct	 to	 be	 unacceptable,	





Government	 policy,	 including	 the	 New	 Zealand	 Disability	 Strategy,	 which	
adopted	the	social	model	of	disability	in	2001:228	
Disability	 is	 not	 something	 individuals	 have.	What	 individuals	
have	 are	 impairments.	 They	 may	 be	 physical,	 sensory,	
neurological,	 psychiatric,	 intellectual	 or	 other	 impairments.	








to	 promote	 workforce	 participation,229	and	 the	 failure	 to	 provide	 reasonable	
accommodation	is	not	a	standalone	prohibited	ground	of	discrimination.230		
3.3.3 Dual	Purpose:		Respecting	the	Employer’s	Managerial	Prerogative		
Furthermore,	 a	 close	 reading	 of	 the	 HRA	 suggests	 it	 has	 more	 than	 one	
objective.231	The	 HRA	 attempts	 to	 balance	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee	
with	 the	employer’s	managerial	prerogative,	and	 this	may	explain	why	there	 is	
no	 positive	 duty	 imposed	 on	 an	 employer	 to	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	
employee.	 Rather, while adverse treatment of the employee ‘by reason of’ their 
disability is unlawful, this treatment may be ‘excepted’ if, for example, it is 
unreasonable for the employer to provide the employee with any special services or 
facilities they require. Furthermore, the general qualification on exceptions232 only 
requires the employer to accommodate the affected employee if it does not involve an 
																																																								
228 	Ministry	 of	 Social	 Development	 The	 New	 Zealand	 Disability	 Strategy	
(Whakanui	Oranga,	2001)	at	1.	
229	Sylvia	 A.	 Bell,	 Judy	McGregor	 and	Margaret	Wilson	 "The	 Convention	 on	 the	
Rights	of	Disabled	Persons:	A	Remaining	Dilemma	for	New	Zealand?"	(2015)	13	
NZJPIL	277,	at	286.		
230	Contrast	 this	 to	 the	 s21	 of	 the	 Equality	Act	 2010	 (UK);	 the	Americans	with	
Disabilities	Act	1990	(USA);	and	section	5(2)	of	the	Disability	Discrimination	Act	







‘unreasonable disruption’ to their activities — not to the higher level of causing 
‘undue hardship’ or ‘undue’ disruption.  
Thus, interpreting the provisions of the HRA in accordance with its dual, and 
seemingly conflicting, purposes remains difficult. Therefore, additional interpretive 
approaches will be needed to establish if an otherwise justifiable dismissal on 




the	 context	 of	 the	Act	 as	 a	whole,	 on	 the	 premise	 that	 an	Act	 has	 a	 consistent	
purpose	 or	 scheme.	 This	 delivers	 internal	 interpretive	 consistency	—	 as	 other	
provisions	may	place	a	gloss	on	the	meaning	of	a	specific	word,	or	phrase,	and	
thus	 clarify	 ambiguities. 233 	The	 definitions	 and	 preamble	 sections	 provide	
additional	 information.234	Furthermore,	ambiguous	or	vague	provisions	may	be	





















of	 an	ambiguity	needs	 to	be	established	based	on	 linguistic	presumptions	 (can	




in	 turn	 is	 grounded	 on	 contextual	 and	 factual	 evidence	 and	 contextual	 and	







separate	 Part	 dealing	with	 discrimination.	However,	 that	 Part	 does	 not	 have	 a	
separate	 objectives	 section.	 As	 other	 provisions	 relevant	 to	 discrimination	 are	




limited	 utility.	 Each	 ground	 has	 different	 requirements	 and	 exceptions,	
influencing	 how	 they	 are	 interpreted.	 Age,	 for	 example,	 has	 a	 ‘genuine	
occupational	 qualification’	 defence,238	which	may	 impact	 on	 how	 the	 notion	 of	
‘qualified’	would	be	interpreted	in	section	22.	Likewise,	where	religion	imposes	a	
particular	 practice	 on	 its	 adherents,	 the	 employer	 ‘must	 accommodate	 the	





Nonetheless,	 Section	 22	 applies	 to	 all	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	 discrimination,	
proscribing	 different	 treatment	 by	 reason	 of	 the	 prohibited	 ground,	 so	 that	 all	
employees	 are	 treated	 equally.	 Thus,	 the	 scheme	 of	 the	 discrimination	 in	
employment	 provisions	 seems	 premised	 on	 equality	 of	 treatment,	 and	 this	
emphasis	 of	 formal	 equality	 may	 influence	 the	 interpretation	 of	 specific	
provisions.	 For	 disability	 discrimination	 this	 is	 problematic,	 as	 it	 is	 not	
necessarily	equal	treatment,	but	individualised	treatment,	or	accommodation	of	




a	 malleable	 concept.	 Context	 may	 refer	 to	 the	 social	 and	 political	 context	 —	






interpretation	 of	 the	 provision.	 Aleinikoff	 refers	 to	 this	 as	 the	 archaeological	













that	 original	 meaning.241	Accordingly,	 reference	 to	 extrinsic	 materials,	 such	 as	
earlier	versions	of	Acts,	analogous	statutes,	 legislative	history,242	and	social	and	
political	considerations,	may	reveal	the	purpose	and	intention	of	the	Act,	clarify	
ambiguous	 provisions,	 or	 determine	 if	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 apply	 a	 specific	
provision	in	a	changed	social	context.243	
Prior	 to	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 HRA	 in	 1993,	 disability	 was	 not	 a	 prohibited	
ground	 of	 discrimination.	 Thus,	 earlier	 Acts	 provide	 little	 guidance	 on	
interpretation	of	the	discrimination	in	employment	provisions	for	disability.		
Furthermore,	 the	 HRA	 was	 enacted	 prior	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 UNCRPD.	
Although	 operative	 UN	 covenants	 at	 the	 time	 required	 all	 individuals	 to	 be	
granted	 equal	 rights	 without	 distinction	 ‘of	 any	 kind’,244 	disability	 was	 not	
specifically	 mentioned.	 The	 NZBORA,	 enacted	 in	 1990,	 did	 not	 originally	 have	
disability	as	a	prohibited	ground	of	discrimination,	but	did	include	the	right	to	be	




The	 rights	 encapsulated	 in	 this	 article,	 [the	 right	 to	 be	 free	 from	
discrimination]	 unlike	 most	 of	 those	 protected	 by	 the	 Bill,	 are	 not	
derived	 from	 the	 common	 law.	 They	 are	 the	 offspring	 of	 the	 profound	
movement	 of	 ideas	 and	 opinions	 during	 the	 last	 50	 years,	 which	 have	





Even	 the	 NZBORA,	 enacted	 only	 three	 years	 previously,	 did	 not	 recognise	 the	






243	If	 the	 provisions	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 cover	 a	 situation,	 the	 social	 and	 political	





Human	 Rights	 (UDHR).	 These	 covenants	 form	 the	 International	 Bill	 of	 Human	
Rights.	









amended	 to	 include	 all	 grounds	 of	 discrimination	 specified	 in	 the	 HRA,	 which	
included	disability.248	
Given	 this,	 a	 rights-based	 interpretation	 of	 the	 HRA	 is	 appropriate.	 	 However,	
whether	 an	 employee’s	 ‘right’	 to	 be	 free	 from	 discrimination	 imposes	 a	
correlative	‘duty’	on	employers	is	less	clear.249	
3.5.2 The	Current	Social	and	Political	Context	
Interpretation	 of	 the	 law	 occurs	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 current	 national	 and	
international	 social	 and	 political	 climate.	 This	 reflects	 a	 ‘nautical’	 approach	 to	
interpretation,	 where	 statutory	 interpretation	 is	 understood	 as	 an	 on-going	
process	 or	 voyage	 where	 the	 shipbuilders	 (legislature)	 and	 subsequent	
navigators	(judiciary)	play	a	role.250	As	the	ILO	noted:	251	
The	 legislation	 governing	 termination	 of	 employment,	 like	 all	
labour	 legislation,	 reflects	 societal	 values	 and	 labour	 market	
conditions	in	a	given	period.	As	these	evolve,	this	legislation	will	
change	as	well.		
Although	 changing	 societal	 values	 are	 encapsulated	 in	 successive	 enactments	
and	amendments	of	human	rights	legislation,	between	these	legislative	changes	





employment.	 Employment	 was	 promoted	 by	 establishment	 of	 an	 ‘under-rate’	
worker’s	permit,	enabling	an	impaired	worker	to	receive	a	wage	matching	their	
productivity	(Industrial	Relations	Act	1973,	s113):	 ‘History	of	Disability	in	New	
Zealand’	 Office	 for	 Disability	 Issues,	 Ministry	 of	 Social	 Development.	 Accessed	
6/4/17.	 https://www.odi.govt.nz/about-disability/history-of-disability-in-new-
zealand/	
248	Until	 amended	 in	 1994,	 the	 NZBORA,	 in	 s19(1),	 only	 granted	 the	 right	 to	
freedom	 from	discrimination	on	 the	grounds	of	 colour,	 race,	 ethnic	or	national	
origins,	sex,	marital	status,	or	religious	or	ethical	belief.		
249	The	 relationship	 between	 rights	 and	 duties	 is	 controversial.	 For	 example,	
Hogg	(Martin	Hogg	Obligations:	Law	and	Language	(Cambridge	University	Press,	
Cambridge,	UK,	2017)	at	121	critiques	W.	N.	Hohfield,	who,	in	his	seminal	essay,	
‘Some	 Fundamental	 Legal	 Conceptions	 as	 Applied	 in	 Legal	 Reasoning’,	 paired	
rights	and	duties	as	jural	correlatives	((1913)	23	Yale	Law	Journal	16).	
250Aleinikoff,	 above	 n241	 at	 21.	 Aleinikoff’s	 metaphor	 explains	 that	 social	 and	
political	changes	are	like	changes	in	the	weather,	crew	or	other	factors	that	were	
not	 identified	when	the	ship	sets	sail.	These	 factors	affect	 the	navigation	of	 the	
ship	and	course	of	the	voyage,	but	not	the	destination	—	which	is	determined	(or	
limited)	by	the	ship’s	construction.	But,	just	as	the	shipbuilders	may	modify	the	






Zealand, 252 	or	 demonstrated	 in	 official	 governmental	 policy	 (such	 as	 the	
Disability	Strategy	2001253).	As	Burrows	states:254	
[I]f	the	law	is	to	be	seen	as	having	some	social	relevance,	rather	
than	 as	 a	 set	 of	 self-serving	 rules,	 materials	 ought	 to	 be	
admissible	to	place	statutory	provisions	in	their	social	setting.	
In	 the	 current	 social	 and	 political	 context,	 interpretation	 of	 the	 HRA	 should	
therefore	be	in	accordance	with	the	UNCRPD,	and	consistent	with	the	Disability	
Strategy	2016	(DS).255		The	aim	of	both	the	UNCRPD	and	the	DS	is	to	promote	the	
social	and	physical	 inclusion	of	 the	disabled	 in	society.	They	 therefore	reflect	a	
paradigm	shift	toward	the	social	construct	of	disability.	This	construct	moves	the	




Those	 of	 us	 who	 need	 specialised	 supports	 and	 services	 have	 ready	
access	 to	 them	 to	 secure	 and	 sustain	 employment.	 Reasonable	
accommodation	 is	understood	and	provided	by	our	employers.	We	will	
have	the	same	opportunities	to	progress	our	careers	as	our	non-disabled	









Human	 Rights	 Commission,	 above	 n143;	 BHP	 New	 Zealand	 Steel	 Ltd	 v	 O’Dea	
[1997]	ERNZ	667	(HC);	Tavita	v	Minister	of	Immigration	[1994]	2	NZLR	257	(CA).		
253	The	Disability	Strategy	was	adopted	in	2001	by	the	Labour	Government.	The	
forward	 by	 the	 Minister	 for	 Disability	 Issues	 (Leanne	 Dalziel)	 confirmed	 ‘The	




Development,	 above	 n228).	 The	 Strategy	 was	 last	 reviewed	 in	 2016	 with	 the	




disabled	 employees	 proportionately	 represented	 at	 all	 levels	 of	 employment;	
having	employers	that	are	confident	and	willing	to	employ	the	disabled	persons;	
ensuring	 disabled	 employees	 are	 treated	 with	 dignity	 and	 respect;	 and	
reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 disability	 is	 understood	 and	 provided	 by	












1971	 and	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Commission	 Act	 1977.	 It	 added	 new	 prohibited	
grounds	of	discrimination	(including	disability)	to	those	listed	in	the	above	Acts.	
When	 introducing	 the	Bill,	 the	Minister	of	 Justice	stated	 the	purpose	of	 the	Bill	




rights	by	 state	 actors,259	the	HRA	 is	 only	 concerned	with	discrimination,260	and	
applies	to	both	private	and	state	actors	in	specified	circumstances.261	Thus,	while	
the	 HRA	 details	 when	 different	 treatment	 on	 a	 prohibited	 ground	 of	
discrimination	is	unlawful,	the	NZBORA	is	an	affirmation	of	fundamental	human	
rights	and	freedoms	in	New	Zealand.	It	establishes	the	minimum	standards	to	be	







258	15	December	 1992,	 14	NZPD	416.	 	 The	Minister	 stated:	 ‘The	 social	 policies	
that	are	implemented	by	the	Bill	are	likely	to	be	of	wide	public	interest.	The	Bill	
promotes	 equality	 of	 status	 for	 all	 New	 Zealanders,	 in	 accordance	 with	 our	
international	obligations.	Every	person	has	the	right	to	be	treated	equally	and	to	
enjoy	freedom	from	discrimination.	Therefore	it	is	proper	that	revised	legislation	





260	Other	 ‘rights’	 are	 covered	 in	 additional	 legislation,	 such	 as	 the	 Privacy	 Act	
1993,	 Official	 Information	 Act	 1982,	 Health	 and	 Disability	 Commissioner	 Act	
1994,	 Immigration	 Act	 1987.	 Other	 Acts	 also	 have	 discrimination	 provisions,	








New	Zealand	has	 embraced	a	dualist	 approach	 to	 international	 law.	Therefore,	
unless	specifically	incorporated	into	domestic	law,	international	instruments	do	
not	directly	 alter	New	Zealand	 law.262	The	 rationales	 for	 this	 are:	 international	
law	 is	 too	 flexible	 and	 general	 for	 direct	 application;	 there	 is	 the	 possible	
usurpation	of	parliamentary	sovereignty	(as	the	executive	ratify	treaties	and	not	
the	 legislature);	and	 there	could	be	unilateral	 introduction	of	 international	 law	
(such	 as	 human	 rights	 norms)	 into	 domestic	 law	 without	 the	 legitimacy	 of	
democratic	adoption	through	statutory	amendments.263		
Thus,	although	New	Zealand	has	ratified	many	of	the	conventions	of	the	ILO	and	
United	Nations	 (UN),	unless	 these	are	 incorporated	 into	New	Zealand	 law	 they	
have	no	binding	force	within	New	Zealand	law.	Nonetheless,	it	is	now	accepted	in	
New	Zealand	that	international	treaties	(most	notably	in	the	human	rights	arena)	
may	 aid	 interpretation	 of	 domestic	 legislation.264	Where	 legislation	 specifically	
refers	 to	 treaties	 or	 covenants	 (indicating	 the	 legislative	 intent),	 the	 court	will	
consider	 the	 relevant	 treaty	 and	 jurisprudence,	 treating	 it	 as	 influential	
authority.	Effectively,	this	incorporates	aspects	of	international	employment	and	








Where	 international	 treaties	 have	 been	 ratified,	 New	 Zealand	 law	 should	 be	
interpreted	in	accordance	with	them:268		
Although	 treaties	 are	 not	 part	 of	 domestic	 law,	 it	 is	 to	 be	
presumed	 that	 the	 Legislature	 would	 not	 enact	 anything	
inconsistent	 with	 its	 international	 obligation	 undertaken	 by	




263	Halton	 Cheadle	 "Reception	 of	 International	 Labour	 Standards	 in	 Common-
Law	Legal	Systems"	(2012)		Acta	Juridica	348	at	351.		
264	Butler	and	Butler,	above	n252.	See:	Nakarawa	v	AFFCO	New	Zealand	Limited,	
above	 n127;	 Northern	 Regional	 Health	 Authority	 v	 Human	 Rights	 Commission,	




266	Waters,	 above	 n262.	 The	 monist	 approach	 to	 international	 law	 makes	 no	
sharp	distinction	between	domestic	and	international	law.	





statutory	 provisions	 may	 be	 read.	 They	 cannot	 affect	 the	
meaning	of	words	that	are	clear,	but	they	can	have	an	influence	
where	several	interpretations	are	open.	
Thus,	 the	 UNCRPD	 —	 which	 specifically	 recognises	 and	 records	 disability	
rights269		 —	 should	 be	 a	 cornerstone	 of	 statutory	 interpretation	 of	 disability	
discrimination	provisions.		
3.5.5 The	Practical	Context		
The	 context	 of	 the	 individual	 workplace	 must	 also	 be	 considered	 when	
interpreting	the	HRA	provisions.		
The	 size	 of	 the	 employer’s	 organisation,	 for	 example,	may	 affect	 the	 extent	 to	
which	 an	 employer	 is	 able	 to	 support	 an	 employee	with	 poor	 performance	—	
although	this	will	depend	on	the	nature	of	the	work.	In	addition,	state	and	public	
sector	 employers	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 ‘good	 employer’	 provisions	 of	 the	 State	
Sector	(and	other)	Acts.270	These	provisions	include	the	requirement	to	provide	
good	 and	 safe	 working	 conditions,	 an	 equal	 employment	 opportunities	
programme,	 and	 recognition	 of	 the	 employment	 requirements	 of	 persons	with	
disabilities.271		 In	 this	 context,	 the	obligations	on	 the	employer	may	potentially	
be	more	onerous	than	those	in	the	private	sector.	In	turn,	this	may	mean	that	the	
employee	working	 in	the	state	sector,	or	 for	a	 large	corporation,	may	be	better	
protected	by	the	legislation	than	those	in	smaller	private	businesses.	Thus,	two	




the	 private	 sector,	 as	 the	 financial	 burden	 for	 accommodating	 the	 disabled	
employee	 falls	 to	 the	 employer,	 the	 ability	 to	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	
employee	is	limited	by	the	employer’s	resources.	Thus,	again	employees	working	
in	 the	 same	 role	 but	 for	 different	 employers	 may	 have	 differing	 levels	 of	
protection	under	the	HRA.		
It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 this	 contextual	 approach,	with	 its	 consideration	 of	 the	
employer’s	situation,	is	fairer	to	the	employer.		However,	it	leads	to	uncertainty	





269	The	UNCRPD	does	 not	 create	 additional	 rights	 for	 disabled	 people.	 Instead,	
the	 Convention	 specifies	 measures	 that	 States	 should	 implement	 to	 ensure	
disabled	 people	 can	 enjoy	 existing	 rights,	 on	 an	 equal	 basis	 with	
others	 (Departmental Report, Office for Disability Issues, July 2008).	






As	 can	 be	 seen,	 each	 approach	 has	 advantages	 and	 limitations.	 Although	 a	
purposive	approach	may	enable	the	principles	of	the	UNCRPD	to	be	considered	
when	 interpreting	 a	 provision,	 conversely,	 the	 conflicting	 nature	 of	 the	 dual	
purposes	 of	 the	Act	 (protecting	 the	managerial	 prerogative	 and	 protecting	 the	
human	 rights	 of	 disabled	 employees)	 may	 also	 paralyse	 the	 interpretative	
process.		
Likewise,	 the	schematic	approach	may	ensure	 the	 interpretation	of	a	provision	
or	phrase	fits	with	the	general	framework	of	the	Act,	but	equally	may	not	be	of	
assistance	 when	 the	 phrase	 or	 term	 is	 used	 in	 different	 contexts	 within	 the	




Finally,	 the	 contextual	 approach	 is	 problematic,	 as	 different	 contextual	 factors	
might	result	 in	different	 interpretations.	For	example,	 the	practical	context	(for	
example,	 a	 large,	well	 resourced,	employer)	might	 suggest	a	high	 threshold	 for	
what	 services	 and	 facilities	 it	 is	 ‘reasonable’	 for	 the	 employer	 to	 provide.	
Conversely,	 if	 the	 political	 or	 social	 context	 at	 the	 time	 of	 enactment	 of	 the	
legislation	 is	 considered,	 then	 this	 might	 suggest	 a	 lower	 threshold	 of	
‘reasonableness’	as	an	ideology	more	sympathetic	to	the	employer’s	prerogative	
may	 have	 predominated	 at	 that	 time.	 Or,	 if	 the	 wider	 international	 context	 is	
considered,	 then	 the	 accommodation	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee	 might	 be	
considered	 paramount,	 demanding	 a	 high	 level	 of	 hardship	 before	 it	would	 be	
considered	unreasonable	for	the	employer	to	provide	a	service	of	facility.				
Because	of	these	difficulties,	and	the	uncertainties	that	result,	this	thesis	suggests	
that	 the	 most	 appropriate	 method	 of	 interpretation	 is	 one	 that	 uses	 several	
approaches	 simultaneously.	 When	 one	 approach	 cannot	 provide	 a	 definitive	
answer,	 this	 might	 be	 provided	 by	 next	 approach,	 and	 so	 forth.	 Furthermore,	
even	when	a	particular	 interpretation	 is	suggested	by	one	approach,	 this	might	
be	 confirmed	 (or	 refuted)	 working	 through	 the	 remaining	 approaches.	 This	
composite	approach	is	outlined	further	below.		
3.7 Conclusion:	The	Preferred	Approach	—	A	Composite	Method	
The	 ‘spiral’	 approach	 to	 interpretation,	 as	 proposed	 by	 Justice	 Glazebrook,	













The	 advantage	 of	 this	 approach	 is	 that	 it	 encompasses	 different	 approaches.	
Moreover,	 when	 the	 answer	 is	 clear,	 the	 interpretive	 process	 may	 stop	 —	
although,	as	Glazebrook	J	acknowledges,	continuing	the	process	acts	as	a	‘double	
check’	 on	 the	 correctness	 of	 the	 interpretation.274 	Moreover,	 this	 approach	
provides	 the	 predictability	 and	 assurance	 of	 a	 logical	 progression	 of	
interpretation,	while	retaining	some	flexibility.		
Using	 this	 approach	 to	 interpret	 the	 HRA’s	 provisions	 on	 discrimination	 in	
employment,	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 mental	 disability,	 is	 not	 without	 difficulties,	
however.	As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	the	ordinary	meaning	of	the	text	
raises	 interpretive	 issues.	 The	 lack	 of	 legislative	 history	 for	 disability	
discrimination	means	 there	 is	 no	 clear	 indication	 of	 Parliament’s	 intentions	 in	
this	 specialised	 area.	 Looking	 at	 the	 wider	 context,	 overseas	 law	 is	 of	 limited	
help,	due	to	the	differences	in	the	provisions	and	schemes	of	the	overseas	Acts.	
In	 particular,	 unlike	 New	 Zealand,	 the	 UK	 has	 a	 provision	 specifically	 for	
discrimination	 arising	 from	 a	 consequence	 of	 a	 disability. 275 	As	 will	 be	
discussed,276	this	 clarifies	 that	—	 in	 the	UK	—	dismissal	 for	 poor	 performance	
attributable	to	mental	disability	is	dismissal	by	reason	of	disability.	Furthermore,	
unlike	 New	 Zealand,	 the	 UK	 imposes	 a	 duty	 to	 make	 adjustments	 to	
accommodate	 the	 disabled, 277 	and	 failure	 to	 comply	 with	 that	 duty	 is	 a	
standalone	 ground	of	 discrimination.278	Australia	 not	 only	makes	 the	 failure	 to	
reasonably	accommodate	the	disabled	a	ground	of	discrimination,279	it	also	has	a	
separate	Act	for	disability	discrimination	—	reflecting	its	special	nature.		
Nonetheless,	 the	 spiral	 approach	 appears	 the	 most	 suitable	 for	 interpreting	
disability	discrimination	law.	The	progression	through	the	spiral	enables	issues	
of	 interpretation	 to	 be	 fully	 explored	 in	 the	 context	 of	 both	 domestic	 and	
international	law,	and	in	light	of	the	social	and	political	climate.		
Therefore,	 this	 approach	 is	 adopted	 here	 to	 discuss	 the	 previously	 identified	























selecting	 the	 spiral	 method280	as	 the	 most	 appropriate	 for	 interpreting	 the	
disability	 discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA.	 This	 chapter	
focuses	on	interpreting	section	22,	which	determines	when	adverse	treatment	of	
a	disabled	person	would	be	considered	discrimination.	The	question	explored	in	
this	 chapter	 is:	 can	 interpretation	 clarify	 when	 adverse	 treatment,	 due	 to	
disability-induced	poor	performance,	would	be	considered	discrimination	—	or	
are	 the	 provisions	 too	 uncertain,	 or	 too	 complex,	 to	 provide	 a	 predictable	
answer?		
Accordingly,	 using	 the	 spiral	 approach,	 the	 core	 elements	 of	 disability	









section	22,	defines	when	 the	employer’s	 treatment	of	an	employee	 is	unlawful,	
because	the	treatment	is	based	on	a	prohibited	ground	of	discrimination	(such	as	
disability).	No	 legislation	 in	New	Zealand	defines	discrimination	per	se.	For	 the	
purposes	of	establishing	whether	treatment	of	a	disabled	employee	 is	unlawful	
or	not	under	the	HRA,	the	absence	of	a	definition	is	probably	of	little	importance.	
As	 this	 thesis	will	 show,	 this	 is	 because	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA	 are	 clearly	
based	on	the	concept	of	equal	treatment,	or	formal	equality,	which	signifies	the	
model	of	discrimination	adopted	by	the	legislation.	However,	if	the	disabled	are	




280This	 is	 the	 approach	 taken	 by	 Justice	 Glazebrook,	 as	 outlined	 in	 her	 paper:	
Glazebrook	J,	above	n91.	The	spiral	approach	is	a	combination	of	the	schematic,	
purposive	and	contextual	approaches,	and	looks	in	sequence	at	 four	things:	the	





Nonetheless,	 section	 22	 establishes	 when	 an	 employer	 treats	 an	 employee	
unlawfully	because	of	one	of	 the	prohibited	grounds	of	discrimination,	 such	as	
disability.	 Once	 this	 has	 been	 established,	 the	 employer	 may	 defend	 their	
treatment	of	 the	employee	under	 the	permitted	exceptions.	These	apply	where	












Section	 22	 thus	 seeks	 to	 ensure	 that	 similarly	 situated	 employees	 are	 treated	




mean	 that	 both	 employees	 could	 be	 dismissed	 for	 poor	 performance.	 For	 the	
employer,	 this	result	seems	equitable,	as	 they	require	workers	who	are	able	 to	
adequately	 perform	 their	 duties.	 However,	 for	 the	 disabled	 employee,	 this	 is	
inequitable,	as	they	are	being	treated	adversely	because	of	their	disability,	which	
has	 caused	 their	poor	performance.	Thus,	 formal	 equality	 fails	 to	 acknowledge	
the	impact	of	disability	on	the	disabled	employee.		
However,	 this	 interpretation	might	 be	 contrary	 to	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	HRA	 (to	
better	protect	human	rights	—	including	the	right	to	employment).	Accordingly,	





the	 employee?	 This	will	 determine	when	 adverse	 treatment	 arising	 due	 to	 the	
consequences	of	the	disability,	will	be	unlawful.		
Nevertheless,	 reviewing	 section	 22	 as	 a	 whole	 reveals	 that	 the	 provision	 also	
seeks	to	balance	the	competing	interests	of	the	disabled	employee	(who	wishes	
to	maintain	 their	 employment)	 and	 the	 employer	 (who	wishes	 only	 to	 employ	
fully	 productive	 employees).	 That	 is,	 while	 the	 provision	 prohibits	 different	
treatment	between	employees	due	to	the	protected	characteristic,	it	restricts	this	
prohibition	to	employees	who	are	‘qualified	for	work.’	Thus,	when	an	employee	
is	 considered	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’	 is	 a	 pivotal	 question.	 This	 will	 be	 the	 first	
interpretive	issue	to	be	examined.		























A	problem	arises	when	two	or	more	of	 the	above	meanings	might	apply	 to	 the	




employee	 remains	professionally	 certified,	 but	 cannot	 satisfy	 the	 requirements	




the	 requisite	 training	 for	 the	 position,	 so	 remain	 eligible	 for	 the	 position.	
However,	the	question	arises	if	they	are	still	able	to	do	the	work.	
When	 an	 employee	 would	 be	 considered	 able	 is	 unclear.	 If	 an	 employee	 can	
perform	some	of	the	essential	duties	of	a	position,	but	not	all	of	 them,	are	they	
still	able	to	work?	At	what	stage	of	diminished	ability	(or	poor	performance)	is	
the	 employee	 was	 no	 longer	 able?	 If	 the	 employee	 is	 formally	 qualified,	 or	
eligible	for	a	position,	but	not	fully	able,	it	is	unclear	if	they	remain	‘qualified	for	
work’	for	the	purposes	of	section	22.	In	the	Professor	Smith	scenario,	it	is	unclear	



















either	 ‘formally	 qualified’	 or	 ‘eligible’	 refers	 to	 skills,	 training	 or	 qualifications	
gained	 in	 the	 past.	 ‘Able’,	 however,	 may	 refer	 to	 the	 current	 ability	 of	 the	
employee.		Thus,	the	point	in	time	at	which	‘qualified’	is	assessed	may	influence	
its	interpretation.	‘Qualified	for	work’	could	be	taken	at	the	time	of	commencing	
the	 position	 (T1)	 or,	 alternatively,	 the	 time	 of	 the	 alleged	 discriminatory	
treatment	(T2).			
If	we	take	the	ordinary,	present	tense,	meaning	of	the	phrase	 ‘is	qualified’,	then	
the	point	 in	 time	 ‘qualified’	refers	 is	T2	and	this	may	 imply	 ‘qualified’	refers	 to	
current	 ability	 (in	 addition	 to	 formal	 qualifications	 and	 eligibility).	However,	 if	
taken	at	T1,	then,	arguably,	this	is	more	likely	to	refer	to	original	eligibility	and	
formal	qualifications	for	a	position,	and	not	the	employee’s	current	ability.		
The	 plain	 meaning	 of	 the	 text	 supports	 both	 a	 time	 T1	 and	 a	 time	 T2	
interpretation.	The	phrase	“is”	qualified	(rather	than	‘was’	qualified,	or	even	just	





However,	 the	 scheme	 of	 the	 Act	 provides	 some	 enlightenment.	 For	
discrimination	in	employment,	the	HRA	has	the	following	schema:		first,	it	must	
be	assessed	if	 the	employee	was	treated	adversely	compared	to	others	because	
of	 their	 disability	 under	 section	 22;	 second,	 the	 employer	 may	 defend	 their	
treatment	 of	 the	 employee	 under	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 for	 that	 ground;286	




283	As	 she	 retains	 the	 skills	 and	 training	 for	 research,	 she	 could	 be	 considered	
eligible	 to	 work.	 It	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 motivation	 or	 energy	 due	 to	 her	 illness	 that	
disenables	her	capacity	to	work,	not	a	lack	of	competency.		
284	Contrast	 this	 to	 the	 Disability	 Discrimination	 Act	 1992	 (Australia),	 s21A	








Thus,	 to	 establish	 unlawful	 discrimination,	 the	 scheme	 of	 the	 Act	 requires	 the	
application	of	multiple	provisions.	Accordingly,	‘qualified’	should	be	interpreted	
in	light	of	these	other	provisions.	However,	ultimately,	it	appears	that	‘qualified	
for	 work’	 still	 acts	 as	 a	 gateway	 into	 section	 22,	 and	 if	 the	 employee	 is	 not	
qualified,	then	the	claim	falls	outside	the	HRA.287		
This	 creates	 a	 dilemma	 for	 the	 correct	 approach	 to	 interpretation	 of	 this	
requirement.	 If	 ‘qualified	 for	work’	 is	 addressed	 at	 the	 outset,	 as	 a	 standalone	
gateway	provision,	 then	 this	must	be	 satisfied	before	a	 claim	of	discrimination	
can	 be	 further	 investigated.	 However,	 it	 might	 be	 more	 apt	 to	 view	 it	 as	 one	
aspect	of	the	full	set	of	discrimination	provisions	that	should	be	interpreted	as	a	
whole.	 Approaching	 things	 in	 this	 manner	 would	 permit	 the	 meaning	 of	
‘qualified’	to	be	influenced	by	the	content	of	other	provisions.		
Furthermore,	 if	 ‘qualified’	 is	 interpreted	 narrowly	 (i.e.	 so	 as	 to	 exclude	
employees	who	are	not	 fully	 able	 to	perform	all	 the	duties	of	 the	position	 to	a	
certain	 standard),	 then	 the	 disabled	 employee	 might	 be	 excluded	 at	 this	 first	
instance	 from	being	 able	 to	 raise	 a	 claim	of	 discrimination.	 	 Consequently,	 the	
employer’s	 treatment	of	 the	employee	would	not	be	 investigated	 to	assess	 if	 it	
was	 adverse,	 and	 by	 reason	 of	 disability,	 thus	 depriving	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	
section	of	effect.	Additionally,	the	adverse	treatment	of	the	employee	would	not	
be	 assessed	 against	 the	 checks	 and	 balances	 provided	 by	 the	 permitted	
exceptions	and	 the	 task	 reallocation	proviso,288	also	depriving	 those	provisions	
of	effect. This goes against the cannon that interpretation	of	provisions	should	not	
‘render	nugatory’	other	parts	of	an	Act.289  
The	task	reallocation	proviso	stipulates	that	when	only	some	of	the	duties	of	the	
disabled	 employee	 are	 excused	 by	 the	 permitted	 exceptions,	 the	 employer	 is	
required	(where	possible)	 to	adjust	 their	activities	 to	reallocate	those	duties	to	
another	employee.	Therefore,	 ‘qualified’	cannot	be	interpreted	to	mean	that	the	
employee	 must	 be	 able	 to	 perform	 all	 the	 duties	 of	 the	 position,	 or	 the	 task	
reallocation	proviso	would	be	moot.		
Therefore,	to	give	effect	to	the	full	scheme	of	the	Act,	when	an	employee,	such	as	
Professor	 Smith,	 is	 able,	 formally	 qualified,	 and	 eligible	 to	 perform	 some	 the	
duties	of	their	position	(such	as	teaching),	or	can	perform	all	of	them	with	special	
services	 provided	 (e.g.	 a	 research	 assistant),	 then	 they	 should	 be	 deemed	
‘qualified’.	
Nevertheless,	 it	 remains	unclear	 if	overall	poor	performance	of	all	 tasks	means	
the	 employee	 is	 no	 longer	 ‘qualified’	 —	 particularly	 if	 the	 employee	 retains	
professional	 certification.	 For	 example,	 a	 radiologist	 who	 holds	 a	 current	
practising	 certificate,	 suffers	 from	 depression	 and	 works	 very	 slowly	 (but	











exceptions	would	 apply,	 as	 there	 are	 no	 special	 services	 or	 facilities	 required,	
and	no	risk	of	harm	to	the	radiologist	or	others.	However,	section	97	grants	the	
HRRT	 the	 power	 to	 declare	 any	 ‘act,	 omission,	 practice,	 requirement	 or	
condition’	that	would	otherwise	be	unlawful,	to	be	a	GOQ.290			
Consequently,	 the	 HRRT	 could,	 if	 requested,	 declare	 a	 minimum	 level	 of	
performance,	or	ability	to	perform	certain	essential	duties,	a	GOQ.	Although	this	
provision	 is	 seldom	utilized,291	it	 adds	 to	 the	 contention	 that	 ‘qualified’	 should	




T1.	This	 is	 because	 section	22(1)(a),	makes	 it	 unlawful	 to	 refuse	 to	 employ	 an	




‘qualified’	 is	 interpreted	 narrowly	 (to	 exclude	 those	 not	 fully	 able),	 then	
assessing	 ‘qualified’	 at	 time	T2	means	 the	disabled	 employee	may	be	 excluded	
before	 the	 potential	 accommodation	 provisions	 can	 be	 utilised	 —	 depriving	
those	provisions	of	effect.	For	example,	on	that	view,	it	would	not	be	unlawful	to	
dismiss	 Professor	 Smith	 for	 poor	 performance,	 even	 though	 this	 may	 be	
temporary,	and	she	could	be	reasonably	accommodated	by	her	employer.		
However,	 if	 ‘qualified’	 is	 taken	 at	 T1,	 it	 is	 likely	 (even	 with	 a	 narrow	
interpretation),	that	the	employee	will	be	deemed	‘qualified’	for	that	position	—	
otherwise	 they	 would	 not	 have	 been	 offered	 the	 position	 initially.	 This	
interpretation	 enables	 all	 the	 provisions	 to	 have	 effect.	 For	 Professor	 Smith,	 if	
she	proves	adverse	treatment,	the	task	reallocation	proviso	may	mean	that,	with	
some	 adjustment	 of	 the	 employer’s	 activities,	 another	 member	 of	 staff	 could	
provide	research	assistance.				
Nonetheless,	 two	 issues	 arise	 if	 interpreting	 ‘qualified’	 at	 time	 T1.	 Firstly,	 it	
would	appear	to	make	the	‘qualified’	gateway	moot,	except	for	job	applicants.	As	
the	 legislature	chose	not	 to	 limit	 ‘qualified’	 to	 job	applicants,	 the	 implication	 is	
that	it	should	apply	to	all	subsections.		
Secondly,	it	seems	ironic	that	whether	a	person	is	‘qualified’	for	a	position	would	
depend	 on	 whether	 they	 were	 employed	 when	 they	 developed	 the	 mental	
																																																								
290	The	 reason	 for	 including	 section	 97	 in	 the	 HRA	 has	 been	 debated.	 One	
explanation	 is	 that	 it	acts	as	a	safety	valve,	 to	excuse	conduct	 that	 is	 justifiable	
but	 was	 not	 anticipated	 when	 the	 legislation	 was	 enacted,	 and	 therefore	 no	
specific	exception	was	included	(Rishworth,	above	n98	at	464).	
291	It	 was	 unsuccessfully	 applied	 for	 in	 E	 v	 L	 Complaints	 Division,	 Settlement	
C337/98	 (Human	 Rights	 Commissioner	 Case	 Note	 13,	 1	 April	 2000).	 The	
employer	 argued	 that	 heavy	 lifting	 was	 a	 requirement	 for	 beekeeping	 and	
therefore	being	male	was	a	GOQ.	However,	the	Proceedings	Commissioner	held	
that	 as	 some	 women	 would	 be	 able	 to	 do	 the	 heaving	 lifting,	 and	 some	 men	




disability.	 A	 lecturer	who	 is	 unable	 to	 research	 is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 considered	 as	
someone	 who	 is	 ‘qualified’	 to	 become	 a	 Professor.	 Therefore,	 it	 would	 be	
inconsistent	 to	 consider	 a	 Professor	 who	 loses	 the	 ability	 to	 research	 as	 still	
being	‘qualified’	to	be	a	Professor.	
The	HRRT	or	Courts	have	not	specifically	addressed	 the	point	 in	 time	at	which	
the	 employee	 is	 to	 be	 ‘qualified’	 for	 work.	 However,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 in	
McAlister	v	Air	New	Zealand292	did	briefly	discuss	the	issue	of	qualification	for	age	
discrimination.	Age	discrimination	has	an	exception	if	age	is	a	GOQ.293	However,	
this	 GOQ	 exception	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 s22(1)(b)-(c),	 the	 provisions	 concerned	
with	the	less	favourable,	or	detrimental,	treatment	of	the	employee.294	The	Court	
held	the	s30	defence	(that	age	is	a	GOQ)	did	not	apply	to	those	provisions	as:295		
…s	 22(1)	 applies	 only	 if	 a	 person	 is	 “qualified	 for	 work	 of	 any	
description”...	 Section	 30	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 s	 22(1)(b)	 because	 an	
employer	who	 is	willing	 to	 employ	 someone	as	qualified	 for	work	of	
that	description	cannot	nevertheless	 invoke	 the	genuine	qualification	
exception	to	justify	less	favourable	terms	of	employment	for	the	work.		
That	 is,	 at	 the	 commencement	 of	 employment	 the	 employee	would	 have	 been	
‘qualified	for	work’	of	that	description	(or	they	would	not	have	been	employed).	
Therefore,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 appears	 to	 say,	 that	 as	 the	 employee	 was	
‘qualified’	at	that	time	of	employment,	the	employer	cannot	later	rely	on	a	GOQ	
for	 excusing	 less	 favourable	 treatment	 of	 the	 employee.	 Therefore,	 for	 age	
discrimination	 at	 least,	 as	 the	 employee	 is	 employed	when	 they	 are	 ‘qualified’,	
the	employer	cannot	at	a	later	time	claim	they	are	no	longer	‘qualified’	due	to	age	




where	he	 could	perform	 them:	 that	 is,	not	 in	 the	USA).297	Nor	did	 it	 result	 in	a	
loss	of	certification.	But,	for	mental	disability	arising	in	employment,	the	issue	is	




employ	 a	 person	 (s30(1)(a)),	 or	 causing	 an	 employee	 to	 retire	 or	 resign	
(s30(1)(d)).	This	is	not	the	situation	in	ERA.	See	n185	above.		
294	The	employer	may	cause	the	employee	to	resign	with	the	defence	that	age	is	a	






297	McAlister	 v	 Air	 New	 Zealand	 Ltd,	 above	 n97.	 American	 flying	 regulations	





the	 time	 at	 which	 it	 should	 be	 assessed	 —	 is	 more	 pertinent	 for	 disability	
discrimination	than	for	other	prohibited	grounds.		
Furthermore,	unlike	age	discrimination,	disability	discrimination	does	not	have	a	
specific	 exception	 of	 a	 GOQ.298	Consequently,	 how,	 in	 the	 scheme	 of	 the	 Act,	
‘qualified’	 is	 interpreted	for	age	may	not	apply	to	disability,	so	the	reasoning	in	
McAlister	v	Air	New	Zealand	may	not	be	entirely	relevant.		
Nonetheless,	 to	give	effect	 to	all	 the	provisions	of	 the	HRA,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	
‘qualified’	 should	 be	 assessed	 at	 time	 T1.	 This	would	 give	 rise	 to	 a	 rebuttable	
presumption	 of	 qualification,	 ensuring	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 is	 not	
‘screened	 out’	 too	 soon,	 before	 their	 treatment	 is	 evaluated	 against	 the	
remainder	of	the	provisions,	depriving	them	of	effect.		‘Qualified	for	work’	could	
be	 rebutted	 if	 the	 employee’s	 performance	 is	 so	 poor	 that	 they	 are	 in	 effect	
unable	to	perform	any	of	the	essential	duties	of	the	position.		
This	interpretation	fits	the	purposes	of	the	Act,	which	according	to	the	long	title,	
is	 to	 ‘provide	 better	 protection	 of	 human	 rights’	 and	 ‘in	 accordance	 with	 the	
United	Nations	Covenants	or	Conventions	on	Human	Rights’.299	









the	 employee	 from	 adverse	 treatment	 by	 reason	 of	 their	 disability,	 and	 to	
maintain	 the	 employer’s	 managerial	 prerogative	 to	 some	 degree,	 which	 may	
explain	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’	 requirement.	 This	 prerogative	
may	 enable	 an	 employer	 to	 dismiss	 a	 poorly	 performing	 employee,	 without	 it	













be	 liberal	 and	 enabling;	 in	Bullock	 v	Department	 of	 Corrections,	 above	 n143	 at	





and	these	required	 ‘qualities’	are	determined	by	the	employer.	 In	 this	case,	 the	
HRRT	accepted	the	employer’s	contention	that	the	complainant	did	not	have	the	
necessary	 ‘x-factor’	 required	 to	 be	 an	 auctioneer.302	For	 Professor	 Smith,	 it	 is	
possible	she	may	have	lost	an	essential	‘quality’	for	her	job	when	her	depression	
manifested	as	 irritability	and	decreased	 tolerance	 for	 students.	Furthermore,	 if	
the	ability	to	get	along	with	students	is	considered	to	be	an	essential	duty	of	the	
position,	 then	 she	 is	 no	 longer	 fulfilling	 it.303	Therefore	 she	 may	 no	 longer	 be	
‘qualified	for	work’.			
Therefore,	 the	 different	 purposes	 of	 the	 Act	 can	 support	 either	 a	 narrow	 or	 a	
liberal	interpretation	of	 ‘qualified	for	work.’	To	better	protect	the	human	rights	
of	 the	 disabled	 employee	 would	 suggest	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’	 be	 interpreted	
widely,	 so	 the	disabled	employee	need	not	be	 able	 to	perform	all	 the	 essential	
requirements	of	the	position,	or,	the	time	at	which	the	assessment	of	whether	an	
employee	 was	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’	 should	 be	 at	 the	 commencement	 of	
employment,	not	at	 the	 time	of	 the	alleged	discrimination.	However,	 to	protect	
the	managerial	prerogative	 ‘qualified	for	work’	should	be	interpreted	narrowly,	
with	 the	 employer	 determining	 whether	 the	 employee	 had	 the	 necessary	
qualities	 for,	and	was	able	to	perform	all	essential	duties	of	 the	position,	at	 the	
time	 of	 the	 unfavourable	 treatment.	 Thus,	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 HRA	 appear	 to	
point	 in	 different	 directions	 and	 do	 not	 clarify	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘qualified	 for	
work’.	Therefore,	the	legislative	history	and	wider	context	should	be	considered.			
4.3.2 Consideration	of	the	Legislative	History	and	Wider	Context	
The	 legislative	 history	 provides	 little	 enlightenment,	 as	 disability	 was	 not	 a	
prohibited	 ground	 of	 discrimination	 under	 the	 previous	 legislation	 (Human	
Rights	 Commission	 Act	 1977	 (HRCA)).	 Nonetheless,	 the	 discrimination	 in	
employment	 provisions	 remain	 similar,	 except	 in	 the	 HRCA	 the	 ‘qualified’	
prerequisite	 applied	 to	 job	 applicants	 only.304	The	 rationale	 for	 changing	 this	
																																																								
301	Director	 of	Human	Rights	 Proceedings	 v	 Goodrum	and	 City	 and	 Country	 Real	
Estate	Limited	above	n95	at	16.		
302	It	has	been	strongly	argued	 that	 the	majority	decision	demonstrates	gender	
bias	 on	 by	 the	 HRRT	 (Elisabeth	 McDonald	 and	 others	 Feminist	 Judgments	 of	
Aotearoa	 New	 Zealand	 (Hart	 Publishing,	 Oxford;	 Portland,	 Oregon,	 2017)	 at	
Chapter	15).	 Interestingly,	 as	Mize	noted,	 the	main	 judgment	does	not	 refer	 to	
the	 dissenting	 judgment.	 This	 judgment	 found	 the	 ‘x	 factor’	 requirement	 to	 be	
gender	biased.	
303	In	the	USA,	the	ability	to	get	along	with	others	has	been	held	to	be	an	essential	













employed)	 is	not	 clear,	 and	was	not	mentioned	 in	 the	white	paper	or	Hansard	
prior	to	enactment.	
This	change,	which	might	reduce	employees’	rights,	seems	inexplicable	given	the	
purpose	 of	 the	 earlier	 HRCA	 was	 to	 ‘promote	 the	 advancement’305	of	 human	
rights,	whereas	 the	more	 recent	HRA	has	 a	 higher	 objective	 to	 ‘provide	 better	
protection	of	human	rights’.306		
However,	 overseas	 and	 international	 law	may	provide	 some	 illumination	 as	 to	








to	 all	 matters	 concerning	 all	 forms	 of	 employment,	 including	
conditions	of	recruitment,	hiring	and	employment,	continuance	
of	 employment,	 career	 advancement	 and	 safe	 and	 healthy	
working	conditions	(emphasis	added).	
This	 implies	 that,	whenever	possible,	 the	employment	of	 the	mentally	disabled	
employee	 should	be	protected.	 In	 addition,	 the	UNCRPD	has	a	 requirement	 for	
the	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 the	 disabled	 in	 employment.	 Thus,	 to	 give	
effect	 to	 the	potential	 accommodation	provisions	of	 the	HRA,	 ‘qualified’	 should	
be	 interpreted	 in	 a	manner	 that	 enables	 the	 full	 assessment	 of	 the	 treatment,	
which,	if	found	adverse,	can	be	assessed	against	these	provisions.	This	reinforces	
the	 argument	 that,	 even	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 partial,	 or	 poor	 performance,	 the	
employee	should	still	be	considered	‘qualified’.	







306	Human	 Rights	 Act	 1993,	 Long	 Title.	 In	 addition,	 NZBORA	 s19	 confirms	 the	






308	New	 Zealand	 is	 a	 founding	member	 of	 the	 ILO.	 The	 ILO	 has	 promulgated	 a	




improving	 employment	 prospects	 for	 persons	with	 disabilities	
by	 facilitating	 recruitment,	 return	 to	 work,	 job	 retention	 and	
opportunities	for	advancement	(emphasis	added).	
Furthermore,	 the	 ILO	 Code	 states	 performance	 requirements	 may	 need	 to	 be	
reviewed	when	an	existing	employee	acquires	a	disability.310		
Therefore,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 international	 conventions,	 retention	 of	 work	 and	





(ADA)	 prohibits	 discrimination	 against	 a	 ‘qualified’	 individual.	 A	 ‘qualified	
individual’	means:311		
…an	 individual	 who,	 with	 or	 without	 reasonable	






This	 is	 a	 narrower	 interpretation	 than	 could	 be	 proposed	 for	 the	 HRA	 (which	





that	 inform	 the	 code	 are	 the	 international	 labour	 standards,	 including	 the	
Vocational	Rehabilitation	and	Employment	(Disabled	Persons)	Convention,	1983	
(No.	159),	 and	Recommendation	 (No.	168),	1983.	 	Article	7	of	 that	Convention	
states:		‘The	competent	authorities	shall	take	measures	with	a	view	to	providing	
and	evaluating	vocational	guidance,	vocational	training,	placement,	employment	
and	 other	 related	 services	 to	 enable	 disabled	 persons	 to	 secure,	 retain	 and	




‘For	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 subchapter,	 consideration	 shall	 be	 given	 to	 the	
employer's	 judgment	 as	 to	 what	 functions	 of	 a	 job	 are	 essential,	 and	 if	 an	
employer	has	prepared	a	written	description	before	advertising	or	interviewing	
applicants	 for	 the	 job,	 this	 description	 shall	 be	 considered	 evidence	 of	 the	
essential	functions	of	the	job.’	
312	The	 ‘qualification	 standards’	may	 include	 a	 requirement	 that	 the	 individual	
not	pose	a	direct	threat	to	the	health	and	safety	of	other	individuals	in	the	work	
place.	 It	 may	 be	 a	 defence	 to	 a	 discrimination	 charge	 when	 a	 qualification	
standard	 is	 ‘job-related	 and	 consistent	 with	 business	 necessity,	 and	 such	




after	 the	 employee	 has	 been	 reasonably	 accommodated,	 and,	 furthermore,	 the	
ADA	 specifies	 the	 reasonable	 accommodation	 requirements, 313 	making	 the	
failure	to	reasonably	accommodate	the	disabled	employee,	to	the	point	of	‘undue	
hardship’,	 a	 ground	 of	 discrimination.314	Given	 these	 safeguards,	 this	 narrower	
interpretation	of	‘qualified’	is	apposite.		
However,	 the	 situation	 is	 not	 the	 same	 under	 the	 HRA,	 where	 there	 is	 no	
distinction	between	the	essential	and	non-essential	duties	of	a	position,	and	no	
positive	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 the	 mentally	 disabled	
employee	is	imposed	on	the	employer.	Therefore,	a	more	liberal	interpretation	of	









must	 be	 reasonably	 accommodated	 before	 the	 assessment	 of	 ‘qualification’	 is	
made.	 Conversely,	 as	 the	 HRA	 contains	 no	 positive	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation,	a	more	liberal	interpretation	of	‘qualified’	is	required	—	else	the	
disabled	 employee	 risks	 falling	 outside	 the	 HRA,	 before	 the	 remainder	 of	 the	
provisions	are	given	effect.		
Therefore,	 the	 best	 interpretation	 of	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’	 is	 that	 the	 employee	
should	be	 considered	 ‘qualified’	unless	 they	are	unable	 to	perform	most	of	 the	
essential	duties	of	the	position.	This	interpretation	enables	the	treatment	of	the	
employee	 to	 be	 assessed	 against	 the	 remainder	 of	 section	 22,	 and	 utilises	 the	
checks	 and	balances	 of	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 (which	provide	 the	 employer	
with	a	defence	against	a	claim	of	discrimination)	and	task	reallocation	proviso.	




which	 their	 dismissal	will	 be	 substantively	 justified),	 it	 is	 possible	 that,	 at	 that	
level	of	performance,	 the	employee	may	still	be	considered	 ‘qualified	 for	work’	
under	the	HRA.	Thus,	it	appears	that	what	might	constitute	a	justified	dismissal	





or	 modification	 of	 equipment	 or	 devices,	 appropriate	 adjustment	 or	
modifications	 of	 examinations,	 training	 materials	 or	 policies,	 the	 provision	 of	





Nevertheless,	 when	 the	 employee’s	 performance	 is	 so	 poor	 they	 are	 not,	 in	
reality,	performing	most	of	the	essential	duties	of	the	position,	then	they	can	no	




The	 next	 core	 element	 of	 discrimination	 posing	 interpretive	 difficulties	 is	 the	
identification	of	 the	proper	 comparator	 employee.	This	 is	 a	 crucial	 ‘step	 in	 the	
process’,316	as	 how	 the	 comparator	 employee	 would	 be	 treated	 in	 the	 same	
circumstances	determines	 if	 the	disabled	employee’s	 treatment	was	adverse	or	
not.	If	it	is	established	that	the	treatment	of	the	disabled	employee	was	adverse	
(compared	 to	 the	 treatment	 of	 the	 comparator	 employee),	 the	 next	 step	 is	 to	
determine	if	the	reason	for	the	adverse	treatment	was	the	protected	ground	(in	




to	 offer	 or	 afford	 the	 applicant	 or	 the	 employee	 less	 favourable	
terms	 of	 employment,	 conditions	 of	 work….	 than	 are	 made	
available	to	applicants	or	employees	of	the	same	or	substantially	
similar	 capabilities	 employed	 in	 the	 same	 or	 substantially	
similar	circumstances	on	work	of	that		description;	
and,	under	s22(1)(c):	
to	 terminate	 the	 employment	 of	 the	 employee,	 or	 subject	 the	
employee	 to	 any	 detriment	 in	 circumstances	 in	 which	 the	
employment	 of	 other	 employees	 employed	 on	 work	 of	 that	
description	 would	 not	 be	 terminated,	 or	 in	 which	 other	
employees	employed	on	work	of	that	description	would	not	be	
subjected	to	such	detriment.	






a	 person	 is	 qualified:	 the	 rationality	 test	 (that	 the	 decision	 is	 an	 honest	
assessment	 by	 the	 employer	 of	 the	 person’s	 suitability	 to	 do	 the	 job)	 and	 the	
factual	test	(that	the	honest	assessment	of	the	employee’s	ability	based	on	facts	
available	 to	 the	 employer	 at	 the	 time):	Proceedings	Commissioner	v	Canterbury	
Frozen	 Meat	 Co	 Ltd	 CRT	 14/98,	 26	 November	 1998	 at	 6.	 Both	 of	 these	 tests	
authorise	the	employer	to	determine	if	the	employee	is	able	or	not.			






Second,	 section	 22	 (1)(b)	 compares	 the	 treatment	 of	 the	 mentally	 disabled	




similar	 circumstances	 to	 the	 disabled	 employee,	 and	 on	 work	 of	 the	 same	
description.	
Third,	 section	 22	 (1)(c)	 assesses	 the	 circumstances	 in	 which	 the	 mentally	
disabled	was	adversely	treated.	The	comparison	is	made	between	the	treatment	











is	 compared	 to	 a	 normally	 performing	 Professor	 the	 outcome	 might	 well	 be	
different	than	if	she	was	compared	with	a	poorly	performing	Professor.	That	is,	a	
normally	 performing	 Professor	 would	 not	 be	 subjected	 to	 a	 PIP.	 Therefore,	
Professor	Smith,	when	subjected	to	a	PIP,	is	treated	adversely	in	comparison	to	
that	other	Professor.			
Conversely,	 if	 Professor	 Smith	 is	 compared	 to	 a	 previously	 highly	 performing	
Professor,	whose	performance	has	declined	for	other	reasons	(such	as	laziness),	
and	who	would	 be	 subjected	 to	 a	 PIP,	 then	 Professor	 Smith’s	 treatment	 is	 not	
dissimilar	to	the	comparator’s	treatment,	and	may	not	be	adverse.	
But,	in	comparison	to	a	Professor	or	lecturer	who	performs	equally	poorly,	but	is	





‘circumstances’	 may	 determine	 if	 this	 would	 be	 an	 apt	 comparator	 employee.		




poorly	 performing,	 then,	 in	 comparison	 to	 them,	 Professor	 Smith	 is	 treated	
adversely.	 If	 that	 other	 employee	would	 be	 subjected	 to	 a	 PIP,	 then	 Professor	







Therefore,	 to	 identify	 the	 proper	 comparator,	 the	 three	 comparative	 elements	
require	 interpretation:	 ‘work	 of	 that	 description’;	 the	 employee’s	 ‘capabilities’;	







to	 employees	 generally	 involved	 in	 teaching	 and	 research,	 regardless	 of	
academic	 title.	However,	 a	narrow	 interpretation	 could	 restrict	 the	meaning	 to	
employees	working	in	the	same	field	—	or	even	having	the	same	job	description.	
Thus,	Professor	Smith	would	be	compared	to	other	Professors.		
Interpreting	 ‘work	of	 that	 description’	 broadly	would	 enable	Professor	 Smith’s	
work	 to	 be	 compared	with	 a	wide	 range	 of	work	 in	 the	 teaching	 and	 research	
fields.	 Thus,	 the	 comparator	 employee	 on	 ‘work	 of	 that	 description’	 might	
include	 newly	 employed,	 or	 inexperienced	 lecturers,	 or	 teaching	 fellows	 or	






is	would	be	 compared	 to	 the	work	of	 other	Professors,	with	high	performance	
expectations	and	where	poor	performance	would	likely	trigger	a	PIP.		
Thus,	 the	plain	meaning	of	 the	 text	 is	 capable	of	more	 than	one	 interpretation,	
which	could	affect	the	choice	of	comparator,	and	hence	the	outcome	of	the	claim.		
The	Same	or	Substantially	Similar	Capabilities	
In	 addition	 s22(1)(b)	 requires	 that	 the	 comparator	 employee	 must	 be	 of	 the	
‘same	or	substantially	similar	capabilities’.318		
‘Substantially	 similar’	 is	 an	 evaluative	 term,	 so	 who	 is	 considered	 to	 satisfy	 it	





them,	 the	 treatment	 for	 Professor	 Smith	 would	 not	 be	 adverse.	 However,	 the	
treatment	of	both	employees	may	be	adverse	by	 reason	of	 their	disability,	 and	
the	employer	is	merely	being	consistently	discriminatory.	
318 	Under	 HRA	 s22(1)(b),	 the	 employer	 cannot	 afford	 the	 employee	 less	
favourable	 terms	 of	 employment	 or	 conditions	 of	work	 than	 afforded	 to	 other	





‘competent;	 able;	 gifted’,	 or	 as	 ‘having	 the	 ability,	 fitness,	 or	 necessary	 quality	
for.’320		
Consequently,	there	is	a	spectrum	of	ability	(from	‘competent’	to	 ‘gifted’)	that	a	
comparator	 of	 ‘the	 same	 or	 similar	 capabilities’	 may	 fall	 within.	 Thus,	 the	
potential	comparator	for	Professor	Smith	ranges	from	the	less	 ‘able’	(i.e.	barely	
competent)	 academic	 to	 the	 highly	 performing	 (or	 ‘gifted’)	 Professor.	 As	
discussed	 above,	 if	 the	 comparator	with	 ‘substantially	 similar	 capabilities’	 is	 a	
highly	 performing	 Professor	 (who	 would	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 PIP),	 then	 the	
treatment	 of	 Professor	 Smith	 is	 adverse.	 However,	 if	 the	 comparator	 of	
‘substantially	similar	capabilities’	is	a	less	able	(so	barely	competent)	employee,	
who	 would	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 PIP,	 then	 it	 would	 not	 be	 adverse	 treatment	 of	
Professor	Smith	to	subject	her	to	a	PIP	as	well.		
Alternatively,	 the	 approach	 could	 be	 to	 choose	 a	 comparator	 that	 mirrors	
Professor	 Smith	 in	 terms	 of	 capability.	 Then	 the	 question	 arises:	 should	 this	
mirror	 image	 comparator	 be	 Professor	 Smith	 at	 time	 T1	 (when	 she	 became	 a	
Professor	 and	 was	 highly	 performing)	 or	 time	 T2	 (when	 she	 was	 poorly	
performing	and	the	PIP	was	instigated)?			
As	discussed	previously,	 for	mental	disability,	 there	are	good	policy	 reasons	 to	
assess	the	capabilities	of	the	mentally	disabled	employee	at	T1,	as	this	fits	most	
closely	 with	 the	 objectives	 of	 the	 UNCRPD	 and	 HRA.	 This	 is	 because	 a	 more	
highly	capable	employee	 (like	 the	disabled	employee	at	 time	T1)	would	not	be	
treated	adversely.	In	comparison	to	them,	subjecting	the	disabled	employee	to	a	
PIP	 would	 be	 adverse	 treatment.	 However,	 if	 the	 comparator	 employee	 is	
someone	of	 similar	 capability	 to	 the	disabled	 employee	 at	 time	T2	 (when	 they	
were	 less	 capable),	 such	 an	 employee	 might	 also	 be	 subjected	 to	 a	 PIP.	 In	
comparison	to	them	the	disabled	employee’s	treatment	would	not	be	adverse	—
and	 the	 disabled	 employee	 falls	 outside	 the	 Act	 without	 it	 being	 necessary	 to	
assess	if	the	employer	could	have	accommodated	the	employee’s	disability.	This	
is	 inconsistent	 with	 New	 Zealand’s	 obligations	 under	 the	 UNCRPD	 for	 the	
reasonable	accommodation	of	disability,	and	with	the	HRA’s	objectives	to	better	
protect	the	human	rights	of	the	disabled.		
Overall	 then,	 the	 text	does	not	 clarify	what	 the	 ‘capabilities’	 of	 the	 comparator	
should	be.	It	 is	unclear	from	the	text	whether	‘capabilities’	should	be	construed	
broadly	—	that	 is,	 the	comparator	employee	 is	someone	capable	of	performing	
the	duties	of	 the	position	(regardless	of	skill	 level),	or	whether	the	comparator	
employee	should	be	of	similar	skill	level	to	the	disabled	employee	at	the	time	of	
their	unfavourable	 treatment,	 or	of	 similar	 skill	 level	 to	 the	disabled	employee	
when	they	were	performing	normally.		
Again,	 as	 the	 text	 is	 capable	 of	 more	 than	 one	 meaning,	 this	 could	 affect	 the	
choice	of	the	comparator,	and	the	outcome	of	the	claim.	However,	before	moving	
on	 to	 discuss	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 correct	 comparator	 using	 the	 remaining	







The	 last	 comparative	element	 requiring	 interpretation	 is	 the	 ‘circumstances’	of	
the	treatment.	The	term	circumstances	is	used	differently	in	s22(1)(b)	than	it	is	
in	s22(1)(c).	In	the	former,	it	refers	to	the	comparator	employee	being	employed	
in	 similar	 circumstances	 —	 for	 example,	 both	 employees	 are	 employed	 as	
fulltime	equivalents,	 or	 employed	 in	 the	 same	 location,	or	 employed	under	 the	
same	collective	contract.	In	this	situation	Professor	Smith	would	be	compared	to	
another	 fulltime	 Professor	 at	 the	 same	 University.	 Used	 in	 this	 way,	 the	 term	
‘circumstances’	is	unlikely	to	prove	controversial.		
However,	 in	 s22(1)(c),	 ‘circumstances’	 pertains	 to	 the	 situation	 under	 which	




the	 ‘circumstances’,	 or	 situation,	 that	 led	 to	 Professor	 Smith’s	 PIP	 was	 simply	
that	 she	 was	 poorly	 performing.	 Therefore	 the	 comparison	 would	 with	 an	
employee	who	was	also	poorly	performing	(perhaps	due	to	laziness).	Then,	if	the	
comparator	employee	would	be	subjected	 to	a	PIP,	 in	 that	 ‘circumstance’	 there	
would	be	no	adverse	treatment	of	Professor	Smith.		
However,	 it	 could	 also	 be	 argued	 that	 Professor	 Smith’s	 PIP	 arose	 in	 the	
circumstances	where,	due	to	matters	beyond	her	control,	she	was	unable	to	work	
productively.	 Therefore,	 the	 comparative	 circumstances	 should	 be	 those	 in	
which	another	Professor,	due	to	factors	outside	of	their	control	was	also	unable	
(as	opposed	 to	unwilling)	 to	work	productively.	Perhaps	 there	 is	on-going	and	
excessive	 noise	 from	 building	 work	 outside	 their	 office,	 or	 they	 have	 been	
allocated	 extra	 administrative	 work	 by	 the	 University,	 or	 they	 have	 other	
personal	 problems,	 for	 example,	 having	 to	 care	 for	 a	 sick	 child.	 Under	 these	
circumstances,	 a	 PIP	 might	 not	 be	 instigated	 against	 them.	 Thus,	 how	
‘circumstances’	 is	 interpreted	will	 affect	 the	 choice	of	 comparator,	 and	 in	 turn,	
impact	on	whether	the	disabled	employee’s	treatment	is	adverse	in	comparison	
to	them.	
Potentially	 then,	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘circumstances’	 may	 be	 controversial.	 The	
problem	 is	 that,	 while	 the	 comparator	 will	 be	 an	 employee	 without	 a	 mental	
disability,	 what	 is	 unclear	 is	 whether	 the	 effects,	 or	 consequences,	 of	 the	
disability	(such	as	poor	performance)	should	be	included	in	the	circumstances	—	
that	 is,	 should	 the	 comparator	 employee	 be	 in	 circumstances	where	 they	 also	
perform	poorly	(but	for	another	reason,	such	as	laziness)?		
If	 the	 consequence	 of	 the	 disability,	 such	 as	 the	 poor	 performance,	 is	 not	
included	 in	 the	comparative	circumstances,	 then	the	comparator	employee	will	
be	performing	normally,	so	will	not	be	subjected	to	a	PIP.	In	comparison	to	them,	













If	 so,	 then	 the	 comparator	would	 be	 a	 poorly	 performing	 employee	without	 a	
disability.	 If	 that	 comparator	 employee	 would	 be	 subjected	 to	 a	 PIP,	 then	
Professor	 Smith’s	 treatment,	 in	 comparison	 to	 them,	 is	 not	 adverse,	 as	 both	
would	suffer	the	same	treatment.		
However,	a	further	complicating	factor	is	whether	consideration	should	be	taken	
of	 the	cause	of	 the	circumstances.	 In	the	Professor	Smith	example,	where	other	
lecturers	are	poorly	performing,	this	may	be	caused	by	inexperience	or	newness	
to	 a	 role.	 If	 Professor	 Smith	 is	 compared	 to	 such	 a	 poorly	 performing	 but	
inexperienced	 lecturer	 (not	 a	 Professor)	 who	 is	 not	 subjected	 to	 a	 PIP,	 then	
although	 both	 are	 poorly	 performing,	 the	 cause	 of	 the	 poor	 performance	 is	
different.	 So,	 although	 Professor	 Smith	 is	 treated	 adversely	 in	 comparison	 to	
another	 poorly	 performing	 lecturer,	 the	 differing	 causes	 of	 the	 ‘circumstances’	
may	explain	the	disparity	in	treatment.	In	these	circumstances	the	inexperienced	
employee	is	expected	to	improve,	whereas	Professor	Smith	has	demonstrated	a	
loss	 of	 performance.	 Additionally	 their	 respective	 ‘capabilities’	 differ	 —	 the	
comparator’s	 capabilities	 may	 be	 appropriate	 for	 their	 level	 of	 experience,	
whereas	Professor	Smith’s	are	not.		
However,	 if	 the	 comparator	 employee’s	 poor	 performance	was	 due	 to	 laziness	
and	they	were	subjected	to	a	PIP,	then	it	may	be	that	the	circumstances	are	more	
similar	 to	 those	 of	 Professor	 Smith	 (i.e.	 both	 of	 similar	 capability	 and	 both	
demonstrating	a	loss	of	performance).	If	the	lazy	Professor	is	subjected	to	a	PIP,	
then	Professor	Smith’s	treatment,	in	comparison	to	them,	is	not	adverse.		
It	 is	not	clear	 from	the	 text	 if	 the	 ‘circumstances’	 include	 the	cause	of	 the	poor	
performance	(or	other	consequential	effects	of	disability),	or	the	future	expected	
outcome.	 A	 lazy	 or	 disinterested	 Professor’s	 performance	 is	 a	 matter	 of	 their	
choice,	and	their	performance	may	not	be	expected	to	improve.	However,	like	a	
mentally	 disabled	 Professor,	 an	 employee	 who	 suddenly	 has	 to	 take	 on	 extra	
administrative	 work,	 so	 that	 they	 cannot	 concentrate	 on	 their	 research	 and	
writing,	 has	no	 intention	or	 desire	 to	 be	poorly	performing,	 and	will	 return	 to	
normal	performance	 in	 time.	Likewise	 the	unwell	Professor	may	well	 return	to	
normal	productivity,	given	time	and	appropriate	treatment.	But,	the	causes	of	the	
circumstances	are	different,	and	this	may	affect	the	potential	outcome.		
Generally,	 that	 the	 text	 does	 not	 clarify	 what	 is	 meant	 by	 the	 ‘circumstances’	
under	which	the	comparison	will	take	place,	yet	this	can	affect	the	outcome.		
Overall,	 the	 text	 reveals	 several	 possible	 interpretations	 for	 each	 comparative	
element.	This	means	 the	provisions	 (taken	as	 a	whole)	 are	 capable	of	multiple	










Elias	 J	 said:322	the	 Court	must	‘select	 the	 comparator	 group	which	 best	 fits	 the	
statutory	scheme	in	relation	to	the	particular	ground	of	discrimination	that	is	in	
issue’,	 taking	 into	 account	 any	 defences	 available.	 Accordingly,	 for	 disability	
discrimination,	 the	permitted	exceptions	and	 the	 task	reallocation	proviso	may	
provide	 interpretive	 assistance,	 as	 the	 scheme	 of	 the	 Act	 reveals	 a	 complex	
interaction	between	these	provisions.	
The	role	of	the	comparator	is	to	ascertain	if	the	mentally	disabled	employee	was	
treated	 adversely	 in	 comparison	 to	 a	 non-disabled	 employee	 and	whether	 this	
adverse	 treatment	 was	 by	 reason	 of	 disability	 (s22).	 That	 is,	 even	 after	 the	
comparison	 reveals	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 was	 treated	 adversely	
compared	to	other	employees,	discrimination	is	not	yet	proven	—	the	employee	
still	must	demonstrate	 the	adverse	 treatment	was	 ‘by	 reason	of’	disability	 (the	
crux	 of	 discriminatory	 treatment).	 At	 that	 stage	 the	 potential	 accommodation	
provisions	are	pertinent.	That	 is,	 if	 the	 treatment	was	due	 to	 the	disability,	 the	
employer	may	 still	 defend	 their	 actions	 under	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 (s29),	
subject	to	the	task	reallocation	proviso	(s35).		
Therefore,	 in	the	context	of	the	Act,	the	comparator	should	be	one	that	enables	
the	employee	to	prove	whether	 their	 treatment	was	because	of	 their	disability.	
Comparison	 with	 an	 employee	 demonstrating	 the	 salient	 feature,	 or	
consequences	arising	from	the	disability	(such	as	poor	performance)	is	less	likely	
to	 result	 in	 a	 finding	 of	 adverse	 treatment	 (as	 it	 is	more	 likely	 that	 all	 poorly	
performing	employees	would	be	subjected	to	a	PIP	or	dismissal).	Consequently,	
whether	 the	 treatment	 was	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	 disability	 would	 not	 be	 properly	
evaluated	 and	 nor	 would	 the	 employee’s	 treatment	 be	 assessed	 against	 the	
potential	accommodation	provisions,	depriving	these	provisions	of	effect.		
In	 contrast,	 using	 a	 comparator	 that	 does	 not	 mirror	 the	 employee’s	
circumstance	(e.g.	poor	performance)	allows	the	full	scheme	of	the	HRA	to	have	
effect.	 Thus,	 the	 comparator	 should	 not	 mirror	 the	 employee	 with	 the	
manifestation	or	consequence	of	their	disability,	but	mirror	how	they	were	prior	
to	 the	 manifestation	 of	 the	 disability,	 allowing	 the	 material	 reasons	 for	 the	
adverse	 treatment	 to	 be	 established.	 The	 employer	 may	 still	 rely	 on	 the	
permitted	 exceptions	 (subject	 to	 the	 task	 reallocation	 proviso)	 to	 defend	 their	
adverse	treatment	of	the	employee.	This	allows	each	part	of	the	legal	scheme	to	
play	its	part.		
Accordingly,	 the	 scheme	 of	 the	 Act	 suggests	 the	 comparator	 should	 be	 a	 non-
disabled	 employee	 without	 the	 features	 of	 the	 disability	 (i.e.,	 the	 comparator	
should	not	replicate	the	poor	performance	of	the	disabled	employee).	Thus,	 for	
Professor	Smith,	the	comparator	should	be	the	normally	performing	Professor.		






purpose	 is	 to	maintain	 the	employer’s	managerial	prerogative.	These	purposes	
are	potentially	in	conflict.		
To	 give	 effect	 to	 the	 former	 purpose,	 the	 comparator	 should	 be	 selected	 in	 a	
manner	 that	 does	 not	 deprive	 the	 disabled	 employee	 of	 their	 human	 right	 to	
work.	Therefore,	as	discussed	above,	the	comparator	should	not	demonstrate	the	
effects	or	manifestations	of	the	disability,	but	should	mirror	the	well	employee.		
However,	 to	 respect	 the	 latter	purpose	of	 the	Act	—	 to	protect	 the	 employer’s	
managerial	 prerogative	 (including	 the	 prerogative	 to	 dismiss	 a	 poorly	
performing	 employee)	 —	 the	 comparator	 should	 be	 a	 poorly	 performing	
employee	(but	absent	their	disability).	Therefore,	the	purposes	of	the	Act	appear	
conflicting	and	do	not	clarify	which	is	the	correct	comparator.			
Judicial	 history	 provides	 limited	 assistance	 in	 indicating	 the	 appropriate	
comparator	 for	 disability	 discrimination.	 However,	 its	 selection	 has	 been	
discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 other	 grounds.	 In	McAlister	 v	 Air	 New	 Zealand,323	the	
Supreme	Court	confirmed	(for	age	discrimination	at	 least),	that	the	comparator	
should	 not	 reflect	 the	 salient	 feature	 of	 the	 protected	 ground.	 For	 McAlister,	
where,	 due	 to	 USA	 regulations,	 his	 age	 meant	 he	 was	 unable	 to	 pilot	 in	 USA	





provides	 the	 employer	 with	 a	 defence	 for	 causing	 an	 employee	 to	 retire	 or	
resign.	That	defence	 is	 that	being	under	(or	over)	a	certain	age	 is	a	GOQ.	Thus,	
Air	New	Zealand	had	the	potential	to	argue	that	being	less	than	60	years	old	was	
a	GOQ	for	a	pilot-in-command.324	However,	disability	discrimination	has	no	GOQ	
defence,	 so	 in	 the	 Professor	 Smith	 scenario,	 the	 University	 could	 not	 claim	
performance	 to	a	 certain	 standard	 is	a	GOQ	 for	her	position.	 	This	 changes	 the	
context	in	which	interpretation	takes	place.		
Secondly,	McAlister’s	inability	to	pilot	was	due	to	a	regulatory	requirement,	not	
poor	performance.	 Similarly,	 in	Atley	v	Southern	DHB,325	where	 a	 nurse	had	bi-
polar	disorder	and	was	unable	to	work	night	shifts,	there	were	no	performance	





324	The	 claim	 in	McAlister	was	 raised	 as	 a	 PG	 under	 the	 ERA	 discrimination	 in	
employment	provisions.	The	ERA	differs	 from	the	HRA	 in	 that	 the	GOQ	 for	age	
applies	to	adverse	treatment	(s103(1)(a))	whereas	it	does	not	in	the	HRA.	Given	
this,	it	is	possible	the	comparator	selected	by	the	Supreme	Court	may	have	been	











Accordingly,	 for	 other	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	 discrimination,	 the	 comparator	
should	 not	 reflect	 the	 salient	 feature	 of	 that	 ground	 (e.g.	 the	 inability	 to	work	
Saturday,	or	being	unable	 to	pilot	an	aircraft	 into	USA	airspace).	However,	 it	 is	
less	 certain	 that	 this	 type	 of	 comparator	 (i.e.,	 one	 that	 does	 not	 exhibit	 the	
consequence	 of	 the	 ground)	 is	 appropriate	 for	 disability.	 	 The	 difficulty	 with	




protecting	 the	 human	 rights	 of	 the	 disabled,	 and	 fails	 to	 give	 effect	 to	 the	
potential	accommodation	provisions.		
This	demonstrates	how	the	current	law	in	New	Zealand	pits	the	interests	of	the	
employer	 against	 those	 of	 the	 employee,	 and	 shows	 that	 the	 selection	 of	 the	
comparator	 will	 reflect	 where	 the	 point	 of	 balance	 between	 these	 competing	
interests	 lies.	 Thus,	 if	 interpretation	 of	 the	 provisions	 is	 unable	 to	 clearly	
establish	the	correct	comparator,	there	is	a	risk	that	the	interpretation	selected	





Interpretation	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 UNCRPD	 requires	 selection	 of	 a	
comparator	 that	best	 fits	 the	purposes	of	 the	convention,	which	 is	 to	 ‘promote,	
protect	 and	 ensure	 the	 full	 and	 equal	 enjoyment	 of	 the	 human	 rights	 and	
fundamental	freedoms’328	for	those	with	disabilities,	including	the	right	to	work.	
Thus,	the	focus	of	the	UNCRPD	is	not	on	equal	treatment	of	the	employee	(formal	
equality),	but	on	equality	of	outcome,	 i.e.	 the	 full	enjoyment	of	 their	 rights	and	




purpose	 or	 effect	 of	 impairing	 or	 nullifying	 the	 recognition,	
enjoyment	 or	 exercise,	 on	 an	 equal	 basis	 with	 others,	 of	 all	
human	 rights	 and	 fundamental	 freedoms	 in	 the	 political,	









forms	 of	 discrimination,	 including	 denial	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation	(emphasis	added).	
The	 UNCRPD’s	 focus	 on	 substantive	 equality	 and	 the	 need	 for	 reasonable	
accommodation	 implies	 the	 comparator	 should	 not	 ‘mirror’	 the	 disabled	
employee,	as	 that	approach	 focuses	on	 formal	equality.	 Instead	the	comparator	
should	 be	 one	 that	 promotes	 substantive	 equality.	 Thus,	 as	 reasonable	
accommodation	 promotes	 substantive	 equality,	 then,	 under	 the	 HRA,	 the	
comparator	should	be	one	that	allows	the	employee’s	position	to	be	assessed	in	
light	 of	 the	 HRA’s	 potential	 accommodation	 provisions,	 before	 a	 finding	
regarding	unlawful	treatment	is	made.		
Nonetheless,	 for	 mental	 disability,	 overseas	 jurisprudence	 has	 shown	 this	
interpretation	 to	 be	 contentious.	 The	manifestations	 of	 mental	 disability	 have	




It	 is	one	thing	to	say,	 in	the	case	of	 the	pupil,	 that	his	violence,	
being	disturbed	behavior	resulting	from	a	disorder,	is	an	aspect	
of	 his	 disability.	 It	 is	 another	 thing	 to	 say	 that	 the	 required	
comparison	 is	 with	 a	 non-violent	 pupil.	 The	 required	
comparison	 is	 with	 a	 pupil	 without	 the	 disability;	 not	 a	 pupil	
without	 the	 violence.	 The	 circumstances	 are	 relevantly	 the	
same,	in	terms	of	treatment,	when	that	pupil	engages	in	violent	
behaviour.	 The	 law	 does	 not	 regard	 all	 bad	 behaviour	 as	
disturbed	behaviour;	and	it	does	not	regard	all	violent	people	as	
disabled.	 The	 fallacy	 in	 the	 appellant's	 argument	 lies	 in	 the	
contention	 that,	 because	 the	 pupil's	 violent	 behaviour	 was	
disturbed,	and	resulted	from	a	disorder,	s	5	always	requires,	and	
only	 permits,	 a	 comparison	 between	 his	 treatment	 and	 the	






interaction	 between	 State	 and	 Federal	 criminal	 law	 (at	 [83]),	 	 while	 Gleeson	 J	
held	 it	 would	 be	 	 ‘unfair’	 to	 identify	 disability	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 principal’s	
decision	as	it	would	‘leave	out	of	account	obligations	and	responsibilities	which	
the	principal	was	legally	required	to	take	into	account’	(at	[227]).	
332	Purvis	 v	 New	 South	Wales,	 above	 n29	 at	 [11].	 The	 claimant	 was	 the	 foster	
father	 of	 a	 brain-damaged	 boy	 who	 was	 suspended	 and	 then	 excluded	 from	
school	as	a	result	of	his	violent	behaviour.	The	majority	held	that	exclusion	of	the	
complainant	 from	 school	 was	 not	 discriminatory,	 as	 other	 non-disabled,	 but	
similarly	 violent,	 students	 would	 be	 excluded.	 The	 minority	 held	 the	







was	not	disturbed	behaviour	 resulting	 from	a	disorder.	 Such	a	
comparison	 requires	 no	 feat	 of	 imagination.	 There	 are	 pupils	
who	have	no	disorder,	and	are	not	disturbed,	who	behave	 in	a	
violent	manner	towards	others.	…	





Cth),	 by	 inserting	 a	 requirement	 for	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 the	
disabled.334	
The	 situation	 in	 the	 UK	 has	 varied.	 Until	 2008,	 the	 leading	 authority,	 decided	
under	 the	 Disability	 Discrimination	 Act	 1995	 (DDA	 UK),	 was	 Clark	 v	Novacold	
Ltd.335	Clark	was	 dismissed	 as,	 due	 to	 disability,	 he	was	 unable	 to	 perform	 the	
main	functions	of	his	position.	The	Court	of	Appeal	held	the	comparator	did	not	
have	 to	 be	 in	 the	 same	 circumstances	 as	 the	 disabled	 employee	 (i.e.	 unable	 to	
work).	The	comparator	would	be	an	employee	who	was	able	to	perform	the	main	
functions	 of	 the	 job,	 so	 they	 would	 not	 be	 dismissed.	 In	 comparison	 to	 them,	
Clark’s	dismissal	for	non-performance	was	adverse	treatment.336			




in	 comparison	 to	 them	 he	 was	 not	 treated	 adversely,	 and	 hence,	 no	
discrimination	 had	 occurred.	 Nonetheless,	 Baroness	 Hale	 acknowledged	 the	
difficulties	of	disability	discrimination	law:338	











336	The	 case	was	 remitted	 to	 the	 Tribunal	 to	 assess	whether,	 on	 the	 facts,	 this	
treatment	was	unjustified	(and	therefore	discriminatory).		
337	London	Borough	of	Lewisham	v	Malcolm,	above	n111.	This	was	decided	under	








people	 who	 do	 not	 have	 their	 disability?	 Or	 is	 it	 intended	 to	
secure	 that	 they	 are	 treated	 differently	 from	 other	 people	 in	





Nonetheless,	 caution	 should	 be	 used	 when	 considering	 decisions	 from	 other	









However,	 selecting	 a	 normally	 performing	 employee	 as	 the	 comparator	 will	
almost	 inevitably	 lead	 to	 a	 finding	 of	 adverse	 treatment,	making	 a	 comparator	
moot.	 As	 provisions	 are	 not	 enacted	 to	 be	 meaningless,	 this	 result	 seems	
incorrect.		
Perhaps	 then,	 there	 should	 not	 even	 be	 a	 comparator	 for	 disability	










Nonetheless,	 currently	 the	HRA	 requires	 a	 comparator.	 Therefore,	 to	 interpret	
the	 HRA	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 UNCRPD,	 the	 comparator	 should	 be	 one	 that	
does	not	mirror	the	disabled	employee’s	circumstances,	which	may	more	readily	
lead	 to	 a	 finding	 that	 the	 employee	was	 adversely	 treated.	 A	 comparator	 that	













The	 phrase	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	 provides	 the	 ‘causal	 connection’	 between	 the	
prohibited	ground	of	discrimination	and	the	adverse	treatment	that	makes	that	
treatment	 unlawful.344	This	 is	 a	 core	 element	 of	 discrimination,	 as,	 even	 if	 the	
employee	is	treated	adversely,	and	is	disabled,	unless	the	disability	is	the	reason	
for	the	adverse	treatment,	the	treatment	is	not	discriminatory.		
This	 issue	 of	 the	 causal	 connection	 may	 be	 more	 easily	 resolved	 for	 other	
grounds	 of	 discrimination,	 where	 the	 ground	 does	 not	 affect	 the	 employee’s	
ability	to	perform	the	work.	However,	for	disability,	where	the	disability	impacts	
on	 the	 employee’s	 ability	 to	 perform,	 the	 disability	 and	 poor	 performance	 are	
entwined.	Accordingly,	it	is	less	certain	if	any	dismissal	is	due	to	the	disability,	or	
simply	due	to	poor	performance.		
When	 the	 disabled	 employee’s	 performance	 no	 longer	 reaches	 the	 employer’s	




The	 interests	 of	 the	 employee	 and	 employer	 are	 therefore,	 in	 conflict.	 	 If	
interpretation	 of	 this	 phrase	 cannot	 clarify	 whether	 treatment	 would	 be	
considered	by	reason	of	disability,	and	not	poor	performance,	the	risk	is	that	the	
decision-making	process	will	then	rest	on	policy	grounds.	That	is,	how	‘by	reason	
of’	 is	 interpreted	 will	 be	 determined	 by	 where	 the	 balance	 between	 the	
competing	 interests	 of	 the	 employer	 and	 employee	 lie.	 For	 example,	 if	 the	
employer’s	interests	have	ascendancy	over	those	of	the	disabled	employee,	then	
‘by	 reason	 of’	 disability	 may	 be	 interpreted	 so	 that	 it	 does	 not	 include	 the	
consequences	 arising	 from	 the	 disability.	 This	 would	 mean	 that	 the	 poor	
performance	would	be	 considered	a	 separate	 issue	 to	 the	disability.	Therefore,	
the	 adverse	 treatment	 of	 the	 employee	 would	 simply	 be	 due	 to	 their	 poor	
performance,	not	their	disability,	and	therefore,	not	discrimination.	However,	 if	
the	 rights	of	 the	disabled	are	 considered	paramount,	 then	 the	consequences	of	
the	 disability,	 such	 as	 poor	 performance,	 might	 be	 considered	 part	 of	 the	
disability.	 In	 this	 situation,	 adverse	 treatment	 for	 poor	 performance	would	 be	
adverse	 treatment	 because	 of	 their	 disability	 (which	 has	 caused	 the	 poor	
performance).	So	 it	would	be	considered	 ‘by	reason	of	 the	disability’,	 and	 thus,	
discriminatory.			
4.5.1 The	Meaning	from	the	Text,	the	Scheme	and	the	Purposes	of	the	Act	
The	 plain	 meaning	 of	 the	 phrase	 by	 reason	 of’	 appears	 clear	 —	 that	 is,	 the	
adverse	treatment	is	because	of,	or	due	to,	the	disability.	The	dictionary	defines	








Despite	 this,	 the	 HRRT	 has	 (although	 not	 in	 the	 employment	 context) 346	
differentiated	between	motive	and	reason,	holding	that	motive	is	irrelevant.347		
Thus,	in	cases	such	as	Nakarawa	v	AFFCO,348	McAlister	v	Air	New	Zealand,349	and	
Atley	 v	 Southland	 District	 Health	 Board, 350 	although	 the	 motivation	 for	 the	
adverse	 treatment	 may	 have	 been	 business	 necessity,	 the	 reason	 was	 the	
prohibited	ground	of	discrimination.351		
If	this	reasoning	applies	to	disability	discrimination,	where	the	disability	impacts	
on	 the	 employee’s	 actual	 performance,	 then,	 although	 the	 motivation	 may	 be	
attributed	to	poor	performance,	 the	reason	 is	still	 the	disability.	 	However,	 this	
requires	the	salient	feature	of	the	disability	(poor	performance)	to	be	considered	
part	of	the	disability.		
Problematically,	 the	 text	 of	 the	 HRA	 refers	 to	 the	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	
discrimination,	which	are	defined	in	section	21.		These	grounds	are	specific	and	
exhaustive	—	and	do	not	include	behaviours	arising	in	consequence	of	disability	
(e.g.	 poor	 performance).352		 Thus,	 from	 the	 text	 it	 is	 unclear	 if	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	
																																																								
345	Thomson,	above	n282.		
346 	Winther	 v	 Housing	 New	 Zealand	 Corporation	 [2011]	 NZHRRT	 18.	 The	
complainant,	 when	 facing	 eviction	 from	 her	 rental	 property,	 claimed	 she	 had	
been	discriminated	on	the	ground	of	family	status.	The	HRRT	held	there	must	be	
a	relevant	connection	between	the	action	and	the	ground	of	discrimination,	and	

















352 	Contrast	 this	 to	 the	 UK,	 where	 discrimination	 includes	 unfavourable	
treatment	because	of	 ‘something	arising	 in	 consequence’	of	disability	 (Equality	
Act	2010	(UK),	s15).	In	Australia,	the	definition	of	disability	includes	‘a	disorder,	
illness	or	disease	that	affects	a	person’s	thought	processes,	perception	of	reality,	









the	Human	Rights	 Act	 is	 not	 expressed	 in	 a	way	 that	 includes	
resultant	behaviour	as	part	of	 the	ground.	This	means	 that	 the	
statutory	 scheme	 in	 New	 Zealand	 is	 lacking	 the	 feature	 relied	




ground	 of	 disability,	 then	 both	 the	motivation	 and	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 adverse	
treatment	 of	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 might	 be	 attributed	 to	 the	 poor	
performance.			
Furthermore,	even	accepting	that	disability	and	poor	performance	are	entwined,	
the	 text	 does	 not	 clarify	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 disability	 must	 be	 the	 deciding	




are	evaluated	under	section	22	(that	 is,	 section	22	applies	 to	all	 the	prohibited	
grounds	of	discrimination).	 If	adverse	 treatment	 is	 found	 to	be	 ‘by	reason	of’	a	
prohibited	 ground,	 the	 treatment	 is	 assessed	 against	 the	 specific	 permitted	
exceptions	 for	 that	 ground,	 and	 the	 general	 task	 reallocation	 proviso.356	‘By	
reason	 of’	 provides	 the	 causative	 link	 between	 the	 adverse	 treatment	 and	 the	
prohibited	ground	of	discrimination.		
As	 section	 22	 applies	 to	 all	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	 discrimination,	 a	 consistent	
approach	 to	 interpreting	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	 should	 be	 taken	 across	 all	 grounds.	






intensive	 care	 unit	 were	 unable	 to	 leave	 the	 premises,	 they	 could	 not	 smoke.	
They	 raised	 a	 claim	 of	 indirect	 discrimination	 on	 the	 grounds	 of	 disablity.	
However,	 the	Court	held	 that	 smoking	was	not	 a	disability	 thus	 the	employees	










Zealand,357	determined	 the	prohibited	ground	must	be	a	 ‘material’	 factor	 in	 the	
decision.	 This	 shows	 a	 trend	 away	 from	 a	 restrictive	 interpretation	 of	 this	
phrase.	 Formerly,	 the	 Equal	 Opportunities	 Tribunal358	held	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	 to	
mean	the	prohibited	ground	had	to	be	a	‘substantial	and	operative	cause’	in	the	
decision.359	However,	 Tipping	 J	 held	 this	 to	 be	 ‘too	 strong	 a	 link’,	 and	 the	
prohibited		ground	need	only	be	‘a	material’	reason	for	the	treatment.360		
This	 lesser	 test	 reflects	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 HRA	—	 to	 ‘better	 protect	 human’	
rights	—	as	the	complainant	need	only	show	that	the	mental	disability	was	one	
material	 reason	 in	 the	 decision.	 However,	 ‘material’	 is	 an	 evaluative	 term	
meaning	‘significant’,	‘important’	or	‘relevant’.361		If	poor	performance	is	relevant	
to	 a	 decision	 to	 adversely	 treat	 an	 employee,	 then	 it	 is	 a	 material	 factor	 in	 a	
decision.	But	there	could	be	more	than	one	material	factor,	and	in	Meulenbroek	v	
Vision	Antenna	Systems	Ltd362	the	HRRT	 confirmed	 the	 prohibited	 ground	need	
only	be	‘a’	material	reason	and	not	‘the’	material	reason	for	the	treatment.	
The	HRRT	 applied	 this	 ‘material’	 factor	 test	 in	Nakarawa	v	AFFCO363	(religious	
discrimination).	 The	 defendant	 argued	 that	 the	 reason	 for	 dismissal	 was	 Mr	
Nakarawa’s	unavailability	 for	weekend	evening	shifts.	However,	 the	HRRT	held	




as	 her	poor	performance	 results	 from	mental	 disability,	 the	 adverse	 treatment	
would	be	‘by	reason	of’	her	mental	disability.	
However,	 in	Nakarawa,	Meulenbroek	and	 Atley,	 the	 complainants	 were	 able	 to	




Disability	 is	 less	 straightforward,	 when	 it	 impacts	 on	 the	 employee’s	 actual	
performance.	 As	 previously	 discussed,	 establishing	 the	 causative	 link	 between	




358	The	 Equal	 Opportunies	 Tribunal	 was	 the	 forerunner	 to	 the	 Human	 Rights	
Review	Tribunal.		
359	Human	 Rights	 Commission	 v	 Eric	 Sides	 Motors	 Co	 Ltd	 (1981)	 2	 NZAR	 447	











Some	 prohibited	 grounds	 have	 permitted	 exceptions	 that	 indicate	 when	
treatment	 will	 be	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	 that	 ground,	 and	 not	 attributable	 to	 other	
reasons.	 For	 example,	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 for	 religion	 recognise	 some	
religions	have	practices	affecting	their	adherent’s	ability	 to	work.	Furthermore,	
this	 provision	 requires	 accommodation	 of	 those	 practices	 by	 the	 employer.364	
This	provision	effectively	(if	indirectly)	establishes	a	causative	link	between	the	
consequences	arising	from	religion	(inability	to	work	certain	days)	and	religion.		
The	 permitted	 exceptions	 for	 disability	 recognise	 the	 disabled	 employee	 may	
require	 ‘special	 services	 or	 facilities’,	 or	pose	 a	 ‘risk	of	 harm’	 to	 themselves	or	
others.	However,	other	matters	that	may	arise	in	consequence	of	disability	(such	
as	behavioural	or	performance	issues)	are	not	explicitly	recognised,	and	the	HRA	
does	 not	 positively	 impose	 an	 obligation	 to	 accommodate	 these	 consequent	
features	 of	 disability.	 Thus,	 unlike	 religion,	 this	 provision	does	not	 (directly	 or	
indirectly)	link	the	consequent	features	of	disability	with	disability	itself.		
Nevertheless,	 following	the	general	scheme	of	the	Act,	the	provisions	should	be	
interpreted	 similarly.	 Thus,	 in	 the	 same	 way	 that	 inability	 to	 work	 weekend	
shifts	 (a	material	 reason	 for	 dismissal)	 is	 linked	 to	 religion	 (‘but	 for’	 religious	
belief	 they	 would	 work	 weekends),	 poor	 performance	 (a	 material	 reason	 for	
adverse	 treatment)	 is	 linked	with	disability	 (‘but	 for’	 the	disability	 they	would	
perform	well).	Therefore	disability	is	a	material	cause	of	the	adverse	treatment.		
Overall,	 then,	 the	scheme	of	 the	HRA	suggests	 ‘by	reason	of’	should	 include	the	
effects	 of	 disability.	 However,	 the	 dual	 purposes	 of	 the	 Act	 make	 this	
interpretation	 problematic.	 While	 one	 purpose	 of	 the	 Act	 is	 to	 prevent	 the	
employee	 from	 being	 treated	 adversely	 because	 they	 have	 a	 disability,	 an	
additional	 purpose	 is	 to	 preserve	 the	 employer’s	 managerial	 prerogative,	




Thus,	 while	 interpreting	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	 to	 include	 any	 factor	 arising	 from	 the	
disability	 (such	 as	 poor	 performance)	 accords	 with	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 Act	 to	
protect	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee,	 this	 interpretion	 sits	 uncomfortably	
with	the	conflicting	employer’s	managerial	prerogative	to	justifiably	dismiss	that	
poorly	performing	employee,	without	it	being	discriminatory.	This	may	suggest	
the	poor	performance	 should	be	 considered	 the	 relevant	 (and	hence,	material)	




legislation	 requires	 it	 to	 be	 given	 a	 fair,	 large	 and	 liberal	 interpretation,	 not	 a	
literal	 and	 technical	 one.365	A	 large	 and	 liberal	 interpretation	 of	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	
																																																								






would	 encompass	 adverse	 treatment	 stemming	 from	 the	 consequences	 of	
disability.	 Although	 this	 would	 accord	 with	 the	 UNCRPD	 interpretation	 of	
disability,	 it	 is	 hard	 to	 interpret	 the	 HRA	 along	 these	 lines.	 Furthermore,	
international	jurisprudence	indicates	this	approach	is	fraught	with	difficulties.	
The	 difficulty	 of	 interpretation	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 UNCRPD	 is	 that	 New	
Zealand	 legislation	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 medical	 model	 of	 disability,	 but	 the	
UNCRPD	 definition	 of	 disability	 is	 a	 combination	 of	 the	 social	 and	 medical	
models.	 The	 medical	 model	 of	 disability	 views	 disability	 as	 an	 impairment	 or	
condition	that	the	individual	has,	that	must	be	fixed	or	ameliorated	to	enable	the	
disabled	 person	 to	 fit	 into	 ‘normal’	 society.	 The	 HRA’s	 exhaustively	 defines	
disability	 in	 terms	 of	 illnesses,	 impairments,	 abnormalities	 of	 anatomical	
structure	 or	 function,	 or	 reliance	 on	 remedial	 means,	 reflecting	 the	 medical	
model.366	A	social	construct	of	disability	however,	recognises	the	disabling	effect	
of	 societal	 barriers,	 including	 attitudinal	 barriers,	 that	 prevent	 the	 disabled	
person’s	full	participation	in	society.	The	social	construct	sees	these	barriers	to	
inclusion	 as	 the	 reason	 why	 physical	 or	 psychosocial	 impairments	 become	
‘disabilities’.		
The	UNCRPD	defines	disability	in	the	following	way:367		
Persons	 with	 disabilities	 include	 those	 who	 have	 long-term	
physical,	mental,	 intellectual	 or	 sensory	 impairments	which	 in	
interaction	 with	 various	 barriers	 may	 hinder	 their	 full	 and	
effective	participation	in	society	on	an	equal	basis	with	others.	
As	 the	 social	 construct	 of	 disability	 emphasizes	 inclusion	 and	 participation	 in	
society,	 this	suggests	 that	 the	effects	or	manifestations	of	disability,	which	may	
hinder	such	participation,	should	be	considered	a	feature	of	the	disability	—	and	




New	 Zealand	 legislation	 does	 not	 define	 discrimination	 per	 se,	 and	 the	 HRA	
merely	prohibits	adverse	treatment	on	the	prohibited	ground	of	discrimination.	
However,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 definition	 of	 discrimination,	 the	 UNCRPD	 may	
properly	be	used	as	an	aid	to	interpretation.	The	UNCRPD	defines	discrimination	
on	the	basis	of	disability	as:368	
…	 any	 distinction,	 exclusion	 or	 restriction	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
disability	 which	 has	 the	 purpose	 or	 effect	 of	 impairing	 or	
nullifying	 the	 recognition,	 enjoyment	 or	 exercise,	 on	 an	 equal	
basis	with	others,	of	all	human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms	
in	the	political,	economic,	social,	cultural,	civil	or	any	other	field.	










the	exercise	of	 the	human	right	 to	work,	 it	 could	be	 considered	discriminatory	
under	 the	 UNCRPD	 definition.	 Therefore	 interpreting	 the	 HRA	 in	 accordance	
with	 the	 UNCRPD	 suggests	 that	 adverse	 treatment	 of	 the	 employee	 for	
behaviours	 or	 matters	 attributable	 to	 the	 disability	 should	 be	 considered	 ‘by	
reason	of’	disability.		
However,	overseas	 jurisprudence	has	 shown	 just	how	contentious	and	difficult	
this	causation	issue	can	be.	The	House	of	Lords	in	London	Borough	of	Lewisham	v	
Malcolm	said:369		







namely	 the	 violation	 of	 the	 confidentiality	 of	 a	 colleague's	
computer	 files,	 had	nothing	whatever	 to	do	with	his	disability,	
which	 was	 deafness.	 By	 contrast,	 the	 dismissal	 of	 the	 absent	
claimant	in	Clark	v	Novacold	[1999]	ICR	951,	the	refusal	of	entry	
to	 a	 blind	 person	 with	 a	 dog	 or	 the	 refusal	 of	 service	 to	 a	
customer	 with	 eating	 difficulties	 (hypothetical	 examples	
considered	 in	 that	 case	 and	 elsewhere),	 or	 the	 dismissal	 for	
slowness	 of	 a	 one-legged	 postman	 (a	 hypothetical	 example	
discussed	by	Lindsay	 J	 in	Heinz	v	Kenrick,	 above),	would	all,	 in	







This	 controversial	 decision	 is	 one	 of	 the	 reasons	 why	 the	 UK’s	 Equality	 Act	
includes	 the	 ‘Discrimination	 arising	 from	 disability’	 provision, 371 	making	 it	
discrimination	 to	 treat	 someone	 unfavorably	 because	 of	 ‘something	 arising	 in	
consequence’	of	disability.		
In	 Australia,	 the	 High	 Court	 decision	 of	 Purvis	 v	 New	 South	 Wales372	proved	
particularly	contentious.	The	Court	held	the	manifestation	of	claimant’s	disability	
(propensity	 to	 violent	 behaviour)	 was	 part	 of	 his	 disability,	 but	 then,	












policy	 based	 judicial	 activism	 undermining	 the	 legislative	 intent	 of	 the	 anti-
discrimination	law.373		
In	response	to	this	decision,	the	DDA	Cth	was	amended	—	rendering	the	failure	
to	 make	 reasonable	 adjustments	 for	 the	 disabled	 person	 a	 ground	 of	
discrimination.374		
In	 Canada,	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 Stewart	 v	 Elk	 Coal	 Corporation375	held	 the	
threshold	 for	 adverse	 treatment	 ‘because	 of’	 the	 protected	 ground	was	met	 if	
that	 ground	 was	 ‘a	 factor’	 (not	 a	 ‘material’	 factor)	 in	 the	 treatment. 376 	A	
‘connection’	between	 the	protected	ground	and	 the	adverse	 treatment	must	be	
proved,	not	a	‘causative	link’,	which	is	too	high	a	standard	The	Court	said:377			
In	 a	 recent	 decision	 concerning	 the	Human Rights Code,	 R.S.O.	
1990,	 c.	 H.19,	 the	 Ontario	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 found	 that	 it	 is	
preferable	 to	 use	 the	 terms	 commonly	 used	 by	 the	 courts	 in	
dealing	with	 discrimination,	 such	 as	 “connection”	 and	 “factor”:	
Peel Law Assn. v. Pieters,	 2013	ONCA	396,	 116	O.R.	 (3d)	 80,	 at	
para.	59.	In	that	court’s	opinion,	the	use	of	the	modifier	“causal”	
elevates	 the	 test	 beyond	what	 is	 required,	 since	 human	 rights	
jurisprudence	 focuses	 on	 the	 discriminatory	 effects	 of	 conduct	
rather	than	on	the	existence	of	an	intention	to	discriminate	or	of	
direct	 causes:	 para.	 60.	 We	 agree	 with	 the	 Ontario	 Court	 of	
Appeal’s	reasoning	on	this	point.		
Nonetheless,	whether	disability	was	a	‘factor’	in	Stewart	was	not	unanimous.	The	










376	At	 46.	 The	 Chief	 Justice	 saw	 no	 need	 for	 adjectives,	 such	 as	 ‘significant’	 or	
‘material’	 to	 be	 added	 to	 ‘factor’	 requirement,	 adding	 ‘if	 a	 protected	 ground	
contributed	to	the	adverse	treatment,	then	it	must	be	material.’	
377	At	 [84]	 quoting	 from	 Quebec	 (Commission	 des	 droits	 de	 la	 personne	 et	 des	
droits	de	la	jeunesse)	v.	Bombardier	Inc.	(Bombardier	Aerospace	Training	Center),	
2015	SCC	39,	[2015]	2	SCR	789.	
378	The	decision	was	based	on	 the	whether	 the	 findings	of	 the	Tribunal	on	 this	
issue	was	reasonable,	and	within	the	range	of	possible	acceptable	outcomes.	The	
majority	 held	 a	 reviewing	 Court	 could	 not	 ‘pay	 lip-service’	 to	 the	 Tribunal	
reasoning	and	substitute	their	own	views	[27].	Of	 the	three	 Justices	who	found	
the	Tribunal’s	findings	unreasonable,	(i.e.,	that	the	addiction	had	played	no	part	
in	 the	 employer’s	 decision	 and	 therefore	 there	 was	 no	 discrimination)	 only	
	
	104	
A	 ‘connection’	 or	 ‘factor’	 is	 a	 lower	 threshold	 than	 currently	 applied	 in	 New	
Zealand,	 where	 the	 prohibited	 ground	 must	 be	 a	 ‘material	 factor’	 to	 act	 as	 a	
causative	link.379		
Thus,	 internationally,	 judicial	 interpretation	 of	 when	 adverse	 treatment	 is	
proscribed	for	being	due	to	disability	has	proved	problematic,	and	has	 in	some	
jurisdictions	 resulted	 in	 legislative	 change.	 Although	 the	 UK	 and	 Australian	
legislation	differs	to	that	of	New	Zealand,	it	will	not	be	surprising	if	similar	issues			
arise	here,	given	the	lack	of	clarity	in	the	current	legislation.	Therefore,	although	




Statutory	 interpretation	 of	 adverse	 treatment	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	 disability	 fails	 to	
clearly	 establish	 if	 adverse	 treatment	 resulting	 from	 the	 effects	 or	 features	 of	
disability	would	be	deemed	‘by	reason	of’	disability	in	New	Zealand.	Thus,	where	
the	employee	is	poorly	performing,	 it	 is	not	clear	 if	subjecting	them	to	a	PIP	or	
dismissal	would	be	 ‘by	reason	of’	disability	or	not.	While	it	 is	 likely	that	a	large	
and	 liberal	 interpretation	 of	 the	 legislation,	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 UNCRPD,	
would	result	in	interpretation	in	favour	of	the	employee,	the	dual	purposes	of	the	





In	order	 to	answer	 the	central	question	of	 this	 thesis:	—	when	an	employee	 is	
justifiably	 dismissed	 on	 performance	 grounds,	 could	 this	 nevertheless	 be	
discrimination	 if	 the	 poor	 performance	 is	 due	 to	 mental	 disability?	 —	 this	





Gaston	 J	held	 in	 favour	of	 the	appellant.	Moldaver	 and	Wagner	 JJ	 held	 that	 the	
employer	had	accommodated	the	employee	to	the	point	of	undue	hardship.	
379New	Zealand	Workers	 Industrial	Union	of	Workers	 v	Sarita	Farm	Partnership,	
above	 n344.	 Not	 only	 is	 a	 ‘material	 factor’	 a	 higher	 threshold	 than	 Canada’s	
‘connection’	 between	 the	 prohibited	 ground	 and	 the	 treatment,	 once	 the	
connection	is	established,	in	Canada,	the	employer	must	then	accommodate	the	
disabled	 employee	 to	 the	 point	 of	 ‘undue	 hardship’.	 This	 is	 a	 more	 arduous	
requirement	that	in	New	Zealand,	where	the	HRA	only	requires	accommodation	











all	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA.	 This	 allows	 the	 employer	 to	 defend	
themselves	 under	 the	 permitted	 exceptions,	 while	 the	 mentally	 disabled	
employee	 still	 garners	 some	 protection	 from	 the	 potential	 accommodation	
provisions.	 This,	 to	 some	 degree,	 balances	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 disabled	 and	 the	
prerogatives	of	the	employer.		
Thus,	 to	 avoid	 screening	 out	 the	 employee	 from	 the	 analysis	 too	 soon,	 the	
disabled	 employee	 should	 be	 considered	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’,	 unless	 they	 are	
unable	 to	 perform	 most	 of	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	 role.	 Nevertheless,	
determining	when	 poor	 performance	 crosses	 the	 boundary	 to	 no	 longer	 being	
‘qualified’	(i.e.	when	they	are	not,	in	reality,	performing	the	essential	duties	of	the	
position)	 is	problematic.	 It	remains	unclear	 if	Professor	Smith,	who	is	(perhaps	
temporarily)	 unable	 to	 research,	 and	 is	 teaching	 using	 previous	 materials	
without	 checking	 for	 new	 developments	 in	 her	 field,	 is	 still	 qualified	 (i.e.,	 still	
performing	the	‘essential’	duties	of	her	position).		
Furthermore,	deeming	the	employee	qualified	if	they	are	able	to	perform	some	of	
the	 essential	 duties	 (even	 if	 poorly),	would	 verge	 on	making	 the	 ‘qualified	 for	
work’	 requirement	 redundant	 (except	 for	 job	 applicants).	 This	 is	 difficult	 to	




them	 —	 is	 the	 normally	 performing	 employee,	 without	 a	 disability.	 Again,	
controversially,	 this	 approach	 almost	 makes	 the	 comparator	 moot,	 as	 almost	
inevitably	 the	 treatment	 of	 a	 poorly	 performing	 employee	 will	 be	 adverse	 in	
comparison	to	that	of	a	normally	performing	employee.	Moreover,	some	would	
consider	 that	 this	 approach	 unfairly	 fetters	 the	 employer’s	 managerial	
prerogative.		
Nonetheless,	 the	adverse	 treatment	will	 still	be	 lawful	 if	 it	 is	not	 ‘by	 reason	of’	
disability,	which	 is	 the	 crux	of	 disability	discrimination.	Whether	 the	 effects	 of	
the	disability	 (such	as	poor	performance)	 should	be	viewed	as	a	 feature	of	 the	
disability	 is	 difficult,	 as	 it	may	 be	 the	 poor	 performance	 and	 not	 the	 disability	
that	 is	 the	 salient	 issue	 for	 the	 employer.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 best	 interpretation	




is	 that,	 when	 the	mental	 disability	 results	 in	 poor	 performance,	 the	 employee	
																																																								






employee	 can	 no	 longer	 perform	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position.	
Nonetheless,	 it	would	be	manifestly	unjust	to	the	employer	if	they	could	not,	at	
some	point,	dismiss	 the	mentally	disabled	employee	who	was	still	managing	to	
perform	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position,	 but	 very	 poorly,	 without	 it	 being	
discriminatory.	Where	this	level	is	remains	unclear.		
It	appears	then,	because	of	 the	phraseology	used,	and	 lack	of	definitions	of	key	
terms,	 that	 even	 the	 ‘best’	 interpretation	 fails	 to	 adequately	 clarify	 (or	 make	
certain)	 the	 core	 elements	 of	 discrimination.	 This	 might	 suggest	 that	 some	
reformation	of	the	law	is	required	to	resolve	these	issues.	Nonetheless,	it	may	be	
that	 interpretation	 of	 the	 potential	 accommodation	provisions	 shed	more	 light	





answering	 the	 following	 in	 order:	 is	 the	 employee	qualified,	were	 they	 treated	
detrimentally	 in	 comparison	 to	others,	was	 it	by	 reason	of	disability,	 and	 if	 so,	
can	 the	 conduct	be	defended	under	 the	permitted	 exceptions,	 or	does	 the	 task	
reallocation	proviso	apply?).	The	many	possible	permutations	 in	 interpretation	
at	each	step	leads	to	a	complex	and	possibly	contradictory	analysis.		
A	 better	 approach	 may	 be	 for	 the	 Court	 to	 reach	 a	 single	 conclusion	 after	
assessing	 the	 alleged	 conduct	 against	 the	 entirety	 of	 the	 provisions,	 then	
determining	if	unlawful	conduct	on	behalf	of	the	employer	has	occurred,	relying	




been	 raised	 would	 remain	 largely	 unresolved.	 It	 may	 be	 that,	 for	 disability	















adverse;	 and,	 when	 would	 such	 adverse	 treatment	 would	 be	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	
disability?	These	elements	of	the	statutory	requirements	for	discrimination	were	
analysed	 using	 the	 spiral	 approach	 to	 interpretation,	 with	 the	 ‘best’	
interpretation	being	suggested.	Despite	this,	some	interpretive	 issues	remained	
unresolved	 (or	 uncertain).	 However,	 the	 spiral	 approach	 suggests	 that	
consideration	of	the	potential	accommodation	provisions	might	illuminate	these	
areas	of	uncertainty.			
Furthermore,	 even	 the	 ‘best’	 interpretation	of	 section	22	 suggests	 it	 is	 difficult	
for	 the	 disabled	 employee	 to	 achieve	 greater	 substantive	 equality,	 as	 the	
provisions	 are	 premised	 on	 the	 medical	 model	 of	 disability	 and	 a	 formal	
approach	 to	 equality.	 The	 question	 therefore	 arises:	 might	 the	 potential	
accommodation	 provisions 381 	counteract	 this	 by	 inferring	 an	 obligation	 of	
reasonable	 accommodation	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 employer	—	 or	 are	 they	 simply	
defences	aimed	at	protecting	the	managerial	prerogative?		
To	 answer	 this	 question,	 this	 chapter	 examines	 the	 first	 set	 of	 potential	
accommodation	 provisions,	 that	 is,	 the	 defences	 that	 an	 employer	 may	 raise	
against	 a	 claim	 of	 discrimination	 that	 might	 initially	 seem	 made	 out.	 These	
defences	are	contained	in	what	this	thesis	refers	to	as	the	‘permitted	exceptions’,	
which	 form	 part	 of	 the	 ‘potential	 accommodation’	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA	
(consisting	 of	 section	 29	 (the	 permitted	 exceptions)	 and	 section	 35	 (the	 task	
reallocation	proviso)).	The	chapter	begins	by	explaining	why,	under	the	HRA,	the	










381	Commentators	 and	 the	 courts	 refer	 to	 these	 provisions	 as	 the	 ‘reasonable	
accommodation’	provisions.	However,	as	 they	do	not	contain	a	positive	duty	of	






the	 prohibited	 ground	 of	 disability	 under	 section	 22,	 the	 HRA	 provides	 the	
employer	 with	 certain	 defences	 against	 a	 claim	 of	 disability	 discrimination.	
These	 defences	 are	 set	 out	 in	 section	 29,	 entitled	 ‘exceptions	 in	 relation	 to	
disability’.	 These	 defences	 are:	 firstly,	 that	 the	 employee	 requires	 ‘special	
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As	 stated,	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 in	 section	 29	 do	 not	 directly	 require	
accommodation	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee.	 Instead	 these	 provide	 the	 employer	
with	a	defence	against	a	claim	of	discrimination.	Section	29	reads:		
	









of	 harm	 to	 that	 person	 or	 to	 others,	 including	 the	 risk	 of	
infecting	others	with	an	illness,	and	it	 is	not	reasonable	to	take	
that	risk.	
(2)	 Nothing	 in	 subsection	 (1)(b)	 shall	 apply	 if	 the	 employer	
could,	 without	 unreasonable	 disruption,	 take	 reasonable	
measures	to	reduce	the	risk	to	a	normal	level.	
This	 section	 does	 not	 itself	 make	 the	 failure	 to	 provide	 reasonable	
accommodation	a	breach	of	the	HRA.	Nonetheless,	the	employer	may	not	be	able	
to	escape	a	finding	of	discrimination	if	they	have	not	reasonably	accommodated	




Thus,	 although	 these	 provisions	 are	 not	 expressed	 as	 a	 positive	 duty	 on	 the	
employer	to	reasonably	accommodate	the	disabled	employee,	the	effect	may	be	
the	same.		
That	 is,	 if	 it	 is	 not	 unreasonable	 for	 the	 employer	 to	 provide	 the	 special	
assistance,	or	not	unreasonable	to	take	the	risk	of	harm	(or	that	risk	of	harm	can	
be	 mitigated	 by	 taking	 reasonable	 measures	 that	 do	 not	 cause	 unreasonable	
disruption),	then	the	defence	is	not	made	out,	so	the	employer	may	then	be	guilty	
of	discrimination.	 	Thus,	 the	employer	 is	 obliged	 to	 take	 certain	 steps	 to	 avoid	
that	claim.384	In	either	case,	 the	employer’s	 treatment	of	 the	disabled	employee	
would	be	unlawful.			
																																																								
383	In	 Judy	 McGregor,	 Sylvia	 A	 Bell	 and	 Margaret	 Wilson	 Fault	 Lines:	 Human	
Rights	 in	 New	 Zealand	 (AUT	 University,	 2015)	 at	 7.2.1.	 McGregor	 noted	 that	
‘reasonableness’	is	a	relatively	low	threshold	for	a	defence.		
384	In	 Australia,	 under	 the	 DDA	 Cth	 (prior	 to	 the	 2009	 amendment),	 the	 High	
Court	 in	 Purvis	 v	 New	 South	Wales,	 above	 n29	 at	 [104]	 held:	 ‘No	 doubt	 as	 a	
practical	 matter,	 the	 discriminator	 may	 have	 to	 take	 steps	 to	 provide	 the	
accommodation	to	escape	a	 finding	of	discrimination.	But	that	 is	different	 from	
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Interestingly,	 the	 New	 South	Wales	 Anti-Discrimination	 Act	 1977	 (ADA	 NSW)	
contains	 a	 similar	 provision	 to	 that	 in	 the	 HRA,	 providing	 an	 exception	 to	
behaviour	 that	would	otherwise	be	unlawful	 if	 the	employee	requires	 ‘services	
or	 facilities’,	 which	 would	 impose	 unjustifiable	 hardship	 on	 the	 employer	 to	
provide. 385 Like	 the	 HRA,	 this	 provides	 a	 defence	 against	 a	 claim	 of	
discrimination.	 The	 New	 South	 Wales	 (NSW)	 Equal	 Opportunity	 Tribunal	
confirmed	 that	 the	 provision	 does	 not	 impose	 a	 positive	 obligation	 to	
accommodate	 the	 employee. 386 	As	 the	 NSW	 Law	 Reform	 Commission	
commented	in	1999:387		
Although	 the	 intention	 is	 reasonably	 clear,	 the	 phraseology	
gives	rise	to	two	difficulties. First,	while	there	is	an	intention	to	
require	 reasonable	 accommodation	 for	 the	 particular	
disabilities	of	an	individual,	that	obligation	is	imposed	indirectly	
by	way	of	an	exception	to	a	defence.	
The	 New	 South	 Wales	 Commission	 recommended	 that	 the	 legislation	 be	
reformulated	 ‘as	 a	 positive	 obligation	 rather	 than	 as	 an	 exception	 to	 a	
defence’. 388 	As	 this	 thesis	 will	 show,	 this	 may	 also	 be	 an	 appropriate	
recommendation	for	the	HRA.		
In	 Quebec,	 the	 failure	 of	 legislation	 to	 contain	 a	 specific	 duty	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation	has	led	to	protracted	litigation	concerning	whether	such	a	duty	
was	implied	in	the	legislation.389		
Although	 in	New	Zealand,	 the	 provisions	 act	 as	 a	 defence	 or	 lawful	 excuse	 for	
what	would	otherwise	constitute	discrimination,	the	decision	in	Smith	v	Air	New	
Zealand 390 	suggests	 an	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 may	
																																																																																																																																																														
asserting	 that	 the	Act	 imposes	an	obligation	 to	provide	accommodation	 for	 the	
disabled’.		
385	Anti-Discrimination	Act	1977	(NSW),	s49D.		
386	In	 Laycock	 v	 Comissioner	 of	 Police	 [2006]	 NSWADT	 261	 at	 [92]	 the	 NSW	
Tribunal	 confirmed	 this	 provision	 acts	 as	 a	 defence	 and	 does	 not	 import	 a	
positive	obligation	 to	 accommodate:	 ‘None	of	 the	 substantive	provisions	 in	 the	
Act	which	are	relevant	in	this	case	—	those	in	s	49D(2)	—	imposed	obligations	
on	 the	 respondent	 to	 “accommodate”	 the	 applicant	 in	 the	 ways	 that	 he	 has	
claimed,	 or	 in	 any	 other	 ways.’	 This	 was	 confirmed	 on	 appeal	 (Laycock	 v	
Commissioner	of	Police)	[2007]	NSWADTAP	34).		
387 	NSW	 Law	 Reform	 Commission	 Report	 92	 (1999)	 Review	 of	 the	 Anti-
Discrimination	Act	1977	(1999)	at	5.70.		
388	At		5.72.		
389 	In	 Quebec,	 the	 Act	 ‘Respecting	 Industrial	 Accidents	 and	 Occupational	











evaluated	 the	 statutory	 scheme	 concerning	 discrimination	 in	 the	 provision	 of	
goods	and	services	to	the	disabled	(in	this	case,	the	supply	of	free	supplementary	
oxygen	to	disabled	airline	passengers).	They	considered	the	ambit	of	section	52,	
which	 provides	 the	 lawful	 exceptions	 for	 the	 failure	 to	 provide	 services	 and	
facilities	for	persons	with	disabilities,	and	said:391			
The	 exception	 it	 creates	 applies	 to	 excuse	 the	 provision	 of	
services	 when	 that	 is	 too	 onerous.	 That	 suggests	 an	 inherent	
requirement	 to	 accommodate	 otherwise;	 that	 is,	 where	
accommodation	is	not	too	onerous.	
For	discrimination	in	employment,	the	permitted	exceptions	also	act	as	a	defence	
against	 the	 failure	 to	 provide	 the	 disabled	 employee	 with	 special	 services	 or	
facilities,	or	failure	to	mitigate	a	risk	of	harm	—	when	it	is	not	reasonable	to	do	




Nonetheless,	 it	 remains	 unclear	 from	 the	 legislation	what	 the	 precise	 ambit	 of	
‘reasonable	 accommodation’	 is,	 or	 what	 it	 requires,	 particularly	 for	 mental	
disability.	It	could	be	argued	that,	as	the	permitted	exceptions	relate	only	to	the	
provision	of	services	and	facilities,	or	the	risk	of	harm,	that	these	are	perhaps	the	






prevented	 from	 treating	 the	 employee	 differently,	 if	 section	 35	 applies.	 This	
proviso	(hereinafter	referred	to	as	the	task	reallocation	proviso)	says:392		
No	employer	shall	be	entitled,	by	virtue	of	any	of	the	exceptions	
in	 this	Part,	 to	accord	 to	any	person	 in	 respect	of	 any	position	
different	 treatment	 based	 on	 a	 prohibited	 ground	 of	
discrimination	even	 though	some	of	 the	duties	of	 that	position	
would	 fall	 within	 any	 of	 those	 exceptions	 if,	 with	 some	
adjustment	 of	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 employer	 (not	 being	 an	
adjustment	 involving	 unreasonable	 disruption	 of	 the	 activities	
of	 the	 employer),	 some	 other	 employee	 could	 carry	 out	 those	
particular	duties.	
This	 is	 a	 convoluted	 82-word	 sentence	 that	 provides	 an	 exception	 to	 the	
exceptions.	 The	 inelegant	 drafting	 creates	 interpretive	 difficulties,	 but	 the	
general	effect	is	to	create	an	express	obligation	of	accommodation	of	the	disabled	








disabled	 employee	 exists	 only	 when	 ‘some’	 of	 the	 duties	 of	 the	 disabled	
employee	fall	within	the	permitted	exceptions.	If	these	duties	can	be	reallocated	
to	 another	 employee	 after	 ‘some	 adjustment’	 of	 the	 employer’s	 activities	 (but	
without	 ‘unreasonable	 disruption’),	 then	 the	 employer	 is	 obliged	 to	 reallocate	
these	duties	to	that	other	employee.		
Thus,	 how	 the	 phrases	 ‘some	 of	 the	 duties’,	 ‘unreasonable	 disruption’	 and	
‘adjustment	 of	 the	 employer’s	 activities’	 are	 interpreted	 will	 determine	 the	
degree	 to	 which	 the	 employer	 must	 accommodate	 the	 employee	 under	 this	
provision.	Furthermore,	how	these	phrases	are	interpreted	will	depend	on	how	
the	 employer’s	 managerial	 prerogative	 is	 balanced	 against	 protection	 of	 the	
rights	of	the	disabled	employee.	As	Singer	comments:393		
Since	 every	 legal	 decision	 reverts	 to	 the	 fundamental	
contradiction,	we	have	no	alternative	but	to	decide	each	case	in	
the	 light	 of	 competing	 goals	 and	 interests.	 To	 make	 these	
decisions,	nothing	can	aid	us	except	the	same	moral	and	political	
arguments	 we	 use	 in	 other	 areas	 of	 ethical	 discourse.	 It	 is	 an	
illusion	 to	 think	 that	 legal	 reasoning	 is	 any	 less	 political	 and	




the	ability	of	disabled	employees	 to	achieve	greater	 substantive	equality,	 if	 the	
employer’s	 managerial	 prerogative	 has	 paramountcy	 over	 the	 right	 of	 the	
disabled	 employee	 to	 be	 (reasonably)	 accommodated.	 These,	 and	 other	
interpretive	issues,	will	be	addressed	in	more	depth	in	the	following	chapter.		
5.2.3 The	Lack	of	a	Specific	Duty	of	Accommodation	
This	thesis	therefore	contends	that	a	major	problem	with	the	 legislation	 is	 that	
the	 HRA	 contains	 no	 adequate,	 specified	 duty	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation.	
Waddington	explains	reasonable	accommodation	in	employment	in	the	following	
way:394	
A	 reasonable	 accommodation	 requirement	 in	 the	 employment	
context	 therefore	 prohibits	 an	 employer	 from	 denying	 an	
individual	 with	 a	 disability	 an	 employment	 opportunity	 by	
failing	to	take	account	of	the	characteristic,	when	taking	account	
of	it	–	in	terms	of	changing	tasks	or	the	physical	environment	of	
the	 workplace	 –	 would	 enable	 the	 individual	 to	 do	 the	 work.	
Employers	 are	 required	 to	 recognize	 the	 characteristic	 and	 to	
consider	 what	 changes	 they	 could	 make	 to	 the	 work	
environment	to	allow	an	individual	to	carry	out	the	work	to	the	
																																																								
393	Joseph	William	Singer	 "The	 Legal	Rights	Debate	 in	Analytical	 Jurisprudence	
from	Bentham	to	Hohfeld"	(1982)	6	Wis	L	Rev	975	at	1059.		
394 	L	 Waddington	 "Fine-Tuning	 Non-Discrimination	 Law:	 Exceptions	 and	






a	 concept	 of	 equality	 which	 requires	 adaptation	 and	 change.’	
(footnotes	omitted).	
According	 to	 Iannozzi,	 the	 principles	 of	 accommodation	 are	 to	 ‘design	 society	
inclusively,	 remove	 existing	 physical	 barriers	 in	 the	 workplace,	 and	
accommodate	individual	needs	in	a	way	that	most	respects	dignity’.395		
As	discussed	in	Chapter	2,	New	Zealand’s	obligations	under	the	UNCRPD	include	
ensuring	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 disability	 is	 provided	 in	 the	
workplace.396		Although	the	HRA	does	not	impose	a	specific	duty	on	employers	to	
make	 such	 ‘reasonable	 accommodation’	 per	 se,	 the	 requirements	 imposed	 on	
employers	to	fit	within	the	permitted	exceptions	(section	29)	to	defend	a	claim	of	
discrimination,	and	the	task	reallocation	proviso	(section	35),	are	considered	by	
some	 to	 fulfil	 this	 requirement	 for	 employment.397	However,	 this	 thesis	 will	
argue	 that	 any	 obligation	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	 disability	 is,	 at	 best,	
inferred	from	these	provisions.		
Nevertheless,	this	 lack	of	a	specific	obligation	means	uncertainty	surrounds	the	




provisions	 of	 the	 Act.	 However,	 the	 Committee	 is	 concerned	
about	its	opaqueness	and	lack	of	clarity.	
Therefore,	 this	 chapter	will	 use	 the	 spiral	 approach	 to	 interpret	 the	 permitted	
exceptions	and	the	 task	reallocation	proviso	to	see	 if	 this	can	clarify	 the	 law	 in	
this	area,	and	determine	whether	New	Zealand	is	fulfilling	its	obligations	under	
the	 UNCRPD	 (and	 therefore	 promoting	 substantive	 equality	 for	 the	 disabled	
employee).			
These	provisions	need	to	be	understood	as	a	whole,	as	the	meaning	of	a	term	or	








of	 the	 Initial	Report	of	New	Zealand	 (Committee	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 Persons	with	
Disabilities,	 2014)	 at	 B	 11.	 The	 Committee	 expressed	 concern	 regarding	 the	
failure	 to	 have	 a	 definition	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 in	 the	 HRA,	 and	




employee	 —	 then	 the	 employer	 is	 subject	 to	 a	 more	 positive	 duty	 to	
accommodate	 the	 employee,	 through	 task	 reallocation.	 	 This	 formulation	 is	
counter-intuitive,	 as	 the	 normal	 expectation	would	 be	 that	 an	 employer	 has	 a	
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1. What	 is	 meant	 by	 phrases	 such	 as	 ‘special	 services	 or	 facilities’,	




A	 disabled	 employee	 may	 not	 be	 treated	 unfavourably	 by	 reason	 of	 their	
disability.	 However,	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 provide	 the	 employer	 with	 a	
defence	against	a	claim	of	discriminatory	treatment	of	the	disabled	employee	on	
two	 grounds.	 First,	 it	 is	 a	 defence	 if	 it	 is	 not	 reasonable	 for	 the	 employer	 to	
provide	special	services	or	facilities	to	accommodate	the	employee.	Second,	it	is	a	
defence	 if	 the	 employee	 poses	 an	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	 harm	 to	 themselves	 or	
others,	 and	 the	 employer	 cannot	 reduce	 this	 risk	 to	 normal	 without	
unreasonable	disruption	to	their	business.		
These	 defences	 affect	 the	 disabled	 employee’s	 ability	 to	 achieve	 greater	




concept	 of	 the	 ‘reasonableness’	 of	 the	 employer’s	 conduct.	 	 In	 fact,	 throughout	
the	Act,	any	requirement	to	accommodate	the	disabled	is	premised	on	whether	
this	is	 ‘reasonable’	 in	the	circumstances.	For	discrimination	in	employment,	the	
reasonableness	 standard,	 or	 threshold,	 applies	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 special	
services	 or	 facilities,400	to	 accepting	 or	 mitigating	 a	 risk	 of	 harm,401	and	 to	






assessing	 ‘reasonableness’.	However,	 the	purposes	of	 the	Act	 (to	better	protect	

















as	 it	 limits	 the	 degree	 to	which	 the	 employer	must	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	
employee.	Nevertheless,	when	coupled	with	a	duty	of	good	faith	(which	applies	
to	 both	 employers	 and	 employees),	 the	 combination	 of	 the	 reasonable	
accommodation	 obligation	 and	 the	 managerial	 prerogative,	 balances	 the	
interests	 of	 both	parties,	 as	 compromise	 is	made	 from	both	 ends.404		However,	
this	 purposive	 approach	 provides	 little	 assistance	 in	 determining	 where	 this	
balance	lies.	Therefore,	the	concept	of	 ‘reasonableness’	should	be	considered	in	
the	scheme	of	the	Act.		
As	discussed	 in	Smith	v	Air	New	Zealand,405	the	scheme	of	 the	Act	suggests	 that		




of	 exceptions	 to	 what	 is	 otherwise	 unlawful	 conduct,	 some	
consistency	in	approach	in	the	Act	may	be	expected.		
The	Court	held	that	the	threshold	for	‘reasonableness’	in	providing	special	goods	
or	 services	 was	 lower	 than	 one	 of	 undue	 hardship.	 This	 was	 because	
reasonableness	was	also	used	 in	 the	context	of	 risk	of	harm,	and	 the	Court	did	
not	envisage	that	an	undue	hardship	standard	would	be	imposed	in	that	context.	
Consistency	of	meaning	was	desirable.	So	the	requirement	of	reasonableness	in	





determination	 of	 “reasonableness”	 under	 the	 unique	 circumstances	 of	 the	







Roger	 Blanpain	 and	 Frank	 Hendrickx	 (eds)	 Reasonable	 Accommodation	 in	 the	
Modern	Workplace:	Potential	and	Limits	of	 the	 Integrative	Logics	of	Labour	Law	













Furthermore,	 how	 the	 level	 of	 reasonableness	 is	 determined	 may	 also	 reflect	
current	social	and	economic	ideology	or	policy	of	the	interpreter.	That	 is,	 if	 the	
interests	of	the	disabled	employee	were	considered	paramount,	then	the	amount	
of	accommodation	the	employer	would	be	expected	to	make	would	be	significant	
before	 it	 would	 be	 deemed	 unreasonable.	 This	 would	 protect	 the	 disabled	
employee’s	employment,	and	advance	the	social	policy	of	achieving	substantive	
equality	for	the	disabled.	This	interpretation	would	also	reflect	a	more	pluralist	
ideology,	 which	 recognises	 and	 attempts	 to	 redress	 the	 imbalance	 of	 power	
between	 the	 employee	 and	 employer,	 through	 legislation.410	However,	 if	 the	
interests	of	the	employer	were	considered	paramount,	reasonableness	would	be	
would	 be	 interpreted	 at	 setting	 at	 a	 lower	 threshold,	 so	 that	 less	 would	 be	
required	 of	 the	 employer,	 thus	 protecting	 their	 managerial	 prerogative.	 This	













…	 a	 modification	 or	 alteration	 which	 imposes	 unjustifiable	
hardship	 on	 a	 person,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 considerations	




conflicting)	 goals.	 However,	 the	 pluralist	 approach	 contends	 that	 labour	 law	
should	promote	social	justice	through	acceptable	terms	and	conditions	of	work,	
















controversial.	 The	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 in	 Vande	 Zande	 v	 State	 of	 Wisconsin	
Department	 of	 Administration415	considered	 ‘reasonable’	 should	 be	 interpreted	
as	 it	 is	 used	 in	 negligence	 law	 —	 as	 an	 adjective	 that	 qualifies	 or	 weakens	
accommodation.	Therefore,	 it	 held,	 reasonableness	 connotes	 an	ordinary	effort	
rather	 than	 the	 maximum	 possible. 416 	Thus,	 the	 employer	 may	 claim	 an	
accommodation	 unreasonable	 when	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 accommodation	 is	 not	
proportionate	to	the	benefit	gained	by	the	employee.417	This	cost-benefit	analysis	
of	 reasonableness	 has	 been	 criticised	 for	 failing	 to	 take	 into	 consideration	
exclusion	and	humiliation	that	the	disabled	employee	may	suffer,	or	the	potential	
benefits	the	accommodation	may	offer	third	parties.418		
The	 issue	of	 the	 reasonableness	of	 the	adjustments	 required	has	also	arisen	 in	
the	UK.	It	was	held	they	must	be	‘objectively’	reasonable,419	but	the	Employment	
Appeals	 Tribunal	 (EAT),	 in	 Tameside	 Hospital	 NHS	 Foundation	 Trust	 v	 Mylott,	
acknowledged	this	was	difficult	to	assess:420		
Employees	 with	 mental	 health	 conditions...	 can	 pose	 difficult	
management	 problems	 for	 employers.	 The	 question	 of	 what	
																																																								
414	Central	 Alberta	 Dairy	 Pool	 v	 Alberta	 [1990]	 2	 SCR	 489.	 At	 491	 the	 Court	
outlined	 what	 considerations	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	 determining	
undue	hardship.	
415	Vande	 Zande	 v	 State	 of	Wisconsin	 	 Department	 of	 Administration	 (1996)	 44	
F.3d	538	(7th	Cir).		
416	At	[3].		
417	In	Van	Zande	 the	 Court	 held	 that	 despite	 the	 employer	 having	 the	 financial	
resources	 to	 do	 so,	 the	 cost	 of	 lowering	 a	 kitchen	 sink	was	 unreasonable.	 The	
Court	 held	 the	 benefit	 to	 the	wheelchair	 bound	 employee	was	minimal	 as	 the	
employee	 could	 use	 a	 bathroom	 sink	 to	wash	 their	 cup.	De	 Campos	 notes	 this	
decision	 has	 been	 heavily	 criticized	 for	 failing	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	
humiliation,	 inequality	 and	 stigmatization	 suffered	 by	 the	 employee	 having	 to	




into	 account	 when	 considering	 what	 is	 reasonable.	 For	 example,	 lowering	 a	
kitchen	 sink	 would	 accommodate	 not	 only	 current	 but	 also	 future	 disabled	












steps	may	 be	 reasonable	 in	 order	 to	 adjust	 to	 their	 needs	 is	 a	
sensitive	 one,	 in	 which	 proper	 regard	 must	 be	 had	 to	 the	
interests	of	both	parties…..	
The	 tribunal	 therefore	 acknowledged	 the	 need	 to	 reach	 an	 interpretation	 that	
balanced	 the	needs	of	 the	disabled	employee	and	 the	employer.	This	approach	




Thus,	 even	 using	 the	 spiral	 approach	 to	 interpretation,	 what	 is	 ‘reasonable’	
cannot	 be	 definitively	 defined,	 but	 will	 depend	 on	multiple	 contextual	 factors.	
Although	this	allows	for	flexibility	in	interpretation,	it	leads	to	uncertainty	in	the	
law,	 as	 it	 cannot	 be	 predicted	 what	 the	 Court	 or	 HRRT	 might	 consider	
‘reasonable’	 in	 any	 given	 circumstance,	 nor	 what	 factors	 they	might	 take	 into	
account.		
This	 uncertainty	 will	 affect	 how	 the	 potential	 accommodation	 provisions	 as	 a	
whole	are	 interpreted,	as	they	are	premised	on	reasonableness	at	many	points.	
Consequently,	 the	 interpretation	 might	 well	 depend	 on	 whose	 interests	 are	
considered	 paramount,	 and	 this	 in	 turn,	 may	 affect	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 the	
disabled	employee	can	attain	greater	substantive	equality.		
Moreover,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 question	 of	 reasonableness,	 the	 defences	 present	
many	 additional	 interpretive	 issues.	 These	will	 now	 be	 examined,	 starting	 the	
‘unreasonable	to	provide	special	assistance’	defence.			
5.3.2 Unreasonable	 to	 Provide	 Special	 Assistance	 Defence:	 Section	 29	
(1)(a)		
The	 first	 permitted	 exception	 is	 where	 an	 employee	 could	 only	 perform	 the	
duties	 of	 the	position	 satisfactorily	with	 the	 aid	 of	 special	 services	 or	 facilities.	
Performing	‘satisfactorily’	is	evaluative,	and	determined	initially	by	the	employer	
(although	it	is	likely	that	the	employer	would	need	to	demonstrate	to	the	Court	
or	 HRRT	 that	 the	 performance	 criteria	 used	 were	 objectively	 reasonable421).	
What	is	less	clear	is	what	is	meant	by	‘special	services	or	facilities’.	Therefore	the	
remainder	of	this	section	will	concentrate	on	the	interpretation	of	those	terms.		
Any	interpretation	of	what	 is	reasonable	 in	the	provision	of	 ‘special	services	or	
facilities’	 should	 probably	 balance	 protecting	 the	 human	 rights	 of	 the	 disabled	
employee	against	the	employer’s	managerial	prerogative.		
Somewhat	ironically,	to	better	protect	human	rights,	the	interpretation	given	to	
the	notion	of	 ‘special	services	or	 facilities’	should	be	a	narrow	one	—	that	 is,	 it	
should	 be	 given	 a	 meaning	 where	 few	 things	 would	 be	 considered	 ‘special	
services	or	facilities’	that	it	would	be	unreasonable	for	the	employer	to	provide.	








‘services	 or	 facilities’	 was	 interpreted	 narrowly	 so	 as	 to	 exclude	 toleration	 of	
poor	 performance,	 then	 the	 employer	 who	 did	 not	 tolerate	 poor	 performance	
might	have	no	defence	under	 the	permitted	exceptions.	That	 is,	 if	 toleration	of	
poor	 performance	 is	 not	 considered	 a	 ‘special	 service	 or	 facility’	 then	 the	
employer	has	no	defence	that	it	was	unreasonable	to	‘provide’	it.			
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 more	 things	 considered	 ‘special	 services	 or	 facilities’	
would	 provide	 the	 employer	 with	 more	 opportunity	 to	 defend	 a	 claim	 of	
discrimination	on	the	basis	that	 it	was	not	reasonable	to	provide	them.	Thus,	 if	
tolerance	 of	 disability-induced	 poor	 performance	 was	 considered	 a	 ‘service’	





That	 is,	 the	 employer	 might	 be	 expected	 to	 provide	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 ‘special	
services	 and	 facilities’.	 However,	 this	 also	 means	 the	 employer	 has	 more	
opportunities	 to	 defend	 a	 claim	 of	 discrimination	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 it	 being	
unreasonable	 to	 provide	 them	 (thus	 protecting	 their	 prerogative).	 A	 narrow	
approach	however,	where	 few	things	are	considered	 ‘services	or	 facilities’	may	
suggest	 there	 is	 a	 limited	 range	 of	 things	 the	 employer	 is	 obliged	 to	 provide.		
Nonetheless,	as	outlined	above,	 their	defence	 is	also	 limited	as	 there	are	 fewer	
things	 the	 employer	 could	 claim	were	 special	 services	 or	 facilities	 that	 it	 was	
unreasonable	 to	 provide.	 Accordingly,	 the	 failure	 to	 furnish	 the	 disabled	
employee	 with	 things	 are	 not	 considered	 to	 be	 ‘special	 services	 or	 facilities’	
might	be	considered	discriminatory.		
‘Special	 Services	 or	 Facilities’:	Meaning	 from	 the	Text,	 in	 the	Context	 of	 the	
HRA	and	from	the	Legislative	History	
What	is	the	‘best’	interpretation	of	‘services	or	facilities’	then?	The	text	provides	
little	assistance,	as	neither	 ‘services’	nor	 ‘facilities’	are	defined	 in	 the	HRA.	The	
ordinary	meaning	suggests	the	phrase	would	mainly	cover	physical	adjustments	
required	to	accommodate	a	person’s	physical	impairments,	rather	than	types	of	
adjustment	 needed	 to	 accommodate	 the	 psychosocial	 impairments	 of	 mental	
disability.422		
The	Oxford	Dictionary	defines	‘facility’	as:423	“an	opportunity,	the	equipment,	or	
the	 resources	 for	 doing	 something”,	 “a	 plant,	 installation	 or	 establishment”.	
																																																								
422 	Lawson	 argues	 that	 reasonable	 accommodation	 laws	 focus	 on	 physical	
impairments	 as	 they	 are	 easier	 to	 identify	 and	 solutions	 are	 more	 readily	
identifiable.	 There	 is	 a	 tendency	 to	 overlook	 psychosocial	 impairments,	 partly	
because	the	barriers	are	less	easy	to	identify	or	remedy,	and	partly	because	the	
medical	model	of	disability	perpetuates	the	emphasis	on	curing	the	individual	or	
adapting	 their	 behavior,	 rather	 than	 accommodating	 difference:	 Anna	 Lawson	






‘Facilities’	 is	 defined	 as:424	“something	designed,	 built,	 installed,	 etc.,	 to	 serve	 a	
specific	function	affording	a	convenience	or	service”,	“something	that	permits	the	
easier	performance	of	an	action,	course	of	conduct,	etc.”		
The	 meaning	 from	 the	 text	 therefore	 sits	 comfortably	 with	 providing	 aids	
required	 for	 the	 physically	 disabled,	 such	 as	 ramps,	 or	 modified	 desks,	 or	
computer	 programmes	 for	 the	 visually	 disabled.	 A	 broad	 interpretation	 could	
encompass	 even	more,	 such	 as	 ‘resources	 for	 doing	 something’,	 or	 ‘something	
that	 permits	 easier	 performance’.	 This	 could	 encompass	many	 things,	 such	 as	





envisage	 that	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 a	 ‘facility’.	 Other	 potential	 accommodations,	
such	 as	 additional	 or	 extended	 sick	 leave,	 temporary	 redeployment	 to	 less	
stressful	working	environments,	or	working	 from	home,	 also	 fail	 to	 fall	 readily	
within	these	definitions.			
‘Services’	is	a	broader	term.	It	can	be	defined	as	“the	act	of	helping	or	doing	work	
for	 another”,	 “assistance	 or	 benefit	 given	 to	 someone”;	 and	 the	 “provision	 or	
system	of	supplying	a	public	need	e.g.	transport”.425		 ‘Services’	 is	defined	as	“an	
act	of	helpful	activity;	help;	aid”.426		
These	 broad	 definitions	 could	 include	 some	 of	 accommodations	 required	 by	
mentally	disabled	employees.	For	example,	provision	of	a	research	assistant	for	
Professor	Smith	could	be	‘assistance	or	benefit	given	to	someone’.	Nonetheless,	it	
is	 still	 not	 easy	 to	 define	 tolerance	 of	 poor	 performance,	 extended	 sick	 leave,	
working	from	home,	or	redeployment	as	provision	of	a	‘service’.		
Therefore,	 although	 the	 meaning	 of	 the	 text	 can	 encompass	 many	 forms	 of	
accommodation,	others	do	not	fit	so	easily,	and	Parliament’s	intention	is	unclear.	
However,	the	scheme	of	the	Act	may	provide	some	clarification.		
If	 the	mentally	 disabled	 employee	 requires	 a	 form	 of	 accommodation	 that	 fits	





fall	 within	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 to	 another	 employee.427 	As	 these	 two	
provisions	interact,	they	should	be	read	together.		
Thus,	 if	 another	 employee	 could	 perform	 a	 duty	 that	 the	 disabled	 employee	











all	 of	 the	 duties	 of	 her	 position	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	 interpret	 as	 a	 service.	
However,	if	the	duty	she	is	not	performing	(i.e.	research)	could	be	reallocated	to	
an	assistant	(who	could	then	co-author	the	resulting	papers),	then	the	toleration	
of	 her	 failure	 to	perform	 research	might	well	 be	defined	as	 a	 ‘service’	 that	 the	
employer	could	reasonably	provide.		
Furthermore,	 in	 the	 HRA,	 in	 many	 contexts	 other	 than	 the	 discrimination	 in	
employment	 provisions,	 many	 forms	 of	 conduct	 that	 might	 constitute	
discrimination	have	an	exception	in	relation	to	disability	when	special	 ‘services	
or	 facilities’	are	required	and	 it	 is	not	reasonable	 to	provide	 them.428	It	may	be	
possible	then	to	ascertain	a	general	meaning	of	this	phrase	from	the	context	of	its	
use	 in	 the	 legislation.	Nevertheless,	 this	approach	would	 still	 give	 the	phrase	a	
limited	meaning	because,	throughout	the	Act,	these	‘services	or	facilities’	appear	
directed	 toward	 accommodating	 physical	 impairment.	 For	 example,	 section	 41	
(exceptions	 in	 relation	 to	 vocational	 training	 bodies)	 refers	 to	 	 ‘services	 or	
facilities	designed	for	a	specified	purpose’.429	Linking	‘designed’	with	‘services	or	
facilities’	 implies	 bespoke	 equipment,	 physical	 alterations	 etc.,	 but	 fits	 less	




enable	 persons	with	 disabilities	 equal	 access	 to	 ‘benefits,	 facilities,	 or	 services	
provided	by	the	organisation	(including	the	right	to	stand	for	election	and	hold	
office).’430	This	 implies,	 in	 this	 context	 at	 least,	 that	 ‘services	or	 facilities’	 could	
include	intangible	matters,	such	as	the	right	to	stand	for	election.431	However,	as	
the	 legislation	 specifically	 stipulates	 the	 need	 to	 provide	 access	 to	 these	
intangible	matters,	this	may	indicate	it	falls	outside	the	normal	interpretation	of	
the	 ‘services	 or	 facilities’	 that	 need	 to	 be	 provided.	 Nonetheless,	 for	
discrimination	in	relation	to	the	provision	of	goods	and	services,	the	HRRT432	has	






services	 cannot	 supply	 them	 in	 a	 special	 manner.	 Other	 sections	 that	 have	
exceptions	 relating	 to	disability	 are:	 s52	 (the	provision	of	 goods	and	 services),	
s60	(provision	of	housing	and	other	accommodation),	s43	(access	to	educational	
establishments),	 ss37-41	 (provisions	 relating	 to	 discrimination	 by	 various	
bodies).	
429	Human	Rights	Act	1993,	 s41(7):	Nothing	 in	 section	40	makes	 it	unlawful	 to	
fail	 to	 provide	 special	 services	 or	 facilities	 designed	 for	 a	 specified	 purpose	 if	











The	 legislative	 history	 also	 provides	 little	 assistance.	 The	meaning	 or	 scope	 of	
‘services	 or	 facilities’	 was	 not	 discussed	 in	 debates	 on	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	
HRCA	in	1977,433	nor	the	HRA	in	1993.434		
Equally,	the	conflicting	purposes	of	the	Act	do	not	aid	in	the	interpretation	of	this	
phrase	 as	 a	 broad	 interpretation	 of	 ‘services	 or	 facilities’	 fits	 the	 purpose	 of	
supporting	the	managerial	prerogative	(as	it	provides	a	wider	range	of	possible	
defences),	 while	 a	 narrow	 interpretation	 better	 fits	 with	 protection	 of	 human	
rights	(as	it	limits	the	managerial	prerogative).			
As	the	text,	scheme,	and	purposes	of	the	Act	do	not	provide	a	definitive	answer	to	




Like	 the	 HRA,	 the	 ADA	 NSW	 provides	 the	 employer	 with	 a	 defence	 against	 a	
claim	of	discrimination,	rather	than	imposing	a	positive	obligation	to	reasonably	
accommodate	 the	 disabled	 employee.	 The	 defence	 is	 that	 the	 employee	would	
require	additional	services	or	facilities	to	carry	out	the	inherent	requirements	of	







impose	 a	 general	 duty	 to	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	 employees.438	Under	 this	
interpretation,	 tolerance	 of	 poor	 performance,	 or	 temporary	 redeployment,	
would	 not	 be	 considered	 a	 service	 or	 facility,	 as	 they	 are	 not	 external	 to	 the	
																																																								
433	The	 former	 HRCA	 did	 not	 have	 disability	 as	 a	 ground	 of	 discrimination.	
However,	it	was	unlawful	to	fail	to	provide	‘services	or	facilities’	by	reason	of	any	
of	the	prohibited	grounds	of	discrimination	listed	at	the	time.	The	Human	Rights	
Commission	Bill	1977	did	not	define	 ‘services	or	 facilities’	and	 the	explanatory	
notes	to	the	Bill	did	not	discuss	this.		






















leave, 441 	and	 addressing	 a	 grievance	 promptly	 to	 alleviate	 the	 employee’s	
stress.442	However,	 the	scope	of	 these	adjustments	may	reflect	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
provision	is	not	worded	in	terms	of	providing	certain	‘services	or	facilities’.			
Overall	 the	 wider	 context	 suggests	 that	 ‘services	 or	 facilities’	 should	 be	
interpreted	 as	 things	 external	 to	 the	 role	 that	 may	 be	 provided	 to	 enable	 the	
employee	to	carry	out	the	essential	or	inherent	duties	of	the	position.	If	the	HRA	
is	 interpreted	 in	 this	 light,	 then	 ‘services	 or	 facilities’	 would	 not	 include	 the	
tolerance	of	poor	performance,	or	alteration	of	essential	duties	to	cater	for	part	
performance,	as	 they	do	not	enable	 the	mentally	disabled	employee	 to	perform	
the	essential	duties	of	the	role.			
Special	services	and	facilities:	Conclusion	
The	 spiral	 approach	 has	 clarified,	 to	 some	 degree,	 the	meaning	 of	 ‘services	 or	
facilities.	 It	 suggests	 ‘services	or	 facilities’	 should	be	 things	 that	are	external	 to	
the	 disabled	 employee’s	 position	 and	 enable	 the	 employee	 to	 carry	 out	 the	
essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position.	 This	 interpretation	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 list	 of	
possible	 types	 of	 accommodations,	 produced	 by	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Business,	
Innovation	 and	 Employment	 (MBIE)	 that	 employers	 could	 make	 for	 mentally	
																																																								
439	Equality	 Act	 2010,	 (UK)	 s20(3).	 This	 is	 not	 a	 general	 duty	 to	 accommodate	
those	with	disability.	 In	The	Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	v	Ashton	above	n419	at	[15]	
the	 UKEAT	 said:	 “The	 duty,	 given	 that	 disadvantage	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	
substantial	are	both	identified,	is	to	take	such	steps	as	are	reasonable	to	prevent	
the	provision,	criterion	or	practice	(which	will,	of	course,	have	been	identified	for	
this	 purpose)	 having	 the	 proscribed	 effect	—	 that	 is	 the	 effect	 of	 creating	 that	
disadvantage	when	compared	to	those	who	are	not	disabled.	It	is	not,	therefore,	
a	section	which	obliges	an	employer	to	take	reasonable	steps	to	assist	a	disabled	
person	 or	 to	 help	 the	 disabled	 person	 overcome	 the	 effects	 of	 their	 disability,	
except	insofar	as	the	terms	to	which	we	have	referred	permit	it.”	












disabled	employee	 to	 carry	out	 the	essential	duties	of	 their	position,	 then	 they	
might	be	considered	as	‘services	or	facilities’.		
However,	 for	 the	 phrase	 to	 carry	 a	 wider	 meaning	 would	 seem	 to	 require	 a	
change	to	the	legislation.	This	may	be	necessary	to	ensure	that	the	New	Zealand	
meets	 its	 obligations	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 under	 the	 UNCRPD,	 and	
promotes	greater	substantive	equality	for	disabled	employees.		
5.3.3 The	Unreasonable	Risk	of	Harm	Defence:	Sections	29(1)(b);	29(2)		
The	 second	 defence	 to	 unlawful	 treatment	 of	 a	 disabled	 employee	 is	 available	
when	 the	 performance	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee’s	 duties	 creates	 an	
unreasonable	risk	of	harm	to	that	employee	or	others.	This	is	the	unreasonable	
risk	of	harm	defence.	It	is	available	when:444	
the	 environment	 in	which	 the	 duties	 of	 the	 position	 are	 to	 be	
performed	or	the	nature	of	those	duties,	or	of	some	of	them,	 is	
such	that	the	person	could	perform	those	duties	only	with	a	risk	
of	 harm	 to	 that	 person	 or	 to	 others,	 including	 the	 risk	 of	
infecting	others	with	an	illness,	and	it	 is	not	reasonable	to	take	
that	risk.	
This	 is	 another	 long	 and	 complex	 provision,	 encompassing	 several	 elements.		
Firstly,	 the	 defence	 may	 apply	 where	 the	 duties	 performed	 by	 the	 disabled	
employee	are	in	an	environment	where	the	performance	of	those	duties	creates	a	
risk	of	harm;	or,	secondly,	the	defence	may	apply	when	the	nature	of	the	duties	
being	performed	by	 the	disabled	 employee	means	 they	 can	only	be	performed	
with	a	risk	of	harm.	Thirdly,	the	risk	of	harm	may	apply	to	the	disabled	employee	
or	to	‘others’.	Fourthly,	the	defence	may	apply	when	only	‘some	of	the	duties’	fall	




443	The	 Ministry	 of	 Business,	 Innovation	 and	 Employment	 on	 its	 ‘Employment	
New	Zealand’	website	 suggests	 the	 following	 as	 possible	 accommodations:	 “let	
the	 employee	wear	 headphones	with	 soothing	music,	 ear	 protectors	 to	 screen	





prioritise	 task	 reallocation	 and	 estimate	 completion	 times;	 with	 the	 person’s	
consent,	 brief	 colleagues	 about	 the	 person’s	 needs	 and	 organise	 a	 mentor	 or	
buddy	 in	 the	 workplace;	 provide	 regular	 chances	 for	 feedback;	 give	 plenty	 of	
notice	 of	 planned	 changes,	 with	 clear	 and	 full	 explanations	 of	 the	 change	 and	






However,	 section	29(2)	 creates	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	 harm	
defence.	 If	 the	 employer	 is	 able	 (without	 unreasonable	 disruption),	 to	 take	
reasonable	measures	to	reduce	the	 level	of	risk	to	 ‘normal’,	 then	the	defence	 is	
not	available.	The	provision	reads:		
Nothing	 in	 subsection	 (1)(b)	 shall	 apply	 if	 the	employer	 could,	
without	 unreasonable	disruption,	 take	 reasonable	measures	 to	
reduce	the	risk	to	a	normal	level.	
Finally,	in	addition	to	this,	the	unreasonable	risk	of	harm	defence	is	subject	to	the	
task	 reallocation	 proviso.	 Therefore,	 only	 when	 no	 reasonable	 measures	 are	
available	 to	 the	employer	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	of	harm	 to	normal,	 and	 the	duties	
that	 pose	 the	 risk	 of	 harm	 cannot	 be	 reallocated	 to	 another	 employee,	 is	 the	
defence	of	unreasonable	risk	of	harm	available	to	the	employer.			
Again,	 how	 the	 phrase	 ‘risk	 of	 harm’	 is	 interpreted	 will	 determine	 where	 the	
balance	 lies	between	the	competing	 interests	of	 the	disabled	employee	and	the	
employer.	If	harm	is	defined	broadly,	there	is	more	opportunity	for	employers	to	
make	out	the	defence	that	it	is	unreasonable	to	take	that	risk	of	harm.	Therefore,	
if	 suffering	 from	 any	 degree	 of	workplace	 stress	 is	 defined	 as	 ‘harm’,	 then	 the	
disabled	 employee,	 who	 as	 a	 result	 of	 carrying	 out	 their	 duties	 is	 at	 risk	 of	









The	 lower	 the	 threshold	 of	 risk	—	 that	 is,	 the	 lower	 the	 point	 at	 which	 it	 is	
unreasonable	to	take	a	risk	—	then	the	greater	the	potential	for	the	defence	to	be	
made	out.	Accordingly,	 if	 there	need	only	be	 a	minimal	 risk	of	 harm	occurring	
before	it	becomes	unreasonable	to	take	that	risk,	then	the	employer	will	benefit	
more.	 If,	 however,	 the	 threshold	 at	 which	 the	 risk	 of	 harm	 occurring	 is	 high	




what	 is	 reasonable.	 While,	 conceivably,	 the	 disabled	 employee	 may	 have	 an	
autonomous	 right	 to	 take	 some	 personal	 risk,	 placing	 other	 employees	 or	 the	
unwitting	public	at	any	significant	risk	of	harm	may	be	unreasonable.				
																																																								
445	Workplace	 stress	 is	 known	 to	 precipitate	 depression	 and	 general	 anxiety	
disorder	 in	 healthy	 young	 workers	 (Maria	 Melchoir	 and	 others	 "Work	 Stress	
Precipitates	 Depression	 and	 Anxiety	 in	 Young,	 Working	 Women	 and	 Men."	













is	 difficult,	 as	 ‘normal’	 risk	 cannot	 be	 standardised.	Different	 occupations	 pose	
different	 types	of	 harm	 (that	 is,	 the	harm	may	be	physical	 or	psychological,	 or	
both).	Some	occupations	involve	a	high	risk	of	physical	harm	(such	as	forestry	or	
farming),	 while	 some	 occupations	 (such	 as	 providing	 health	 services	 or	
administration)	will	have	a	low	risk	of	physical	harm,	but	may	be	more	prone	to	
psychological	 harm	 or	workplace	 stress.446	Even	within	 the	 same	 industry,	 the	
level	 of	 risk	 may	 vary	—	 for	 example,	 the	 risks	 involved	 in	 logging	 on	 steep,	
rugged	 and	 remote	 terrain	 will	 be	 greater	 than	 on	 a	 purpose-designed,	 flat	
plantation.		
Thus,	establishing	what	a	‘normal’	level	of	risk	of	harm	is	for	any	industry	may	be	
difficult.	 This	 is	 particularly	 true	 of	 psychological	 harm,	 as	 situations	 that	 one	
employee	 may	 find	 stressful	 another	 may	 find	 stimulating.447	To	 complicate	
matters	further,	for	those	with	mental	disability,	it	may	be	unclear	if	the	mental	
disability	 (e.g.	 depression	 or	 an	 anxiety	 disorder)448	has	 been	 caused	by	 stress	
(even	when	this	level	of	stress	is	considered	normal	in	that	particular	industry),	
or	whether	the	presence	of	a	mental	disability	means	the	employee	is	simply	less	
able	 to	 deal	with	 the	 normal	 stresses	 of	 the	 job.	 Either	way,	with	 exposure	 to	
stress,	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 may	 be	 at	 risk	 of	 exacerbating	 their	
mental	 disability.	 Thus,	 when	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 position	 creates	 some	 level	 of	
stress	 to	 the	 individual	 employee,	 and	 this	 stress	 is	 causing	 them	 harm,	 then	
reducing	this	risk	of	harm	may	be	difficult	to	achieve	without	adverse	treatment	
of	 the	 employee,	 and	 risking	 a	 claim	 of	 discrimination.	 Even	 Professor	 Smith,	
whose	occupation	may	not	be	considered	inherently	risky,	may,	due	to	her	own	
personality,	still	be	at	risk	of	harm,	if	workplace	stress	is	exacerbating	her	mental	
disability.449	If	 so,	 the	University	may	have	a	defence	 that	Professor	Smith	 is	at	
																																																								
446	Hampson	and	others,	above	n53	at	9.	This	report	analyzed	the	level	of	stress	
suffered	 by	 employees	 in	 different	 industries.	 Although	 this	 is	 taken	 from	 UK	
data,	the	same	results	are	likely	to	apply	in	New	Zealand.		
447 	Aaron	 Martin	 "Foresight	 of	 Harm	 and	 Inherently	 Stressful	 Occupations"	
(2006)		NZLJ	395	at	395.		
448	Workplace	 stress	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 development	 of	 depression	 and	
anxiety	disorders	(Melchoir	and	others,	above	n445).		
449	The	 employer	 cannot	 escape	 liability	 by	 arguing	 that	 an	 employee	 is	 less	
resilient	than	other	employees.	In	Gilbert	v	Attorney	General	[2001]	1	ERNZ	332	
(EC),	 at	384,	 the	Employment	Court	held:	 “it	was	not	open	 to	 the	defendant	 to	
argue	that	Mr	Gilbert’s	physical	or	mental	health	or	personality	were	such	that	
he	was	 unable	 to	 cope	with	 the	 stresses	 and	 strains	 of	 the	 job,	whereas	 other	
employees	 or	 a	 different	 personality	 type	 may	 have	 been	 more	 resilient.	 The	
	
	128	
risk	 of	 harm	 and	 it	 is	 not	 reasonable	 to	 take	 that	 risk.	 If	 the	 only	 means	 of	
reducing	 her	 risk	 is	 to	 reduce	 her	 workload	 (for	 example,	 removing	 her	
supervision	 or	 lecturing	 duties),	 the	 University	 may	 claim	 these	 are	 not	
reasonable	measures,	 or	 that	 taking	 these	measure	would	 cause	 unreasonable	
disruption.		
There	are,	then,	major	interpretive	issues	associated	with	the	concept	of		‘risk	of	
harm’	 and	 whether	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 take	 that	 risk.	 Following	 the	 spiral	




the	 text	 of	 the	 HRA	 and	 in	 light	 of	 its	 purpose.	 ‘Harm’	 is	 the	 initial	 term	
presenting	difficulties,	 as	 it	 is	not	defined	 in	 the	 legislation.	The	plain	meaning	
(as	 defined	 in	 the	 Oxford	 dictionary)	 is	 ‘hurt’	 or	 ‘damage’.450	Whether,	 for	 the	
purposes	of	the	Act,	this	is	restricted	to	physical	harm	is	not	clear	from	the	text.		
‘Risk’	has	been	defined	as	‘a	chance	or	possibility	of	danger,	loss,	injury	or	other	
adverse	 consequences’.451	‘Chance’	 or	 ‘possibility’	 implies	 a	 low	 potential	 or	
likelihood	 of	 the	 event	 occurring,	 suggesting	 that	 a	 low	 likelihood	 of	 either	
physical	or	psychological	hurt	would	be	sufficient	to	meet	the	criteria	of	a	‘risk	of	
harm’	 under	 the	HRA.	However,	whether	 this	 interpretation	 fits	 the	 scheme	of	
the	HRA	requires	further	assessment.		
The	scheme	of	the	HRA	shows	a	consistent	theme	for	disability	discrimination,	in	
all	 contexts	 covered	 by	 the	 Act.	 This	 is	 that	 adverse	 treatment	 of	 a	 disabled	
person	 will	 not	 be	 unlawful	 if,	 due	 to	 their	 disability,	 the	 activity	 poses	 an	
unreasonable	 risk	 of	 harm	 to	 the	 disabled	 person	 (or	 others),	 and	 it	 is	
unreasonable	to	take	that	risk.	Throughout	the	HRA,	 this	exception	to	unlawful	
treatment	will	not	apply	 if	 the	risk	of	harm	can	be	reduced	 to	normal,	without	
unreasonable	disruption	 to	 the	 relevant	person	or	organisation.452		Thus,	 to	be	





from	 the	 department's	 liability.”	 This	 finding	 was	 not	 overturned	 on	 appeal.	
Furthermore,	 the	Court	of	Appeal	has	accepted	 that	 some	occupations,	 such	as	
front	 line	 social	 work	 and	 policing,	 are	 inherently	 stressful.	 This	 placed	
employers	under	greater	obligations	under	the	(now	repealed)	Health	and	Safety	
in	 Employment	 Act	 1992	 to	 protect	 the	 employee	 from	hazards.	 See	Whelan	v	












is	 different	 again	 to	 the	 risk	 of	 harm	 involved	 in	 obtaining	 admission	 to	 an	
educational	environment.454	This	in	turn	will	play	an	important	part	in	assessing	
the	 degree	 to	which	 the	 affected	 person	 or	 organisation	 can	 either	 reasonably	
take	that	risk,	or	take	measures	to	mitigate	it.	Nonetheless,	if	the	same	factors	or	
considerations	 (such	 as	 the	 degree	 of	 risk	 involved,	 the	 resources	 of	 the	
organisation,	 whether	 the	 disability	 causing	 the	 risk	 is	 a	 permanent	 or	
temporary	condition,	the	number	of	people	affected,	etc.)	are	taken	into	account	
during	 the	 assessment,	 this	 should	 provide	 some	 level	 of	 predictability	 to	 the	
interpretation.	Currently,	however,	 the	HRA	provides	no	guidance,	and	 there	 is	
little	case	law	on	the	factors	to	consider	in	the	interpretation	of	‘risk	of	harm’,	or	
what	counts	as	an	acceptable	level	of	risk.					
Furthermore,	 although	 the	 scheme	 of	 the	 HRA	 may	 suggest	 a	 consistent	
approach	should	be	taken	to	assessing	what	is	a	reasonable	risk	of	harm	in	the	
context	 of	 a	 particular	 provision,	 it	 is	 less	 clear	 how	 this	 should	 be	 applied	 in	
practice.	 Should	 the	 assessment	 relate	 to	 the	 risk	 associated	with	 a	 particular	
aspect	of	the	activity,	or	the	activity	as	a	whole?455		For	employment,	given	that	
the	task	reallocation	proviso	applies	to	only	‘some	of	the	duties’	of	a	position,	an	
analysis	 of	 the	 risk	 associated	 with	 each	 particular	 duty	 of	 the	 role	 seems	
required.	 Then,	 if	 any	 particular	 duty	 poses	 an	 unreasonable	 risk	 to	 the	
employee	 or	 others,	 further	 enquiry	 may	 be	 made	 regarding	 whether	 the	
employer	could	reasonably	accommodate	the	employee	in	relation	to	that	duty.	
Thus,	in	Connell	v	Sepclean	Limited,456	the	employer	contended	that	Connell	was	






work	 safely.	 Therefore	 Connell’s	 dismissal	 was	 discrimination.457	Furthermore,	
the	only	duty	where	there	was	a	risk	of	harm	to	Connell	(or	at	least	his	prosthetic	
leg)	 was	 working	 on	 a	 barge,	 as	 the	 salt	 water	 would	 damage	 his	 prosthesis.	





the	 ground	of	 disability	 due	 to	 a	 risk	 of	 harm.	However,	 if	 it	 is,	 for	 example,	 a	
multi-sport	event,	should	the	risk	assessment	be	a	global	assessment	across	all	
categories,	or	should	each	category	be	assessed	separately	and	only	some	of	the	









proviso	 applied	 (that	 is,	 another	 employee	 could	 perform	 the	 work	 where	
saltwater	immersion	was	a	possibility,	without	undue	disruption	to	Sepclean).		
Thus,	 the	 scheme	 of	 the	 Act,	 with	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	 permitted	
exceptions	 and	 the	 task	 reallocation	 proviso,	 suggests	 that	 the	 risk	 of	 harm	
should	be	assessed	against	individual	duties	of	the	position.	However,	there	may	
be	a	cumulative	effect	of	accommodating	a	risk	of	harm.	That	 is,	 if	all	(or	many	
of)	 the	duties	of	a	position	contain	a	small	 risk	of	harm,	 then	 if	 those	risks	are	
assessed	 cumulatively,	 it	 may	 mean	 the	 overall	 risk	 is	 unreasonable.	 For	
example,	if	the	stress	of	researching	is	only	putting	Professor	Smith	at	a	mild	risk	








At	 the	 time	of	enactment,	 the	emergence	of	AIDS	was	a	major	social	 issue,	and	
discussion	 regarding	 ‘risk	 of	 harm’	 related	 mainly	 to	 the	 threat	 of	 ‘infecting	
others	with	an	illness’.458	Clearly	however,	other	risks	of	harm	are	also	covered	
the	legislation.		





posed	must	be	 ‘unreasonable’	 and	 there	must	be	no	 ‘reasonable	measures’	 the	
employer	 could	 take	 to	 reduce	 that	 risk	 to	 normal	 without	 ‘unreasonable	
disruption’	to	their	activities.		
Whether	it	is	reasonable	to	take	the	risk	of	harm	might	appear	to	be	based	on	the	
employer’s	 subjective	 view	 of	 disability	 and	 the	 risk	 it	 poses.	 This	 issue	 was	
discussed	 in	Proceedings	Commissioner	v	Canterbury	Frozen	Meat	Co	Ltd.459	The	
Complaints	Review	Tribunal	 (CRT)460	confirmed	that	 the	employer’s	view	must	
have	 a	 factual	 basis	 and	 the	 evidence	 must	 be	 current,	 reliable	 and	















confirmed	 that	 merely	 assuming	 an	 employee’s	 condition	 (or	 impairment)	
creates	a	risk	of	harm	is	not	sufficient.463		
In	 addition,	 the	 Authority	 has	 interpreted	 ‘harm’	 broadly.	 In	 Lidiard	 v	 New	




others	 owed	 duties	 by	 NZFS	 without	 it	 having	 a	 chance	 to	






managerial	 prerogative,	 as	 the	 employer	would	 be	 able	 to	 treat	 the	 employee	
differently	 when	 they	 posed	 a	 low	 risk	 of	 harm.	 The	 rights	 of	 the	 disabled	
employee	 are	 still	 protected,	 as	 the	 employer	 would	 still	 have	 to	 reasonably	
accommodate	 the	 disabled	 employee,	 by	 reducing	 the	 risk	 of	 harm	 to	 normal	
when	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 do	 so,	 or	 by	 task	 reallocation,	 when	 that	 is	 possible.	
When	other	employees	or	members	of	the	public	are	unlikely	to	be	aware	of	any	
risk	 associated	 with	 the	 disabled	 employee	 performing	 their	 duties,	 it	 is	
appropriate	 that	 the	 threshold	 for	acceptable	 risk	of	harm	be	 low,	 to	minimise	
their	risk.	This	fulfils	the	purpose	of	protecting	‘others’	from	the	risk	of	harm,	in	
circumstances	 where	 they	 might	 not	 have	 voluntarily,	 or	 knowingly,	 assumed	
that	risk.		
Thus,	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 Act	 and	 the	 legislative	 history	 suggest	 it	 would	 be	
unreasonable	to	take	more	than	a	low	risk	of	harm.			
This	 is	 particularly	 the	 case	 as	 the	 employer	 has	 obligations	 under	 the	Health	
and	Safety	at	Work	Act	2015	(HSWA)	to	eliminate	or	minimise	risks	to	the	health	
and	 safety	 of	 employees	 and	 other	 people	 as	 far	 as	 reasonably	 practicable.466	
Harm	is	not	defined	in	the	HSWA,	however	a		‘hazard’	includes:		
...	a	person’s	behaviour	where	that	behaviour	has	the	potential	to	
cause	 death,	 injury,	 or	 illness	 to	a	person	 (whether	 or	 not	 that	
behaviour	 results	 from	 physical	 or	 mental	 fatigue,	 drugs,	
alcohol,	 traumatic	 shock,	 or	 another	 temporary	 condition	 that	
affects	a	person’s	behaviour)	(emphasis	added).		
																																																								
463 	McClelland	 v	 Schindler	 Lifts	 NZ	 Ltd	 [2015]	 NZHRRT	 45	 at	 [78],	 [86].	
McClelland	suffered	 from	a	benign	essential	 tremor	of	 the	hands.	His	employer	
assumed	he	had	a	disability,	and	assumed	this	posed	a	risk	to	his	safety	as	a	lift	










disabled	 employee	 (as	 a	 result	 of	 their	 disability)	 exhibits	 difficult	 behaviours,	
this	may	 lead	 to	 increased	workplace	 stress	 for	 other	 employees	 and	 result	 in	
their	 illness.	 Is	 this	 then	 a	 hazard	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 HSWA?	 	 If	 so,	
elimination	 of	 this	 hazard	 may	 require	 the	 employer	 to	 dismiss	 (or	 at	 least	
redeploy)	the	mentally	disabled	employee,	if	that	adverse	treatment	was	the	only	
way	to	eliminate	the	hazard	posed	by	the	employee.		
Therefore,	 this	 same	 ‘hazard’	 created	by	 the	employee’s	behaviour	may	be	one	
that	 poses	 a	 ‘risk	 of	 harm’	 to	 others,	 under	 the	HRA.	 This	 implies	 that	 ‘risk	 of	
harm’	 should	 be	 interpreted	 to	 include	 the	 negative	 psychological	 affects	 on	
other	 employees	 (such	 as	 increased	workplace	 stress)	 caused	 by	 the	mentally	
disabled	 employee’s	 disability.	 Thus,	 this	 potential	 ‘risk	 of	 harm’	 to	 other	
employees	may	 be	 enough	 to	 excuse	 the	 employer’s	 adverse	 treatment	 of	 the	
mentally	disabled	employee	under	the	permitted	exceptions.			
Consideration	of	the	Wider	Context	




In	Australia,	 if,	 after	 reasonable	 adjustments,	 an	 employee	 cannot	 perform	 the	
inherent	 requirements	 of	 the	 position	 safely,	 the	 employer	may	 dismiss	 them.	
The	High	Court	of	Australia	has	held:467		
In	 most	 employment	 situations,	 the	 inherent	 requirements	 of	








direct	 threat	 to	 the	 health	 and	 safety	 of	 others	 in	 the	 workplace. 468 	For	
interpretive	guidance	as	to	the	meaning	of	a	direct	threat,	the	Equal	Employment	
Opportunity	Commission	 (EEOC)	has	adopted	a	 four-stage	 test:	 the	duration	of	





held	that	an	 inherent	requirement	 for	a	soldier	was	to	be	able	to	 ‘bleed	safely’,	









of	 discrimination,	 it	 bears	 some	 similarity	 to	 the	 New	 Zealand	 legislation,	
although,	 unlike	 the	 HRA,	 this	 defence	 does	 not	 include	 a	 ‘reasonableness’	
component.	 Presumably,	 however,	 when	 a	 risk	 is	 significant,	 it	 would	 not	 be	
reasonable	to	have	to	bear	it.	





that	 risk	 can	 only	 be	 considered	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 undue-
hardship	 analysis,	 not	 as	 an	 independent	 justification	 of	
discrimination.	
…	 To	 meet	 the	 test	 of	 undue	 hardship,	 the	 risk	 must	 be	
"serious".	The	use	of	the	term	undue	infers	that	some	hardship	
is	acceptable;	 it	 is	only	 "undue"	hardship	 that	 satisfies	 the	 test	
(footnotes	omitted).		
Thus,	 in	 Canada,	 the	 degree	 of	 risk	 that	 must	 exist	 before	 the	 employer	 can	
refuse	 to	 accommodate	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 is	 ‘serious’.	
Furthermore,	 the	 employer	 is	 not	 entitled	 to	 set	 ‘standards	 higher	 than	
necessary	for	workplace	safety	or	irrelevant	to	the	work	required’.474		However,	
in	New	Zealand	the	employer	is	only	expected	to	take	 ‘reasonable	measures’	to	
accommodate	 the	 employee	 that	do	not	 cause	 ‘unreasonable	disruption’	 to	 the	
employer’s	 activities.	 As	 a	 high	 level	 of	 risk	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 require	 the	
employer	to	take	significant	measures	to	accommodate	the	risk,	it	is	more	likely	




In	 general,	 then,	 overseas	 jurisdictions	 only	 provide	 limited	 assistance	 in	
interpreting	the	meaning	of		‘risk	of	harm’	in	the	HRA.		
																																																								
470	These	 factors	were	adopted	 from	the	case	 law,	 in	particular	School	Board	of	
Nassau	Count	v	Airline,	480	US	273	(1987).	See	Stephen	Befort	“Direct	Threat	and	
Business	Necessity:	Understanding	 and	Untangling	Two	ADA	Defenses”	 (2018)	
39	 Berkeley	 J	 Emp	 &	 Lab	 L	 (2018)	 Forthcoming.	 Available	 at	 SSRN:	
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3055913	at	6.		
471	At	9.		
472	British	 Columbia	 (Public	 Service	 Employee	 Relations	 Commission)	 v	 BCGSEU	
(1999)	3	 SCR	3;	Lane	v	ADGA	Group	Consultants	 Inc.	[2007]	HRTO	34	 at	 [119],	
which	 was	 upheld	 by	 the	 Ontario	 Superior	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (Adga	 Group	
Consultants	Inc.	v	Lane	91	OR	(3d)	649;	295	DLR	(4th)	425;	[2008]	OJ	No	3076	).		
473	Adga	Group	Consultants	Inc.	v	Lane,	above	n472	at	[116]-[117].		





Overall,	 taking	 into	 consideration	 the	 factors	 addressed	 above,	 the	 spiral	
approach	 suggests	 that	 the	 best	 interpretation	 of	 ‘harm’	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
assessing	 unreasonable	 risks	 includes	 both	 physical	 and	 psychological	 damage	
or	 hurt,	 including	 the	 indirect	 hurt	 suffered	 by	 other	 employees	 as	 a	
consequence	 of	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee’s	 behaviours	 or	 the	
manifestation	of	their	disability	(e.g.	poor	performance).		
Additionally,	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 others	 (and	 to	 comply	with	 the	HSWA),	 the	
level	of	‘risk’	that	it	may	be	unreasonable	to	bear	should	mean	low	or	moderate	
risk,	 rather	 than	 substantial	 or	 serious	 risk.	Although	 this	 is	 a	 lower	 threshold	
than	 suggested	 by	 overseas	 jurisdictions,	 those	 jurisdictions	 require	 the	
employer	 to	 accommodate	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 (and	 their	 risk	 of	
harm)	to	the	point	of	undue	hardship,	whereas,	under	the	HRA,	the	employer	is	
only	 expected	 to	 take	 ‘reasonable	 measures’	 and	 does	 not	 have	 to	 tolerate	
‘unreasonable	disruption’.	This	suggests	the	threshold	for	the	accommodation	of	
risk	 will	 be	 lower	 (before	 these	 accommodations	 become	 unreasonable)	 than	
where	accommodation	is	required	to	the	point	of	undue	hardship.	Furthermore,	
as	the	employer	must	protect	others	from	risks	of	harm,	and,	under	the	HSWA,	
eliminate	hazardous	behaviour	 that	has	 the	potential	 to	cause	 injury	or	 illness,	
the	employer	should	be	able	to	defend	their	actions	on	the	basis	of	a	relatively	
low	risk	for	harm	to	others.		
Although	this	 interpretation	may	provide	a	 level	of	certainty	to	the	 law,	 it	does	
not	advance	substantive	equality	for	the	disabled	employee,	as	their	disability	is	
not	accommodated	to	a	significant	degree.	However,	this	provision	is	subject	to	
section	 29	 (2)	 which	might	 provide	 the	 disabled	 employee	with	 some	 further	
protection.		
5.3.4 The	 Proviso	 to	 the	 Unreasonable	 Risk	 of	 Harm	 Defence:	 Section	
29(2)		
The	unreasonable	risk	of	harm	defence	has	an	exception	set	out	in	section	29(2).	
This	 exception	 provides	 that	 an	 employer	 cannot	 rely	 on	 the	 defence	 of	
unreasonable	 risk	 of	 harm	 if,	 without	 causing	 unreasonable	 disruption,	
reasonable	measures	could	be	taken	to	reduce	that	risk	to	normal.	This	provision	
contains	 two	 ambiguous	 concepts	 requiring	 interpretation.	 Firstly,	 what	
constitutes	 ‘unreasonable	 disruption’,	 and	 secondly,	 what	 are	 ‘reasonable	





the	 defence	 is	 only	 made	 out	 when	 there	 is	 no	 reasonable	 measure	 that	 the	
employer	 could	 take	 to	 reduce	 the	 level	 of	 risk	 to	 normal,	 this	may	 imply	 the	
employer	 is	 under	 a	 positive	 duty	 to	 take	 any	 measures	 that	 are	 not	




Again,	 interpreting	 ‘unreasonable	disruption’	 involves	balancing	 the	 conflicting	
interests	 of	 the	 parties	 and	may	 be	 influenced	 by	 several	 factors.	 The	 starting	
point	is	ascertaining	the	meaning	from	the	text	in	light	of	its	purpose.		
The	Meaning	of	‘Reasonable	Measures’	and	‘Unreasonable	Disruption’	
Section	 29(2)	 negates	 the	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	 harm	 defence	 if	 there	 are	
reasonable	 measures	 the	 employer	 could	 take	 ‘to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 harm	 to	
‘normal’.	This	is	a	proviso	to	the	unreasonable	risk	of	harm	defence.	Accordingly,	
it	will	be	referred	to	as	the	‘harm	reduction	possible	proviso’.		




defence	 does	 not	 specifically	 mention	 the	 employer’s	 activities,	 instead	
stating:476	
Nothing	 in	 subsection	 (1)(b)	 shall	 apply	 if	 the	employer	 could,	




likely)	 meaning	 is	 that	 the	 measures	 taken	 would	 create	 an	 unreasonable	
disruption	to	the	activities	of	the	employer	(such	as	changes	to	rosters,	extended	
breaks,	excusing	 the	employee	 from	some	duties).	That	 is,	 the	measures	would	
affect	the	day-to-day	activities	of	the	business.		
The	text	suggests	the	employer	has	two	particular	ways	in	which	to	defend	their	
actions.	 They	 can	 either	 establish	 that	 the	 reasonable	 measures	 are	 unduly	
disruptive;	or,	even	if	not,	that	the	measures	themselves	are	not	reasonable.	How	
the	 measures	 can	 be	 distinguished	may	 be	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 example	 of	 a	
nurse	who	has	bi-polar	disorder	and	cannot	work	night	shifts,	without	a	risk	of	
harm	to	her	health.	In	this	situation,	the	measure	of	allowing	the	nurse	to	work	
only	 afternoon	 shifts	may	 reduce	 that	 risk	 to	 normal.	 However,	 if	 the	 nurse	 is	
employed	in	a	small	hospital	with	a	limited	pool	of	staff,	the	hospital	may	defend	
their	 failure	 to	 allow	 this,	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 manipulating	 staff	 to	 cover	 these	
shifts	 would	 unreasonably	 disrupt	 their	 activities.	 Alternatively,	 the	 hospital	
might	 defend	 their	 conduct	 it	 would	 be	 an	 unreasonable	 measure	 to	 employ	





any	 of	 the	 exceptions	 in	 this	 Part,	 to	 accord	 to	 any	 person	 in	 respect	 of	 any	
position	different	treatment	based	on	a	prohibited	ground	of	discrimination	even	









Furthermore,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 from	 the	 text	 whether	 the	 cumulative	 effects	 of	
individual	measures,	and	the	disruption	they	cause,	should	be	considered.	That	
is,	should	the	reasonableness	of	the	disruption	to	the	employer	be	assessed	only	
by	 focusing	 on	 each	 individual	 duty	 that	 poses	 a	 risk	 and	 the	 accommodation	
required	for	that	duty	and	deciding	if	that	is	reasonable,	or	should	the	total	effect	
of	 multiple	 accommodations	 for	 an	 individual	 employee	 (or	 accommodations	
provided	 for	 other	 similarly	 situated	 employees)	 be	 taken	 into	 account?	 	 The	
cumulative	effect	could	relate	to	one	employee	requiring	multiple	measures	to	be	
taken	for	multiple	duties,	(such	as	not	working	night	shifts,	and,	when	working	
day	 shifts,	 requiring	multiple	 rest	 breaks,	 requiring	other	 staff	 be	 available	 for	
cover).	Each	individual	accommodation	may	be	a	reasonable	measure	that	does	
not	 unreasonably	 disrupt	 the	 employer,	 but,	 cumulatively,	 re-rostering	 staff	 to	
cover	 night	 duties	 and	 providing	 additional	 cover	 during	 the	 days	 may	 be	
unreasonable.	 In	 addition,	 conceivably,	 there	may	 be	more	 than	 one	 employee	
that	 requires	 accommodation.	 Whilst,	 on	 an	 individual	 basis,	 the	 measures	
required	 may	 be	 reasonable,	 the	 cumulative	 effect	 may	 be	 such	 that	 the	
disruption	 becomes	 unreasonable	 as	 a	 whole.	 For	 example,	 if	 two	 employees	
were	 unable	 to	 work	 night	 shifts,	 and	 the	 employer	 could	 only	 manage	 to	
accommodate	 one	 without	 unreasonable	 disruption,	 could	 they	 count	 on	 the	




be	 short	 term	 and	 intense	 (e.g.	 work	 undertaken	 to	 alter	 the	 physical	
environment	of	a	site	—	perhaps	to	provide	the	mentally	disabled	employee	with	
a	quiet	or	secluded	workspace),	or	less	disruptive	but	occurring	over	the	longer	
term	 (e.g.	 providing	 the	 employee	with	 appropriate	 long-term	 supervision).	 It	
could	 have	 significant	 short-term	 financial	 implications	 (such	 as	 purchasing	























The	 term	 “unreasonably	 disrupt	 the	 employer’s	 activities”	 is	 a	
relative	term	and	cannot	be	given	a	hard	and	fast	meaning.	Each	
case	will	necessarily	depend	on	its	own	facts	and	circumstances	
and	 it	will	 come	 down	 to	 a	 determination	 of	 “reasonableness”	
under	 the	 unique	 circumstances	 of	 the	 particular	 employer-
employee	relationship.	
This	 provides	 little	 guidance.	Nonetheless,	 the	HRRT	 said	 the	 employer	 had	 to	
make	‘a	significant,	serious	and	sincere	effort’480	to	accommodate	the	employee,	
and	 an	 ex	 post	 facto	 justification	 that	 an	 accommodation	 would	 have	 caused	
‘unreasonable	disruption’	is	unlikely	to	succeed.	Thus,	justifications	offered	after	
the	event	without	prior	efforts	to	accommodate	the	disabled	employee	will	not	
be	 sufficient.	 As	 the	 HRRT	 said	 the	 effort	 required	 to	 accommodate	 must	 be	






the	 competing	 interests	of	 the	employer	and	employee.	This	was	 the	approach	
taken	 in	 Smith	v	Air	New	Zealand,484	where	 the	 Court	 held,	 that	 for	 reducing	 a	
																																																																																																																																																														
merely	states	that		‘if	the	employer	could,	without	unreasonable	disruption,	take	
reasonable	measures	 to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 to	 normal’.	 However,	 it	 is	 likely	 these	
differences	are	semantic	rather	than	substantive.			
479	Nakarawa	v	AFFCO	New	Zealand	Limited,	above	n127	at	[74].		
480 	The	 employer	 must	 provide	 evidence	 that	 the	 accommodation	 required	
would	 cause	 ‘unreasonable	 disruption’	 or	 the	 measures	 required	 are	
unreasonable,	 to	 allow	 for	 ‘an	 evaluative	 analysis	 of	 the	 reasonableness	 or	
proportionality	of	the	employer’s	response’	(above	n127	at	[74.5]).		
481	In	Atley	 v	 Southland	District	Health	Board,	 above	 n84	 at	 [21]	 the	 Authority	






staff	 failed	to	appreciate	the	importance	of	religious	belief,	 if	 they	believed	that	
work	 should	have	priority	over	 the	 right	 to	adhere	 religious	practice.	This,	 the	
HRRT	 held,	 is	 inconsistent	 with	 the	 human	 right	 to	 religious	 freedom	 which	






risk	 of	 harm	 the	 employer	 need	 not	 tolerate	 ‘undue	 hardship’.	 Similarly,	 the	
HRRT	 has	 held	 that	 assessing	 what	 is	 reasonable	 involves	 evaluating	 the	
‘proportionality	 of	 the	 accommodation	 required	 against	 the	 disruption	 it	
causes.’485	
Moreover,	 a	measure	 that	 appears	 on	 the	 face	 of	 it	 to	 be	 reasonable	 and	 non-
disruptive	may	still	indirectly	cause	disruption	to	the	activities	of	the	employer.	
For	example,	if	the	measure	needed	to	reduce	a	risk	of	harm	to	others	would	be	




cause	 concern	 to	 customers	 who	 feel	 they	 are	 being	 charged	 additional	 costs	
because	of	the	presence	of	a	second	gas-fitter.	Or	they	may	wonder	if	there	are	
safety	or	competency	issues	with	the	gas-fitters	(requiring	them	to	double-check	
each	 other).	 Either	 way,	 this	 may	 affect	 the	 customer’s	 choice	 to	 use	 that	
provider	 again.	 Thus,	 a	 seemingly	 reasonable	measure,	 that	 in	 the	 short	 term	
causes	no	unreasonable	disruption,	may	in	the	long-term	do	so.			
Ultimately,	the	conflicting	purposes	of	the	HRA	suggest	that	what	can	reasonably	
be	 expected	 of	 the	 employer	 (to	 reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 harm	 to	 normal	 at	 least)	
should	not	be	set	at	such	a	high	standard	that	it	would	cause	undue	hardship	to	
the	employer	or	their	activities.					







This	 interpretation	 balances	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 parties,	 and	 promotes	




be	 interpreted	 as	 inferring	 a	 positive	 obligation	 to	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	
employee,	rather	than	purely	providing	defences.		
As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 Court486	and	 the	 Committee	 for	 the	 UNCRPD487	have	








provisions	 in	 the	 HRA.	 However,	 the	 HRRT,488	and	 the	 Authority	 (assessing	
discrimination	claims	arising	under	the	ERA)489	have	not	considered	this	issue.	
It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 should,	 if	 possible,	 be	
interpreted	 as	 an	 obligation	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	 the	 employee,	 as	 this	
would	 fulfil	 the	 dual	 purposes	 of	 the	 HRA.	 As	 the	 obligation	 to	 accommodate	
disability	 would	 be	 premised	 on	 what	 is	 ‘reasonable’,	 this	 protects	 both	 the	
rights	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee	 and	 the	 employer’s	managerial	 prerogative.	 It	
would	 also	 be	 consistent	 with	 the	 effect	 of	 some	 other	 provisions	 of	 the	 Act	




is	 to	 ‘ensure	 that	 reasonable	 accommodation	 is	 provided	 to	 persons	 with	
disabilities	 in	 the	workplace’.490	Arguably,	meeting	 this	 requirement	means	 the	
disabled	employee	should	have	a	right	to	reasonable	accommodation.491		This	is	
because	 a	 positive	 obligation	 (or	 duty),	 imposed	 on	 one	 party	 (e.g.	 ensuring	
reasonable	 accommodation	 is	 provided	 in	 the	 workplace)	 will	 bestow	 a	
corresponding	‘right’	(to	reasonable	accommodation)	on	the	recipient.492	Rights	
may	 be	 considered	 as	 ‘claims,	 enforceable	 by	 state	 power,	 that	 others	 act	 in	 a	
certain	way	toward	the	right-holder.’493	
However,	 merely	 providing	 an	 employer	 with	 a	 defence	 against	 a	 claim	 of	
discrimination	when	it	would	be	unreasonable	to	make	accommodation	does	not	
confer	 a	 specific	 right	 on	 the	 disabled	 employee	 to	 have	 an	 accommodation	
made.	 It	 merely	 excuses	 the	 employer’s	 behaviour.	 According	 to	 Hohfeld’s	
																																																								
488	Interestingly,	 the	 HRRT	 has	 not	 yet	 had	 to	 consider	 whether	 there	 is	 an	
obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 in	 employment	 in	 the	 context	 of	
disability	discrimination.	The	issue	of	reasonable	accommodation	has	arisen	for	
religious	 discrimination.	 However,	 there	 is	 a	 specific	 duty	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation	of	religious	practice	in	section	28(3).		
489	As	 yet,	 it	 has	 not	 been	 necessary	 for	 the	 Authority	 to	 consider	 the	 issue	 of	






491	Quinn	 argues	 that,	 as	 well	 as	 being	 a	 non-discrimination	 convention,	 the	
Convention	provides	a	web	of	substantive	rights.	That	is,	it	enables	the	disabled	











analytical	 jurisprudence,	 a	 defence	 would	 provide	 the	 employer	 with	 an	











‘best’	 interpretation	 for	 these	 provisions.	 The	 fact	 that	 several	 defences	 are	




is,	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 ‘special	 services	 or	 facilities’	 or	 to	 taking	 reasonable	
measures	to	reduce	a	risk	of	harm	to	normal.	For	example,	if	‘special	services	or	




general	 tolerance	 for	 poor	 performance,	 or	 additional	 sick	 leave.	 	 But	 that	 is	
exactly	 what	 ensuring	 the	 disabled	 employee’s	 continued	 employment	 may	
require.		
A	 better	 interpretation	might	 be	 to	 view	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 solely	 as	 a	
defence.	 Then,	 if	 the	 employee	 requires	 an	 accommodation	 that	 does	 not	 fall	
within	 the	 definition	 of	 ‘services	 or	 facilities’	 (such	 as	 additional	 sick	 leave	 or	
tolerance	of	poor	performance)	the	employer	would	have	no	defence	for	failing	
to	accommodate	them	(as	they	were	not	‘special	services	or	facilities’	that	it	was	
unreasonable	 to	 provide).	 Thus,	 it	 would	 be	 discrimination	 to	 fail	 to	
accommodate	the	disabled	employee	in	this	manner.	This	would	appear	to	offer	
better	 protection	 to	 the	 disabled	 employee	 than	 an	 inferred	 obligation	 to	
accommodate	 the	 employee.	 The	 inferred	 obligation	 would	 only	 require	 the	
employer	 to	provide	 things	 that	 fall	within	 the	narrow	category	of	 ‘services	or	
facilities’	(which	would	not	include	toleration	of	poor	performance).		
In	 short,	 if	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 are	 considered	 to	 infer	 a	 duty	 of	
accommodation,	 as	 toleration	of	 poor	performance	 is	 not	 a	 ‘service	 or	 facility’,	














legislation), 496 	apparently	 to	 ensure	 it	 was	 compliant	 with	 New	 Zealand’s	
obligations	under	 the	Convention.	These	amendments497	were	said	 to	be	aimed	
at	ensuring	 the	 legislation	did	not	discriminate	against	 the	disabled,	and	 in	 the	
case	 of	 the	 HRA,	 to	 clarify	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 reasonable	 accommodation	
required.498		
Nevertheless,	although	a	multitude	of	amendments	were	made	to	the	HRA,	and	




be	 expected	 to	 tolerate.	 This	 would	 be	 determined	 on	 whether	 the	 employee	
remained	‘qualified	for	work’.		
496	The	 2008	 amendments	 were	 introduced	 by	 the	 Disability	 (United	 Nations	
Convention	on	the	Rights	of	Persons	with	Disabilities)	Bill	2008.	
497	The	 amendments	 were	 recommended	 after	 the	 completion	 of	 the	 National	
Interest	 Analysis	 in	 early	 2008:	 Justice	 and	 Electoral	 Committee	 Disability	
(United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	Persons	with	Disabilities)	Bill	(232—
1)	 and	 International	 Treaty	 Examination	 of	 the	 Convention	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	
Persons	with	Disabilities	(2008)	.	
498 	Disability	 (United	 Nations	 Convention	 On	 The	 Rights	 Of	 Persons	 With	
Disabilities)	 Bill	 2008	 (232-1).	 The	 explanatory	 note	 to	 the	 Bill	 stated	 the	
purpose	was:	 ‘to	 amend	 the	Human	Rights	Act	 1993	 to	 clarify	 the	 scope	 of	 its	
provisions	enabling	a	person	 to	refuse	 to	accommodate	a	person's	disability	 in	
certain	areas	of	activity’.	This	suggests	that	the	purpose	of	the	amendment	was	
to	clarify	 lawful	refusal,	 rather	 than	curtail	 it.	 Ironically,	 the	phrase	“enabling	a	
person	 to	 refuse	 to	 accommodate”	 implies	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 legislation	 is	 to	
empower	a	person	to	discriminate	(as	the	denial	of	reasonable	accommodation	
is	 discrimination	 under	 the	 UNCRPD).	 However,	 the	 reason	 for	 instigating	 the	
legislation	 was	 to	 ensure	 New	 Zealand’s	 legislation	 was	 compliant	 with	 the	
UNCRPD	in	eliminating	discrimination.	Interestingly,	however,	the	Departmental	
Report	 (Office	 for	 Disablity	 Issues	 United	 Nations	 Convention	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	
Persons	with	Disabilities	and	Disability	(United	Nations	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	
Persons	 with	 Disabilities)	 Bill,	 Departmental	 Report	 (Ministry	 of	 Social	
Development	 and	 Ministry	 of	 Justice,	 2008)	 )	 stated	 the	 amendments	 were	
intended	 to	 clarify	 the	 duties	 and	 obligations	 of	 private	 parties	 to	 provide	
reasonable	accommodation	to	disabled	persons,	not	to	clarify	when	it	was	lawful	







This	 may	 suggest	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 legislature	 was	 to	 keep	 the	 potential	
accommodation	 provisions	 as	 a	 defence	 only,	 and	 therefore	 these	 provisions	
should	not	be	 interpreted	as	 imposing	a	general	obligation	on	 the	employer	 to	
reasonably	accommodate	the	disabled	employee.		
Nonetheless,	 the	 overall	 effect	 is	 that	 a	 positive	 duty	 to	 make	 reasonable	
accommodation	 exists	 in	 some	 legal	 contexts	 but	 not	 in	 others	 —	 a	 rather	






the	 existence	 of	 a	 general	 duty	 of	 accommodation	 to	which	 the	 exception	 can	
apply.’	 Nonetheless,	 they	 did	 acknowledge	 there	 was	 a	 possibility	 of	 New	
Zealand	being	criticised	by	the	UN	Committee	on	the	Rights	of	the	Persons	with	
Disabilities	 for	 failing	 to	 actively	 meet	 the	 obligations	 for	 reasonable	
accommodation.	 However,	 the	 report	 then	 continues	 to	 say	 criticism	 was	
unlikely	 given	 ‘the	 Committee	 is	 expected	 to	 examine	 whether	 New	 Zealand’s	
legislative	and	policy	provisions	and	practice,	as	a	whole,	are	consistent	with	the	
spirit	of	 the	Convention.	There	are	considerably	more	references	 to	reasonable	
accommodation	 in	 the	 Convention	 than	 just	 the	 prohibition	 of	 discrimination.	
Some	 of	 these	 references were	 intended	 to	 provide	 qualifications	 and	
clarification	 around	 the	 extent	 of	 the	 requirement	 for	 reasonable	
accommodation.’	 	 Nonetheless,	 the	 initial	 report	 on	 New	 Zealand	 by	 the	
Committee	did	contain	concerns	about	this	(Disabilities,	above	n398	at	11-14).		
500	Furthermore,	 the	 legislature	did	not	take	the	opportunity	to	 incorporate	the	
UNCRPD	into	New	Zealand	law,	nor	amend	the	purpose	of	the	Act	to	specifically	
give	effect	to	the	UNCRPD.	The	Departmental	Report	(Issues,	above	n499	at	97-




interpretation.	 Additionally,	 they	 stated	 that	 the	 HRA	 already	 provides	 the	
analysis	explicitly	in	certain	areas.	Nonetheless,	the	Committee	for	the	UNCRPD	
expressed	 concern	 regarding	 this	 lack	of	 definition:	Disabilities,	 above	n398	 at	
11.		
501	These	 provisions	 make	 it	 unlawful	 to	 fail	 to	 provide	 special	 services	 or	
facilities.	 Provisions	 that	 include	 this	 obligation	 are:	 s36,	 Discrimination	 in	
partnerships;	 s37,	 Organisations	 of	 employees	 or	 employers	 and	 professional	
and	trade	associations.		
502	A	National	Interest	Analysis	(NAI)	was	undertaken	in	2008.	The	purpose	of	an	
NAI	 is,	 in	 part,	 is	 to	 assess	 what	 legislative	 changes	 are	 required	 to	 ensure	
compliance	for	international	treaties.	However,	McGregor	(Judy	McGregor,	Sylvia	
A.	 Bell	 and	 Margaret	 A.	 Wilson	 Human	 Rights	 in	 New	 Zealand:	 Emerging	




Overall	 it	 appears	 that	 interpreting	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 in	 a	 way	 that	
achieves	 substantive	 equality	 for	 disabled	 people,	 and	 accords	 with	 the	














The	 interpretation	 of	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 therefore	 raises	 a	 number	 of	






required	 for	mental	 disability.	 Even	under	 a	 liberal	 interpretation,	 the	 concept	
may	refer	only	to	things	that	need	to	be	provided	that	are	external	to	the	role	of	
the	employee,	and	are	aimed	at	enabling	the	employee	to	perform	the	essential	
duties	 of	 the	 position,	 rather	 than	 creating	 a	 general	 obligation	 to	 deliver	 all	
forms	 of	 support	 that	may	 be	 required	 to	 accommodate	 the	mentally	 disabled	
employee.	Read	as	a	defence,	this	provision	will	protect	the	disabled	employee	to	
some	 degree	 (as	 the	 employer	 would	 have	 limited	 defences	 available	 if	 few	
things	were	considered	‘special	services	or	facilities’).	However,	if	the	employee	
required	an	accommodation	that	was	not	a	‘special	service	or	facility’,	in	order	to	
be	 ‘qualified’	 for	 the	 position,	 the	 employer	 would	 be	 under	 no	 obligation	 to	
provide	 it.	Thus,	 if	 the	employee	developed	a	mental	disability,	 and	performed	
poorly,	 the	 employer	 could	 claim,	 in	 those	 circumstances,	 that	 their	 poor	
performance	meant	 they	were	 no	 longer	 qualified	 for	 the	 position.	 This	 could	
occur	 even	 if	 the	 disabled	 employee	was,	 in	 fact,	 still	 performing	 the	 essential	
duties	 of	 the	 position,	 just	 not	 to	 the	 standard	 required	 by	 the	 employer.	 The	
employee	would	have	no	 comeback,	 as	 tolerance	of	 poor	performance	 is	 not	 a	









be	 interpreted	 in	 a	way	 that	 endorses	 the	 social	 construct	 of	 disability,	which	
would	require	greater	effort	to	be	made	to	remove	barriers	that	inhibit	disabled	
persons	 from	full	participation	 in	social	 life.	Consequently,	 the	 legislation	 itself,	






the	 disabled	 employee’s	 decision-making	 autonomy,	 particularly	 concerning	
risks	to	self.	If	it	is	the	employer	who	decides	when	it	is	not	reasonable	to	take	a	
risk	of	harm,	 the	employee’s	autonomy	is	compromised,	as	 they	are	denied	the	
choice	 (or	 right)	 to	 accept	 a	 level	 of	 risk	 in	 order	 to	 remain	 employed.	
Nevertheless,	under	health	and	safety	in	employment	law,	it	is	the	employer	who	
bears	the	obligation	to	create	a	safe	working	environment.		





to	 stressors,	 and	 assessing	 the	 level	 of	 risk	 to	 the	 individual	 in	 these	








measures	 that	 need	 to	 be	 taken	 to	 reduce	 the	 level	 of	 harm	 to	 normal	 should	
probably	be	significant	ones	before	they	should	be	viewed	as	unreasonable,	and	
any	 disruption	 incurred	 should	 fall	 short	 of	 undue	 hardship	 to	 the	 employer.	
However,	 it	 remains	 unclear	 what	 factors	 should	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 when	
assessing	whether	disruption	would	be	unreasonable,	leaving	a	lack	of	clarity	in	
the	law	in	this	area.		
Furthermore,	 it	 is	 unclear	 if	 the	 employer,	 when	 defending	 a	 claim	 of	
discrimination,	can	rely	on	the	cumulative	effect	of	accommodations	for	multiple	
employees	 to	 establish	 that	 the	 requirement	 would	 be	 unreasonable.	 On	 one	
view,	 when	 an	 accommodation	 is	 reasonable	 for	 one	 employee,	 it	 should	 be	
reasonable	for	another.	But	an	employer	may	still	view	the	cumulative	effect	of	
both	 accommodations	 as	 unreasonable,	 or	 consider	 it	 causes	 unreasonable	
disruption.	The	correct	interpretation	on	this	point	is	unclear.		













“Equality	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 matter	 of	 likeness.	 It	 is,	 equally,	 a	
matter	 of	 difference.	 That	 those	 who	 are	 different	 should	 be	





The	 previous	 chapter	 examined	 the	 section	 29	 defences	 (the	 permitted	
exceptions)	against	a	claim	of	discrimination,	which	are	the	first	of	the	potential	
accommodation	provisions.	These	permitted	exceptions	were	analysed	using	the	
spiral	 approach	 to	 interpretation,	 and	 concluded	 that	 although	 the	 permitted	
exceptions	 could	 be	 interpreted	 to	 infer	 a	 limited	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation,	 that	 this	was	 not	 the	 ‘best’	 interpretation	 of	 these	 provisions.	
Rather,	 the	 analysis	 suggests	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 should	 be	 interpreted	
only	as	a	defence.			
This	 chapter	 follows	 a	 similar	 format	 to	 examine	 the	 remaining	 potential	
accommodation	 provision:	 that	 is,	 the	 section	 35	 ‘General	 qualification	 on	
exceptions’	 (which	 this	 thesis	 refers	 to	 as	 the	 ‘task	 reallocation	 proviso’).	
Accordingly,	 the	chapter	starts	with	an	overview	of	 this	provision,	outlining	 its	
general	 intention,	before	 identifying	and	discussing	 the	 interpretive	 issues	 that	
arise.	This	chapter	then	examines	whether	this	provision	may	provide	a	positive	
duty	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 in	 some	 circumstances,	 and	 whether	 this	
may	place	a	further	gloss	on	the	interpretation	of	the	permitted	exceptions,	and	




As	a	 result	of	 this	analysis,	 this	 thesis	 concludes	 that	 some	of	 the	 issues	 in	 the	
task	 reallocation	 proviso	 cannot	 be	 solved	 through	 interpretation	 alone,	 and	
therefore	 contends	 that	 the	 way	 forward	 for	 clarifying	 the	 law	 regarding	
reasonable	 accommodation	 is	 via	 statutory	 reform.	 This	 would	 ensure	 New	
Zealand	 meets	 it	 commitments	 under	 the	 UNCRPD	 and	 promote	 substantive	






As	 explained	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 when	 discriminatory	 conduct	 has	 been	













in	 this	Part,	 to	accord	 to	any	person	 in	 respect	of	 any	position	
different	 treatment	 based	 on	 a	 prohibited	 ground	 of	
discrimination	even	 though	some	of	 the	duties	of	 that	position	
would	 fall	 within	 any	 of	 those	 exceptions	 if,	 with	 some	
adjustment	 of	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 employer	 (not	 being	 an	
adjustment	 involving	 unreasonable	 disruption	 of	 the	 activities	
of	 the	 employer),	 some	 other	 employee	 could	 carry	 out	 those	
particular	duties.	
This	 convoluted	82-word	 sentence	 creates	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 exceptions,	 and	
cancels	the	defence	in	certain	situations.		
The	 inelegant	 drafting	 creates	 interpretive	 difficulties,	 but	 the	 general	 effect	 is	
that	 this	 provision	 imposes	 on	 the	 employer	 a	 limited,	 express	 obligation	 to	
accommodate	the	disabled	employee,	in	specific	circumstances.		





For	 example,	 Professor	 Smith,	 due	 to	 her	 depression	 is	 unable	 to	 carry	 out	
research	and	is	dismissed.	Therefore,	she	has	been	treated	adversely	by	reason	
of	 her	 disability.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 unreasonable	 to	 provide	 special	 assistance	
defence	 is	 available	 to	 the	 University	 if	 it	 is	 unreasonable	 for	 it	 to	 provide	
Professor	Smith	with	a	 ‘special	 service	or	 facility’	 (i.e.,	 a	 research	assistant),	 in	
these	 circumstances.	However,	 the	 task	 reallocation	 proviso	would	 now	 apply,	
which	may	void	this	defence.			
Nevertheless,	 the	 task	reallocation	proviso	applies	only	 if	some	of	 the	duties	of	
the	disabled	employee	fall	within	the	defence	(or	permitted	exception).	That	 is,	
the	 disabled	 employee	 would	 not	 require	 special	 services	 or	 facilities	 (that	 it	




503	The	previous	 chapter	 also	 explained	how	 these	 permitted	 exceptions	might	




Then,	 if	 Professor	 Smith’s	 research	 duty	 could	 be	 reallocated	 to	 another	 staff	
member,	and	this	reallocation	did	not	involve	more	than	some	adjustment	to	the	
University’s	 activities	 and	 this	 adjustment	 would	 not	 cause	 unreasonable	
disruption	to	the	University,	then	the	defence	is	cancelled.	The	University	would	
then	be	obligated	to	accommodate	her	in	that	manner.	
Under	 the	 task	 reallocation	 proviso,	 the	 employer	 need	 not	 provide	 any	
unreasonable	 ‘special	 services	 or	 facilities’,	 or	 to	 take	 an	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	
harm.	Instead,	they	may	be	obliged	to	reallocate	certain	duties.	
Therefore,	 the	 task	 reallocation	 proviso	 performs	 two	 roles.	 First,	 it	 limits	 the	
defences	 provided	 by	 the	 permitted	 exceptions.	 That	 is,	 the	 defence	 will	 be	
cancelled	if	only	some	(but	not	all)	of	the	duties	of	the	employee	fall	within	the	
permitted	 exceptions	 and	 these	 duties	 could	 be	 reallocated	 to	 another	 staff	
member.	 Secondly,	 it	 creates	 an	 obligation	 under	 those	 circumstances	 to	
accommodate	the	disabled	employee	through	reallocation	of	those	duties,	rather	
than	 permitting	 them	 to	 be	 treated	 adversely	 (e.g.,	 their	 dismissal	 for	 non-
performance).		
The	Competing	Interests	of	the	Parties	
However,	 there	 is	only	a	 limited	obligation	 to	 reallocate	 the	duties,	 as	 the	 task	
reallocation	 proviso	 only	 applies	when	 ‘some’	 of	 the	 duties	 of	 the	 position	 fall	
within	the	defences,	and	where	 ‘some	other	employee’	(i.e.,	a	current	employee	
—	the	employer	 is	not	expected	 to	hire	someone)	could	carry	out	 those	duties	
instead.	Moreover,	 the	use	of	 ‘could’	suggests	 that	 this	must	be	a	viable	option,	
perhaps	implying	that	the	substitute	employee	should	be	able	to	perform	those	
duties	without	having	to	undergo	further	training.		
Furthermore,	 the	 task	 reallocation	 proviso	 only	 applies	 if	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
reallocate	 these	duties	with	 ‘some’	adjustment	of	 the	activities	of	 the	employer	
that	does	not	involve	‘unreasonable’	disruption.	However,	the	requirement	may	
be	onerous,	as	the	‘adjustments’	are	to	be	made	to	the	employer’s	activities,	and	
not	 to	 the	 employee’s	 role.	 That	 is,	 the	 employer	 must	 adjust	 their	 business	
activities	 to	 keep	 the	 disabled	 employee	 in	 their	 current	 role,	 and	 not	 simply	
restructure	the	employee’s	position	or	redeploy	them	elsewhere.504		
This	 is	 the	only	provision	 that	expressly	obliges	 the	employer	 to	accommodate	
the	disabled	employee	(where	possible),	to	avoid	discrimination.	
As	 a	 result,	 the	 task	 reallocation	 proviso	 places	 greater	 restrictions	 on	 the	
employer’s	managerial	prerogative	than	the	permitted	exceptions	—	as	it	acts	as	
a	positive	obligation	to	reallocate	tasks	when	possible,	and,	if	necessary,	requires	
the	 employer	 to	 make	 adjustments	 to	 their	 activities	 to	 do	 so.	 This	 provision	
then,	 appears	 to	 shift	 the	 balance	 of	 the	 competing	 interests	 between	 the	
disabled	 employee	 and	 employer	 toward	 that	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee.	
However,	the	limited	scope	of	the	provision	counter-balances	this.	It	only	applies	
																																																								
504 	Westlaw	 commentary	 (online),	 Human	 Rights	 Act	 HR29.04	 at	 (5).	 The	
commentator	adds:	As	a	result,	the	phrase	“duties	of	the	position”	should	be	read	





when	 ‘some	of	 the	duties’	 fall	within	 the	permitted	 exceptions,	 and	when	only	
‘some’	 adjustments	 need	 be	 made,	 and	 making	 those	 adjustments	 does	 not	
involve	‘unreasonable’	disruption	to	the	activities	of	the	employer.	 	Thus,	again,	
the	interpretation	of	these	phrases	(‘some	of	the	duties’,	‘some	adjustment’,	and	
‘unreasonable	 disruption’)	will	 determine	where	 the	 point	 of	 balance	 between	
the	 competing	 interests	 will	 lie,	 and	 thus,	 how	 much	 protection	 the	 disabled	
employee	is	afforded.		
A	disability-rights	approach	to	interpretation	of	these	phrases	would	be	one	that	
seeks	 to	 achieve	 greater	 substantive	 equality,	 by	 protecting	 the	 disabled	
employee’s	employment.	For	example,	‘some	of	the	duties’	may	be	interpreted	to	
mean	 a	 significant	 number	 of	 duties,	 including	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	
position,	while	‘some	adjustment’	of	the	employer’s	activities	may	be	interpreted	
to	 mean	 ‘some	 significant’	 adjustment,	 and	 the	 threshold	 for	 ‘unreasonable’	
disruption	may	be	high.	 Conversely,	 if	 the	 employer’s	 rights	have	 considerable	
sway,	 the	obligation	to	reallocate	duties	would	be	 interpreted	to	mean	that	 the	
obligation	exists	when	only	a	few,	non-essential	duties	fall	within	the	permitted	
exceptions,	 while	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘some’	 adjustment	 of	 the	 employer’s	 activities	
would	 require	 no	 more	 minimal	 adjustments,	 and	 there	 would	 be	 a	 low	
threshold	before	the	disruption	would	become	unreasonable.			




As	 there	 is	 no	 positive	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation,	 how	 the	 task	
reallocation	 proviso	 (and	 the	 potential	 accommodation	 provisions	 as	 a	whole)	






The	 task	 reallocation	 proviso	 applies	 when	 only	 ‘some	 of	 the	 duties	 of	 that	
position’	fall	within	the	permitted	exceptions.	If	this	is	the	case,	and	those	duties	
can	 be	 reallocated	 to	 another	 employee,	 then	 the	 employer’s	 defence	 will	 be	
annulled.	In	deciding	what	‘some	of	the	duties	of	that	position’	means,	two	issues	
arise.	The	first	issue	is	identifying	the	types	of	duties	that	fall	within	the	meaning	
of	 ‘some	of	 the	duties’.	The	other	concerns	the	quantum	of	 the	duties.	The	 first	
arises	 because,	 in	 employment	 law,	 the	 duties	 of	 any	 position	 can	 be	 broadly	
																																																								
505	The	Labour	 led	Coalition	Government	has	 indicated	 that	 it	will	 be	 changing	
some	aspects	of	employment	law,	such	as:	amending	the	90-day	trial	period	so	it	
only	 applies	 to	 small	 employers;	 reinstating	 compulsory	 rest-breaks;	 repealing	
the	Employment	Relations	(Film	Production	Work)	Amendment	Bill;	and	raising	





that	 are	 peripheral	 to	 these	 core	 elements.506	The	 question	 is:	 does	 the	 task	
reallocation	proviso	apply	to	both	these	essential	and	non-essential	duties	of	the	
position?	This	 issue	arises	 as,	 in	 employment	 law,	dismissal	 is	usually	 justified	
when	 an	 employee	 cannot	 perform	 the	 inherent	 or	 essential	 duties. 507		
Therefore,	if	the	employer’s	prerogative	is	to	be	protected,	the	task	reallocation	
proviso	should	be	interpreted	to	exclude	the	essential	or	 inherent	duties	of	the	
position.	 This	 would	 mean	 it	 would	 not	 be	 discriminatory	 to	 dismiss	 an	
employee	who	 is	unable	 to	perform	all	 those	essential	duties.	 	However,	under	
human	rights	law,	if	the	mentally	disabled	employee	is	to	be	better	protected,	the	
task	reallocation	proviso	must	include	the	essential	duties	of	the	position.	Then,	
despite	 the	 convention	 that	 being	 unable	 to	 perform	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 a	
position	 would	 normally	 justify	 dismissal,	 it	 would	 be	 unlawful	 to	 dismiss	 a	






are	 non-essential	 duties,	 would	 more	 of	 those	 duties	 need	 to	 be	 reallocated,	
leaving	the	employee	to	perform	only	the	core	elements	of	the	position?		





the	 employee	 now	 actually	 performing	 the	 position	 for	which	 they	were	 hired	
(and	 for	 which	 they	 are	 being	 paid)?	 Moreover,	 if	 a	 sizable	 proportion	 of	 the	
employee’s	 duties	 need	 to	 be	 reallocated,	 then	 is	 the	 employer	 in	 effect	
redeploying	both	the	disabled	employee	and	the	employee	who	takes	over	those	
duties?	Additionally,	there	may	be	a	domino	effect,	as	the	employee	who	is	now	
undertaking	 the	 disabled	 employee’s	 duties	would	 need	 to	 have	 some	 of	 their	
own	 duties	 reallocated	 before	 they	 could	 take	 on	 those	 additional	 duties.	
Furthermore,	 is	 the	 employer	 still	 expected	 to	 accommodate	 a	 disabled	




Additionally,	 it	 is	 unclear	whether	 ‘some	of	 the	 duties’	 could	 be	 interpreted	 to	













Finally,	 could	 it	 mean	 ‘some	 of	 all	 of	 the	 duties	 of	 a	 position’?	 That	 is,	 for	
Professor	 Smith	 could	 ‘some	 of	 the	 duties’	 mean	 some	 lecturing,	 some	
supervision	and	some	research?		
The	meaning	 from	 the	 Text,	 in	 the	 Context	 of	 the	 HRA	 and	 the	 Legislative	
History		
Starting	with	the	text	of	the	provision,	the	plain	meaning	of	the	phrase	suggests	
that	 the	 task	 reallocation	 proviso	 applies	 only	 when	 some,	 but	 not	 all,	 of	 the	
employee’s	duties	fall	within	the	permitted	exceptions.		Duties	can	be	defined	as	
a	‘job’	or	‘function’.508		
Many	 of	 the	 issues	 raised	 above	 cannot	 be	 determined	 from	 the	 text.	 In	
particular,	 whether	 ‘the	 duties’	 include	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position,	 or	
whether	 ‘some	of	 the	duties’	can	mean	all	of	 the	duties	but	only	during	certain	
period	of	time	—	such	as	a	particular	shift	within	a	position	(e.g.,	a	night	shift).	









proportion.	That	 is,	 is	 it	 still	 only	 ‘some	of	 the	duties’	when	 there	 are	 three	or	
four	duties	 the	 employee	 cannot	perform	as	 opposed	 to	 only	 one	or	 two?	And	




The	 scheme	 of	 the	 Act	 provides	 some	 indicia.	 	 The	 duties	 referred	 to	 are	 the	
duties	 that	 fall	within	 the	permitted	exceptions.	Therefore	 they	are	duties	 that	
the	 disabled	 employee	 could	 not	 perform	without	 special	 services	 or	 facilities	
that	 it	would	not	be	reasonable	 for	the	employer	to	provide,	or	that	they	could	
not	 perform	 without	 an	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	 harm	 arising.	 As	 discussed	
previously,	 the	provision	of	 ‘special	services	or	 facilities’	 is	most	 likely	to	mean	
those	services	or	facilities	that	are	required	to	enable	the	disabled	employee	to	
perform	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position.	 Therefore,	 the	 task	 reallocation	
proviso	must	also	apply	to	these	essential	duties,	even	if	only	to	‘some’	of	them.		














manner	 in	which	 the	 task	 reallocation	proviso	 applies	 in	 relation	 to	 permitted	
exceptions	for	other	prohibited	grounds	of	discrimination.510	For	some	of	those	
grounds,	 employer	 obligations	 to	 accommodate	 the	 employee	 clearly	 apply	
equally	 to	 both	 essential	 duties	 and	 peripheral	 duties.	 For	 example,	 the	
prohibited	ground	of	religion	requires	the	employer	to	accommodate	adherence	
to	 religious	 practice,511	and	 religious	 practice	 may	 mean	 the	 employee	 cannot	
work	 certain	 days.	 Although	 being	 able	 to	work	 Saturdays	may	 be	 considered	





defence	 is	 made	 out,	 it	 is	 still	 subject	 to	 the	 task	 reallocation	 proviso.514	
																																																								
509	Although	 they	 apply	 in	 different	 contexts,	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 consider	 the	
implication	of	the	provisions	that	were	amended	in	2008,	as	they	were	inserted	
to	 ensure	 compliance	 with	 the	 UNCRPD.	 The	 amended	 provisions	 contain	
positive	obligations	 to	ensure	 the	disabled	person	has	access	 to	essential	 roles	




in	 entitlements	 could	 be	 considered	 essential	 or	 core	 facets	 of	 being	 part	 of	 a	
firm	or	partnership.	Thus,	 the	 scheme	of	 the	Act	 suggests	 that	 accommodation	
applies	 to	 the	essential	matters	 to	which	 the	provisions	apply.	Accordingly,	 for	






511	Human	Rights	Act	 1993,	 s28(3).	 The	 employer	 is	 required	 to	 accommodate	





the	 Supreme	 Court	was	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 correct	 comparator.	 However,	 the	
Court	 held	 that	 a	 defence	 of	 a	 GOQ	 was	 available	 to	 Air	 New	 Zealand,	 and	




other	 grounds	 of	 discrimination,	 the	 task	 reallocation	 proviso	 for	 disability	
should	be	read	in	a	similar	way.		
Nonetheless,	 this	 interpretation	may	 not	 accord	well	with	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	




managerial	 prerogative.515	Nevertheless,	 that	 prerogative	 is	 still	 protected	 to	
some	degree	because	 the	 legislation	only	 requires	 ‘some’	 adjustment	 that	does	
not	 ‘unreasonably	 disrupt’	 their	 activities.	 This	 limits	 the	 accommodation	
required.	Therefore,	on	this	interpretation,	both	the	employer	and	the	mentally	
disabled	 employee’s	 rights	 would	 remain	 adequately	 protected,	 even	 when	
‘some	 of	 the	 duties’	 that	must	 be	 relocated	 include	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	
position.			
This	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 approach	 taken	 in	 Atley	 v	 Southland	 District	 Health	
Board.516	The	Authority	interpreted	‘some	of	the	duties’	to	mean	all	of	the	duties	
but	 only	 during	 some	 time	 periods	 (in	 this	 case,	 night	 shifts),	 despite	 the	
employer	 claiming	 that	 being	 able	 to	 work	 night	 shifts	 was	 an	 essential	
requirement	of	that	position.		







duties’	 would	 need	 to	 be	 interpreted	 to	mean	 the	 disabled	 employee	must	 be	
able	to	perform	all	essential	duties	at	least	some	of	the	time	and	perform	all	their	
remaining	duties	all	the	time.	For	example,	if	driving	was	an	essential	duty,	then,	







515	Significantly,	 this	 could	 mean	 that	 an	 employee,	 who	 could	 otherwise	 be	




who	 suffered	 from	 mild	 bi-polar	 disorder	 and	 working	 night	 shifts	 would	
destabilize	her	condition.	The	hospital	policy	for	emergency	department	nurses	





However,	 this	 interpretation	 fails	 to	protect	 the	disabled	employee	adequately.	
In	 particular,	when	 the	 essential	 duty	 that	 the	 disabled	 employee	 is	 unable	 to	
perform	 (at	 any	 time)	 only	 forms	 a	 small	 part	 of	 their	 overall	 duties,	 this	
interpretation	 seems	 overly	 restrictive.	 For	 example,	 an	 employee	 who	 is	
employed	 to	manually	 restock	 supermarket	 shelves	may	have	a	 small	but	 core	
duty	 of	 driving	 a	 forklift	 to	 transport	 the	 goods	 from	 the	delivery	 truck	 to	 the	
storeroom	on	a	daily	basis.	If	the	employee	is	unable	to	drive	the	forklift	due	to	
the	 effects	 of	medication,	 but	 can	 still	 perform	all	 other	 elements	 of	 the	 job,	 it	
would	 seem	 contrary	 to	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 provision	 that	 this	 inability	 to	
perform	this	one	small	essential	duty	at	any	time	would	be	enough	for	the	task	
reallocation	 proviso	 not	 to	 apply.	 This	 interpretation	 would	 not	 protect	 the	
rights	of	the	disabled	and	would	be	contrary	to	the	purposes	of	the	HRA.	Thus,	
the	 permanent	 inability	 to	 perform	 an	 essential	 element	 should	 not	 always	
preclude	the	task	reallocation	proviso	from	applying.		
Consideration	of	the	Wider	Context	
This	 interpretation,	 that	 ‘some	 of	 the	 duties’	 can	 include	 essential	 duties,	 is	
supported	 in	 the	wider	 context,	 as	 it	 accords	with	 the	underlying	principles	of	
the	UNCRPD.	The	obligations	under	the	UNCRPD	are	posed	as	a	general	duty	of	
accommodation.	No	reference	is	made	to	particular	duties,	or	to	any	distinction	
between	 essential	 and	 peripheral	 tasks.	 However,	 the	 Convention	 requires	
member	 parties	 to:	 ‘ensure	 that	 reasonable	 accommodation	 is	 provided	 to	
persons	 with	 disabilities	 in	 the	 workplace’,	 ‘promote…	 job	 retention’,	 and	
provide	 ‘assistance	 in…	 maintaining	 employment’.517 	Coupled	 with	 this,	 the	
UNCRPD’s	definition	of	reasonable	accommodation	requires	adjustments	to	the	
high	 threshold	 of	 ‘disproportionate	 or	 undue	 burden’. 518 	This	 suggests	 a	
substantial	degree	of	accommodation	by	the	employer	is	required.	To	impose	an	
obligation	to	accommodate	the	employee	to	the	point	of	undue	burden,	merely	to	
enable	 the	 employee	 to	 perform	 peripheral	 duties,	 seems	 counter-productive.	
The	implication	is,	 therefore,	that	the	duty	to	accommodate	applies	to	essential	
as	well	as	peripheral	duties	of	the	position.		







the	 DDA	 Cth	 specifies	 that	 if	 the	 employee	 cannot	 perform	 the	 inherent	
requirements	 (essential	 duties)	 of	 the	 position	 even	 if	 reasonable	 adjustments	
have	been	made,	then	it	is	not	unlawful	to	discriminate	against	them.519		Thus,	in	
Australia,	although	the	duty	to	accommodate	applies	to	the	essential	duties	of	the	

















duties)	 the	 employer	 is	 expected	 to	 substitute	 (before	 it	 effectively	 becomes	
redeployment).	 This	 limit	 may	 well	 be	 dependent	 on	 the	 answer	 to	 the	 next	
interpretive	 issue:	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘some	 adjustments	 of	 the	 activities	 of	 the	
employer’.		If,	for	example,	it	takes	little	adjustment	to	reallocate	several	duties,	
then	it	might	seem	reasonable	to	extend	the	obligation	to	multiple	duties.	If	 for	
example,	 an	 employee	 can	no	 longer	drive,	 and	 this	means	 they	 cannot	do	 the	





someone	 who	 can	 drive	 is	 available	 when	 the	 banks	 are	 open,	 or	 at	 suitable	
times	 for	 customer	 deliveries)	 then	 interpreting	 ‘some	 of	 the	 duties’	 to	
encompass	multiple	duties	may	be	inapposite.			
Nonetheless,	it	seems	clear	that	‘some	of	the	duties’	may	refer	to	all	of	the	duties	







520	Like	 New	 Zealand,	 the	 UK	 and	 Australia	 do	 not	 impose	 a	 general	 duty	 to	
redeploy	 an	 employee	 as	 part	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation.	 This	 seems	
counterintuitive,	as	 in	some	circumstances	redeployment	would	seem	the	most	
appropriate	means	of	 keeping	 the	mentally	disabled	 employee	 in	 employment.	
Liisberg	 considers	 that	 even	 contemplating	 redeployment	 would	 be	 an	
improvement:	 “Clearly,	 different	 countries	 have	 different	 interpretations	 of	
when	 a	 duty	 to	 place	 a	 person	 in	 a	 different	 position	 would	 constitute	 a	
disproportionate	burden,	but	even	a	duty	to	show	that	reassignment	to	another	
position	would	constitute	a	disproportionate	burden	would	be	an	improvement,	
compared	 to	 having	 no	 duty	 to	 make	 such	 an	 evaluation”:	 Maria	 Ventegodt	
Liisberg	"Flexicurity	and	Employment	of	Persons	with	Disability	 in	Europe	 in	a	
Contemporary	 Disability	 Human	 Rights	 Perspective"	 in	 	European	Yearbook	 of	
Disability	Law	(Intersentia,		2013)	at	151.		
521	Atley	 v	 Southland	 District	 Health	 Board,	 above	 n84;	 Meulenbroek	 v	 Vision	







Let	 us	 assume	 that	 Professor	 Smith	 cannot	 currently	 undertake	 research	 and	
publication	duties	without	special	services	or	facilities	(in	the	form	of	a	research	
assistant),	or	(potentially)	without	risk	of	harm	to	herself	(if	the	stress	of	trying	
to	 research	 will	 exacerbate	 her	 mental	 disability).	 Following	 the	 preferred	
interpretation	above,	if	another	staff	member	could	perform	her	research	duties	
without	undue	disruption	to	the	university,	then	Professor	Smith	should	not	be	
subjected	 to	 detriment	 for	 failure	 to	 research	 and	 publish.	 Nonetheless,	 two	
issues	 still	 arise.	 Firstly,	 another	 staff	 member	 cannot	 publish	 in	 Professor	
Smith’s	name,	so	Professor	Smith’s	PBRF	rating	would	still	be	affected,	and	this	
may	 impact	 on	whether	 she	 is	 considered	 ‘qualified’	 for	 work.	 Potentially	 she	
may	be	able	 to	co-author	papers,	although	 to	do	so	would	mean	 that	 the	other	
staff	member	was	only	 taking	over	part	of	 that	duty.	So,	 is	 sharing	a	particular	
duty	 (rather	 than	 reallocating	 that	 duty	 in	 its	 entirety	 to	 another	 employee)	
covered	 by	 the	 phrase	 ‘some	 of	 the	 duties’	 that	 the	 employer	 is	 obliged	 to	









by	 reason	 of	 her	 disability.	 Thus,	 unless	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 apply,	 or	
Professor	Smith	is	no	longer	 ‘qualified	for	work’,	the	adverse	treatment	may	be	
unlawful.		
However,	 as	 discussed	 previously,	 it	 would	 be	 difficult	 to	 interpret	 ‘tolerating	
poor	 performance’	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 a	 service	 or	 facility	 that	 it	might	 not	 be	
reasonable	 to	 provide,	 in	 the	 first	 instance.	 So	 these	 duties	 (i.e.	 lecturing	 and	
supervision)	may	not	fall	under	the	permitted	exceptions	at	all	—	and	therefore	
would	not	be	subject	to	the	task	reallocation	proviso.522		If	the	duties	do	not	fall	
under	 the	 permitted	 exceptions,	 then	 the	 University	 would	 have	 no	 defence	
against	 a	 claim	of	 discrimination	on	 these	 grounds.	However,	 they	may	have	 a	
basis	 to	argue	that	Professor	Smith	 is	no	 longer	 ‘qualified	for	work’,	due	to	her	
poor	 performance	 in	 these	 areas,	 and	 therefore	 that	 her	 treatment	 is	 not	











her	performance,	 it	 still	 remains	unclear	whether	 ‘some	of	 the	duties’	 could	be	
interpreted	to	include	‘some	parts	of	all	of	her	duties’,	and	thus,	whether	the	task	
reallocation	 proviso	 applies.	 Although	 this	 interpretation	 seems	 unlikely	 (that	
‘some’	 could	 refer	 to	 all	 of	 her	 duties),	 following	 a	 large	 and	 liberal,	 rights-
orientated	 approach	 to	 interpretation,	 it	 could	 be	 possible	 to	 interpret	 it	 this	
way.	Overall,	 therefore,	 this	 scenario	 reveals	 the	complexity	of	 the	 law	and	 the	
interaction	 of	 different	 uncertainties	 in	 its	 interpretation.	 The	 result	 is	 that	 it	
remains	 unclear	 if	 the	 University	 has	 an	 obligation	 to	 accommodate	 Professor	
Smith	in	these	circumstances	or	not.			
‘Some	of	the	Duties’	Conclusion	
Overall,	 the	 ‘best’	 interpretation	 is	 that	 ‘some	 of	 the	 duties’	 includes	 essential	
duties	 of	 the	 position,	 and	may	 include	 all	 of	 the	 duties	 of	 a	 position	 during	 a	
certain	 period	 of	 time.	 Further	 clarification	 may	 be	 added	 by	 considering	 the	




even	 if	 it	 requires	 the	 employer	 to	make	 ‘some	 adjustment’	 to	 their	 activities.	
Accordingly,	 the	 failure	 to	make	such	an	adjustment	may	make	 treatment,	 that	
would	 otherwise	 be	 excused	 under	 the	 permitted	 exceptions,	 discriminatory.	
‘Some’	(adjustment)	determines	the	level	of	effort	that	the	employer	is	expected	
to	 undertake	 to	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	 employee	—	 so	where	 this	 level	 is	
pitched	is	important.		
While	 to	 maintain	 employment	 and	 promote	 greater	 substantive	 equality	 for	
disabled	employees	significant	adjustments	may	be	required,	the	employer,	who	
bears	 the	 cost	 of	 any	 adjustments,	 is	 likely	 to	 suggest	 that	 ‘some	 adjustments’	
should	be	of	a	more	minor	nature.		




The	 text	 states	any	adjustments	 that	may	be	 required	apply	 to	 the	activities	of	
the	employer,	rather	than	to	the	position	of	the	employee.	This	suggests	that	the	
adjustment	 should	 not	 involve	 redeployment	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee,	 but	
continuance	 in	 their	 current	 role	 (with	 reallocation	 of	 the	 duties	 they	 cannot	
perform).	 Whether	 the	 disabled	 employee	 could	 be	 required	 to	 perform	
alternate	 duties	 instead	 is	 not	 clear	 and	 may	 be	 contentious.	 Although	 the	
managerial	prerogative	would	suggest	 that	 the	employer	has	 the	right	 to	 insist	
the	disabled	employee	undertake	alternative	duties	to	remain	fully	occupied,	this	
may	not	be	appropriate	in	all	circumstances.	For	example,	in	the	Professor	Smith	





Only	 ‘some’	 adjustment	 to	 the	 employer’s	 activities	 is	 required.	 ‘Some’	 is	 an	
elastic	 term	 with	 meanings	 ranging	 from	 a	 considerable	 amount	 (‘he	 went	 to	
some	trouble	to	arrange	a	meeting’),	to	a	minimal	amount	(‘there	was	some	talk	
of…’).	 	 The	 text	 suggests	 the	 latter	meaning,	 as	 the	 adjustments	 are	 limited	 to	
those	 that	 do	 not	 ‘unreasonably	 disrupt’	 the	 employer’s	 activities	 —	 and	 a	
substantial	adjustment	would	be	more	likely	to	do	that.			





the	 text,	 adjusting	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 employer	 could,	 on	 a	 very	 broad	
interpretation,	 require	 the	 employer	 to	 adjust	 how	 their	 business	 is	 run	 (for	
example,	 changing	 the	 timing	 of	 customer	 deliveries	 to	 daylight	 hours	 or	
increasing	 freight	 transit	 times	 to	accommodate	an	employee	no	 longer	able	 to	
drive	 after	 dark).	 However,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 this	 level	 of	 adjustment	 was	
intended	 by	 the	 legislature,	 even	 if	 after	 such	 an	 adjustment,	 deliveries	 and	
freight	transportation	could	still	occur.			
Looking	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 HRA,	 there	 are	 defences	 or	 exceptions	 to	 a	
claim	of	discrimination	in	employment	for	many	of	the	prohibited	grounds	(such	
as	 age,	 religion	 or	 sex).	 Like	 disability,	 when	 a	 defence	 is	 made	 out	 for	 the	
adverse	 treatment	 of	 an	 employee	 for	 these	 different	 grounds,	 the	 task	
reallocation	 proviso	 applies.	 Therefore,	 in	 the	 scheme	 of	 the	 HRA,	 the	 task	
reallocation	 proviso	 acts	 as	 a	 general	 limit	 on	 the	 managerial	 prerogative,	
limiting	the	employer’s	ability	to	dismiss	employees,	as,	even	when	the	adverse	









In	 the	 Professor	 Smith	 scenario,	 multiple	 staff	 members	might	 be	 required	 to	
accommodate	 her	 needs	 (that	 is,	 a	 research	 assistant,	 a	 lecturer	 and	 a	
postgraduate	 supervisor).	 This	 may	 require	 substantial	 adjustments	 of	 an	
employer’s	 activities.	 The	 adjustment	 for	 the	 University	 might	 involve	
rearranging	 lecturing	 schedules	 so	 that	 Professor	 Smith’s	 lectures	 could	 be	
reallocated	 to	 other	 staff,	 or	 diverting	 research	 assistants	 away	 from	 other	
projects	to	aid	her.	Altering	the	duties	of	multiple	staff	members	is	likely	to	cross	











level	 of	 adjustments	 that	 an	 employer	 should	 make.	 The	 obligation	 to	 make	
‘some	 adjustments’	 to	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 employer	 corresponds	 with	 the	
UNCRPD	definition	of	reasonable	accommodation	—“necessary	and	appropriate	
modifications	and	adjustments…	where	needed	in	a	particular	case”.523		




reallocation	 proviso	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 UNCRPD,	 the	 disruption	 required	
would	need	 to	be	significant	 (i.e.	 to	 the	point	of	 imposing	an	undue	burden	on	
the	 employer),	 before	 it	 becomes	 unreasonable.	 However,	 this	 interpretation	
does	not	sit	well	within	the	scheme	of	the	HRA,	nor	with	the	multiple	purposes	of	
the	Act.		








proviso.	 Instead,	 it	 appears	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 adjustment	 on	 the	





524 	Disability	 Discrimination	 Act	 1992	 (Australia),	 s4	 defines	 a	 reasonable	
adjustment	 as	 one	 that	 would	 not	 impose	 unjustifiable	 hardship	 on	 the	
employer.	 Furthermore,	 section	 21B	 excuses	 discrimination,	 if	 avoiding	 the	
discrimination	would	impose	unjustifiable	hardship	on	the	discriminator.		
525 	Disability	 Discrimination	 Act	 1992	 (Australia),	 s11.	 All	 the	 relevant	
circumstances	in	the	particular	case	are	taken	into	account,	including:	the	nature	
of	 the	benefit	or	detriment	 likely	 to	accrue	 to,	or	 to	be	suffered	by,	any	person	
concerned;	 the	 effect	 of	 the	 disability	 of	 any	 person	 concerned;	 the	 financial	
circumstances,	and	the	estimated	amount	of	expenditure	required	to	be	made,	by	
the	 first	 person;	 the	 availability	 of	 financial	 and	 other	 assistance	 to	 the	 first	
person;	and	any	relevant	action	plans	given	to	the	Commission	under	section	64.		
526	Adjustments	made	 for	 the	disabled	employee	may	also	benefit	 third	parties,	
such	as	other	employees.	For	example,	the	employee	taking	over	the	reallocated	
duties	may	benefit	from	a	change	in	working	hours,	or	the	hedonistic	benefit	of	








reallocation	 proviso	 is	 to	 limit	 when	 the	 permitted	 exceptions,	 which	 excuse	
discrimination,	 apply.	 The	 effect	 of	 this	 is	 that	 it	 ensures	 the	 employee	 who	
cannot	perform	some	duties	is	not	treated	less	favourably	than	the	non-disabled	
employee,	 when	 those	 duties	 could	 be	 reallocated.	 Both	 statutes,	 therefore,	











The	 duties	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee	 need	 only	 be	 reallocated	 if	 this	 does	 not	






unreasonable.528	The	 test	 is	 lower	 than	 that,	 but	 establishing	 a	 more	 precise	
meaning	is	difficult.	In	Nakarawa	v	AFFECO	the	HRRT,	rather	unhelpfully,	said:529	
The	 term	 “unreasonably	 disrupt	 the	 employer’s	 activities”	 is	 a	
relative	term	and	cannot	be	given	a	hard	and	fast	meaning.	Each	
case	will	necessarily	depend	on	its	own	facts	and	circumstances	
and	 it	will	 come	 down	 to	 a	 determination	 of	 “reasonableness”	
																																																																																																																																																														
reallocation.	Emens	argues	 that	 these	 third	party	benefits	 should	be	 taken	 into	












under	 the	 unique	 circumstances	 of	 the	 particular	 employer-
employee	relationship.	




The	 financial	 cost	 and	 impact	 on	 consumers	 was	 discussed	 in	Meulenbroek	 v	
Vision	Antenna	Systems	Ltd.	The	HRRT	acknowledged	the	impact	of	these:530	
We	 do	 not	 doubt	 the	 commercial	 imperative	 that	 Vision	 take	
into	 account	 the	 need	 to	 perform	 to	 the	 standards	 agreed	 to	
with	 its	 largest	 client.	Nor	 do	we	doubt	 the	 need	 for	Vision	 to	
take	 into	account	any	 financial	burden	that	may	be	 involved	 in	
accommodating	a	practice…		
Nonetheless,	short	of	undue	hardship,	 it	 is	unclear	how	much	financial	cost	the	










The	 corollary	 is	 that,	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 work	 substitution,	 the	 disabled	
employee’s	reallocated	duties	become	additional	work	that	must	be	catered	for.	
That	 is,	 either	 some	 other	 employee	 is	 expected	 to	 work	 ‘over	 capacity’,	 to	
complete	 the	 reallocated	 task	 as	well	 as	 their	 own	 job,	 or	 some	of	 their	duties	
must	be	reallocated,	perpetuating	the	problem.532	This	is	likely	to	be	considered	
an	unreasonable	disruption	to	the	employer’s	activities.		
Accordingly,	 to	 avoid	 reallocation	 being	 an	 unreasonable	 disruption,	 it	 would	
seem	 that	 the	 disabled	 employee	must	 replace	 the	work	 they	 cannot	 perform	
with	 other	 duties.	 The	 problem	 to	 avoid	 is	 the	 multiple	 reshuffling	 of	 duties	
between	several	employees	which	might	constitute	an	unreasonable	disruption	
to	the	employer’s	activities.			
Furthermore,	 even	 if	 such	 shuffling	 of	 work	 could	 be	 implied	 into	 the	 task	















duties	 on	 other	 employees	 is	 enough	 to	 be	 an	 unreasonable	 disruption	 to	 the	




now	 must	 perform	 some	 of	 the	 other	 employee’s	 duties,	 they	 may	 be	 less	
efficient	or	effective	as	they	learn	the	new	tasks,	which	may	cause	consumers	or	
clients	to	take	their	business	elsewhere	(adversely	affecting	the	reputation	of	the	
business).	 This	 could	 also	 be	 viewed	 as	 unreasonable	 disruption	 to	 the	
employer’s	business.		
Thus,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 threshold	 for	 reallocation	 of	 duties	 becoming		
‘unreasonable’	may	easily	be	met,	 and	may	substantially	 limit	 the	obligation	of	




while	 requiring	 the	employer	 to	accommodate	 the	mentally	disabled	employee	
through	partial	 task	 reallocation,	 requires	only	 limited	 accommodation,	 and	 so	
provides	 only	 minimal	 protection	 for	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee.	 The	
employer	 seems	 only	 required	 to	make	modest	 adjustments	 to	 their	 activities,	
and	the	threshold	for	unreasonable	disruption	is	set	relatively	low.	Furthermore,	
the	 HRA	 does	 not	 explicitly	 require	 that	 the	 benefit	 to	 the	 mentally	 disabled	




Nonetheless,	 the	 adjustments	 required	 should	 extend	 to	 some	 of	 the	 essential	
duties	of	 the	position,	 or	 at	 least	 to	 the	essential	duties	during	 some	period	of	
time.	This	 approach	does	provide	 the	disabled	employee	with	more	protection	
than	is	available	under	the	usual	rules	of	employment	law.		Additionally,	a	large	





533	The	HRRT	has	 held	 that	 concerns	 of	 others	 based	 on	 attitudes	 inconsistent	
with	 human	 rights	 are	 irrelevant	 (Meulenbroek	 v	 Vision	 Antenna	 Systems	 Ltd,	
above	n164	at	[157]).			






fairly,	 it	 does	 little	 to	 further	 the	 disabled	 employee’s	 aim	 to	 achieve	 greater	
substantive	equality.	 It	may	be	 then,	 that	 for	 the	disabled	employee	 to	achieve	
this,	a	different	model	of	law	is	required,	where	the	interests	of	the	employer	and	











the	 interpretation	 of	 one	 of	 the	 earlier	 matters	 considered	 in	 this	 thesis:	 the	
meaning	of	‘qualified	for	work’	in	section	22.		
As	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	a	narrow	interpretation	of	 ‘qualified	for	work’	could	
require	 the	 employee	 to	 be	 able	 to	 perform	 all	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	
position,	 and	 this	 approach	 is	 consistent	 with	 general	 employment	 law.		
However,	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’	 should	 be	 interpreted	
liberally:	 that	 is,	 the	 disabled	 employee	 need	 not	 be	 able	 to	 perform	 all	 the	
essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position	 to	 be	 considered	 ‘qualified’.	 Assessing	whether	










of	 the	 position	 —	 if	 those	 duties	 could	 be	 reallocated.	 Taking	 this	 into	
consideration,	 the	 scheme	 of	 the	 HRA	 suggests	 that	 whether	 an	 employee	 is	
‘qualified	 for	work’	should	be	assessed	after	 the	employee’s	disability	has	been	
reasonably	accommodated	by	the	provision	of	special	services	or	facilities,	or	by	





















Thus,	 even	 using	 the	 spiral	 approach,	 there	 are	 numerous	 interpretive	
difficulties	 remain	 with	 the	 potential	 accommodation	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA.	
These	arise	in	part	because	the	permitted	exceptions	are	expressed	as	defences	
and	not	as	a	specific	obligation	of	reasonable	accommodation,	and	in	part	due	to	
the	 inelegant	 drafting	 of	 the	 legislation.536	Consequently,	 for	 disability	 at	 least,	
the	 discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA	 lack	 clarity	 and	
certainty.		
The	failure	to	define	key	terms	results	in	uncertainty.	Furthermore,	the	complex,	
interweaving	 nature	 of	 the	 provisions	means	 phrases	 in	 one	may	 influence	 or	
determine	 the	meaning	 of	 another,	 earlier,	 provision.	 Consequently,	 the	 risk	 is	









task	 reallocation	 proviso	 particularly,	 by	 qualifying	 the	 permitted	 exceptions,	
constitutes	 an	 exception	 to	 an	 exception.	 This	means	 a	 complicated	 analysis	 is	
required	to	assess	firstly	if	the	employer	has	a	valid	defence,	and	secondly	if	this	
defence	 then	 fails,	 because	 the	 employee	 could	 have	 been	 accommodated.	 A	
simpler	approach	would	be	to	have	a	standalone	provision	requiring	reasonable	
accommodation	for	the	disabled	in	employment.		





536	The	 Supreme	 Court	 in	McAlister	 v	 Air	 New	 Zealand	 Ltd,	 above	 n97	 at	 [26]	
when	 assessing	 the	 application	 of	 the	 GOQ	 for	 age	 discrimination,	 commented	








This	 will	 ensure	 the	 employer	 (and	 the	 disabled	 employee)	 are	 aware	 of	 the	








The	 legislature	 did	 not	 specifically	 incorporate	 a	 positive	 obligation	 of	
reasonable	 accommodation	 into	 the	 employment	 provisions	 at	 the	 time	 of	
enactment	 of	 the	 HRA,	 and	 nor	 has	 it	 elected	 to	 do	 so	 since.	 Even	when	 New	
Zealand	amended	the	HRA,	 to	ensure	compliance	with	 the	UNCRPD	prior	 to	 its	
ratification	 in	 2008,	 it	 chose	 not	 to	 amend	 the	 discrimination	 in	 employment	
provisions.	 This	 may	 suggest	 the	 intention	 was	 to	 keep	 the	 potential	
accommodation	provisions	as	a	defence	only.		
Arguably,	 in	 some	 circumstances,	 the	 general	 effect	 of	 the	 potential	
accommodation	 provisions	 may	 be	 the	 same,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 they	 are	
viewed	 as	 an	 obligation	 or	 as	 a	 defence.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 unreasonable	 to	
provide	 special	 assistance	 defence,	 or	 the	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	 harm	 defence,	
will	 not	 be	 made	 out	 if	 reasonable	 ‘services	 or	 facilities’	 could	 have	 been	
provided,	 or	 reasonable	 measures	 could	 have	 been	 taken	 to	 reduce	 a	 risk	 of	
harm	 to	 normal.	 The	 effect	 is	 that	 the	 employer	 will	 be	 viewed	 as	 acting	
unlawfully,	whether	it	is	viewed	as	the	failure	to	meet	a	duty	of	accommodation,	
or	 due	 to	 a	 failure	 to	 establish	 a	 defence	 to	 a	 valid	 claim	 of	 discrimination.	 In	
either	case,	remedies	might	lie	against	them.		
However,	 a	 disabled	 employee	might	 be	 better	 protected	 if,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
defences,	 there	was	 a	more	 general	 duty	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 in	 the	
HRA.	A	general	duty	could	be	more	wide	 ranging	 in	effect	—	 it	may	oblige	 the	
employer	to	act	positively	 to	accommodate	the	employee	beyond	the	provision	
of	 what	 might	 be	 narrowly	 defined	 as	 ‘services	 or	 facilities’.	 It	 could	 include	
things	like	toleration	of	poor	performance	(for	a	period	of	time	at	least),	reducing	
workloads,	providing	extended	sick	leave,	etc.	Even	electing	not	to	institute	a	PIP	




travail)	 v	 Caron,	 above	 n389	 at	 [92]	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 of	 Canada	 held	 that	
‘inflexibility,	 short	 of	 undue	 hardship,	 in	 the	 application	 of	 an	 employer’s	





Furthermore,	 it	 could	 be	 argued,	 imposing	 a	 positive	 duty	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation	on	the	employer	would	confer	a	corresponding	right	to	receive	
reasonable	 accommodation	 on	 the	 disabled	 employee.538	Thus,	 the	 employee	
would	 not	 need	 to	 raise	 an	 initial	 claim	 of	 disadvantage	 or	 discrimination	 in	
order	 to	 be	 accommodated,	 but	 instead	 could	 assert	 their	 enforceable	 right	 to	
accommodation	from	the	outset.				
The	 problem	with	 failure	 to	 have	 a	 specific	 duty	 (and	 corresponding	 right)	 to	
accommodate	was	amply	demonstrated	 in	DDA	Cth,	prior	 to	 its	 amendment	 in	
2009.	As	the	report	on	the	Act	stated:539	
Until	 recently,	 it	 had	 been	 presumed	 that	 the	 DDA	 obliged	
affected	 organisations	 to	 make	 ‘reasonable	 adjustments’	 to	
accommodate	the	needs	of	people	with	disabilities.	Although	the	
term	 ‘reasonable	 adjustment’	 does	 not	 appear	 in	 the	 DDA,	
various	features	of	the	Act	seemed	to	imply	such	an	obligation.	
However,	 a	 recent	 High	 Court	 decision	 questioned	 this	
presumption	 and	 appears	 to	 have	 narrowed	 significantly	 the	
protection	that	the	Act	was	previously	thought	to	provide.	
This	 report	 was	 referring	 to	 Purvis	 v	 NSW,540	where,	 controversially,	 the	 High	









effectively	 reduced	 the	protections	of	 the	Act	 for	 the	disabled.	That	 is	because,	
when	 the	manifestations	 of	 the	 disability	were	 implied	 into	 the	 comparator,	 it	
																																																								
538	Jeremy	Bentham	argues	that	rights	and	obligations	are	inseparable	so	that	‘it	
is	 not	 possible	 to	 create	 a	 right	 in	 favour	 of	 one,	 except	 by	 creating	 a	
corresponding	 obligation	 imposed	 upon	 the	 other’	 (J	 Bentham	 "Rights	 and	
Obligations"	 in	 	Theory	of	Legislation.	 (Routledge	Kegan	Paul	 London,	 1931)	 at	
94).	 It	 seems	 logical	 that	 the	 reverse	 is	 true,	 that	 where	 an	 obligation	 exists,	
there	is	a	corresponding	right	created.	However,	this	relationship	between	rights	
and	 obligations	 is	 contested	 (Hogg,	 above	 n249.	 A	 full	 discussion	 of	 this	 is	
beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.		
539	Productivity	 Commission	 Review	 of	 the	 Disability	 Discrimination	 Act	 1992	
(Australian	 Government,	 2004)	 at	 XL.	 The	 case	 referred	 to	 was	 Purvis	 v	 New	
South	 Wales,	 above	 n29,	 where	 the	 High	 Court	 held	 there	 was	 no	 positive	
obligation	to	accommodate	the	student’s	disability.		
540	Purvis	v	New	South	Wales,	above	n29.	
541	Jacob	Campbell	 "Using	Anti-Discrimination	 Law	 as	 a	 Tool	 of	 Exclusion	—	A	




was	 difficult	 for	 adverse	 treatment	 of	 the	 disabled	 person	 to	 be	 considered	
discriminatory	 (as	 those	 without	 disabilities	 who	 demonstrated	 the	 same	
behaviours,	would	also	be	treated	adversely).542		
In	 their	 dissenting	 judgment,	 Kirby	 and	McHugh	 JJ,	 despite	 suggesting	 the	 Act	
contained	 ‘recognition’	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation,	 held	 there	 was	 no	 legal	
duty	to	accommodate	the	disabled	in	the	DDA	Cth,543	and	declined	to	imply	a	one	
into	 the	 Act.	 Kirby	 and	 McHugh	 JJ	 found	 that	 if	 accommodations	 had	 been	
provided	 to	Daniel	 then	he	would	not	have	been	 treated	 less	 favourably	(as	he	
would	have	behaved),	and	therefore	the	school’s	treatment	of	Daniel	would	not	
have	been	discriminatory.544		This	 implies	 that	under	 the	DDA	Cth,	 to	 escape	a	
finding	of	discrimination,	reasonable	accommodation	may	need	to	be	provided.	
However,	 as	 Campbell	 points	 out,	 the	 problem	 with	 this	 approach	 is	 that	 it	
provides	 no	 guidance	 on	 when	 reasonable	 accommodation	 should	 be	
provided.545		
The	same	situation	could	arise	in	New	Zealand,	as	there	is	no	positive	obligation	
of	 reasonable	 accommodation.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 possible	 that,	 as	 in	 the	 decision	 in	
Purvis,	the	Court	or	HRRT	might,	in	situations	where	the	permitted	exceptions	do	
not	apply,	select	a	comparator	to	achieve	a	desired	outcome.	For	example,	in	the	
case	of	mental	disability,	where	 there	may	be	 some	sympathy	 for	an	employer	
who	 is	 dealing	 with	 an	 employee	 with	 behavioural	 or	 performance	 issues,	
selecting	a	comparator	who	presents	the	same	issues	may	lead	to	the	conclusion	
that	 adverse	 treatment	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee	 is	 not	 discriminatory.	 In	 the	
Professor	Smith	example,	she	is	still	 ‘qualified	for	work’	but	performing	poorly.	
As	toleration	of	poor	performance	is	not	a	service	or	facility,	the	University	has	
no	 defence	 under	 the	 permitted	 exceptions.	 It	 is	 possible	 the	 Court	 or	 HRRT,	
putting	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 University	 above	 those	 of	 Professor	 Smith,	 might	
select	a	comparator	Professor	who	demonstrates	equally	poor	performance	due	
to	 laziness	 (and	who	would	 also	be	dismissed),	 and	 thereby	 avoid	 a	 finding	of	









obligation	 only	 provides	 limited,	 and	 uncertain,	 protection	 to	 the	 disabled	
employee.	 Moreover,	 this	 inferred	 obligation	 does	 not	 necessarily	 fulfil	 New	


















‘Manifestly	 judicial	 reform	 is	 no	 sport	 for	 the	 short-winded	 or	
for	lawyers	who	are	afraid	of	temporary	defeat.	Rather	must	we	
recall	 the	 sound	 advice	 given	 by	 General	 Jan	 Smuts	 to	 the	







The	 previous	 chapters	 have	 highlighted	 some	 of	 the	 interpretive	 difficulties	 in	
the	HRA	 for	disability	discrimination	 in	employment.	These	difficulties	arise	 in	
part	 because	 of	 the	 uncertainty	 of	 the	 language	 employed,	 and	 because	 of	 the	
lack	 of	 a	 positive	 obligation	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	 in	
employment.	 This	 chapter	 assesses	 two	 possible	 solutions	 for	 these	 problems:	
enacting	new	disability	specific	legislation	or	amending	the	current	legislation.	It	
concludes	 the	 latter	 is	 the	best	 approach.	Various	amendments	 to	 the	HRA	are	
then	suggested	with	the	aim	of	clarifying	the	 law	in	this	difficult	area,	ensuring	
the	HRA	 fulfils	 its	 purposes,	 and	New	 Zealand	meets	 its	 obligations	 under	 the	






The	 analysis	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters	 suggests	 that,	 even	 using	 the	 ‘best’	
interpretation	 of	 the	 discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions,	 adverse	
treatment	of	a	mentally	disabled	employee,	who	is	considered	to	be	performing	
poorly,	 may	 still	 be	 lawful,	 even	when	 their	 poor	 performance	 is	 due	 to	 their	
mental	 disability.	 Thus,	 it	 may	 be	 that,	 in	 some	 situations,	 the	 rights	 of	 the	
disabled	 are	 not	 being	 protected	 by	 the	 legislation.	 Furthermore,	 the	 analysis	














to	 recognise	 the	disabling	 impact	of	 social	barriers.547	The	 focus	of	 the	medical	
model	is	on	amelioration	of	the	person’s	impairments.	Any	duty	to	accommodate	
disability	is	aimed	simply	at	amelioration	of	the	effects	of	these	impairments,	and	
does	not	 take	 into	 account	 attitudinal	 or	 social	 barriers,	which	may	be	 equally	
disabling.	 However,	 the	 UNCRPD	 endorses	 the	 social	 construct	 of	 disability,	
which	contends	that	it	is	not	only	the	person’s	impairment	that	causes	disability,	
but	 the	barriers	 created	by	 an	 inhospitable	 society.	 Thus,	 the	 accommodations	
visualised	 by	 the	 UNCRPD’s	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 aim	 to	
remove	 these	 societal	 barriers,	 including	 attitudinal	 ones,	 to	 enable	 greater	
substantive	equality	for	those	with	disabilities.		
Secondly,	 the	 focus	of	 the	UNCRPD	is	on	achieving	greater	substantive	equality	
for	 the	 disabled	 (so	 the	 actual	 outcomes,	 such	 as	 maintaining	 employment,	
would	 be	 the	 same	 for	 the	 disabled	 person	 as	 for	 those	 without	 disabilities),	
whereas	 the	 HRA	 is	 premised	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 formal	 equality,	 which	 only	
requires	 the	 disabled	 employee	 and	 non-disabled	 employee	 to	 be	 treated	 the	
same.	 Interpreting	 the	 provisions	 to	 achieve	 greater	 substantive	 equality	 is	
therefore	 difficult,	 as	 substantive	 equality	 may	 require	 different,	 not	 equal,	
treatment	of	the	disabled	employee.		
Thirdly,	 the	 HRA	 does	 not	 contain	 a	 positive	 general	 duty	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation	 in	 employment	 as	 required	 by	 the	 UNCRPD	 and,	 as	 discussed	
below,	interpreting	the	potential	accommodation	provisions	in	accordance	with	




discussed	 above,	 the	 HRA	 appears	 to	 be	 premised	 on	 the	 notion	 of	 formal	
equality	 (that	 is,	 equality	 of	 treatment),	 rather	 than	 substantive	 equality	 (or	
equality	of	outcome).548	The	problem	with	formal	equality	is	that	it	compares	the	
																																																								
547	The	New	Zealand	Disability	 Strategy	 states:	 ‘Disability	 is	 the	 process	which	
happens	when	one	group	of	people	create	barriers	by	designing	a	world	only	for	
their	 way	 of	 living,	 taking	 no	 account	 of	 the	 impairments	 other	 people	 have.’	
(Social	Development,	above	n228	at	1).			
548	McLean	suggests	that	the	HRA	is	concerned	with	equality	of	outcome	and	not	
merely	 equal	 treatment,	 citing	 both	 the	 reasonable	 accommodation	 provisions	
and	 the	 section	 73	 ‘measures	 to	 achieve	 equality’	 as	 evidence	 of	 this	 (Grant	
Huscroft	and	Paul	Rishworth	Rights	and	Freedoms:	The	New	Zealand	Bill	of	Rights	
Act	 1990	 and	 the	Human	Rights	 Act	 1993	 (Brooker's,	Wellington,	 NZ,	 1995)	 at	










treatment	 of	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 with	 that	 of	 another	 similarly	
situated	 employee,	 to	 ensure	 they	 have	 been	 treated	 equally.	 This	 may	 be	
appropriate	 for	other	protected	grounds	of	discrimination	(e.g.	 sex	or	ethnicity	
or	 political	 belief)	 where	 the	 relevant	 feature	 is	 generally	 irrelevant	 to	 the	
person’s	ability	 to	perform	 the	 job.	However,	 for	disability,	where	 the	disabled	
person’s	work	may	be	affected	by	their	disability,	this	comparison	may	result	in	a	
finding	that	the	disabled	employee	has	not	been	adversely	treated	compared	to	a	
similarly	 situated	 one	 (i.e.	 one	 whose	 ability	 to	 work	 is	 also	 compromised).	
Therefore,	the	disabled	employee	may	not	be	protected	by	the	discrimination	in	
employment	 provisions,	 even	 when	 the	 reason	 for	 their	 poor	 performance	 is	
their	mental	disability.		
Without	 clarification	of	 the	 correct	 comparator,	 and	 clarification	 that	disability	
includes	the	consequences	or	manifestations	(such	as	poor	performance)	arising	
from	 the	disability,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 the	disabled	employee	 could	be	 treated	
adversely,	without	it	being	unlawful.		
3.	The	HRA	contains	no	positive	duty	or	obligation	of	reasonable	accommodation		
Whilst	 an	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	might	 be	 inferred	 from	 the	
legislation	in	some	circumstances,	the	boundaries	of	any	such	obligation	remain	
unclear.	It	may	be	limited	to	the	provision	of	reasonable	services	or	facilities,	and	
to	 reasonable	 measures	 to	 reduce	 a	 risk	 of	 harm.	 As	 some	 of	 the	
accommodations	 the	 employee	 may	 require	 may	 not	 easily	 fall	 within	 the	
definition	 of	 ‘services	 or	 facilities’,	 and	 there	 may	 be	 no	 ‘risk	 of	 harm’	 to	 the	
employee	 or	 others,	 this	 means	 that	 the	 employer	 may	 not	 be	 obliged	 to	
accommodate	 them.	 In	 this	 situation,	 the	HRA	would	 fail	 to	 ‘better	protect’	 the	
rights	of	the	disabled.	
Furthermore,	 in	 many	 instances,	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA	 could	 be	 fairly	
interpreted	 in	 favour	 either	 of	 the	 employer	 or	 the	 disabled	 employee.	
Consequently,	 the	 outcome	 is	 uncertain,	 as	 the	 interpretation	 selected	 may	
reflect	 the	 political	 or	 socio-economic	 policy	 preferences	 of	 those	 adjudicating	
the	matter.		
Moreover,	 as	 this	 thesis	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	 6,	 inferring	 a	 duty	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation	 from	 the	 potential	 accommodation	 provisions	may	 not	 be	 the	
‘best’	 interpretation	of	 these	provisions.	 	Thus,	even	the	 ‘best’	 interpretation	of	
the	 text	 may	 not	 be	 enough	 to	 ensure	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 mentally	 disabled	




what	 Fishkin	 refers	 to	 as	 a	 ‘bottleneck’	 in	 employment	 opportunities	 for	 the	
disabled	 (the	 amelioration	 of	 which,	 he	 argues,	 is	 the	 function	 of	 anti-
discrimination	 law).549	In	particular,	 as	 long	as	 the	disabled	employee	only	has	
																																																								
549 	Joseph	 Fishkin	 Bottlenecks:	 A	 New	 Theory	 of	 Equal	 Opportunity	 (Oxford	
Scholarship	Online,	 	2014).	As	Areheart	explains,	Fishkin	describes	bottlenecks	
as	narrow	spaces	in	the	opportunity	structure	through	which	people	must	pass	if	









in	 employment	 is	 solely	 a	 matter	 between	 the	 individual	 employee	 and	
employer,	 and	 recognising	 that	 the	 problem	 of	 accommodating	 disability	 in	
employment	 needs	 to	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 broader	 societal	 issue,	 responsibility	 for	
accommodating	 the	 disabled	 employee	 could	 be	 repositioned.	 Then,	 perhaps,	





the	 current	 law.	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 explores	 these	 suggestions	
further,	 discussing	 the	 options	 of	 enacting	 new	 disability	 discrimination	
legislation	or	amending	the	HRA,	concluding	that	the	latter	is	the	better	solution	
to	 address	 the	 interpretive	 issues	 raised.	 Nonetheless,	 this	 thesis	 ultimately	
concludes	 that	 even	with	 the	proposed	amendments,	 the	 current	model	 of	 law	
may	be	ineffective	in	ensuring	adequate	accommodation	of	disability.		Therefore,	
it	 suggests	 the	 current	 model	 of	 disability	 discrimination	 law	 needs	 to	 be	
reviewed,	 and	 possibly	 replaced	 with	 a	 new,	 social	 model	 of	 disability	
discrimination	law.						
7.2.2 The	 Failure	 of	 New	 Zealand	 to	 Meet	 its	 Obligations	 Under	 the	
UNCRPD		
The	 previous	 chapter	 suggested	 that,	 although	 it	 might	 be	 possible	 to	 infer	 a	
limited	 obligation	 to	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	 employee	 from	 the	 permitted	
exceptions,	this	was	not	the	best	interpretation	of	these	provisions.	Accordingly,	
the	 permitted	 exceptions	 act	 only	 as	 a	 defence	 for	 the	 employer	 and	 do	 not	
generate	a	 general	obligation	of	 reasonable	accommodation,	 and,	 although	 this	
approach	might	fit	well	enough	with	the	statutory	scheme	of	the	HRA,	and	with	
its	 the	dual	purposes,	 it	does	not	ensure	 that	New	Zealand	 fulfils	 it	obligations	
under	the	UNCRPD.	
																																																																																																																																																														
bottlenecks	 (or	 restrictions)	 of	 opportunities	 are	 reasonable	 (for	 example,	
limiting	 entry	 to	medical	 school	 to	persons	 capable	 of	 becoming	qualified)	 but	
others	are	arbitrary	and	should	be	eliminated	(Bradley	A	Areheart	and	Michael	
Ashley	 Stein	 "The	 Disability–Employability	 Divide:	 Bottlenecks	 to	 Equal	
Opportunity"	(2015)	113(6)	Mich	L	Rev	877	at	104).		
550	As	 a	 corollary,	 this	 change	 in	 attitude	will	 also	 help	 eliminate	 the	 incorrect	
assumption	 or	 stereotype	 held	 by	 some,	 that	 disability	 and	 employability	 are	





provided	 to	 persons	 with	 disabilities	 in	 the	 workplace.551	Furthermore,	 the	
UNCRPD	 defines	 failure	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	 as	
discrimination.552	However,	despite	New	Zealand	ratifying	the	UNCRPD,	the	HRA	
still	 contains	 no	 definition	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation,	 and	 imposes	 no	
positive	 obligation	 on	 the	 employer	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	
employee.	 Nor	 is	 failure	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	 employee	 a	
standalone	ground	of	discrimination.	The	New	Zealand	Government’s	response,	
when	the	Committee	for	the	UNCRPD	raised	concerns	regarding	this,	was:553		
The	 New	 Zealand	 Government	 is	 not	 considering	 amending	
section	 52	 of	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Act	 1993.	 In	 Smith	 v	 Air	New	
Zealand	Ltd	[2011]	NZCA	20,	the	Court	of	Appeal	considered	the	
definition	 of	 “reasonable	 accommodation”	 in	 article	 2	 of	 the	
Convention	 and	 interpreted	 section	 52	 consistently	 with	 that	
definition.	 The	 Court	 found	 that,	 although	 there	 is	 no	 explicit	
definition	 of	 “reasonable	 accommodation”	 in	 the	 Act,	 the	 Act	
does	 apply	 the	 concept	 of	 “reasonable	 accommodation”	 in	
specific	contexts.	Once	discrimination	has	been	established,	the	
defendant	must	 show	 it	would	be	unreasonable	 to	 require	 the	
defendant	 to	provide	 the	goods	or	 services	on	 the	 same	 terms	
and	conditions.	
Thus,	 although	 the	Government	 appears	 comfortable	 in	 its	 belief	 that	 the	HRA	
applies	the	concept	of	reasonable	accommodation,	the	legislation	itself	does	not	
appear	 fully	 compliant	 with	 the	 UNCRPD.	 Accordingly,	 whether	 New	 Zealand	
meets	 its	 obligations	 under	 the	 UNCRPD	 will	 depend	 on	 how	 the	 potential	






a	 particular	 case,	 to	 ensure	 to	 persons	 with	 disabilities	 the	















by	 removing	 barriers	 and	 remedying	 the	 harm	 caused	 by	 an	 inaccessible	
workplace.555		
The	HRA	is	premised	more	on	a	model	of	formal	equality556	and	on	the	medical	
model	 of	 disability,557	which	 regards	 the	 disabled	 as	 having	 needs	 rather	 than	
rights.		Consequently,	the	HRA	does	not	mirror	the	underlying	philosophy	of	the	




the	 same	 disabling	 barriers	 as	 those	 with	 long-term	 conditions. 559 	This	
interpretation	is	inconsistent	with	the	social	model	of	disability	promoted	by	the	
UNCRPD. 560 	In	 the	 Professor	 Smith	 scenario,	 the	 medical	 model	 sees	 her	
depression	 as	 a	 medical	 condition	 that	 requires	 treatment	 to	 enable	 her	 to	
participate	 in	 the	workplace,	 and	an	approach	based	on	 formal	 equality	would	
only	 entitle	 her	 to	 be	 treated	 the	 same	 as	 other	 employees.	 The	 social	model,	
however,	 recognises	 that	 intolerance	 of	 her	 condition	 has	 a	 disabling	 impact.	
Thus,	 an	 attitudinal	 barrier	 (intolerance)	 limits	 her	 participation	 in	 the	
workforce.	 The	 social	 model	 would	 seek	 to	 accommodate	 her	 disability	 by	
																																																								
555	Arlene	Kanter	"A	Comparative	View	of	Equality	under	the	UN	Convention	on	
the	 Rights	 of	 Persons	 with	 Disabilities	 and	 the	 Disability	 Laws	 of	 the	 United	
States	and	Canada"	(2015)	32	Windsor	YB	Access	to	Just	65	at	78.		Kanter	argues	
that	 Article	 27	 of	 the	 UNCRPD	 challenges	 traditional	 anti-discrimination	 laws	
and	seeks	to	ensure	greater	equality	for	people	with	disabilities.		
556	Although	 ‘equality’	 is	 not	 mentioned	 in	 the	 HRA	 (or	 in	 the	 NZBORA),	 the	
provisions	in	the	HRA	prohibit	different	treatment,	implying	the	HRA	is	premised	
on	formal	equality.		
557 	Under	 the	 HRA,	 unless	 the	 condition	 falls	 within	 the	 exhaustive	 list	 of	
disorders	 in	 section	21,	 the	person	with	 the	 impairment	 is	 not	 covered	by	 the	
Act.	This	medical	model	does	not	take	 into	consideration	the	disabling	effect	of	
being	unable	 to	participate	 fully	 and	equally	 in	 society,	which	 is	 recognised	by	
the	UNCRPD’s	definition	of	disability	 in	Article	1.	Additionally,	 the	UNCRPD,	 in	






handicap	 (which	may	 be	 physical	 or	mental	 or	 psychological)	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	
temporary	induced	state	of	unfitness	or	diminution	of	ability”	(at	[213]).	
559	Bell,	 McGregor	 and	 Wilson,	 above	 n229	 at	 284.	 Nonetheless,	 as	 disability	
under	 the	 HRA	 has	 no	 specific	 duration	 requirement	 it	 should	 be	 possible	 to	
interpret	this	provision	consistently	with	the	UNCRPD.	
560 	Although	 the	 definition	 of	 disability	 in	 Article	 2	 of	 the	 UNCRPD	 starts:	
‘Persons	 with	 disabilities	 include	 those	 who	 have	 long-term	 physical,	 mental,	






encouraging	 tolerance	 of	 her	 poor	 performance,	 allowing	 her	 to	 maintain	
employment,	with	the	aim	of	achieving	equality	of	outcome.		
Therefore,	 for	 New	 Zealand	 to	 meets	 its	 obligations	 under	 the	 Convention,	
reform	of	the	legislation	is	required.	As	Bell	comments:561		
Given	 the	 centrality	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 to	 the	
definition	of	disability	in	the	Convention	it	is	no	longer	possible	
to	 avoid	 accommodating	 the	 requirements	 of	 disabled	 people	
when	it	 is	inconvenient…	This	may	need	to	involve	a	rethink	of	
the	Act	itself	—	particularly	the	need	for	a	general	obligation	to	
accommodate	 the	 needs	 of	 disabled	 people…	 (footnotes	
omitted).		
The	UNCRPD	and	Overseas	Jurisdictions	
Before	 suggesting	 that	 New	 Zealand	 should	 make	 substantial	 changes	 to	 the	
HRA,	it	is	worth	reviewing	the	extent	to	which	overseas	jurisdictions	meet	their	
obligations	 under	 the	 UNCRPD,	 or	 the	 problems	 they	 have	 encountered	 in	
achieving	this.		
Like	New	Zealand,	the	UK,	Australia	and	Canada	have	all	ratified	the	UNCRPD.562	
Arguably,	 the	 legislation	 in	 those	 countries	 appears	 more	 compliant	 with	 the	
Convention	than	the	HRA,	as	they	contain	more	clearly	defined	obligations	on	the	
employer	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	 (or	 make	 ‘reasonable	 adjustments’	 for)	
persons	 with	 disabilities.	 Nonetheless,	 the	 nature,	 scope	 and	 interpretation	 of	
the	duty	in	these	jurisdictions	has	not	been	without	controversy.				
In	the	UK,	the	EA	2010	contains	a	‘Duty	to	make	[reasonable]	adjustments’563	and	
the	 failure	 to	 do	 so	 is	 discrimination.564	Case	 law	 suggests	 the	 employee	must	




562	New	 Zealand	 (excluding	 Tokelau),	 Australia	 and	 the	 UK	 have	 ratified	 the	
Optional	 Protocol	 and	 the	 Convention,	 while	 Canada	 has	 only	 ratified	 the	
Convention.	 The	 Optional	 Protocol	 allows	 the	 Committee	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	
Persons	 with	 Disabilities	 to	 receive	 and	 consider	 communications	 from	
individuals	 or	 groups	who	 claim	 to	 be	 victims	 of	 violations	 of	 the	 UNCRPD	 in	
those	jurisdictions.		
563	Equality	 Act	 2010	 (UK),	 s20.	 For	 the	 duty	 to	 arise	 s20(3)	 states:	 ‘The	 first	
requirement	is	a	requirement,	where	a	provision,	criterion	or	practice	of	A’s	puts	
a	disabled	person	at	a	substantial	disadvantage	in	relation	to	a	relevant	matter	in	




Modern	 Workplace	 (Kluwer	 Netherlands,	 2016).	 Nonetheless,	 the	 UKEAT	 has	
held	 that	 it	 is	not	 always	 the	employee	who	 is	 in	 the	best	position	 to	 consider	





responsive’	 in	 nature,	 requiring	 the	 employer	 to	 know	 of	 the	 employee’s	
disability	 and	of	 a	 specific	 ‘provision,	 criterion	or	practice’	 (PCP)	 that	 puts	 the	
disabled	 employee	 at	 a	 ‘substantial	 disadvantage’	 before	 the	 duty	 arises.	566	An	
additional	 criticism	 made	 is	 that	 a	 pragmatic	 and	 formalistic	 approach	 to	
interpretation	 of	 the	 EA	 2010	 has	 been	 taken,	 rather	 than	 a	 principled	 or	
purposive	one.567	Consequently,	unless	the	employee	can	demonstrate	a	specific	
PCP	that	puts	them	at	a	 ‘substantial	disadvantage’,568	no	reasonable	adjustment	
need	 be	 made.569	Furthermore,	 the	 terms	 ‘provision’,	 ‘criterion’	 and	 ‘practice’	
pose	 their	 own	 interpretive	 difficulties,	with	 the	 case	 law	 on	 the	matter	 being	
inconsistent.570		
As	a	result,	 it	has	been	argued	that	 the	current	UK	approach	makes	reasonable	
accommodation	 results	 driven	 (to	 make	 the	 employee	 more	 useful	 to	 the	
employer),	and	not	rights	driven	(emphasising	how	the	employer	could	be	more	
helpful	to	the	employee).571	Lawson	argues	that	if	the	obligation	was	formulated	
as	 an	 anticipatory	 duty	 this	 would	 have	 greater	 potential	 to	 drive	 systemic	
change.572	An	 anticipatory	 duty	 of	 accommodation	 would	 mean	 the	 employer	
would	 be	 obliged	 to	 make	 accommodations	 that	 would	 benefit	 the	 employee	
even	when	 there	was	no	 specific	disadvantageous	PCP.	For	example,	providing	
other	employees,	who	will	be	 interacting	with	a	workmate	with	a	psychosocial	
impairment,	 with	 specialised	 training	 or	 mentoring,	 would	 be	 an	 anticipatory	
reasonable	 accommodation.	 This	 would	 benefit	 all	 parties,	 as	 it	 may	 stave	 off	
																																																								















572	Lawson,	 above	n566	at	369.	The	duty	 to	make	 reasonable	 adjustments	was	
discussed	in	The	Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	v	Ashton	[2010]	UKEAT	0542/09	(under	
the	 similar	 provision	 in	 the	 Disability	 Discrimination	 Act	 1995).	 The	
Employment	 Appeals	 Tribunal	 (UKEAT)	 held	 the	 duty	 is	 concerned	 with	










in	 the	 UK	 to	 the	 reasonable	 adjustment	 duty	 is	 consonant	 with	 the	 UNCRPD,	
which	 does	 not	 require	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 provision,	 criterion	 or	 practice	 that	
puts	 a	 disabled	 person	 at	 a	 ‘substantial	 disadvantage’	 before	 the	 duty	 to	
accommodate	arises.574	The	Convention	requires	reasonable	accommodation	be	
provided	 in	 the	 workplace,	 and	 reasonable	 accommodation	 is	 defined	 as	




right	 to	 work).	 Thus,	 the	 Convention	 does	 not	 restrict	 the	 obligation	 to	 make	
accommodation	to	when	a	PCP	causes	a	substantial	disadvantage	to	the	disabled	
employee.	 For	 example,	 an	 employee	 with	 an	 anxiety	 disorder	 might	 benefit	
from	periodic	time	off	 to	reduce	stress,	but,	unless	they	can	 identify	a	PCP	that	
causes	 the	 stress,	 they	 have	 no	 recourse	 under	 the	 EA	 2010.	 The	 UNCRPD	
definition,	however,	would	suggest	that	accommodation	would	be	required	(for	
example,	 the	 provision	 of	 extra	 sick	 leave),	 as	 this	 would	 be	 needed,	 in	 the	
particular	case,	to	enable	the	employee	to	keep	working.						
In	addition,	the	2017	‘review	of	mental	health	and	employers’	suggests	that	the	
UK	 legislation	 does	 not	 provide	 sufficient	 protection	 for	 those	with	 fluctuating	
mental	health	conditions,	and	does	not	impose	clear	accountability	on	employers	




clearly	 inferred,	as	 the	 failure	 to	make	 ‘reasonable	adjustments’	 to	 the	point	of	
unjustifiable	 hardship	 is	 discrimination,	when	 it	 results	 in	 the	 disabled	person	
being	 treated	 ‘less	 favourably’.577	The	 scope	 of	 the	 duty	 was	 discussed	 by	 the	
																																																								
573	Lawson,	above	n566	at	73.	Lawson	suggests	that	training	of	other	employees	
is	 important	 to	 ‘allay	 fears	 founded	 in	 ignorance	 and	 to	 reduce	 awkwardness	
which	might	 otherwise	 be	 triggered	 by	 unconventional	 behaviour.	 It	may	 also	





of	 Mental	 Health	 and	 Employers	 (Department	 for	 Work	 and	 Pensions	 and	
Department	of	Health	 (UK),	2017)	at	50.	The	authors	 recommended	 legislative	
change	 to	 enhance	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee.	 The	 report	 also	
suggested	 that	 the	 Equality	 and	 Human	 Rights	 Commission	 should	 take	 a	








should	 be	 interpreted	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 UNCRPD, 579 	and	 that	 the	
adjustment	contemplated	is	not	to	the	position	or	equipment,	but	is:580 
an	 alteration	 or	modification	 “for”	 the	 person,	which	 operates	
on	the	person’s	ability	to	do	the	work	she	or	he	is	employed	or	
appointed	to	do.	The	adjustment	is	to	be	enabling	or	facultative.	
There	 is…	 no	 reason	 in	 the	 text,	 context	 or	 purpose	 of	 s	 5(2),	
read	with	 s	 4	 and	within	 the	DDA	 as	 a	whole,	 to	 construe	 the	
word	 “adjustment”	 in	 a	 way	 which	 might	 arbitrarily	 limit	 the	
kinds	 of	 modifications	 or	 alterations	 required	 to	 enable	 a	
disabled	worker	 to	 perform	his	 or	 her	work…..	 An	 adjustment	
“for”	 a	 person	may	 involve	 only	 technology,	 or	 it	may	 involve	
only	 human	 interactions,	 or	 something	 in	 between.	 An	
adjustment	“for”	a	person	may	change	over	time,	and	may	need	
to	be	flexible	and	adaptable.	
The	aim	of	 the	adjustment	 is	 to	eliminate	 less	 favourable	 treatment	because	of	
the	disability.	The	Court,	in	Hudson	v	Australian	Broadcasting	Corporation,	held	in	
this	context:581		
“treated	 less	 favourably”	 means	 the	 disadvantages	 the	 PWD	
[person	with	 the	 disability]	 experiences	 because	 of	 his	 or	 her	
disability,	 not	 because	 the	 discriminator	 has	 treated	 the	 PWD	
differently	 than	 he	 or	 she	 would	 treat	 a	 person	 without	 a	
disability	 in	 circumstances	 that	 are	 not	 materially	 different.	
Subsection	5(2)	defines	as	discrimination	a	person’s	 treating	a	
PWD	 no	 differently	 than	 he	 or	 she	 would	 treat	 a	 person	 who	
does	not	have	a	disability	in	circumstances	where	an	adjustment	
could	 reasonably	 be	 made	 that	 would	 overcome	 or	 perhaps	
ameliorate	 the	 disadvantages	 the	 PWD	 has	 because	 of	 the	
disability	 when	 compared	 with	 persons	 who	 do	 not	 have	 the	
disability	in	circumstances	not	materially	different.	
Thus,	it	appears	the	obligation	to	make	reasonable	adjustments	in	the	DDA	Cth	is	









is	 clear	 that	 these	 amendments	 were	 made	 in	 pursuance	 of	 Australia’s	








to	 a	 defence,	 rather	 than	 a	 positive	 obligation.582	Furthermore,	 the	 failure	 to	









it	 is	 intended	 that	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 those	
inabilities	should	be	provided.	
This	appears	contrary	 to	 the	UNCRPD’s	requirement	 to	provide	adjustments	 to	
accommodate	the	disabled	‘where	needed’.		
Thus,	 although	 Australian	 legislation	 at	 Federal	 level	 appears	 generally	
compliant	 with	 the	 UNCRPD,	 at	 State	 level	 not	 all	 legislation	 appears	
compliant.584		
The	 Canadian	 Employment	 Equity	 Act	 1995	 imposes	 a	 positive	 obligation	 on	
Federal,	 public	 sector,	 and	 large	 private	 employers 585 	to	 make	 reasonable	
accommodations	to	ensure	that	qualified	individuals	from	the	designated	groups	
(including	the	disabled)	are	proportionally	represented	in	the	work	force	(unless	






to	 refuse	 or	 fail	 to	 accommodate	 disability.	 However,	 Discrimination	 Act	 1991	
(ACT),	 s49;	 Anti-Discrimination	 Act	 1991	 (QLD),	 s35;	 Equal	 Opportunity	 Act	
1984	 (WA),	 s66Q;	 and	 Anti-Discrimination	 Act	 1998	 (TAS),	 s45	 all	 have	 as	 a	
defence	 against	 a	 claim	 of	 discrimination	 that	 the	 disabled	 employee	 requires	
special	 services	 or	 facilities,	 or	 other	 accommodation,	 the	 provision	 of	 which	
would	impose	undue	hardship	on	the	employer.				
585	Employment	Equity	Act	1995	(Canada),	s4.	The	Act	applies	to	 federal	public	




employer	 shall	 implement	 employment	 equity	 by	 ‘instituting	 such	 positive	
policies	 and	 practices	 and	 making	 such	 reasonable	 accommodations	 as	 will	
ensure	that	persons	in	designated	groups	achieve	a	degree	of	representation	in	
each	 occupational	 group	 in	 the	 employer’s	 workforce	 that	 reflects	 their	








to	 the	 principle	 that	 employment	 equity	 means	 more	 than	
treating	 persons	 in	 the	 same	 way	 but	 also	 requires	 special	
measures	and	the	accommodation	of	differences.	
This	 fits	 well	 with	 the	 UNCRPD	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 and	
promotes	substantive	equality.	However,	commentators	suggest	the	Act	has	had	
limited	success	in	achieving	its	purposes.588		
Additionally,	 some	 Canadian	 provincial	 human	 rights	 legislation	 imposes	 a	
positive	 duty	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 on	 the	 employer.589	However,	 the	
Canadian	 Charter	 of	 Rights	 and	 Freedoms	 does	 not	 contain	 a	 duty	 to	







demonstrate	 that,	as	 long	as	 the	responsibility	 for	accommodation	rests	on	 the	
employer,	the	ambit	of	reasonable	accommodation	will	be	contested.	Therefore,	
any	 amendments	 New	 Zealand	makes	 to	 the	 HRA,	 to	 comply	 with	 obligations	
under	the	UNCRPD,	should	consider	these	issues,	and	how	best	to	resolve	them.	
As	will	be	discussed,	the	best	way	to	achieve	compliance	with	the	UNCRPD	may	
be	 to	 change	 the	 current	model	of	 law	 for	disability	discrimination	entirely,	 so	
that	the	responsibility	for	accommodation	of	disability	does	not	rest	solely	on	the	
employer	 (who	 has	 limited	 resources),	 but	 on	 society	 as	 a	 whole.	 This	 would	
enable	a	far	greater	level	of	accommodation	of	disability	to	be	possible.						
Nonetheless,	 currently,	 the	 New	 Zealand	 legislation,	 which	 does	 not	 contain	 a	
positive	duty	to	accommodate,	nor	treat	the	failure	to	do	so	as	a	separate	ground	
																																																																																																																																																														
plan,	specifying	among	other	 things,	 the	reasonable	accommodations	 instituted	
(s10).		
587	Employment	Equity	Act	1995	(Canada),	s2.	
588	Carol	Agocs	 "Canada’s	Employment	Equity	 Legislation	And	Policy,	 1987‐
2000:	The	Gap	Between	Policy	 and	Practice"	 (2002)	23(3)	 Int	 J	 	Manpow	256;	
Harish	 Jain,	 Frank	Horwitz	 and	Christa	 	Wilkin	 "Employment	Equity	 in	Canada	
and	 South	 Africa:	 a	 Comparative	 Review"	 (2012)	 23(1)	 Int	 J	 Hum	 Resource	
Manag	1.	
589	For	 example,	 the	Manitoba	Human	Rights	 Code	 1987,	 s(9)(1)(d)	makes	 the	
failure	to	reasonably	accommodate	the	employee	discrimination.	This	code	(and	
several	 other	 provincial	 human	 rights	 codes)	 excuse	 discrimination	 on	 the	
grounds	of	a	bona	fide	occupational	requirement	(BOR).	However,	the	BOR	does	







of	 discrimination,	 is	 out	 of	 step	with	 the	more	 positive	 obligations	 imposed	 in	
some	overseas	jurisdictions.	Thus,	at	the	very	least,	New	Zealand	should	consider	
amending	the	 legislation	to	align	with	those	 jurisdictions	and	the	UNCRPD,	and	
to	 clarify	 the	 obligation	 to	 make	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 disabled	
employees.		
7.3 Potential	Solutions:	Amend	or	Replace	the	HRA			
As	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 several	 provisions	 in	 the	 HRA	 contain	
terms	or	phrases	that	pose	interpretive	difficulties	for	disability	discrimination.	
These	 include	what	 is	meant	 by	 ‘qualified	 for	work’,	 identifying	when	 adverse	
treatment	 is	 ‘by	reason	of’	disability,	and	 the	selection	of	 the	most	appropriate	
comparator	 employee.	 Additionally,	 the	 reasonable	 accommodation	 provisions	
are	less	than	clear.		





though	 amending	 the	 current	 Act,	 or	 by	 enacting	 a	 separate	 Disability	







just	 for	 disability	 discrimination,	 may	 create	 a	 more	 piecemeal	 approach	 to	
discrimination	 law,	with	different	Acts	applying	depending	upon	 the	ground	of	
discrimination	 claimed.	 When	 intersectional	 (or	 multiple)	 grounds	 of	
discrimination	are	claimed	(e.g.	disability	and	sex	discrimination)	then	assessing	
the	 treatment	 under	 different	 provisions,	 in	 different	 Acts,	 may	 be	 more	
complicated	 and	 time-consuming	 than	 assessing	 the	 treatment	 under	 a	 single	
Act.	 This	 potential	 problem	would	 be	 compounded	 if	 the	 Acts	 had	 procedural	
differences	or	differing	remedies.		
However,	 there	 are	 disadvantages	 to	 simply	 amending	 the	 HRA.	 The	
amendments	 themselves	 may	 need	 to	 be	 substantial	 to	 meet	 the	 objectives	
outlined,	 and	 this	 could	make	complex	 legislation	even	more	complicated.	 	For	
example,	 to	 remove	 the	 aim	 of	 achieving	 formal	 equality	 for	 the	 disabled,	 and	
replace	 it	 with	 substantive	 equality,	 would	 require	 separate	 provisions	 to	 be	
drafted	 for	 disability	 discrimination	 (to,	 for	 example,	 remove	 the	 comparator	
component	for	assessing	adverse	treatment).	Consequently,	the	HRA	would	end	
up	 having	 some	 provisions	 based	 on	 formal	 equality,	 plus	 provisions	 for	
disability	discrimination	based	on	substantive	equality,	and	this	may	lead	to	new	
interpretive	 difficulties.	 Additionally,	 these	 new	 provisions	 may	 not	 reconcile	





the	 HRA	 dealing	 with	 disability	 discrimination	 (in	 all	 contexts,	 not	 just	
employment).	This	separate	Part	could	then	contain	a	new	definition	of	disability	
(or	disability	discrimination),	 introducing	the	social	model	of	disability	 into	the	
legislation.	 The	 provisions	 for	 disability	 discrimination	 in	 employment	 would	
then	 be	 separate	 to	 those	 for	 the	 remaining	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	
discrimination,	 and	 the	 new	 disability	 provisions	 could	 be	 drafted	 to	 promote	
substantive	equality:	for	example,	by	removing	the	need	for	a	comparator	when	
assessing	adverse	 treatment.	The	ERA	could	also	be	amended,	 referring	 to	 this	
new	 Part	 of	 the	 HRA	 for	 all	 matters	 relating	 to	 disability	 discrimination.	 This	
would	 (for	 disability	 discrimination	 at	 least)	 eliminate	 any	 textual	 differences	




grounds	 of	 discrimination	 under	 different	 Parts	 of	 the	 HRA,	 with	 different	
underlying	 philosophies	 and	 different	 criteria	 for	 assessment.	 	 If	 the	 grounds	
were	additive	(i.e.	separate	 instances	of	discrimination	occurring	with	different	
grounds),	 this	 may	 prove	 to	 be	 no	 more	 than	 inconvenient,	 but	 for	 true	
intersectional	 discrimination,	 where	 the	 treatment	 cannot	 be	 separated	 into	
component	 parts	 for	 different	 grounds,	 deciding	 which	 ground,	 and	 therefore	
which	Part	 of	 the	Act,	 the	 claim	 should	be	brought	under,	would	be	 extremely	
difficult.592	
Furthermore,	 amending	 the	 Act	 to	 this	 extent	 (that	 is,	 placing	 all	 disability	
discrimination	provisions	 in	the	new	Part)	 is	 tantamount	to	creating	a	new	Act	
within	 an	 existing	 one.	 Consequently,	 there	 would	 be	 no	 real	 advantage	
compared	 to	 creating	 a	 separate	 Act	 for	 disability	 discrimination	 (the	
disadvantages	of	which	are	outlined	below).		
Accordingly,	 this	 thesis	 suggests	 that,	 if	 amending	 the	 HRA,	 the	 best	 solution	
would	be	 to	 amend	 the	 current	 provisions	without	making	 a	 separate	Part	 for	
general	disability	discrimination	or	disability	discrimination	in	employment.		
7.3.2 Replace	the	HRA:	A	Separate	Disability	Discrimination	Act		
Although	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 the	 preferred	 option	 to	 clarify	 the	 law	 is	











this	 type	of	discrimination	occurring	 	 (Mai	Chen	The	Diversity	Matrix:	Updating	




Firstly,	 the	 legislation	 could	 be	 framed	 to	 achieve	 greater	 substantive	 equality	
(rather	than	formal	equality)	in	all	contexts	of	disability	discrimination	(not	just	
employment).	 This	 would	 promote	 and	 protect	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 disabled	 in	
general,	in	accordance	with	the	UNCRPD.		
Secondly,	 disability	 could	 be	 redefined	 in	 keeping	with	 the	 social	 construct	 of	
disability,	or	a	mixed	social/medical	model,	similar	to	that	used	in	the	UNCRPD	




Lastly,	 the	 ERA	 could	 be	 amended,	 excluding	 disability	 from	 the	 s104	
discrimination	in	employment	provisions,	and	instead	making	it	only	subject	to	
the	 provisions	 in	 the	 new	 Act.	 This	 could	 avoid	 a	 piecemeal	 approach	 to	
discrimination	law	that	might	otherwise	be	required	in	an	amended	HRA,	where	
disability	 discrimination	 would	 apply	 to	 certain	 provisions,	 and	 be	 excluded	
from	others.			
However,	 there	are	also	 substantial	disadvantages	 to	having	a	 separate	Act	 for	
disability	discrimination.	It	could	lead	to	increased	complexity	for	framing	claims	
of	 discrimination	 when	 the	 claim	 is	 based	 on	 more	 than	 one	 ground	 of	
discrimination	(e.g.	both	sex	and	disability	discrimination).596	In	the	same	factual	
context,	 claims	 may	 have	 to	 be	 framed	 differently	 for	 each	 ground	 under	 the	
different	 Acts,	 as	 there	 may	 be	 different	 approaches	 to	 the	 question	 of	
discrimination	 and,	 conceivably,	 the	 different	 Acts	 may	 have	 different	
																																																								
593	The	 UNCRPD’s	 definition	 of	 disability	 is:	 ‘Persons	 with	 disabilities	 include	
those	who	have	long-term	physical,	mental,	intellectual	or	sensory	impairments	
which	 in	 interaction	 with	 various	 barriers	 may	 hinder	 their	 full	 and	 effective	
participation	 in	 society	 on	 an	 equal	 basis	 with	 others’	 ("United	 Nations	
Convention	 and	 Optional	 Protocol	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 Persons	 with	 Disabilities"	
(2007)	46(3)	International	Legal	Materials	443	Article	1).	This	definition	reflects	
a	 mixed	 medical/social	 model	 of	 disability.	 The	 reference	 to	 impairments	







596 	In	 the	 USA	 at	 least,	 studies	 have	 confirmed	 the	 multiplicative,	 or	
compounding,	 effects	 of	 disability	 and	 gender	 discrimination	 in	 employment.	











individuals	 to	 raise	 claims	 of	 discrimination	 on	 multiple	 grounds,	 this	 would	
hinder	rather	than	further	protect	human	rights.		
Furthermore,	 this	 increased	 complexity	 in	 the	 law	may	have	other	detrimental	
effects.	 The	 employer,	 for	 example,	 would	 need	 to	 appreciate	 and	 understand	
their	 obligations	 under	 the	 HRA,	 the	 new	 Act,	 and	 the	 ERA	 to	 avoid	 claims	 of	
discrimination	on	any	ground.	If	the	obligations	or	provisions	are	subtly	different	
under	 the	different	Acts,	 this	will	 reduce	 their	 ability	 to	 know	and	understand	
their	obligations	and	rights	under	the	law.	Likewise,	 it	may	prove	confusing	for	
the	disabled	employee,	who	has	to	elect	the	forum	in	which	to	pursue	their	claim	
of	 discrimination	 (particularly	 if	 they	 believe	 they	 have	 been	 discriminated	
against	on	more	than	one	ground).		
Furthermore,	 creating	 an	 entirely	 new	 Act,	 just	 to	 clarify	 the	 disability	
discrimination	in	employment	provisions,	would	seem	excessive	if	the	remaining	
provisions	 in	 the	 HRA	 dealing	 with	 disability	 discrimination,	 outside	 of	 the	
employment	context,	do	not	require	alteration.598		
Additionally,	enacting	new	legislation	would	require	amendments	to	other	Acts	
(as	well	as	 the	current	HRA).	For	example,	 the	NZBORA	would	need	to	refer	 to	
both	 the	 new	 Act	 and	 the	 HRA	 in	 its	 dovetailed	 provisions	 about	
discrimination.599		
Lastly,	 when	 interpreting	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 new	 Act,	 it	 may	 not	 be	 clear	
whether	 the	Courts	 should	 refer	 to	previous	 case	 law	under	 the	HRA,	or	make	
comparison	 with	 the	 text	 of	 the	 current	 HRA,	 or	 whether	 they	 should	 start	
afresh.		The	risk	is	that,	if	the	Courts	or	HRRT	refer	to	previous	case	law	then	the	
objective	 of	 enacting	 the	 new	 legislation	 to	 resolve	 the	 current	 interpretive	
difficulties	may	be	defeated.	That	is,	the	objective	of	attaining	greater	substantive	
equality	may	be	subjugated,	if	the	same	decision-making	approach	is	taken	as	for	
cases	based	on	 formal	 equality.	 If	 the	HRA	 is	 amended	 the	 adjudicators	would	
need	to	consider	precisely	what	the	legislature	has	changed	—	and	why.600	There	
																																																								
597	As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 currently,	 an	 employee	 may	 raise	 a	 claim	 of	
discrimination	under	 the	HRA,	or	as	a	PG	under	 the	ERA.	Although	 it	would	be	
reasonable	to	expect	that	any	new	disability	discrimination	legislation	would	be	
managed	through	the	Human	Rights	Commission,	following	the	same	processes	
as	 the	HRA,	 it	 is	possible	a	 separate	 specialist	 tribunal	might	be	established	 to	
deal	with	disability	discrimination.			
598	The	 provisions	 relating	 to	 disability	 discrimination	 in	 other	 contexts	 are	
outside	the	purview	of	this	thesis	and	have	therefore	not	been	examined	in	any	
depth.	 It	 is	 noteworthy,	 however,	 that	 interpretive	 issues	 for	 reasonable	
accommodation	 of	 disability	 have	 been	 discussed	 in	 cases	 unrelated	 to	




600	The	 Court	 will	 need	 to	 interpret	 the	 new	 provisions,	 which	 would	 include	
examining	why	 an	 amendment	was	made,	 and	 the	 effect	 of	 it.	 The	 decision	 by	
	
	 185	
is	 a	 risk	 that	presumptions	might	be	made	 that	 the	purpose	of	 a	new	Act	 is	 to	
consolidate	 the	 law	 of	 disability	 discrimination,	 rather	 than	 make	 substantive	
changes	to	the	law.		
Therefore,	 taking	 into	consideration	all	 the	 factors	outlined	above,	 the	simplest	




The	 following	 amendments	 to	 the	 HRA	might	 cure	 the	 interpretive	 difficulties	
outlined	 in	 the	previous	chapters.	The	aim	of	 these	amendments	 is	 to	 cure	 the	
uncertainty	in	the	law,	to	ensure	the	purposes	of	the	HRA	are	met,	and	to	enable	
New	 Zealand	 to	 meet	 its	 obligations	 under	 the	 UNCRPD.	 Furthermore,	 these	
amendments	 aim	 to	 achieve	 greater	 substantive	 equality	 for	 those	 with	
disabilities,	 by	 allowing	 them	 to	 receive	 ‘different’	 treatment,	 producing	




3. Include	 the	consequences	arising	 from	disability	within	 the	definition	of	
disability.		
4. Include	 a	 specific	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 in	
employment.	
5. Include	a	definition	of	reasonable	accommodation.	





As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 4,	 depending	 on	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 comparator,	 the	
treatment	of	the	disabled	employee	may	not	be	found	adverse	when	compared	to	
that	 of	 another	 similarly	 situated	 employee.	 This	 is	 because	 it	 is	 not	 clear	
whether	the	consequence	of	the	disability	(for	example,	poor	performance)	is	to	
be	 included	 in	 the	 comparative	 circumstances.	 That	 is,	 would	 a	 poorly	
performing	 disabled	 employee	 be	 compared	 with	 another	 poorly	 performing	
non-disabled	 employee,	 or	with	 a	 normally	 performing	 one?	 If	 the	 former,	 the	
disabled	 employer	 is	 not	 likely	 to	 emerge	with	 a	 favourable	 outcome	 (as	 that	
poorly	 performing	 employee	 might	 also	 be	 adversely	 treated).	 Under	 this	
approach,	 the	 treatment	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee	 may	 not	 be	 considered	
discriminatory,	even	when	the	cause	of	the	treatment	is	a	mental	disability.		
To	 achieve	 greater	 substantive	 equality,	 so	 that	 the	 disabled	 employee	 retains	
their	 employment,	 this	 comparative	 element	 should	 be	 removed.	 Instead,	 the	
																																																																																																																																																														
Employment	Court	in	Angus	v	Ports	of	Auckland	Ltd	(No	2),	above	n75	(when	the	




focus	 should	 be	 on	 whether	 they	 were	 treated	 unfavourably	 because	 of	 their	
disability	 (or	 due	 to	 something	 arising	 in	 consequence	 of	 their	 disability).	
Removing	the	comparative	elements	of	the	HRA	would	allow	the	treatment	to	be	
assessed	 to	 see	 if	 it	 was	 unfavourable,	 and	 if	 it	 was	 due	 to	 disability	 (which	
would	be	discrimination).		
This	 non-comparative	 approach	 is	 utilised	 by	 the	 UK,	 where	 ‘discrimination	
arising	 from	 disability’	 occurs	 when	 ‘A	 treats	 B	 unfavourably	 because	 of	
something	 arising	 in	 consequence	 of	 B’s	 disability.’601 	In	 this	 situation,	 the	
claimant	 must	 show	 that	 there	 has	 been	 unfavourable	 treatment,602	and	 by	
whom,	 but	 no	 question	 of	 comparison	 arises.603	The	 finding	 of	 unfavourable	
treatment	 seldom	 appears	 to	 be	 contentious.604	However,	 under	 the	 EA	 2010,	
																																																								
601	Equality	 Act	 2010	 (UK),	 s15(1).	 This	 is	 a	 different	 test	 to	 that	 of	 direct	
discrimination,	 which	 still	 requires	 adverse	 treatment	 in	 comparison	 to	 other	
employees.	 The	 Equality	 Act	 has	 separate	 provisions	 for	 direct	 discrimination,	
indirect	discrimination,	and	discrimination	arising	 from	disability.	Therefore,	 it	
is	possible	under	the	UK	law	to	 find	no	direct	discrimination	(which	requires	a	
comparator	 (EA	 2010,	 s13)),	 whilst	 simultaneously	 finding	 there	 is	
‘discrimination	arising	from	disability’,	as	there	has	been	unfavourable	treatment	
due	 to	 the	 consequences	 of	 disability.	 The	 UKEAT,	 in	 IPC	Media	 v	Millar,	 held	
there	 is	nothing	 inherently	wrong	 in	 this,	 as:	 “it	 is	precisely	because	 there	 is	 a	
real	 difference	 between	 the	 two	 types	 of	 discrimination	 that	 section	 15	 is	
included	in	the	Act”(IPC	Media	v	Millar	[2013]	IRLR	707	(UKEAT)	at	[36]).	
602	There	 are	 two	 steps	 for	 establishing	 ‘unfavourable	 treatment‘	 under	 this	
provision	 —	 first	 that	 the	 disability	 has	 a	 consequence	 arising	 from	 it	 (the	
‘something’)	 and,	 secondly,	 that	 ‘something’	 causes	 the	 treatment,	 i.e.	 a	 causal	
connection	 (Weerasinghe	 v	 Basildon	 &	 Thurrock	 NHS	 Foundation	 Trust	 [2016]	
ICR	 305	 (UKEAT)	 at	 [34]-[36]).	 Treatment	 may	 be	 considered	 unfavourable	





604	However,	 the	 issue	 did	 arise	 in	Williams	 v	 Trustees	 of	 Swansea	 University	
Pension	and	Assurance	Scheme	and	Another	[2017]	EWCA	Civ	1008,		[2017]	IRLR	
882.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 claimant,	 due	 to	 ill	 health,	 reduced	 his	 hours	 for	 several	
years	 prior	 to	 taking	 medical	 retirement.	 Therefore	 his	 pension	 scheme	
calculation	was	based	upon	his	part-time	hours.	If	an	employee	working	full	time	
retired,	 they	would	 have	 their	 pension	 calculated	 on	 their	 full	 time	wage	 (and	
therefore,	receive	a	larger	amount).	The	critical	question	for	the	Court	of	Appeal	
was	 ‘whether	 treatment	 which	 confers	 advantages	 on	 a	 disabled	 person,	 but	
would	 have	 conferred	 greater	 advantages	 had	 his	 disability	 arisen	 more	





part-time,	 was	 treated	 less	 favourably	 by	 receiving	 a	 lower	 pension.	 Thus,	
	
	 187	
unfavourable	 treatment	 will	 not	 be	 discrimination	 if	 it	 is	 a	 ‘proportionate	




that	 is,	 treatment	 which	 is	 ‘adverse	 to	 the	 complainant’s	 interests’607	—	 but	
without	 any	 further	 qualifier	 or	 limitation.	 In	 both	 these	 jurisdictions,	 the	
determination	 of	 unfavourable	 treatment	 turns	 on	whether	 the	 treatment	was	
aimed	 toward	 the	 individual	 person,	 and	 the	 causal	 connection	 between	 the	
treatment	and	the	attribute.608		
Thus,	 removing	 the	 comparison	 aspect	 for	 determining	 discrimination	 is	 not	





606Buchanan	 v	 The	 Commissioner	 of	 Police	 of	 the	 Metropolis	 UKEAT	 0112/16,		
[2016]	IRLR	918	;	Agbakoko	v	Allied	Bakeries	[2015]	UKEAT	0340/14/0506/DM;	




ALD	 729	 (ACTAAT)	 at	 [24].	 This	 Australian	 case,	 decided	 under	 the	
Discrimination	 Act	 1991	 (ACT),	 s8(1)	 discussed	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘unfavourable	
treatment’	as	this	Act	defines	discrimination	using	these	terms.		
608	The	 Disability	 Discrimination	 Act	 1991	 (ACT),	 s8(1)(a)	 provides	 a	 person	
discriminates	 against	 another	 if	 they	 treat	 or	 propose	 to	 treat	 a	 person	
‘unfavourably’	 because	 of	 the	 attribute.	 Section	 8(1)(b)	 applies	when	 a	 person	




(whether	 reasonable	 or	 not)	 must	 be	 aimed	 toward	 the	 person	 because	 of	 a	




posting	 a	 cheque).	 However,	 the	 treatment	 was	 not	 aimed	 toward	 her	 as	 an	
individual,	 but	was	 a	 ‘requirement	 or	 condition’	 for	 all	 persons	 placing	 ‘adult’	
advertisements	 in	 the	paper.	Therefore,	 as	 it	 fell	 under	 s8(1)(b),	 the	Court	did	
not	 need	 to	 discuss	 the	 interpretation	 of	 unfavourable	 treatment	 or	 its	
implications	 per	 se.	 In	 Victoria,	 the	 Equal	 Opportunity	 Act	 2010	 (Vic),	 s8(1)	
defines	direct	discrimination	as	when	a	person	treats	another	unfavourably	due	
to	a	protected	attribute.	Thus,	again,	the	treatment	must	be	directed	specifically	






make	 the	 test	 for	discrimination	solely	one	of	unfavourable	 treatment	may	not	
be	 straightforward.	 It	 would	 require	 separate	 provisions	 to	 be	 drafted	 for	 the	
treatment	of	employees	who	have	a	disability.	This	 could	be	achieved	with	 the	
insertion	of	new,	disability	specific,	provisions	into	(or	alongside)	section	22;	or	
via	 a	 separate	 subpart,	 dealing	 only	 with	 disability	 discrimination	 in	
employment.		
The	 first	 approach	 could	 lead	 to	 an	 unduly	 complicated	 array	 of	 provisions.	
However,	 the	 latter	approach,	with	a	separate	part	 for	disability	discrimination	
in	employment,	may	result	in	a	clearer	exposition	of	the	law.	The	new	Part	could	
incorporate	 new	 provisions	 (including,	 for	 example,	 the	 provisions	 for	
‘employment	 of	 persons	 with	 disabilities’,	 reasonable	 accommodation,	 and	 a	
definition	 of	 qualified	 for	 work),	 as	 well	 as	 including	 the	 current	 section	 29	
permitted	exceptions.		
At	 first	 blush	 this	 seems	 a	 workable	 solution,	 especially	 as	 the	 ERA	 could	 be	
amended	 to	 incorporate	 (by	 reference)	 this	 Part	 for	 all	 claims	 of	
discrimination. 609 	However,	 as	 discussed	 previously,	 where	 intersectional	




Furthermore,	 other	 disadvantaged	 groups	 may	 also	 benefit	 from	 a	 non-
comparative	 approach	 to	 discrimination,	 where,	 like	 disability,	 equality	 of	




Finally,	 as	 has	 been	 seen	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 Australia,	 even	without	 a	 comparator	
there	 are	 still	 difficulties	 in	 determining	 whether	 discrimination	 has	 occurred	
due	to	unfavourable	treatment,	including	the	difficulty	in	establishing	the	causal	
nexus,	 and	 whether	 the	 treatment	 was	 due	 to	 ‘something	 arising	 from’	
disability. 611 	Furthermore,	 given	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 HRA	 to	 protect	 the	
employer’s	 prerogative,	 it	 is	 likely	 the	 law	 would	 require	 the	 unfavourable	
treatment	to	be	excusable	in	some	other	way,	such	as	via	a	measure	like	the	UK’s	
EA	 2010’s	 ‘proportionate	 means	 to	 achieve	 a	 legitimate	 end.’	 Given	 the	
vernacular	 of	 the	 HRA,	 where	 in	 general,	 obligations	 imposed	 on	 parties	 are	
																																																								
609	This	solution	could	(for	disability	at	least)	resolve	the	uncertainty	that	arises	
from	 the	 textual	 differences	 between	 discrimination	 provision	 of	 the	 ERA	 and	
HRA.	




611	Other	 interpretive	 issues	 that	 might	 arise	 include	 whether	 the	 disability	




restricted	 to	 those	 that	 are	 ‘reasonable’, 612 	it	 is	 likely	 that	 unfavourable	
treatment	would	be	excused,	if	it	was	‘reasonable’	in	the	circumstances.					
Therefore,	 although	 the	use	 of	 a	 comparator	may	not	 be	 the	most	 appropriate	
means	 of	 establishing	 disability	 discrimination,	 removing	 the	 comparative	











As	 discussed	 in	 chapter	 4,	 the	 notion	 of	 being	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’	 acts	 as	 a	
gateway	 into	 the	 HRA’s	 discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions.	 The	
interpretive	 issues	 identified	 were	 mostly	 concerned	 with	 whether,	 to	 be	
qualified	for	work,	the	employee	had	to	be	able	to	perform	all	the	essential	duties	
of	 the	 position	 without	 reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 their	 disability.	 An	
associated	question	was	whether	the	time	of	‘qualification’	should	be	assessed	at	
time	 T1	 (when	 the	 employee	was	 employed	 in	 their	 current	 role),	 or	 time	 T2	
(when	the	alleged	adverse	treatment	occurs).	
This	study	concluded	that	the	best	interpretation,	aligning	with	the	purposes	of	
the	HRA,	 is	 that	 ‘qualified	 for	work’	should	mean	that	 the	disabled	employee	 is	
able	 to	 perform	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position,	 after	 they	 have	 been	
reasonably	 accommodated	 (including	 reallocation	 of	 some	 essential	 duties	 if	
required).		
Furthermore,	 as	 the	 disability	 may	 arise	 during	 employment,	 and	 require	
reasonable	 accommodation	 at	 that	 time,	whether	 an	 employee	 is	 ‘qualified	 for	
work’	 should	 be	 assessed	 at	 time	 T2.	 This	 means	 that	 when	 the	 employee	
becomes	 disabled,	 the	 employer	 must	 try	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	 them	
before	claiming	that	the	employee	is	no	longer	‘qualified’	for	the	position.			
However,	the	text	of	the	HRA	does	not	clearly	convey	this	meaning.	Therefore,	a	
definition	 should	 be	 incorporated	 into	 the	HRA	which	 clarifies	 this.	 A	 suitable	
drafting	might	be:	 	a	person	is	qualified	for	work	when	they	are	able	to	carry	out	




612 	For	 example,	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 have	 the	 defences	 that	 it	 is	 not	






consequences	 arising	 from	 the	 disability	 (such	 as	 poor	 performance)	 are	
considered	a	feature	of	it	or	not.	This	affects	both	the	selection	of	the	appropriate	
comparator	 employee	 and	 whether	 the	 adverse	 treatment	 was	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	
disability.		
Regarding	selection	of	the	comparator,	if	the	consequences	of	the	disability	(such	
as	 poor	 performance)	 are	 not	 considered	 a	 feature	 of	 the	 disability,	 then	 the	
appropriate	 comparator	 may	 be	 another	 employee	 who	 is	 also	 poorly	
performing.	 	 This	 affects	 the	 determination	 of	whether	 the	 disabled	 employee	
was	treated	adversely	or	not.		
Likewise,	 whether	 treatment	was	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	 disability	 will	 also	 depend	 on	
whether	 the	 consequences	 of	 the	 disability	 are	 considered	 a	 feature	 of	 the	
disability.	If,	for	example,	the	consequential	poor	performance	is	not	considered	
a	 feature	 of	 the	 disability,	 then	 dismissal	 for	 poor	 performance	 would	 not	 be	
dismissal	‘by	reason’	of	disability	(and	therefore	it	would	be	lawful).		
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 the	manifestations	 or	 consequences	 of	 the	 disability	 are	
deemed	part	of	the	disability,	this	makes	it	clear	that	the	appropriate	comparator	
would	 be	 a	 non-disabled	 person	 without	 this	 conduct	 or	 behaviour.	
Furthermore,	 this	would	 clarify	 that	 treatment	 of	 an	 employee,	 because	 of	 the	
manifestations	of	the	disability,	such	as	poor	performance,	should	be	viewed	as	
treatment	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	 disability.	 This	 should	 better	 protect	 the	 mentally	
disabled	 employee	 and	 promote	 greater	 substantive	 equality.	 Moreover,	 the	
employer’s	managerial	 prerogative	 is	 still	 protected,	 as	 adverse	 treatment	will	
not	be	unlawful	if	the	permitted	exceptions	apply,	or	if	the	employee	is	no	longer	











In	 the	UK,	 the	 situation	 is	 complex.	 The	definition	 of	 ‘disability’	 does	not	 itself	
include	the	consequences	or	manifestations	of	disability.	Nor	does	the	definition	
of	 direct	 discrimination	 include	 discrimination	 due	 to	 the	 consequences	 or	
manifestations	 of	 disability.	 Consequently,	 in	 London	 Borough	 of	 Lewisham	 v	
																																																								






Malcolm,614	which	was	a	claim	 for	direct	discrimination,	 the	Court	 included	 the	
manifestation,	or	consequences,	of	the	disability	in	the	comparator.		This	had	the	
effect,	for	direct	discrimination,	of	making	it	exceptionally	difficult	for	those	with	
disabilities	 to	 prove	 adverse	 treatment	 due	 to	 their	 disability	 —	 as	 the	
comparator	 would	 demonstrate	 the	 same	 feature	 on	 which	 the	 adverse	
treatment	was	based	(such	as	poor	performance).		
However,	 the	EA	2010	now	establishes	a	 further	type	of	discrimination.	This	 is	
‘discrimination	 arising	 from	 disability’.	 This	 occurs	 when	 unfavourable	
treatment	is	because	of	‘something	arising	from	disability’.615	If	that	“something”	
‘operated	 on	 the	 mind	 of	 the	 putative	 discriminator,	 consciously	 or	
unconsciously,	 to	 a	 significant	 extent’,616	this	 is	 discrimination	 arising	 from	
disability.	 Thus,	 if	 the	 employee	 can	 show	 that	 the	 “something”	 (e.g.	 poor	
performance)	arises	from	the	disability617	(for	example,	the	poor	performance	is	
due	 to	disability	and	not	simply	 laziness),	and	 the	unfavourable	 treatment	was	
due	 to	 this	 “something”,	 then	 the	 causal	 nexus	 is	 established	 —	 confirming	
discrimination	 arising	 from	 disability.618 	Nonetheless,	 the	 employer	 has	 the	
defence	that	the	treatment	was	a	proportionate	measure	to	achieve	a	legitimate	




induced	 impaired	 decision-making	 (the	manifestation	 of	 his	 mental	 disability)	
Malcolm	 sublet	 his	 flat,	 against	 the	 tenancy	 agreement,	 and	 was	 evicted.	 The	
Court	 compared	 him	 to	 another	 individual,	 who,	 without	 impaired	 decision-






618	Weerasinghe	 v	 Basildon	 &	 Thurrock	 NHS	 Foundation	 Trust,	 above	 n602.	 In	





Registry	v	Houghton	&	Ors,	 above	 n606.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 employers	 operated	 a	
bonus	system	for	performance	and	attendance.	The	entitlement	to	the	bonus	was	
revoked	 if	 an	 employee	 received	 a	warning	 for	 disability-induced	 absences	 or	
misconduct.	 However,	 the	 manager	 had	 discretion	 to	 award	 the	 bonus	 when	
warnings	related	to	misconduct	had	been	given	(if	 the	subsequent	conduct	had	
improved).	The	same	discretion	was	not	available	for	disability-induced	absence.	
Thus,	 the	 non-payment	 of	 a	 bonus	 was	 found	 to	 be	 unfavourable	 treatment	
arising	 from	 disability	 (that	 is,	 there	 was	 unfavourable	 treatment	 (loss	 of	
eligibility	 for	 the	 bonus),	 and	 the	 reason	 for	 the	 treatment	 was	 due	 to	
“something”	arising	from	disability	(here,	disability-induced	absenteeism)).	The	
EAT	held,	that	although	the	legitimate	aim	of	the	treatment	was	to	reward	good	




In	Australia,	 the	 solution	 is	more	 straightforward.	The	DDA	Cth,	which	defines	
disability	in	a	similar	manner	to	the	HRA,	includes	the	following	statement:620	
To	 avoid	 doubt,	 a	disability	 that	 is	 otherwise	 covered	 by	 this	




despite	 the	 complainant	 having	 a	 personality	 disorder	 with	 behavioural	
problems	 (the	 reason	 for	 his	 adverse	 treatment),	 his	 behaviours	 were	 ‘a	
manifestation	of	a	generally	disagreeable	person	but	not	a	manifestation	of	any	
personality	 disorder	 the	 applicant	 suffers’.623	However,	where	 the	 link	 is	made	
out,	 the	 treatment	 will	 be	 unlawful,	 unless,	 due	 to	 employee’s	 disability	




equality,	 clarify	 the	 law,	 and	 avoid	 potential	 controversial	 decisions	 on	 the	
matter,	 the	 HRA,	 like	 the	 law	 in	 Australia,	 should	 include	 in	 the	 definition	 of	
disability,	something	to	the	effect	that:	
A	disability	that	is	otherwise	covered	by	the	definition	of	disability	includes	things	
that	 arise	 in	 consequence	 of	 the	 disability	 and	 behaviour	 that	 is	 a	 symptom	 or	
manifestation	of	the	disability.			
This	would	not	prevent	adverse	treatment	of	a	disabled	employee	who	is	unable	
to	 perform	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position,	 even	 after	 reasonable	
accommodation	has	been	made,	as	they	would	no	longer	be	‘qualified	for	work’.	
Furthermore,	 the	permitted	 exceptions	would	 still	 apply.	 Therefore,	where	 the	
manifestations	of	the	disability	pose	an	unreasonable	risk	of	harm,	or	mean	that	
the	 disabled	 employee	 requires	 special	 services	 or	 facilities	 that	 it	 is	 not	
reasonable	 for	 the	employer	 to	provide,	 the	employer’s	adverse	treatment	may	
be	excused	under	those	provisions.			
7.4.4 Include	a	Duty	of	Reasonable	Accommodation		
As	 has	 been	 discussed,	 there	 is	 no	 specific	 duty	 or	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation	in	the	HRA,	although	it	might	be	possible	to	infer	one	from	the	
presence	 of	 the	 permitted	 exceptions.	 These	 permitted	 exceptions	 include	 a	
																																																								
620	Disability	Discrimination	Act	1992	(Australia),	s4.	
621	State	of	Victoria	 (Office	of	Public	Prosecutions)	v	Grant	 [2014]	 FCAFC	 184	 at	
[58].		
622	Forest	v	HK	and	W	Investments	Pty	Ltd	[2014]	FCCA	209.	
623	At	 [43].	 Furthermore,	 the	 Court	 held	 that:	 ‘while	 some	 behaviours	 are	 a	
manifestation	of	his	personality disorder,	i.e	[sic]	the	need	for	an	assistance	dog,	
and	 others	 are	 just	 a	 manifestation	 of	 the	 applicant	 as	 a	 person’	 (at	 [50]).	
Separating	 his	 conduct	 from	 his	 disorder	 in	 this	 way	 might	 be	 considered	








do	 so.	However,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 this	 inferred	 duty	 only	 applies	 to	 providing	
‘special	 services	 or	 facilities’,	 and	 is	 not	 a	 general	 duty	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation.	 The	 same	 reasoning	 applies	 to	 the	 unreasonable	 risk	 of	 harm	
defence.	Consequently,	it	remains	unclear	whether	New	Zealand	is	fully	meeting	
its	 obligations	 under	 the	 UNCRPD	 that	 state	 members	 ensure	 that	 reasonable	
accommodation	 (in	 general)	 is	 provided	 in	 employment.	 	 The	 inclusion	 of	 a	
positive	general	obligation	of	reasonable	accommodation	would	rectify	this.	The	
permitted	exception	would	still	protect	the	employer’s	managerial	prerogative.	
The	 current	 lack	 of	 a	 positive	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 is	
disadvantageous	 to	 both	 the	 employer	 and	 the	 employee.	 As	 there	 is	 no	 clear	
obligation,	 the	employer	may	be	unaware	of	any	 inferred	duty,	or	 the	 scope	of	
such	 a	 duty.	 Consequently,	 they	 might	 lay	 themselves	 open	 to	 a	 claim	 of	
discrimination	for	failing	to	provide	the	disabled	employee	with	(at	a	minimum)	
special	 services	or	 facilities,	where	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	do	so.	For	 the	employee,	
the	lack	of	a	positive	duty	means	it	may	be	unclear	to	them	that	they	may	have	a	
right	 to	 (at	 the	 very	 least)	 the	 provision	 of	 reasonable	 special	 services	 or	
facilities.	 Consequently,	 they	may	 not	 request	 accommodation,	 or	 may	 readily	





the	 HRA	 is	 to	 better	 protect	 human	 rights.	 However,	 aside	 from	 prohibiting	
direct	 discrimination	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 disability	 in	 employment,	 the	 lack	 of	
clarity	 around	 the	 requirement	 for	 reasonable	 accommodation	 means	 the	
legislation	 fails	 to	 adequately	 protect	 the	mentally	 disabled	 employee’s	 human	
right	 to	work.	A	 specified	duty	 to	 accommodate	would,	 to	 some	degree,	 clarify	
this	 purpose.	 By	 keeping	 the	 duty	 to	 accommodate	 to	 the	 level	 of	










625 One	 conventionalist	 concept	 of	 reasonableness	 is	 that	 it	 is	 reflects	 a	
community’s	moral	standards.	 	On	this	view,	what	 is	reasonable	 is	grounded	in	
community	values,	so	what	is	reasonable	would	be	judged	by	what	people	should	
actually	do	 in	 a	 given	 situation,	 as	well	 as	what	 they	would	 actually	do	 (Kevin	




incorporated	 into	 the	 HRA,	 suggesting	 the	 factors	 to	 take	 into	 account	 when	






failure	 to	 make	 reasonable	 accommodation	 is	 discrimination	 —	 unless	 the	
accommodation	required	would	impose	undue	hardship	on	the	operation	of	the	
business.629	Thus,	 like	 Australia,	 reasonable	 measures	 are	 those	 that	 do	 not	
impose	 undue	 hardship	 on	 the	 employer.630	Undue	 hardship	 is	 defined	 in	 the	
ADA	 and	 means	 an	 action	 requiring	 ‘significant	 difficulty	 or	 expense’	 when	
considered	 in	 light	 of	 a	non-exhaustive	 list	 of	 factors.631	However,	 as	 there	has	
been	little	litigation	over	reasonable	accommodation	in	the	USA,	the	Courts	have	





of	 the	benefit	or	detriment	 likely	 to	accrue	 to,	or	 to	be	suffered	by,	any	person	




628 	Americans	 with	 Disabilities	 Act	 42	 USC	 §12111(9).	 Reasonable	
accommodation	 may	 include:	 job	 restructuring,	 part-time	 or	 modified	 work	
schedules,	 reassignment,	 acquisition	 or	 modification	 of	 equipment	 or	 devices,	
appropriate	adjustment	or	modifications	of	 examinations,	 training	materials	or	
policies,	 the	 provision	 of	 qualified	 readers	 or	 interpreters,	 and	 other	 similar	
accommodations	 for	 individuals	with	 disabilities	 and	making	 existing	 facilities	




631	Americans	 with	 Disabilities	 Act	 42	 USC	 §12111	 (10).	 The	 factors	 to	 be	
considered	include:	(i)	the	nature	and	cost	of	the	accommodation	needed;	(ii)	the	




facilities;	 (iv)	 the	 type	 of	 operation	 or	 operations	 of	 the	 entity,	 including	 the	








Thus,	 in	 the	 USA,	 as	 in	 Australia,	 the	 reasonableness	 of	 an	 accommodation	 is	
determined	by	 linking	 it	 to	 another	 standard	or	 limit,	 such	as	undue	hardship.	
However,	 the	 potential	 accommodation	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA	 do	 not	 link	
‘reasonableness’	 to	 another	 standard.	 As	 there	 is	 no	 link	 between	 ‘reasonable’	
and	 another	 appropriate	 standard	 in	 the	 HRA,	 then,	 how	 the	 Australian	 and	
American	 Courts	 have	 approached	 the	 interpretation	 of	 reasonableness	 is	 not	
necessarily	relevant	in	the	New	Zealand	context.		
Unlike	other	jurisdictions,	the	New	Zealand	legislation	does	not	provide	guidance	
on	 the	 relevant	 factors	 to	 take	 into	 account	 in	 assessing	 the	 reasonableness	 of	
providing	 services	 or	 facilities,	 or	 in	 determining	 when	 this	 would	 constitute	
unreasonable	disruption	to	the	employer.	Until	now,	this	lack	of	guidance	has	not	
appeared	 to	 be	 an	 issue.	 But,	 should	 a	 positive	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation	be	incorporated	into	the	HRA	(as	suggested	by	this	thesis),	this	
would	 be	 an	 opportune	 time	 to	 include	 guidelines	 that	 provide	 interpretive	
guidance	and	clarity	on	the	issue.	These	guidelines	could	help	avoid	controversy	
as	 to	what	 is	 ‘reasonable’.	 For	 example,	 the	 Saskatchewan	Human	Rights	 Code	
defines	 undue	 hardship	 as	 one	 that	 imposes	 an	 ‘intolerable	 financial	 cost	 or	
disruption	to	business’,633	whereas	the	same	term	used	in	the	ADA	is	pitched	at	
what	 seems	 to	 be	 a	 lower	 level	 of	 a	 ‘significant	 difficulty	 or	 expense’. 634	
Guidelines	may	help	define	where	the	appropriate	level	of	‘reasonable’	would	be	
pitched	in	the	New	Zealand	context.		
Nonetheless,	 like	 the	 HRA,	 the	 UK’s	 EA	 2010	 does	 not	 provide	 guidance	 for	
assessing	 the	 ‘reasonableness’	 of	 an	accommodation.	The	UKEAT	has	 indicated	
that	what	 is	 ‘reasonable’	 involves	 a	 balancing	 act	 between	 the	 interests	 of	 the	
employer	and	the	employee.635			
Regardless,	 if	 the	 HRA	 is	 amended	 to	 include	 a	 positive	 duty	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation,	 for	 clarity,	 consistency,	 and	 as	 an	 aid	 to	 interpretation,	
guidelines	 for	the	 factors	to	consider	when	assessing	the	reasonableness	of	 the	
required	 accommodation	 should	 be	 included.	 This	 enables	 the	 employer	 to	
ensure	they	have	considered	all	relevant	factors,	and	allows	the	HRRT	or	Court	
to	approach	assessments	 consistently.	These	 factors	 could	 include	 the	 size	and	
resources	of	 the	employer,	 the	availability	of	additional	government	 funding	or	
support,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 cost	 to	 the	 employer,	 and	 the	 benefit	 to	 the	 disabled	
employee	and	third	parties.		
																																																																																																																																																														
more	 likely	 to	shift	 to	reasonable	accommodation	and	undue	hardship	 instead:	
Porter,	above	n477	at	4.		
633	The	 Saskatchewan	Human	Rights	 Code	 1979,	 s2	 (1)(q).	 The	 factors	 to	 take	
into	account	when	assessing	the	intolerable	financial	cost	or	burden	include	the	










However,	 one	 question	 does	 remain,	 and	 that	 is:	 should	 the	 level	 of	
accommodation	 be	 pitched	 at	 the	 level	 of	 what	 is	 reasonable	 —	 or	 should	 a	
higher	standard	apply?		
Differing	 jurisdictions	 pitch	 the	 duty	 to	 accommodate	 disability	 at	 different	
thresholds,	above	which	the	employer	is	no	longer	obliged	to	accommodate	the	
disability.	 The	 UNCRPD	 uses	 the	 threshold	 of	 a	 ‘disproportionate	 or	 undue	
burden’	on	the	person	doing	the	accommodating.636		In	Australia,	the	threshold	is	
‘unjustifiable	hardship’,	and	 for	 the	USA	and	Canada	 it	 is	 ‘undue	hardship’.	The	
UK,	 however,	 just	 has	 a	 duty	 of	 reasonable	 adjustments,	 without	 further	
limitation.637	This	 suggests	 that	 (aside	 from	 the	 UK),	 in	 general	 the	 duty	 to	
accommodate	is	pitched	at	a	more	onerous	threshold	than	what	it	is	‘reasonable’	
for	an	employer	to	do.			
Given	 this,	 should	 the	 threshold	 for	 accommodation	 in	 the	 HRA	 remain	 at	
‘reasonable’,	or	should	a	higher	 threshold	apply,	such	as	undue	or	unjustifiable	
hardship?	Or,	 given	our	obligations	under	UNCRPD,	 should	 the	obligation	exist	
until	it	imposes	a	‘disproportionate	or	undue	burden’	on	the	employer?		
Although	 this	 latter	 threshold	 of	 ‘disproportionate	 or	 undue	 burden’	 fits	 the	
HRA’s	purpose	of	better	protecting	human	rights,	 for	the	other	purposes	of	 the	








Additionally,	 throughout	 the	HRA,	 the	 accommodation	of	disability	 is	based	on	
the	 reasonableness	 of	 the	 requirement.	 Even	 for	 other	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	
discrimination,	 the	 standard	 of	 reasonableness	 is	 used	 (including	 when	 a	
positive	 obligation	 to	 accommodate	 an	 employee	 is	 required,	 such	 as	 when	
																																																								
636 	‘Disproportionate	 or	 undue	 burden’	 was	 adopted	 by	 the	 UNCRPD	 as	 a	
compromise	 between	 the	 phrases	 ‘disproportionate	 burden’,	 adopted	 in	 the	
initial	draft	definition	of	reasonable	accommodation,	and	‘unjustifiable	hardship’	
advocated	 by	 the	National	Association	 of	 Community	 Legal	 Centres	 (Australia)	
during	the	drafting	negotiations.	‘Undue’	rather	than	‘unjustifiable’	was	selected	
as	 it	 was	 used	 in	 several	 jurisdictions,	 including	 the	 USA	 and	 Canada	 (thus	
providing	some	jurisprudence	on	the	term);	‘disproportionate’	was	included	as	it	
was	 employed	 by	 the	 European	 Union	 (Rosemary	 Kayess	 and	 Ben	 Fogarty	
"Rights	and	Dignity	of	Persons	with	Disabilities"	(2007)	32	Alternative	LJ		at	24).		
637	Section	 22	 of	 the	 Equality	 Act	 2010	 (UK)	 provides	 that	 regulations	may	 be	





accommodating	 religious	 practice).638	Thus,	 for	 consistency	 in	 interpretation	
throughout	the	Act,	the	threshold	of	reasonableness	should	probably	apply	in	all	
contexts	requiring	accommodation	of	disability.		
Several	 other	 factors	 also	 imply	 that	 a	 higher	 threshold	 is	 not	 necessary.	 For	
example,	the	UNCRPD	definition	of	reasonable	accommodation	includes	the	term	
‘disproportionate’	and	this	is	(arguably)	a	similar	standard	to	reasonableness	—	
as	 something	 is	 disproportionate	 when	 unreasonable	 in	 amount	 or	 size	
compared	 to	 another.639	Furthermore,	 as	 discussed	 previously,	 the	 Court	 has	
suggested	 that	 the	 standard	of	undue	hardship,	when	accommodating	a	 risk	of	
harm,	is	too	high.640	In	addition,	given	the	incremental	nature	of	changes	usually	
made	 to	 human	 rights	 legislation	 in	 New	 Zealand,	 it	 is	 doubtful	 whether	 the	
legislature	would	 be	willing	 to	make	 such	 a	major	 change	without	 compelling	
reasons.641	Finally,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 replacing	 one	 ‘elastic’	 term	 with	
another	may	not	alter	the	actual	threshold	applied	by	the	HRRT	or	Courts.	As	the	
USA	Court	of	Appeal	said,	‘reasonable’	means	less	than	the	maximum	possible.642	
Thus,	 ‘reasonable’	could	still	be	 interpreted	as	a	high	threshold	(i.e.	 that	of	 just	
less	 than	 the	 maximum	 possible),	 which	 may	 indeed	 be	 the	 point	 of	 undue	
burden	or	unjustifiable	hardship.643			
Conclusion:	Reasonable	Accommodation	
As	 outlined,	 there	 are	 difficulties	 in	 assessing	 when	 accommodation	 is		




is	 reasonable	 should	 be	 included	 in	 the	 HRA.	 While	 these	 would	 have	 to	 be	








638	Human	 Rights	 Act	 1993,	 s28(3).	 The	 positive	 obligation	 to	 accommodate	




641	In	Trevethick	 v	The	Ministry	of	Health	 HC	Wellington	 CIV-2007-485-2449,	 1	

















would	 clarify	 the	 law	 for	 employer	 and	 employee,	 and	 provide	 guidance	 and	
limits	 as	 to	 their	 respective	 rights	 and	 obligations.	 Furthermore,	 imposing	 a	
positive	duty	of	accommodation	will	promote	substantive	equality,	as	it	enables	
individualised	 treatment	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee,	 enabling	 them	 to	 remain	




As	 well	 as	 bolstering	 the	 duty,	 making	 failure	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	
disability	 a	 ground	 of	 discrimination	 accords	 with	 current	 international	 and	
overseas	law.		
Although	 the	 UNCRPD	 contains	 no	 specific	 obligation	 to	 make	 failure	 to	
reasonably	accommodate	a	standalone	ground	of	discrimination,	its	definition	of	




discrimination,	 and	 include	 failure	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	 within	 that	
definition.	 However,	 the	 HRA	 does	 not	 define	 discrimination	 per	 se.	 Instead	 it	
prohibits	specific	conduct	on	prohibited	grounds,	such	as	disability.	If	disability	
discrimination	 was	 to	 be	 defined,	 defining	 what	 discrimination	 is	 may	 prove	
fraught,	 and	 raise	 interpretive	 difficulties.644	Accordingly,	 it	 may	 be	 better	 to	
leave	the	provisions	as	they	are	currently	structured.	
It	 would	 not	 be	 possible	 to	 add	 failure	 to	 reasonably	 accommodate	 into	 the	
prohibited	grounds	of	discrimination	in	section	21,	as,	unlike	the	other	grounds	
of	 discrimination,	 failure	 to	 accommodate	 is	 not	 a	 characteristic	 of	 a	 person.	
Failure	in	reasonable	accommodation	cannot	therefore	readily	be	a	“ground”	of	
discrimination.		
A	 solution	could	be	a	provision	 that	deems	 failure	 to	 reasonably	accommodate	
disability	 to	 be	 unlawful.	 This	 could	 either	 be	 inserted	 so	 it	 applies	 to	 all	









the	 employment	 context,645 	but	 it	 is	 in	 employment	 that	 this	 requirement	
requires	most	clarification.646		







The	 following	 definition	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	would	 be	 added	 to	 the	
definitions	section:	
Section	2	Definitions	
	‘Reasonable	 accommodation	 of	 disability:	 reasonable	 accommodation	means	






The	 following	 clause	 would	 be	 added	 to	 the	 list	 of	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	
discrimination:	
Section	21	Prohibited	Ground	of	Discrimination		
21	 (1)(h)(viii)	 A	 disability	 that	 is	 otherwise	 covered	 in	 (i)-(vii)	 above	 includes	
things	that	arise	in	consequence	of	the	disability	and	behaviour	that	is	a	symptom	
or	manifestation	of	the	disability.	






645 	For	 example,	 Smith	 v	 Air	 New	 Zealand	 Ltd,	 above	 n57,	 and	 Hosking	 v	
Wellington	 City	 Transport	 Ltd	 (t:a	 Stagecoach	 Wellington)	 CRT	 2/95	 [1992]	
NZCRT	 7;	 (1995)	 1	 HRNZ	 542	 (12	 June	 1995)	 for	 the	 failure	 to	 reasonable	
accommodation	disability	in	the	provision	of	goods	and	services.		
646	Few	 cases	 have	 come	 before	 the	 Courts,	 Authority	 or	 HRRT	 concerning	
disability	 discrimination	 in	 employment,	 but	 in	 those	 that	 have,	 the	 issue	 of	
accommodation	has	been	 an	 important	 feature	 (for	 example:	Atley	v	Southland	
District	Health	Board,	 above	 n84;	Connell	v	Sepclean	Ltd,	 above	 n119;	Aubrey	v	
Chief	 Executive	 of	 the	 Department	 of	 Child	 Youth	 and	 Family	 Services	 ERA	




























(6)	 It	 shall	 be	 unlawful	 for	 the	 employer,	 or	 any	 person	 acting	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	




These	 recommended	 amendments	 may	 help	 clarify	 the	 law	 for	 disability	
discrimination	 in	 employment,	 including	 the	 employer’s	 duty	 to	 reasonably	
accommodate	 the	disabled	employee.	However,	 there	would	still	be	 limitations	
to	 their	effectiveness	 in	better	protecting	human	rights,	or	 in	achieving	greater	
substantive	equality	for	the	disabled.	There	are	several	reasons	for	this.		
The	Retention	of	the	Requirement	for	Equal	Treatment			
Firstly,	 the	 discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions	 would	 still	 be	 mainly	
premised	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 formal	 equality	 (i.e.	 equal	 treatment	 of	 employees).	
However,	 to	 achieve	 equality	 of	 outcome,	 what	 the	 disabled	 employee	 may	
require	is	different	treatment.		
However,	the	proposed	amendments	attempt	to	counter	the	effect	of	the	HRA’s	
requirement	 for	 equal	 treatment	 to	 some	 extent.	 Firstly,	 this	 is	 achieved	 by	
ensuring	 the	 features	of	—	or	consequences	arising	 from	—	disability	 (such	as	
	
	 201	
poor	performance)	are	considered	as	part	of	 the	disability.	The	effect	of	 this	 is	
that,	 as	 the	 consequences	 of	 disability	 are	 deemed	 part	 of	 the	 disability,	 the	
comparator,	 who	 would	 not	 have	 the	 disability,	 would	 also	 not	 have	 the	
consequences	 or	 feature	 of	 the	 disability.	 Thus,	 in	 a	 case	 of	 poor	 performance	
due	to	the	consequences	of	disability	the	employee	must	be	treated	equally	with	
an	employee	who	is	performing	normally	(and	therefore	would	not	be	subject	to	
adverse	 treatment).	Thus,	 the	disabled	employee	will	 be	better	protected	 from	
adverse	treatment	due	to	their	disability	and	attain	greater	substantive	equality.	
Secondly,	the	effect	of	formal	equality	(i.e.,	the	requirement	for	equal	treatment)	
is	 mitigated	 through	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	 positive	 obligation	 to	 reasonably	
accommodate	 the	 disabled	 employee.	 Reasonable	 accommodation	may	 require	
different	treatment	of	the	disabled	employee,	which	will	enable	them	to	continue	
to	work.				
Nonetheless,	 the	 risk	 is	 that	 these	 measures	 may	 still	 prove	 insufficient.	 The	
proposed	 amendments	 may	 simply	 re-focus	 the	 defence	 against	 a	 claim	 of	
discrimination	on	whether	the	conduct	of	concern	(such	as	poor	performance)	is	
a	 consequence	 of	 disability.	 This	 may	 be	 contentious	 if	 the	 poor	 performance	
occurred	before	the	mental	disability	was	disclosed	(or	became	apparent)	to	the	




its	 affect	 on	 their	 conduct.	 It	 may	 then	 be	 difficult	 for	 the	 poorly	 performing	
employee	to	prove	their	poor	performance	was	a	consequence	of	their	disability,	
as	mere	 correlation	between	mental	 disability	 and	poor	performance	does	not	
prove	causation.		
If	it	cannot	be	shown	(on	the	balance	of	probabilities)	that	the	conduct	was	due	
to	 the	 disability,	 then	 the	 comparator	 employee	 will	 still	 be	 someone	
demonstrating	 the	 same	 feature	 as	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 (i.e.,	 poor	
performance),	who	may	be	subjected	to	adverse	treatment.	On	that	analysis,	the	
treatment	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee	 would	 be	 equal	 treatment	 to	 that	 of	 a	
similarly	situated	non-disabled	employee.	Therefore,	the	treatment	would	not	be	
discriminatory,	 although	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 would	 be	
disadvantaged.			
Thus,	 the	 amendment	 aimed	 at	 clarifying	 when	 treatment	 is	 ‘by	 reason	 of’	
disability	may	not	prove	as	effective	as	first	hoped.		
The	Retention	of	the	Medical	Model	of	Disability	
The	 second	 limitation	of	 the	proposed	amendments	 is	 they	do	not	 address	 the	
definition	 of	 disability	 in	 the	 HRA,	which	 is	 based	 on	 a	 purely	medical	model.	
Given	 that	 the	 New	 Zealand	 Government’s	 social	 policy	 (in	 the	 form	 of	 the	
Disability	Strategy)	has	adopted	a	social	construct	of	disability,	and	this	model	is	
also	 promoted	 in	 the	 UNCRPD,	 arguably	 this	model	 should	 be	 reflected	 in	 the	
HRA.	Unlike	the	medical	model	of	disability,	which	focuses	on	the	amelioration	of	
impairments	so	that	the	disabled	can	fit	into	the	“normal”	world,	the	social	model	





are	 due,	 in	 part	 at	 least,	 to	 barriers	 (including	 attitudinal	 barriers)	 created	 by	
society.	 This	 model	 emphasises	 the	 inclusion	 and	 participation	 in	 society,	
including	through	employment,	of	individuals	who	have	disabilities.		
The	medical	model	of	disability	 focuses	on	 ‘fixing’	 the	 impairment,	 rather	 than	
achieving	 full	 inclusion	 and	 participation.	 Under	 this	 paradigm,	 reasonable	
accommodation	 acts	 only	 to	 ameliorate	 the	 impairment	 allowing	 the	 disabled	
person	to	fit	into	an	“able”	society	(and	workplace).		




would	 apply	 to	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 job.	 The	 social	 model	 also	 aims	 to	 remove	
attitudinal	 barriers,	 including	 intolerance	 of	 mental	 disability	 (and	 potentially	
this	could	include	intolerance	of	poor	performance).	The	aim	is	to	change	society	
so	that	those	with	disabilities	can	participate	fully	in	it.		
The	 inclusion	 of	 a	 definition	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 would	 attempt	 to	





provisions	 might	 be	 interpreted	 as	 meaning	 that	 accommodation	 is	 required	
only	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 ameliorates	 the	 disability,	 allowing	 the	 disabled	
employee	to	fit	into	the	‘able’	workplace,	and	perform	the	essential	duties	of	the	
position.	 What	 is	 required,	 however,	 is	 a	 more	 rights	 based	 approach,	 where	
reasonable	accommodation	aims	to	ensure,	not	only	that	the	disabled	employee	
remains	 employed,	 but	 also	 enjoys	 full	 participation	 in	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	
workplace.		
To	 address	 these	 issues,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 requirement	 for	 reasonable	
accommodation,	 the	 definition	 of	 disability	 in	 the	HRA	might	 be	 replaced	with	
one	reflecting	the	social	model	of	disability	—	or	a	mix	of	the	medical	and	social	
models,	 such	 as	 found	 in	 the	 definition	 in	 the	 UNCRPD.	 Then	 there	 would	 be	
recognition	of	the	disabling	effects	of	barriers	to	participation	in	the	workforce,	
and	a	requirement	for	measures	to	counter	this.		
However,	 this	 type	 of	 definition	 of	 disability,	 which	 uses	 language	 that	 is	
inclusive	 and	 open-ended,648	is	 less	 ‘precise’	 than	 one	 based	 on	 the	 medical	
model.	The	medical	model’s	definition	more	clearly	delineates	the	conditions	or	
impairments	 that	 constitute	 disability.	 The	 risk	 of	 changing	 to	 a	 more	 open-




disorder	does	not	 ‘hinder	their	participation	 in	society’	and,	 therefore,	 they	are	
																																																								






arise.	 This	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 USA	 and	 UK,	 whose	 definitions	 are	
more	 in	keeping	with	the	social	model	of	disability	(as	their	definitions	 include	




physical	 impairment	 must	 ‘substantially	 limit	 one	 or	 more	 major	 life	
activities’.652		Much	of	the	litigation	in	these	jurisdictions	focuses	on	whether	the	
claimant	 fits	 within	 these	 definitions	 of	 disability,	 rather	 than	 on	whether	 the	
treatment	 was	 discriminatory,	 or	 whether	 the	 disabled	 employee	 was	
reasonably	 accommodated.	 Thus,	 it	 may	 be	 that	 changing	 the	 definition	 of	
disability	in	the	HRA	may	merely	introduce	new	interpretive	issues.	
Furthermore,	 this	 type	 of	 open-textured	 definition	 would	 not	 fit	 comfortably	
with	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 other	 prohibited	 grounds	 of	 discrimination	 are	





will	 not	 achieve	 substantive	 equality,	 as	 ‘reasonable’	 is	 a	 low	 threshold	 for	 the	
employer	 to	 reach.653	Arguably,	 to	 enable	 disabled	 employees	 to	 remain	 in	
employment,	 and	 to	 achieve	greater	 substantive	 equality,	 a	higher	 threshold	 is	
required,	perhaps	to	the	point	of	undue	hardship.		
Finally,	 the	 ‘reasonableness’	 standard	 is	 elastic	 (as,	 admittedly,	 is	 undue	
hardship),	 and	 contextual	 in	 nature.	 Therefore,	 what	 accommodation	 is	





accommodation,	 wherein	 the	 accommodation	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 special	 measure	




651	Equality	Act	2010	(UK),	 s6(1).	There	 is	no	 further	definition	of	 ‘substantial’,	
‘long-term’,	or	what	constitutes	‘day-to-day’	activities,	and,	although	s6(5)	states	










more	 than	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	 individual	 employee	 to	 work.	 If	 the	 disabled	
employee	leaves,	the	accommodation	may	cease.	In	contrast,	a	dynamic	model	of	
reasonable	 accommodation	 sees	 accommodation	 as	 focussing	 on	 the	 disabled	
population	as	a	whole.	Therefore	measures	undertaken	may	be	more	generalised	
and	 wide	 ranging.	 Emens	 gives	 the	 example	 of	 an	 employer	 moving	 early	
morning	 team	meetings	 to	 later	 in	 the	 day,	 so	 that	 those	 taking	 psychotropic	
medications	(which	make	it	difficult	to	get	up	in	the	morning)	can	attend.	This,	
she	 argues,	 may	 benefit	 other	 future	 disabled	 employees	 who	 require	
accommodation.	 In	 addition,	 other	 employees	 who	 are	 not	 early	 risers	 will	
benefit,	and	this	may	make	the	workplace	in	general	happier.	Thus,	this	dynamic	
model	 recognises	 that	 generalised	 accommodation	 measures	 may	 also	 benefit	
third	 parties,	 and	 the	 business	 as	 a	 whole.	 These	 benefits	 may	 be	 physical,	
material,	 relational,	 or	 hedonic.	 Another	 example	 would	 be	 that,	 instead	 of	
accommodating	an	individual	with	concentration	problems	by	allowing	them	to	
use	 headphones,	 or	 providing	 uninterrupted	 quiet	 times,	 instituting	 this	 as	 an	
overall	 policy	 (so	 the	 measure	 is	 available	 to	 all	 employees),	 may	 benefit	
everyone,	 and	 increase	 productivity	 overall.655	These	 benefits	 arise	 from	 the	
provision	of	effective	accommodations	 in	 the	workplace	 in	general,	 rather	 than	
limiting	 the	 accommodation	 to	 the	 disabled	 employee.	 This	 dynamic	model	 of	
accommodation	fits	with	the	social	construct	of	disability,	as	the	end	result	is	to	
remove	 barriers	 in	 general,	 and	 promote	 an	 inclusive	 workplace,	 rather	 than	
limiting	 accommodation	 to	 an	 individual’s	 requirements	 (which,	 at	 times,	may	
result	in	the	segregation	of	the	individual).		
It	seems,	then,	that	although	the	suggested	amendments	may	help	clarify	some	of	
the	 current	 interpretive	 difficulties	 of	 the	 HRA,	 they	may	 not	 always	 result	 in	
better	 protection	 of	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 disabled,	 or	 achieve	 greater	 substantive	
equality.	 Additionally,	 there	 is	 the	 risk	 that	 the	 amendments	 themselves	 may	
create	new	interpretive	difficulties.	
Nonetheless,	 this	 thesis	 suggests	 that	 the	 potential	 advantages	 that	 would	 be	




7.5.3 The	 Limited	 Benefits	 of	 the	 Proposed	 Amendments	 for	 Professor	
Smith		
Some	 of	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 proposed	 amendments	 outlined	 above	 can	 be	
illustrated	by	considering	the	implications	for	Professor	Smith.	 	Even	under	the	
amended	 HRA,	 the	 result	 would	 probably	 still	 be	 her	 lawful	 dismissal.	 This	 is	
because	 the	 definition	 of	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’	 might	 still	 exclude	 her,	 and	
secondly,	 it	 might	 be	 found	 that	 it	 is	 not	 reasonable	 for	 the	 employer	 to	
accommodate	her	position.		
Under	 the	 amended	 HRA,	 Professor	 Smith’s	 poor	 performance	 would	 be	








Professor	 Smith	 must	 still	 be	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’;	 and	 under	 the	 suggested	
definition	she	would	only	be	so	qualified	if,	after	reasonable	accommodation,	she	
could	 perform	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position.	 However,	 currently,	 she	 is	




there	 is	 no	 accommodation	 available	 that	 will	 enable	 her	 to	 carry	 out	 the	
essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position,	 she	 is	 not	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’.	 Moreover,	
potentially,	her	poor	performance	in	other	areas	of	her	work	might	not	meet	the	
threshold	 of	 ‘qualified	 for	work’	 either	 (if	 ‘qualified’	 is	 interpreted	 as	 ‘able’	 or	
‘competent’),	as	the	standard	for	this	is	likely	to	be	dictated	by	the	University.		
In	a	similar	vein,	even	a	positive	general	duty	of	 reasonable	accommodation	 in	
the	 HRA	 might	 not	 assist	 Professor	 Smith.	 She	 could	 argue	 that	 the	
accommodation	 required	 should	 be	 (temporary)	 tolerance	 of	 her	 poor	
performance	by	lightening	her	workload;	and	employing	a	research	assistant	so	
she	 could	 jointly	 publish	work.	 However,	 the	 suggested	 amendments	 limit	 the	
positive	 obligation	 of	 accommodation	 to	 adjustments	 that	 do	 not	 impose	 a	
‘disproportionate	 burden	 or	 unreasonable	 disruption’	 on	 the	 employer.	 The	
University	might	 successfully	 argue	 that	 employing	 a	 research	 assistant	would	
be	 a	 disproportionate	 financial	 burden,	 and	 that	 ‘carrying’	 Professor	 Smith	
would	 unreasonably	 disrupt	 other	 staff	 members.	 Furthermore,	 changing	 her	
supervisory	 and	 teaching	 duties	 may	 negatively	 impact	 her	 students,	
unreasonably	disrupting	them,	and	this	might	be	considered	a	disproportionate	
impact.	
Thus,	 even	 if	 the	 amendments	 were	 to	 add	 a	 new	 general	 obligation	 of	
reasonable	 accommodation,	 Professor	 Smith’s	 problems	 would	 not	 be	 solved.	
This	 is	 because,	 under	 the	 medical	 model	 of	 disability,	 adopted	 by	 the	 HRA,	
reasonable	accommodation	focuses	on	ameliorating	the	individual’s	condition	so	
they	 can	 fit	 into	an	 ‘able’	 society,	 rather	 than	 recognising	and	ameliorating	 the	
disabling	 effects	 of	 society.	 Thus,	 for	 Professor	 Smith,	 the	 focus	 would	 be	
enabling	 her	 to	work	 at	 the	University	 under	 its	 current	 arrangements,	 rather	






workplace	 environment	 (or	 culture)	 to	 tolerate,	 and	 accommodate,	 reduced	
ability,	 thus,	 for	 supporting	 Professor	 Smith	 her	 in	 employment.	 This	 model	
would	 suggest	 that,	 temporarily	 at	 least,	 Professor	 Smith	 should	 be	
accommodated	by	an	exemption	 from	the	requirement	 to	research	and	publish	
(despite	 the	 impact	on	PBRF).	Easing	her	workload	might	also	be	considered	a	
reasonable	 measure,	 despite	 the	 short	 term	 disruption	 it	 might	 cause	 —	
particularly	 if	 this	 disruption	 could	 be	mitigated	 by,	 for	 example,	 transferring	
students	 who	 have	 just	 started	 post	 graduate	 study	 to	 new	 supervisors,	 or	
	
	206	
allocating	 another	 lecturer	 or	 senior	 student	 to	 take	 over	 a	 particular	 block	 of	
teaching,	or	even	by	not	offering	one	of	Professor	Smith’s	papers	in	a	particular	








These	 include	 the	 social	 and	 political	 context	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 political	 will	 to	





idea	 that	 the	 employer	 had	 the	 right	 to	 run	 their	 business	 as	 they	 thought	 fit.	
Arguably,	 the	protection	of	 the	 employer’s	managerial	 prerogative	 reflects	 this	
unitary	 ideology.	 Although	 current	 employment	 law	 adopts	 a	 more	 pluralist	
ideology,	 recent	changes	 to	 legislation	suggest	 the	 legislature	still	 retains	some	
unitary	leanings.657		This	would	possibly	explain	why	the	HRA	discrimination	in	
																																																								
656	In	 fact,	 it	 could	 be	 said	 that	 this	 failure	 by	 the	 legislature	 to	 introduce	 the	
social	 construct	 of	 disability	 into	 the	 HRA	 demonstrates	 an	 attitudinal	 barrier	
(by	 the	 government)	 toward	 impairment	 	 —	 the	 very	 thing	 that	 the	 social	
construct	 of	 disability	 seeks	 to	 remove.	 Indeed,	 one	 of	 the	 criticisms	 of	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Social	 Development’s	 ‘Health	 and	 Disability	 Long-term	 Work	
Programme’	was	the	failure	of	Work	and	Income	New	Zealand	(WINZ)	to	move	
from	 the	medical	 model	 to	 a	 culture	 where	WINZ	would	 work	 in	 partnership	
with	the	disabled	person	to	overcome	potential	workplace	barriers.	Participants	
considered	 the	 plan	 should	 be	more	 rights-based	 and	 use	 the	 social	 model	 of	
disability:	 Health	 and	 Disability	 Long-term	 Work	 Programme	 —	 Supporting	




657 	Although	 current	 New	 Zealand	 labour	 law	 generally	 reflects	 a	 pluralist	
approach,	some	unitary	trends	emerged	under	the	recent	National	Government.	
These	 included	 the	 trend	 away	 from	 collective	 employment	 agreements,	 the	
addition	 of	 the	 90-day	 trial	 period,	 the	 loss	 of	 reinstatement	 as	 the	 primary	
remedy	for	unjustified	dismissal,	and	the	change	to	the	test	for	justification	of	a	
dismissal.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 pluralist	 approach	 is	 still	 recognisable	 in	 the	 ERA	








law.	 Even	 the	 amendments	 made	 immediately	 prior	 to	 ratification	 of	 the	
UNCRPD	 did	 not	 change	 these	 provisions	 —	 although	 creating	 a	 positive	
obligation	to	reasonably	accommodate	the	disabled	would	have	reflected	a	more	
pluralist	 approach.	 This	 suggests	 that	 currently	 the	 rights	 of	 the	 employer	 are	
prioritised	over	those	of	the	employee.			
If	the	interests	of	the	employer	are	considered	to	have	ascendancy	over	those	of	
the	 employee,	 then,	 as	 even	 the	 most	 minimal	 requirements	 for	 reasonable	
accommodation	of	disability	impact	on	the	interests	of	the	employer,	any	duty	of	
accommodation	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 minimised.	 As	 the	 costs	 associated	 with	
presenteeism	 may	 be	 substantial,658	and	 the	 employer	 may	 have	 difficulty	 in	
identifying	 any	 positive	 business	 benefit	 in	 continuing	 to	 support	 a	 poorly	
performing	employee,659	accommodating	the	disabled	to	the	employer’s	financial	
or	 business	 detriment	 may	 be	 viewed	 as	 an	 anathema.	 This	 may	 inhibit	 any	
incentive	to	change	the	law	of	reasonable	accommodation.	
This	may	also	explain	why	the	social	construct	of	disability	has	not	been	adopted	
into	 the	 HRA,	 or	 other	 legislation,	 as	 this	 model	 implies	 that	 a	 wider	 duty	 of	
accommodation	is	imposed	on	the	employer.660		
Prioritising	the	interests	of	the	employer	over	those	of	the	disabled	is	unlikely	to	
change	 in	 the	 near	 future	 because,	 as	 noted	 by	 McGregor,661	it	 is	 ministerial	
leadership	 that	 determines	 the	 ‘ebb	 and	 flow	 of	 political	 will	 that	 strongly	
characterises	 New	 Zealand’s	 commitment	 to	 human	 rights’.	662	Currently	 there	
appears	to	be	a	lack	of	championship	to	further	disability	rights	at	governmental	
level.	Without	 this,	 there	 is	unlikely	 to	be	 legislative	 change	 to	 incorporate	 the	





is	 up	 to	 three	 times	 that	 for	 absenteeism.	 However,	 return	 on	 investment	 for	
proactive	workplace	mental	health	interventions	(rather	than	reactive	measures	
after	mental	health	problems	occur),	 enabling	employees	 to	 ‘thrive	at	work’,	 is	
overwhelmingly	positive	(Hampson	and	others,	above	n53).		
659	The	 same	 study	 noted	 (n53	 at	 5)	 that	 there	 are	 costs	 when	 an	 employee	









663	However,	 the	 ‘Statement	of	 Intent’,	 issued	 in	2017	by	 the	Ministry	of	 Social	
Development,	 includes	 a	 focus	on	 employment	 issues	 for	 those	with	 long	 term	
disabilities.	 It	 remains	 to	be	seen	what	effect	 the	election	of	 the	Labour-Green-







An	 alternative	 (or	 additional)	 reason	 why	 no	 positive	 duty	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation	has	been	included	in	the	HRA	may	simply	be	that	the	legislature	
believes	 the	 current	 legislation,	 with	 the	 inferred	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation,	 fulfils	 New	 Zealand’s	 commitments	 under	 the	 UNCRPD,	 and	
adequately	 balances	 the	 potentially	 conflicting	 interests	 of	 the	 employer	 and	
employee.		
Thus,	 even	 if	 a	 positive	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 were	 to	 be	






Balancing	 the	 interests	of	 the	parties,	however,	 inevitably	 involves	concessions	
being	made	on	both	sides.	For	example,	the	employer’s	prerogative	is	restricted	
by	 the	 requirement	 to	 accommodate	 the	 disabled	 employee,	 when	 otherwise	
they	 could	 have	 dismissed	 them.	 The	 disabled	 employee’s	 right	 to	
accommodation	is	limited	by	what	it	is	‘reasonable’	for	the	employer	to	provide.	
At	 best,	 the	 interests	 of	 both	 parties	 are	 compromised.	 At	worst,	 in	 particular	
cases,	 the	balance	may	 result	 in	what	 appears	 to	be	 an	unfair	 outcome	 for	 the	
‘losing’	party	—	despite	the	result	for	the	‘winning’	party	seeming	to	be	no	more	





as	 well	 as	 social	 reasons	 for	 wishing	 to	 stay	 employed	 (such	 as	 status,	 social	
contact,	a	reason	to	get	up	in	the	morning).	Furthermore,	she	knows	that	if	she	
loses	this	job,	with	a	history	of	mental	illness	and	dismissal,	it	will	be	difficult	for	
her	 to	 obtain	work	of	 a	 similar	nature	 in	 future.	However,	 if	 Professor	 Smith’s	
interests	 prevail,	 the	 University	 may	 be	 disadvantaged	 as	 their	 interests	 are	
diametrically	 opposed.	 They	 are	 paying	 a	 full	 time	 wage	 to	 an	 employee	 and	
(quite	 reasonably)	 expect	 her	 to	 fully	 perform	 that	 role.	 They	 have	 financial	











Accordingly,	 depending	 on	 where	 the	 balance	 of	 interests	 is	 found	 to	 lie,	 the	
provisions	 of	 the	 HRA	 can	 validly	 be	 interpreted	 to	 support	 either	 Professor	
Smith’s	position	or	that	of	the	University.		
That	is,	it	may	be	held	that	it	is	not	discrimination	to	dismiss	Professor	Smith,	as	
she	 is	 no	 longer	 qualified	 for	work	—	 as	 she	 cannot	 perform	 all	 the	 essential	
duties	 of	 the	 position.	 Alternatively,	 it	 might	 be	 held,	 that	 although	 she	 is	
qualified	for	work,	she	requires	special	services	(e.g.	a	research	assistant)	that	is	
it	not	reasonable	for	the	University	to	provide.		
Conversely,	 the	 HRA	 could	 be	 interpreted	 to	 find	 that	 it	 is	 discrimination	 to	
dismiss	 Professor	 Smith,	 as	 she	 retains	 her	 professional	 qualification	 (so	 is	
qualified	 for	work),	and,	after	reasonable	accommodation	she	would	be	able	 to	
perform	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position	 (as	 the	 task	 reallocation	 proviso	
might	 allow	 someone	 else	 to	 perform	 part	 of	 her	 research,	 and	 allow	
collaborative	publishing).		
However,	would	the	proposed	amendments,	including	imposing	a	general	duty	of	
reasonable	 accommodation	 on	 the	 employer,	 positively	 shift	 the	 balance	 in	
favour	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee?	 This	 seems	 unlikely.	 This	 is	 because	 even	 a	
general	 duty	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 may	 be	 interpreted	 to	 a	 low	
threshold.	 So	 although	 the	 types	 of	 accommodation	 required	 might	 become	
broader	 (and	 hence	 provide	 some	 additional	 protection	 for	 the	 disabled	




is	 the	provision	of	 reasonable	accommodation	 that	does	not	place	 the	 financial	
burden	of	employing	a	poorly	performing	employee	on	the	employer	—	so	that	
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8.1 The	 Problem	 of	 Disability	 Discrimination	 in	 Employment:	
Conclusions	
The	central	question	 this	 thesis	has	asked	 is:	When	an	employee	is	dismissed	on	
performance	grounds,	in	a	seemingly	justifiable	manner,	could	this	nevertheless	be	
unlawful	 discrimination	 if	 the	 poor	 performance	 is	 due	 to	 the	 employee’s	mental	
disability?	The	 focus	has	been	on	whether	 this	adverse	 treatment,	or	dismissal,	
was	direct	discrimination	under	the	HRA.		
As	 there	 is	 little	 case	 law	 on	 point,	 the	 answer	 has	 been	 derived	mainly	 from	
interpretation	of	 the	discrimination	 in	employment	provisions	of	 the	HRA.	The	
thesis	attempted	to	find	the	‘best’	interpretation	of	these	provisions.	To	do	this,	it	
revisited	 principles	 of	 statutory	 interpretation.	 A	 composite	 method	 —	 the	
“spiral	 approach”	 —	 was	 selected	 as	 the	 best	 interpretive	 approach.	 Then,	
utilising	 this	 approach,	 the	 provisions	 were	 re-examined	 to	 determine	 when	
adverse	treatment	would	constitute	discrimination,	and	what	(if	any)	obligation	
the	employer	has	to	reasonably	accommodate	the	disabled	employee.	
However,	 even	 the	 ‘best’	 interpretation	 failed	 to	 fully	 clarify	 the	 law	 in	 this	
difficult	 area,	 and	 the	 conclusion	 has	 been	 reached	 that	 there	 is	 insufficient	
clarity	 in	 the	 law	 to	give	a	predictable	answer	 to	 this	question.	As	a	 result,	 the	




Thus,	 this	 thesis	 sought	 to	 find	a	means	 to	 clarify	 the	 law	 in	 this	difficult	 area,	




• defining	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’.	 An	 employee	 should	 be	 considered	
‘qualified’	when	they	can	perform	the	essential	duties	of	the	position	—	
after	any	necessary	accommodation	of	their	disability	has	been	provided;	
• clarifying	 that	 the	 comparator	 employee	 should	 be	 a	 similarly	 situated	
employee,	without	 the	 disability	—	 and	without	 any	 of	 the	 features	 or	
consequences	arising	from	the	disability	(such	as	poor	performance);		






of	 a	 disabled	 employee,	 but	 would	 still	 permit	 the	 employee	 to	 be	 treated	
differently	 if	 they	 could	 not	 perform	 the	 essential	 duties	 of	 the	 position,	 even	
after	reasonable	accommodation	had	been	made.	
This	 thesis	 also	 argued	 that,	 to	 clarify	 the	 law	 around	 the	 reasonable	
accommodation	 of	 disability,	 a	 positive	 duty	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	
should	 be	 included	 in	 the	 HRA,	 and	 the	 failure	 to	 meet	 this	 duty	 should	 be	
deemed	 unlawful.	 A	 definition	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation,	 aligned	with	 the	
one	in	the	UNCRPD,	should	also	be	included	in	the	legislation.			
These	 are	 therefore	 the	 primary	 conclusions	 reached	 in	 this	 thesis	 about	 the	
discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA.	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	
Conclusion	addresses	a	number	of	remaining	points.	First	it	considers	a	possible	
objection	 to	 the	 general	 idea	 that	 the	HRA’s	 provisions	 are	 in	 need	 of	 reform.	
That	 argument	 is,	 that,	 the	 lack	 of	 relevant	 case	 law	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 no	
current	problem	that	needs	to	be	addressed.	This	thesis	concludes,	however,	that	
this	 is	 not	 the	 case,	 and	 actually,	 New	 Zealand	 law	 in	 this	 area	 needs	 more	
comprehensive	 reform	 than	 the	 proposed	 amendments	 to	 the	 HRA	 would	
provide.	It	will	be	argued,	that	to	promote	substantive	equality,	what	is	required	
is	a	new	model	of	disability	discrimination	 law.	Finally,	 this	chapter	reflects	on	
some	 of	 the	 jurisprudential	 threads	 that	 have	 permeated	 the	 analysis	 in	 this	
thesis:	that	is,	the	effectiveness	of	the	‘spiral’	approach	to	interpretation,	and	the	
difficulty	in	achieving	clarity	in	this	field	of	law.			
8.1.1 Is	 There	 a	 Problem?	 The	 Lack	 of	 Disability	 Discrimination	
Jurisprudence				
Undoubtedly	part	of	the	problem	in	establishing	the	correct	interpretation	of	the	
discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA,	 concerning	 disability,	 is	
that	 the	 HRRT	 and	 Courts	 have	 had	 limited	 opportunity	 to	 address	 them.	
Accordingly,	one	possible	response	to	the	view	advanced	in	this	thesis	(that	the	
law	 requires	 reform)	 is	 that	 the	 dearth	 of	 case	 law	 concerning	 disability	










for	 work.	 An	 underutilised	 person	 may	 be	 unemployed,	 underemployed	 (i.e.,	












complaints	 to	 the	HRC	proceed	 to	mediation,	where	 the	majority	 are	probably	
resolved.	As	 this	process	 is	confidential,	 the	outcomes	are	unknown.	Moreover,	
claims	that	do	not	proceed	to	mediation,	or	do	not	settle	there,	may	not	always	
progress	 further.670	This	 may	 be	 due	 to	 the	 difficulties	 for	 the	 claimant	 in	





first	 instance.	 Thus,	 the	 problem	 is	 likely	 to	 be	much	more	 prevalent	 than	 the	
available	data	currently	shows.		
When	a	claim	of	discrimination	is	laid	with	the	HRC,	mediation	is	usually	the	first	
step	 in	attempting	 to	 solve	 the	problem.	For	a	person	with	a	mental	disability,	
settling	a	claim	at	mediation	is	a	quick	and	cheap	solution,	and	they	may	receive	
compensation.	 However,	 this	 confidential	 mediation	 process	 does	 not	 develop	
discrimination	 jurisprudence.	 For	 such	 reasons,	 the	 law	 around	 disability	
discrimination	 has	 rarely	 been	 considered	 in	 detail	 in	 contested	 proceedings	
before	 the	 HRRT	 or	 the	 courts,	 and	 important	 aspects	 of	 it	 remain	 unclear,	
despite	the	HRA	being	almost	25	years	old.			
																																																								

























pursued	 through	 the	 Courts,	 as	 occurred	 in	 McAlister	 v	 Air	 New	 Zealand,672	
concerning	 the	 comparator	 issue	 (in	 relation	 to	 age	 discrimination,	 at	 least).	
However,	 for	 this	 to	 happen,	 the	 right	 cases,	 with	 sufficiently	 well	 resourced	
employers	or	employees	to	bring	them,	are	required.673	This	process	would	take	
some	considerable	time,	if	it	happened	at	all.		
Another	 alternative,	 to	 promote	 the	 jurisprudence,	 would	 be	 to	 use	 a	 similar	
system	to	that	of	 the	Privacy	Commission,	whereby	anonymized	case	notes	are	
published	 on	 all	 its	 investigations.	 These	 case	 notes	 provide	 a	 useful	 tool	 for	
developing	 jurisprudence	under	the	Privacy	Act.	 If	 instituted	for	discrimination	











the	 HRA	 remains	 premised	 on	 formal	 equality	 and	 the	 medical	 model	 of	
disability,	 the	 amendments	 suggested	 would	 create	 only	 limited	 opportunities	
for	 disabled	 employees	 to	 achieve	 greater	 substantive	 equality.	 Compounding	
this,	 the	current	 ‘two-party’	model	of	discrimination	law,	 in	which	the	interests	
of	the	employer	and	employee	are	pitted	against	one	another,	restricts	the	duty	
accommodation	to	that	which	it	is	reasonable	for	the	employer	to	provide.	This	is	
mainly	 because	 this	 model	 of	 law	 places	 the	 burden	 of	 accommodating	 the	
disabled	 employee	 solely	 on	 the	 individual	 employer.	 This	 limits	 the	
accommodations	 that	 can	 be	 made	 available	 to	 the	 disabled	 employee	 as	






in	 different	 organisations	 may	 be	 treated	 completely	 differently	 even	 if	 they	
develop	 the	 same	 mental	 disability.	 In	 a	 large	 government	 department,	 for	
example,	 which	 has	 ‘good	 employer’	 obligations	 imposed	 on	 them,674	may	 be	
																																																								
672	McAlister	v	Air	New	Zealand	Ltd,	above	n97.		
673	The	 complainant	may	 apply	 to	 the	 Office	 of	 Human	 Rights	 Proceedings	 for	
free	representation	to	take	a	complaint	to	the	HRRT.		
674	The	 State	 Sector	 Act	 1988	 places	 additional	 ‘good	 employer’	 obligations	 on	
State	 and	 Public	 sector	 employers,	 including	 recognising	 the	 employment	









For	 this	 reason,	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 current	 disability	 discrimination	 law	 is	
incapable	 of	 promoting	 substantive	 equality	 for	 the	 disabled	 employee,	 as	 it	
situates	the	problem	of	disability	discrimination	in	employment	as	one	between	
the	 individual	 employer	 and	 the	 employee.	 This	 approach	 inevitably	 pits	 the	
rights	 of	 the	 disabled	 employees	 to	 be	 accommodated	 against	 the	 rights	 of	
employers	 to	 manage	 their	 workplace.	 This	 occurs	 as	 the	 HRA	 endeavours	 to	
protect	the	(competing)	interests	of	both.		
Furthermore,	 there	 is	 indeterminacy	 in	 the	 balancing	 required	 between	 their	
competing	 interests.	 This	 means	 that,	 where	 their	 interests	 are	 so	 evenly	
balanced	 (so	 that	 the	 case	 could	 legitimately	 be	 decided	 in	 favour	 of	 either	
party),	a	finding	of	disability	discrimination	may	be	influenced	—	and	ultimately	









an	 unwell	 employee	 to	 bring	 a	 claim	 of	 discrimination,	 which	 puts	 them	 at	 a	
disadvantage	from	the	outset.		
Therefore,	 to	 achieve	 greater	 substantive	 equality,	 the	 law	 of	 disability	





with	 disabilities	 were	 twice	 as	 likely	 to	 be	 unemployed,	 and,	 if	 employed,	 the	













As	 discussed,	 although	 the	 proposed	 amendments	 might	 clarify	 the	 law,	 and	
ensure	New	Zealand	 is	meeting	 its	obligations	under	 the	UNCRPD,	 the	 issue	of	
enabling	disabled	employees	to	achieve	greater	substantive	equality	remains.		
Thus,	the	final	conclusion	of	this	thesis	is	that	the	model	of	law	that	is	currently	





the	 individual	 employer.	 This	 model	 of	 law	 would	 view	 discrimination	 in	
employment	 as	 a	 multiparty	 problem,	 involving	 the	 disabled	 employee,	 the	
employer	and	 society	as	 a	whole	 (through	 the	government).	Under	 this	model,	
the	 economic	 burden	 would	 no	 longer	 rest	 on	 the	 employer	 alone.	 The	
accommodation	that	could	then	be	provided	to	the	disabled	employee	would	be	




implement	 it.	 Nonetheless,	 some	 of	 the	 possible	 ways	 in	 which	 this	 could	 be	
implemented	 are	 discussed	 below.	 However,	 the	 first	 issue	 that	 needs	 to	 be	




Part	of	 the	problem	of	 interpreting	 current	discrimination	 law	 in	New	Zealand	
arises	 because	 the	 legislation	 does	 not	 have	 a	 clear	 underlying	 philosophical	
basis.	 International	 jurisprudence	demonstrates	that	a	clear	philosophical	basis	
may	help	determine	when	 treatment	 is	discrimination.	 In	Canada,	 for	example,	
discrimination,	 under	 the	 Charter	 of	 Rights,	 may	 only	 be	 found	 if	 treatment	
results	in	an	insult	to	an	individual’s	dignity.677		
Thus,	 any	 new	model	 of	 disability	 discrimination	 law	 for	 New	 Zealand	 should	
have	 a	 clear	 underlying	 philosophy.	 Although,	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 the	
emphasis	has	been	on	the	need	for	those	with	disabilities	to	achieve	substantive	
equality,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	 philosophical	 basis	 on	which	 a	 new	model	 of	 law	
could	be	based.	There	may	be	good	 reasons	 to	 consider,	 for	example,	 concepts	
based	on	respect	for	individual	dignity	or	autonomy	as	the	underlying	principle.			
Reaume	asserts	that	dignity	can	be	understood	as	inherent	human	worth,	and	it	
is	 damage	 to	 the	 sense	 of	 self-worth	 that	 violates	 dignity.	 Therefore,	
discrimination	occurs	when	a	person	is	treated	without	regard	to	their	status	as	








Current	 New	 Zealand	 legislation	 recognises	 the	 importance	 of	 dignity,	 as	
damages	 may	 be	 awarded	 for	 loss	 of	 dignity	 under	 the	 HRA	 and	 ERA.679	
According	to	the	HRRT,	the	fundamental	objectives	of	the	HRA	include:680		
enhancing	 equality	 of	 opportunity,	 inclusivity	 in	 society	 and	
respect	for	the	dignity	of	all	human	beings.	
Furthermore,	the	Supreme	Court	has	held	that	there	is	a	right	to	dignity,	and	that	
the	 principle	 of	 dignity	 is	 ‘the	 key	 value	 underlying	 the	 rights	 affirmed	 in	 the	
[New	Zealand]	Bill	of	Rights’.681		
However,	whether	dignity	should	be	viewed	as	a	right,	a	principle	or	a	value	 is	
contentious.682	Furthermore,	 establishing	 if	 there	 has	 been	 an	 insult	 to	 dignity	
requires	 a	 value	 judgement	 which	 may	 raise	 interpretive	 issues,	 as	 may	 the	
meaning	of	‘dignity’.683	According	to	O’Mahony:684	
…the	elusive	nature	of	the	concept	has	led	many	commentators	
to	 argue	 that	 it	 is,	 at	 best,	 meaningless	 or	 unhelpful,	 and	 at	






The	 principle	 of	 promoting	 personal	 autonomy	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 the	 legal	 regime	
also	has	drawbacks.	This	 is	because	the	State	has	the	power	to	 limit	a	person’s	
autonomy	 in	 some	 situations	 (for	 example,	 by	 imprisonment).	 Therefore,	 as	
autonomy	is	something	that	can	be	restricted	or	removed,	it	is	not	an	inherent	or	








above	 n15	 at	 532,	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 also	 emphasized	 the	 importance	 of	 the	





683 	Fredman,	 above	 n40	 at	 725.	 Fredman	 points	 out	 that	 dignity	 may	 be	










there	 is	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 not	 only	 the	 disabled	
and	 other	 people	 but	 also	 between	 the	 different	 forms	 of	
disability.	 The	 differences	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	 question	 of	 how	
disabled	 people	 should,	 variously	 according	 to	 the	 type	 and	
extent	 of	 their	 disability,	 be	 treated.	 On	 one	 hand	 we	 think	
disabled	 people	 should	 be	 treated	 the	 same	 as	 other	 people.	
They	 should	 be	 able	 to	 compete	 fairly	 on	 merit	 for	 prized	







its	 meaning	 is	 elusive,	 in	 that	 it	 can	 mean	 equality	 of	 results,	 equality	 of	
opportunity,	or	even	treating	people	with	dignity.687		
One	 limited	 concept	 of	 substantive	 equality	 is	 that	 it	 means	 equality	 of	
opportunity.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 aim	 would	 be	 to	 equalise	 the	 starting	 point	 in	







good.	 As	 a	 result	 she	 may	 still	 face	 disciplinary	 action	 for	 poor	 employment	




achieve	equal	 results	 (so,	 for	example,	Professor	Smith	would	be	excused	 from	

















A	 better	 conception	 of	 substantive	 equality	 may	 be	 the	 one	 outlined	 by	
Fredman. 689 	She	 suggests	 substantive	 equality	 should	 be	 approached	 as	 a	
principle	 with	 four	 dimensions:	 to	 address	 stigma	 and	 prejudice,	 to	 enhance	
voice	 and	 participation,	 to	 accommodate	 difference,	 and	 to	 achieve	 structural	
change.690	Consideration	 of	 all	 these	 dimensions,	 she	 argues,	 allows	 the	 law	 to	
address	 the	 different	 facets	 of	 inequality,	 such	 as	 obstacles	 to	 participation,	
structural	obstacles	to	equality,	distributive	inequality,	and	prejudice.691		
Adopting	 this	 approach	 to	 substantive	 equality,	 rather	 than	 restricting	 it	 to	 a	
single	 concept,	 enables	 a	 holistic	 view	 to	 be	 taken	 of	 the	 disabled	 employee’s	
treatment	and	the	context	in	which	it	arises.	For	Professor	Smith,	this	approach	
could	address	structural	obstacles	to	equality.	 It	could	remove	the	requirement	
to	 work	 to	 certain	 performance	 criteria	 or	 be	 subjected	 to	 a	 PIP.	 It	 could	
counteract	 prejudice	 (there	 may	 be	 an	 underlying	 assumption	 that	 having	 a	
mentally	 disability	 means	 she	 is	 permanently	 incapable	 of	 functioning	
‘normally’).	 And	 it	 could	 remove	 obstacles	 to	 participation	 in	 social	 life	 (by	
continuing	to	provide	the	social	contact	which	work	provides,	and	the	financial	
means	to	fully	participate	in	social	life).			
Therefore,	 if	 a	 new	model	 of	 law	 is	 adopted,	 it	 might	 be	 based	 on	 this	 broad	
concept	of	substantive	equality.		
But	 how	 will	 this	 new	 model	 achieve	 substantive	 equality?	 For	 the	 reasons	
outlined	 below,	 this	 thesis	 contends	 that	 disability	 discrimination	 should	 be	
viewed	as	a	social	issue,	requiring	a	societal	response.	Thus,	a	new	model	of	law	
will	not	view	the	issue	of	disability	discrimination	simply	as	one	arising	between	





the	 benefit	 to	 the	 employer, 693 	and	 to	 society	 in	 general,	 should	 also	 be	




690	At	 713.	 Fredman	 contends	 that	 the	 right	 to	 substantive	 equality	 should	 be	




purpose,	 being	 engaged	 in	meaningful	 activities	 and	having	 social	 identity	 and	
status	(Boardman	and	others,	above	n).		
693	There	are	recruitment	and	training	costs	associated	with	obtaining	new	staff.	







economic	 benefits	 of	 the	 spending	 of	 wage	 earners,	 compared	with	 un-waged	
counterparts. 694 	There	 are	 social	 benefits	 of	 increasing	 diversity	 in	 the	
workplace,	 including	reducing	 the	stigma	and	stereotyping	of	mental	disability,	
encouraging	 tolerance	 of	 difference,	 and	 eliminating	 ‘ableism’.695 	Therefore,	
employment	of	those	with	disabilities	 is	beneficial	to	all	society	and	barriers	to	
meaningful	employment	should	be	viewed	as	a	societal	issue.	696	
However,	 as	 discussed,	 under	 the	 current	 law,	 the	 combination	 of	 the	medical	
model	 of	 disability,	 and	 the	 emphasis	 on	 formal	 equality,	 means	 the	 disabled	
employee	is	viewed	simply	as	an	impaired	individual	—	who	has	the	right	to	no	
more	 than	 equal	 treatment	 by	 the	 employer.	 These	 factors,	 coupled	 with	 a	
limited	 duty	 of	 accommodation,	 create	 a	 ‘bottleneck’	 in	 opportunity	 (which	




de	Asis	argues,	 in	 the	 context	of	human	rights	 law,	 limitations	 to	 rights	 should	
not	 be	 restricted	 by	 costs	 —	 unless	 those	 costs	 will	 prove	 harmful	 to	 other	
human	rights.699		
This	 approach	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 social	 construct	of	disability	 and	with	 the	
promotion	of	substantive	equality,	as	it	promotes	the	full	and	equal	participation	
in	 society,	 but	 acknowledges	 certain	 limitations	 (e.g.	 that	 a	 certain	 measure	
might	 not	 be	 possible	 in	 our	 current	 level	 of	 knowledge).	 Using	 this	 vision	 of	




695 	Wasserman	 in	 Michael	 Connolly	 Discrimination	 Law	 (2nd	 ed,	 Sweet	 &	
Maxwell,	London,	2011)	at	13.	Wasserman	argues	that	the	goals	of	equality	are	
the	 realisation	 of	 the	 positive	 benefits	 of	 tolerance	 and	 diversity	 (recognising	
people	 as	 equal	 but	 different).	 These	 concepts	 reflect	 a	 philosophy	 based	 on	
compassion	and	human	dignity,	and	the	social	model	of	disability.	




697 As	 Areheart	 explains,	 Fishkin’s	 ‘bottlenecks’	 are	 narrow	 spaces	 in	 the	
opportunity	 structure	 through	which	people	must	pass	 if	 they	hope	 to	 reach	 a	
range	of	opportunities	on	the	other	side	(at	551	at	879).		
698	This	bottleneck	is	a	direct	consequence	of	the	current	two-party	model	of	law.	
Fisken	 contends	 the	 function	 of	 anti-discrimination	 law	 is	 to	 eliminate	 these	
bottlenecks	(Fishkin,	above	n551).		





A	 new	 social	 model	 of	 disability	 discrimination	 law	 would	 view	 the	 issue	 in	
terms	 of	 a	multi-party	 relationship,	 involving	 the	 employer,	 the	 employee	 and	
the	government.	Therefore,	it	would	address	the	valid	economic	concerns	of	the	
employer,	by	providing	them	with	governmental	(social)	support.		





Another	 alternative	 would	 be	 to	 ‘top	 up’	 salaries	 for	 under-performing	
employees.	That	 is,	 if	 the	employee	was	only	able	to	work	at	60%	productivity,	
then	the	employer	would	pay	60%	and	the	government	would	top	up	the	salary	






would	 then	 be	 funnelled	 to	 compensate	 other	 employers	 for	 additional	 costs	
incurred	 from	 employing	 disabled	 persons.	 Versions	 of	 this	 system	 have	 been	
successfully	 adopted	 in	 Germany	 and	 France.700 	This	 has	 the	 advantage	 of	
spreading	the	cost	of	disability	employment	to	all	employers,	and	not	simply	to	
those	who	 find	 themselves	with	 disabled	 employees.	 However,	 it	 still	 requires	
employers	in	general	to	shoulder	the	cost	of	accommodations.		
Many	 other	 approaches	 have	 been	 implemented	 internationally	 for	 ensuring	
employment	of	the	disabled,	that	remove	the	risk	or	cost	from	the	employer.	For	
example,	 in	 Denmark,	 local	 Councils	 must	 provide	 sheltered	 employment	 for	
disabled	employees	under	the	age	of	65	who	cannot	find	or	maintain	work.	Israel	
requires	 affirmative	 action	 to	 integrate	 those	 with	 disabilities	 into	 the	
workplace;	 and	 in	 Japan	 the	 government	 funds	 a	 3-month	 trial	 employment	
period	 for	 those	with	mental	 disability,	 and	 provides	 incentives	 for	 employers	
who	 permanently	 employ	 the	 disabled	 person.701	All	 of	 these	 approaches	 have	
merit	and	could	be	applicable	in	the	New	Zealand	situation.		
Additional	 safeguards	 could	 be	 adopted,	 to	 ensure	 the	 disabled	 employee	 is	
reasonably	 accommodated,	 and	 not	 discriminated	 against	 in	 employment.	 For	
example,	 there	 could	 be	 an	 overseeing	 or	 administrative	 body,	 and	 this	 body	
could	provide	mediation	if	 issues	arose	between	the	employer	and	the	disabled	
employee.	Furthermore,	 it	could	be	stipulated	 in	 the	 legislation	 that	employees	
																																																								
700	Daniel	 Mont	 Disability	 Employment	 Policy	 (Social	 Protection	 Unit,	 Human	
Development	Network,	The	World	Bank,	2004)	at	21.	
701	Felicity	Callard	and	others	"Examples	of	Disability	Legislation	from	Across	the	






An	 independent	 administrative	 body	 would	 ensure	 that	 appropriate	 support	
measures	were	provided	to	the	employer	and	disabled	employee,	while	ensuring	
the	proper	allocation	of	public	funds.		








While	all	of	 the	above	measures	would	help	 integrate	the	disabled	 into	society,	
and	 further	 the	 aims	 of	 achieving	 greater	 substantive	 equality,	 they	 may	 be	





Zealand	 views	 both	 disability	 and	 discrimination.	 That	 is,	 it	 will	 require	
reconsideration	 of	 the	meaning	 of	 discrimination	 and	disability	 rights,	 and	 the	
role	of	employment	in	the	social	(rather	than	economic)	context.	At	a	minimum,	
it	 will	 require	 reform	 of	 both	 discrimination	 and	 employment	 law,	 with	 the	
implementation	 of	 some	 financial	 support	 scheme,	 which	 supports	 either	 the	
disabled	employee	or	their	employer	to	achieve	these	goals.			
Reform	 of	 the	 law	 to	 enable	 this	will	 involve	 not	 only	 legislation	 dealing	with	
setting-up	 and	 managing	 whatever	 scheme	 is	 selected,	 but	 it	 will	 probably	
require	further	reform	of	the	HRA	to	reflect	this	new	paradigm.	In	particular,	the	
potential	 accommodation	 provisions	 may	 cease	 to	 be	 so	 relevant,	 as	
accommodation	would	no	 longer	be	 the	sole	 responsibility	of	 the	employer.	As	
the	statutory	context	would	require	reconsideration	and	change,	this	could	be	an	





Permission	will	 only	 be	 granted	 if	 there	 are	 reasonable	 grounds	 for	 dismissal,	
and	 redeployment	 is	 not	 possible.	 Furthermore,	 employers	 are	 obliged	 to	 pay	
sick	employees	70%	of	their	salaries	(but	not	less	than	the	minimum	wage)	for	
the	first	two	years	of	their	 illness.	 	 	http://knowledge.leglobal.org/termination-
of-employment-contracts-in-netherlands/	
703	Stevenson	and	Farmer,	 above	n577.	This	 report	 estimated	 that	 cost	of	poor	
mental	health	 to	 the	UK	Government	at	£24	billion	per	year,	and	even	more	 to	
the	 economy	 in	 general.	 However,	 the	 report	 found	 adopting	 measures	 to	




Fredman	 suggests,	 for	 discrimination,	 instead	 of	 having	 the	 law	 directed	 at	




equal	 opportunity	 for	 the	 disabled	 (rather	 than	 the	 current	 prohibition	 of	
unequal	 treatment).	 This	 would	 replace	 an	 adversarial	 model	 of	 dispute	
resolution	with	a	model	of	‘structural	reform’.	As	Fredman	argues,	the	imposition	
of	 positive	 duties	 changes	 the	 whole	 landscape	 of	 discrimination	 law,	 from	
reacting	to	discrimination	that	has	occurred,	to	proactively	promoting	disability	




could	 be	 adjusted	 to	 enable	 a	 disabled	 person	 to	 fill	 it.706	If	 combined	 with	
incentives	 (such	 as	 the	 employer	 support	measures	previously	discussed),	 this	
model	of	 law	might	achieve	 social	 change.	The	goal	of	 the	 legislation	would	be	
facilitation	of	change	and	goal	setting,	and	the	role	of	the	 judiciary	would	be	to	
ensure	 the	employer’s	decision-making	was	 ‘deliberative’	—	 i.e.,	 that	 they	 took	
deliberative	steps	to	consider	the	disabled	in	employment	matters,	prior	to	any	
decision-making.707	This	 consideration	 would	 need	 to	 go	 beyond	 procedural	
‘box-ticking’.		
This	 principled,	 deliberative	 approach	 to	 decision-making	 is	 not	 without	
precedent	 in	New	Zealand,	 as	 it	 is	 similar	 to	 the	approach	 taken	 (in	 the	public	











704	Sandra	 Fredman	 "Breaking	 the	Mold:	 Equality	 as	 a	 Proactive	 Duty"	 (2012)	
60(1)	Am		J		Comp		L	265	at	266.		
705	At	271.		
706	This	may	of	 course	 raise	 issues	about	 the	boundary	between	what	 is	a	pro-









the	 HRA,	 this	 thesis	 adopted	 the	 spiral	 approach.	 This	 approach	 involves	 a	
sequential	progression	 through	a	series	of	 interpretive	methods,	analysing:	 the	
text	 of	 the	 provision,	 the	 provision	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 Act	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	
legislative	 history	 and	 finally	 the	 wider	 context	 (including	 international	 and	
overseas	law).	
The	 advantages	 of	 this	 approach	 are	 that	 many	 factors	 can	 legitimately	 be	
considered	 when	 finding	 the	 ‘best’	 interpretation	 of	 the	 legislation.	 This	 is	
particularly	 useful	 when	 the	 text	 is	 ambiguous,	 and	 the	 purposes	 of	 the	 Act	
appear	 to	 be	 conflicting	 (as	 was	 frequently	 the	 situation	 when	 examining	 the	
discrimination	in	employment	provisions	of	 the	HRA).	Assessing	the	provisions	
in	 the	 overall	 scheme	 of	 the	 Act,	 and	 appraising	 how	 the	 legislative	 history	
(including	amendments	to	the	Act)	may	reflect	a	change	in	legislative	intent	over	
time,	provided	some	clarification.	However,	 for	some	provisions,	 the	 legislative	
history	 was	 unhelpful:	 for	 example,	 when	 amendments	 made	 to	 the	 HRA	
imposed	a	positive	obligation	of	accommodation	in	some	contexts,	but	not	in	the	
context	 of	 employment.	 It	 was	 not	 clear	 if	 this	 was	 legislative	 oversight,	 or	 if	
Parliament	had	no	intention	of	creating	a	positive	obligation	to	accommodate	the	




interpretations	 of	 the	 law.	 Regarding	 the	 comparator	 issue,	 for	 example,	 the	
interpretations	adopted	in	the	UK	and	Australia,	and	the	legislative	responses	to	





convention.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 spiral	 approach	 affords	 a	 ‘double	 check’	 that	 the	
interpretation	selected	is	the	most	appropriate.		
Nevertheless,	as	alluded	to	in	Chapter	Four,	there	are	also	disadvantages	in	using	
the	 spiral	 approach.	 This	 is	 because	 it	 adopts	 a	 stepping-stone	 approach	 to	





provision,	 before	 attending	 to	 the	 overall	 purposes	 of	 anti-discrimination	
legislation	 or	 obligations	 under	 the	 UNCRPD.	 When	 interpreting	 the	
discrimination	 in	 employment	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA,	 this	 approach	 risks	 the	
possibility	 that	 if	discrimination	 is	not	 found	at	 first	 instance	under	section	22,	
then	 the	 enquiry	 stops	 —	 without	 the	 reasonable	 accommodation	 provisions	
being	evaluated,	even	though	they	might	 influence	the	 interpretation	of	section	
22.	For	example,	interpreting	the	text	of	section	22	might	find	that	an	employee	
is	 not	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’,	 as	 they	 could	 not	 perform	 an	 essential	 duty	 of	 the	
	
	224	
position	 to	 the	satisfaction	of	 the	employer.	As	 there	 is	 then	no	discrimination,	
no	 further	evaluation	would	be	 required	—	when	possibly	 the	employer	 could	
have	 accommodated	 the	 disabled	 employee,	 by	 providing	 them	with	 a	 special	
facility,	 or	 reallocating	 an	 essential	 duty,	 after	 which	 they	 may	 have	 been	
‘qualified	for	work’.		
A	more	appropriate	method	might	be	to	take	a	global	approach	to	interpretation,	
rather	 than	 one	 that	 proceeds	 step-by-step.	 The	 approach	 would	 assess	 the	
employer’s	 treatment	 of	 the	 mentally	 disabled	 employee	 against	 all	 the	
provisions	of	 the	HRA.	Then,	 instead	of	 assessing	 the	ability	 to	provide	 special	
services	 only	 after	 finding	 discriminatory	 treatment,	 the	 employer’s	 ability	 to	
provide	the	accommodation,	or	reallocate	duties,	would	be	assessed	in	the	first	
instance	and	might	influence	whether	the	employee	was	considered	qualified.					
This	 global	 approach	 might	 result	 in	 a	 more	 ‘just’	 result.	 By	 assessing	 the	
treatment	 against	 all	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 HRA,	 including	 the	 potential	
accommodation	provisions,	a	different	outcome	to	that	arrived	at	under	the	step-
by-step	 approach	 may	 result.	 For	 example,	 under	 a	 global	 approach,	 the	
employee	 might	 be	 found	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’,	 as	 they	 could	 be	 appropriately	
accommodated,	 whereas	 under	 a	 stepping-stone	 approach,	 the	 disabled	
employee	 may	 be	 screened	 out	 before	 the	 ability	 to	 accommodate	 them	 was	
traversed	by	the	Court	or	HRRT.		
However,	 this	 global	 approach	 might	 risk	 the	 determination	 becoming	 more	
subjective.	That	is,	it	risks	the	HRRT	or	Court’s	assessment	being	based	on	what	
they	 think	 the	 employer	 ought	 to	 have	 done	 in	 the	 circumstances.	 	 This	 could	
unfairly	bias	the	outcome.		
Overall,	 however,	 although	 the	 spiral	 approach	 may	 have	 some	 limitations,	 it	
seems	a	useful	approach	to	interpretation.	It	enables	the	interpreter	to	‘double-
check’	the	correctness	of	their	interpretation	as	they	progress	through	the	steps	





whether	 it	 expresses	 a	 clear	 and	 consistent	 position,	 is	 understood	 by	 the	
parties,	 and	 provides	 them	 with	 a	 degree	 of	 certainty	 as	 to	 their	 respective	
positions	 in	 advance.	 A	 high	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 suggests	 the	 law	 is	 not	
knowable.	According	to	Doerfler,708	laws	that	are	not	clear	are	also	unknowable,	
as	 ‘claims	 about	 “clarity”	 and	 claims	 about	 “knowledge”	 seem	 to	 be	 mutually	
warranting	—	that	 is,	 if	one	 is	warranted	 in	claiming	 that	 something	 is	 “clear,”	
one	 is	 warranted	 in	 claiming	 to	 “know”	 it,	 and	 vice	 versa.’	 Thus,	 both	 lack	 of	




Court	 will	 ‘know’	 the	 law,	 and,	 therefore,	 it	 is	 less	 likely	 the	 language	 in	 the	




contends	 that	 failure	 to	 make	 rules	 (or	 laws)	 understandable	 (or	 knowable)	
makes	 them	 fail.709	For	 Fuller,	 the	 desideratum	 of	 clarity	 is	 ‘one	 of	 the	 most	
essential	ingredients	of	legality.’710		
This	thesis	has	found	the	current	law	for	disability	discrimination	under	the	HRA	




First,	 there	 is	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 drafting.	 The	 individual	 provisions	 are	
somewhat	 inelegant,	 as	 they	 are	 both	 long	 and	 convoluted,	 and	 incorporate	
multiple	elements,	all	of	which	require	some	level	of	interpretation.		
Second,	section	22,	which	determines	when	conduct	will	be	unlawful,	covers	all	
grounds	 of	 discrimination.	 Therefore,	 the	 requirements	 are	 pitched	 at	 a	 high	
level	 of	 generality,	 rather	 than	 being	 specific	 to	 a	 prohibited	 ground,	 such	 as	
disability.	Different	exceptions	to	these	general	rules	are	then	provided	for	each	
separate	ground.	These	exceptions	are	in	the	form	of	defences	against	a	claim	of	
discrimination	 (as	 with	 the	 permitted	 exceptions	 for	 disability).	 In	 turn	 these	
defences	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 ‘general	 qualification	 on	 exceptions’,	 provided	 by	
another	 general	 provision	 that	 applies	 to	 all	 exceptions	 for	 all	 grounds	 of	
discrimination.	 The	 result	 is	 a	 complex	 interweaving	 of	 provisions,	 some	 of	
which	 apply	 to	 a	 specific	 ground	 (e.g.	 disability),	 while	 others	 are	 general	 in	
nature.	Consequently,	there	is	an	overall	lack	of	clarity.						
Third,	 it	 seems	 that	 terms	 or	 phrases	 used	 in	 later	 provisions	 may	 affect	
interpretation	of	earlier	provisions.	Consequently,	 even	when	 it	 seems	 that	 the	
Court	 or	HRRT	need	not	 enquire	beyond	 s22,	 the	 failure	 to	do	 so	may	mean	a	









Lastly,	 there	 are	 several	 evaluative,	 or	 elastic,	 concepts	 in	 the	 Act,	 such	 as	
‘reasonableness’.	There	is	no	sufficient	guidance	as	to	how	these	terms	should	be	
interpreted,	 or	 what	 factors	 should	 be	 considered	 in	 assessing,	 whether	 a	















include:	 having	 a	 separate	 part	 of	 the	 HRA	 for	 disability	 discrimination;	
providing	definitions	(or	fuller	definitions)	of	key	terms;	including	factors	to	be	
considered	 when	 determining	 ‘reasonableness’	 of	 measures;	 and	 specifying	 a	
positive	duty	of	reasonable	accommodation.		




be	 drafted	 more	 clearly	 and	 concisely.	 Additionally,	 it	 might	 be	 possible	 to	
redefine	 disability	 discrimination	 in	 terms	 that	 are	 more	 sympathetic	 to	 the	
social	 construct	 of	 disability,	 and	 construct	 the	 provisions	 in	 a	 manner	 that	
promotes	 greater	 substantive	 equality	 for	 disabled	 employees.	 Moreover,	
reforming	 the	 Act	 in	 this	 way	 might	 ensure	 there	 is	 internal	 consistency	 of	
concepts	and	terms,	such	as	what	constitutes	a	risk	of	harm,	or	the	threshold	for	
when	 something	 is	 considered	 ‘reasonable’,	 or	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘services	 or	
facilities’,	across	different	contexts.		
Furthermore,	 the	 ERA	 could	 be	 amended	 to	 incorporate	 (by	 reference)	 this	
separate	 part	 of	 the	 HRA	 concerning	 disability	 discrimination.	 This	 would	




law	 for	 disability	 discrimination,	 it	 might	 also	 complicate	 the	 law	 for	
discrimination	 in	 general,	 particularly	when	 intersectional	 or	multiple	 grounds	




achieved	 through	 amendments	 to	 the	 current	 provisions.	 Incorporating	
definitions	 of	 key	 terms	 and	 phrases	will	 determine	 their	meaning	 and	 ambit.	
This	could	also	solve	the	issue	that	the	meaning	of	a	phrase	in	one	provision	can	
be	 influenced	 by	 the	 interpretation	 of	 subsequent	 provisions.	 For	 example,	
defining	 the	 meaning	 of	 ‘qualified	 for	 work’	 in	 section	 22	 would	 remove	 the	











or	consequences	of	 the	disability	 for	example,	 could	clarify	 the	selection	of	 the	
proper	 comparator	 employee,	 and	 clarify	 when	 adverse	 treatment	 is	 to	 be	
considered	‘by	reason	of’	disability,	and	not	simply	due	to	poor	performance.		
Nevertheless,	definitions	can	raise	their	own	interpretive	issues.	For	example,	if	
‘qualified	 for	work’	 is	 defined	 in	 terms	 of	 being	 able	 to	 perform	 the	 ‘essential	
duties’	of	the	position,	then	clarification	of	that	term	might	be	required.	It	is	not	
easy	 to	 quantify	 what	 an	 ‘essential	 duty’	 is.	 To	 clarify	 this,	 rather	 than	 a	
definition,	 a	 list	 of	 factors	 that	must	 be	 considered	 by	 the	 Court	 of	 HRRT	 for	
determining	this	could	be	included,	with	the	addition	of	a	catch-all	phrase	(such	
as,	 the	 consideration	 of	 ‘any	 other	 factors	 the	 Authority	 or	 Court	 thinks	
appropriate’).	This	would	improve	the	clarity	of	the	law	in	several	ways.	First,	by	
providing	 guidance	 to	 the	 Court	 or	 HRRT	 on	 the	 factors	 to	 consider,	 this	
indicates	 the	 importance	 or	 weightiness	 of	 those	 factors.	 Second,	 a	 list	 of	
mandatory	 factors	 should	 lead	 to	 a	 more	 consistent	 approach.	 This	 means	 all	
employers	would	be	judged	on	the	same	basis,	ensuring	greater	consistency	and	
fairness,	 and,	 over	 time,	 decisions	 made	 on	 arguments	 raised	 concerning	 the	
different	 factors	 will	 provide	 a	 body	 of	 jurisprudence	 that	 should	 further	
develop,	 and	clarify	 the	 law.	But,	 the	 inclusion	of	a	 catch-all	phrase	 still	 allows	
some	 flexibility,	 so	other	 relevant	 factors	 can	be	 considered.	There	 are	 several	





discussed,	 this	 uncertainty	 arises	 because	 there	 is	 no	 positive	 duty	 of	
accommodation	imposed	by	the	HRA.	Although	it	might	be	possible	to	infer	such	
a	 duty	 from	 the	 potential	 accommodation	 provisions,	 this	 thesis	 argues	 this	 is	
not	 the	 ‘best’	 interpretation	 of	 what	 are	 actually	 defences	 against	 a	 claim	 of	
discrimination,	 and	 a	 proviso	 to	 those	defences.	Moreover,	 even	 if	 such	 a	 duty	
were	to	be	inferred	from	these	provisions,	the	ambit	of	the	duty	remains	unclear,	
as	 it	applies	to	the	provision	of	 ‘special	services	or	 facilities’	and	to	accepting	a	
reasonable	‘risk	of	harm’.		
The	 imposition	 of	 a	 clear	 positive	 duty	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 could	
clarify	the	law	in	this	area.	It	would	ensure	the	employer	knows,	from	the	outset,	
that	 they	 have	 a	 duty	 of	 accommodation,	 and	 the	 employee	 would	 know	 that	
they	 have	 a	 right	 to	 be	 reasonably	 accommodated.	 Specifying	 the	 duty	 in	 this	
way	makes	the	law	more	‘knowable’.	Furthermore,	the	employee	would	not	need	





a	 risk	 of	 harm,	 or	 when	 a	 disruption	 to	 an	 employer’s	 activities	 would	 be	
‘unreasonable’.	 Should	a	duty	of	 reasonable	accommodation	be	 included	 in	 the	




The	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 could	 apply	 throughout	 the	 Act.	
This	would	have	the	advantage	of	clarifying	the	law	in	other	contexts	of	disability	
discrimination,	 where	 the	 obligation	 of	 reasonable	 accommodation	 may	 be	
contentious.		
Lastly,	 inserting	a	provision	that	makes	 the	 failure	 to	reasonably	accommodate	
the	 disabled	 unlawful	 would	 reinforce	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 duty	 of	 reasonable	
accommodation	is	mandatory,	and,	provide	the	parties	with	additional	certainty.		
Nonetheless,	the	ambit	of	this	duty	would	still	not	be	clear,	or	certain,	without	a	







Overall	 then,	 this	 thesis	 concludes	 that	 the	 current	 law	 for	 disability	
discrimination	 in	 employment	 is	 not	 adequate	 for	 its	 purposes,	 as	 it	 is	
insufficiently	 clear	 to	 provide	 employers	 and	 disabled	 employees	 with	 any	




substantive	 equality.	 Accordingly,	 it	 may	 be	 time	 for	 the	 Government	 to	 re-
evaluate	the	current	law	of	disability	discrimination,	to	assess	if	there	would	be	a	
better	 way	 to	 promote	 substantive	 equality	 for	 disabled	 employees,	
acknowledging	the	general	social	advantage	and	importance	of	including	people	
































Flight	 Attendants	 &	 Amp	 Related	 Services	 Associations	 Inc,	 Aviation	 &	 Marine	
























NZ	 Amalgamated	 Engineering	 Printing	 and	Manufacturing	 Union	 Inc	 v	 Air	 New	
Zealand	Ltd	(2004)	7	HRNZ	539	(EC)	


































































Weerasinghe	 v	 Basildon	 &	 Thurrock	 NHS	 Foundation	 Trust	 [2016]	 ICR	 305	
(UKEAT)	












NSW	 Law	 Reform	 Commission	 Report	 92	 (1999)	 Review	 of	 the	 Anti-
Discrimination	Act	1977	(1999)	
Productivity	 Commission	 Review	 of	 the	 Disability	 Discrimination	 Act	 1992	
(Australian	Government,	2004)	
Justice	 and	 Law	 Reform	 Committee	 Report	 on	 the	 Human	 Rights	 Bill	 (New	
Zealand,	1991-1993)	
Committee	on	the	Rights	of	Persons	with	Disabilities	Concluding	Observations	of	






















Disabilities)	 Bill,	 Departmental	 Report	 (Ministry	 of	 Social	 Development	 and	
Ministry	of	Justice,	2008)	
Justice	 and	 Electoral	 Committee	 Disability	 (United	 Nations	 Convention	 on	 the	
Rights	 of	 Persons	 with	 Disabilities)	 Bill	 (232—1)	 and	 International	 Treaty	
Examination	of	the	Convention	on	the	Rights	of	Persons	with	Disabilities	(2008)	
Conventions	






G	 Anderson	 and	 J	 Hughes	 Employment	 	 Law	 in	 New	 Zealand	 (Lexis	 Nexis	
Wellington,	New	Zealand,	2014)	
G.	 J.	 Anderson	 Reconstructing	 New	 Zealand's	 Labour	 Law:	 Consensus	 or	
Divergence?	(Victoria	University	Press,	Wellington,	NZ,	2011)	
J	Bentham	"Rights	and	Obligations"	 in	 	Theory	of	Legislation.,	 (Routledge	Kegan	
Paul	London,	1931)	






Felicity	 Callard	 and	 others	 "Examples	 of	Disability	 Legislation	 from	Across	 the	
World"	 in	 	Mental	 Illness,	Discrimination	and	 the	Law,	 (John	Wiley	&	 Sons,	 Ltd,		
2012)	299	
Ross	 Carter	 Statutory	 Interpretation	Update	 (Continuing	 Legal	 Education,	 New	
Zealand	Law	Society,		2016)	
Marshall	 Cohen	 and	 others	 Equality	 and	 Preferential	 Treatment	 (Princeton	
University	Press,	Princeton	NJ,	1977).	




Do	 for	 the	 Labour	Market;	 Ask	What	 the	 Labour	Market	 Can	 Do	 for	 You’)"	 in	





Joseph	 Fishkin	 Bottlenecks:	 A	 New	 Theory	 of	 Equal	 Opportunity	 (Oxford	
Scholarship	Online,		2014)	
Sandra	 Fredman	Discrimination	Law	 (2nd	 ed,	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 Oxford,	
United	Kingdom,	2011)	
Lon	 L.	 Fuller	 The	Morality	 of	 Law	 (Rev	 ed,	 Yale	 University	 Press,	 New	 Haven,	
1969)	
Eugene	 Gerhart	Quote	 It!	Memorable	 Legal	 Quotations	 (Williams	 S	 Hein	 &	 Co.,	
New	York,	1987)	
Henry	G.	Harder	"The	Scope	of	Mental	Illness"	in	Shannon	L.	Wagner	et	al	(eds)	
Mental	 Illness	 in	 the	Workplace:	 Psychological	Disability	Management,	 (Ashgate,	
Farnham,	2014)	
Deborah	 Hellman	 and	 Sophia	 Moreau	 (eds)	 Philosophical	 Foundations	 of	
Discrimination	Law	(Oxford	Scholarship	Online,	2013)	




Tarunabh	 Khaitan	 "Indirect	 Discrimination"	 in	 K.	 Lippert-Rasmussen	 (ed)	
Routledge	 Handbook	 of	 the	 Ethics	 of	 Discrimination,	 (Routledge,	 London,	 UK,	
2017)	
Maria	 Ventegodt	 Liisberg	 "Flexicurity	 and	 Employment	 of	 Persons	 with	
Disability	in	Europe	in	a	Contemporary	Disability	Human	Rights	Perspective"	in		
European	Yearbook	of	Disability	Law,	(Intersentia,		2013)		





Judy	 McGregor,	 Sylvia	 A.	 Bell	 and	 Margaret	 A.	 Wilson	 Human	 Rights	 in	 New	
Zealand:	Emerging	Faultlines	(Bridget	Williams	Books	with	the	New	Zealand	Law	
Foundation,	Wellington,	NZ,	2016)	
Stephen	 Penk	 and	 Mary-Rose	 Russell	 New	 Zealand	 Legal	 Method	 Handbook	
(Thomson	Reuters,	Wellington,	NZ,	2014)	
Denise	 Reaume	 "Dignity,	 Equality	 and	 Comparison"	 in	 Deborah	 Hellman	 and	
Sophia	 Moreau	 (eds)	 Philosophical	 Foundations	 of	 Discrimination	 Law,	 (Oxford	
Scholarship	Online,		2013)	
Paul	 Rishworth	The	New	Zealand	Bill	of	Rights	 (Oxford	University	 Press,	 South	
Melbourne,	Vic;	New	York,	2003)	
John	 E.	 Roemer	Equality	 of	Opportunity	 (Harvard	 University	 Press,	 Cambridge,	
USA,	2000)	




Nicholas	 Smith	 Basic	 Equality	 and	 Discrimination:	 Reconciling	 Theory	 and	 Law	
(Ashgate,	Farnham,	Surrey;	Burlington,	VT,	2011)	
Ruth	Sullivan	Statutory	Interpretation	(2nd	ed,	Irwin	Law,	Toronto,	2007)	
John	 Swain,	 Sally	 French	 and	Colin	 Cameron	Controversial	 Issues	 in	a	Disabling	
Society	(Open	University	Press,	Buckingham,	England;	Philadelphia,	PA,	2003)	
Della	 Thomson	 (ed)	 The	 Concise	 Oxford	 Dictionary	 (9th	 ed,	 Clarendon	 Press,	
Oxford	1995)	
Raymond	Wacks	Understanding	 Jurisprudence:	 An	 Introduction	 to	 Legal	 Theory	
(3rd	ed,	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford,	2012)	
Thomson	 Reuters	 (Firm)	 and	 Brooker's	 (Firm)	 "HR35.01	 Adjustment	 of	




G	 Anderson	 and	 others	 (eds)	Mazengarb's	 Employment	 Law	 (NZ)	 (LexisNexis	
2015)	
Michael	 Sinclair	 Traditional	 Tools	 of	 Statutory	 Interpretation	 (Vandeplas	
Publishing,	Florida,	USA,	2013)	








Alexander	 Aleinikoff	 "Updating	 Statutory	 Interpretation"	 (1988)	 87(1)	 Mich	 L	
Rev	20	






Stephen	 Befort	 “Direct	 Threat	 and	 Business	 Necessity:	 Understanding	 and	
Untangling	 Two	 ADA	 Defenses”	 (2018)	 39	 Berkeley	 J	 Emp	 &	 Lab	 L	 (2018)	
Forthcoming.	Available	at	SSRN:	https://ssrn.com/abstract=3055913		












Jed	 Boardman	 and	 others	 "Work	 and	 Employment	 for	 People	with	 Psychiatric	
Disabilities"	(2003)	182(6)	BJPsych	467	
Andrew	 S.	 Butler	 and	 Petra	 Butler	 "The	 Judicial	 use	 of	 International	 Human	
Rights	Law	in	New	Zealand"	(1999)	29	VUWLR	173	
Colin	Campbell	“A	Hard	Case	Making	Bad	Law:	Purvis	v	New	South	Wales	and	the	
Role	of	 the	Comparator	Under	 the	Disability	Act	1992	 (Cth)”	 	 (2007)	35(6)	FL	
Rev	111	
Jacob	 Campbell	 "Using	 Anti-Discrimination	 Law	 as	 a	 Tool	 of	 Exclusion	 —	 A	
Critical	 Analysis	 of	 the	 Disability	 Discrimination	 Act	 1992	 and	 Purvis	 v	 NSW"	
(2005)	5	Macquarie	LJ	201	
Halton	 Cheadle	 "Reception	 of	 International	 Labour	 Standards	 in	 Common-Law	
Legal	Systems"	(2012)		Acta	Juridica	348	
B.	 Clough	 "'People	 like	 that':	 Realising	 the	 Social	 Model	 in	 Mental	 Capacity	
Jurisprudence"	(2015)	23(1)	Med	Law	Rev	53.	
Peter	 Creed	 and	 Tania	Watson	 "Age,	 Gender,	 Psychological	Wellbeing	 and	 the	
Impact	of	Losing	the	Latent	and	Manifest	Benefits	of	Employment	in	Unemployed	
People"	(2003)	55(2)	Australian	Journal	of	Psychology	95	
Rafael	 de	 Asís	 Roig	 "Reasonableness	 in	 the	 Concept	 of	 Reasonable	
Accommodation"	(2016)	(6)	Age	of	Human	Rights	Journal	42	
Letícia	de	Campos	Velho	Martel	“Reasonable	Accommodation:	The	New	Concept	
from	 an	 Inclusive	 Constitutional	 Perspective”	 	 (2011)	 14	 (8)	 Sur	 International	
Journal	on	Human	Rights	84	
Thomas	 P	 Dirth	 and	 Nyla	 R	 Branscombe	 "Disability	 Models	 Affect	 Disability	
Policy	 Support	 through	 Awareness	 of	 Structural	 Discrimination"	 (2017)	 73(2)	
Journal	of	Social	Issues	413	
Ryan	Doerfler	“High-Stakes	Interpretation”	(2018)	116(4)	Mich	L	Rev	523	
Samantha	 Edwards	 "Purvis	 in	 the	 High	 Court	 Behaviour,	 Disability	 and	 the	
Meaning	of	Direct	Discrimination"	(2004)	26(4)	Syd	L	Rev	639	






Samantha	 Fairclough	 and	 others	 "In	 Sickness	 and	 in	 Health:	 Implications	 for	





Sandra	 Fredman	 "Substantive	 Equality	 Revisited"	 (2016)	 14(3)	 International	
Journal	of	Constitutional	Law	712	









The	 Convention	 on	 The	 Rights	 of	 Persons	 with	 Disabilities"	 (2012)	 27(1)	
Disability	&	Society	1	
Anne	 Honey	 "The	 Impact	 of	 Mental	 Illness	 on	 Employment:	 Consumers'	
Perspectives"	(2003)	20(3)	Work	267	
Harish	 Jain,	 Frank	Horwitz	 and	Christa	 	Wilkin	 "Employment	Equity	 in	Canada	
and	 South	 Africa:	 a	 Comparative	 Review"	 (2012)	 23(1)	 Int	 J	 Hum	 Resource	
Manag	1	
John	 Jensen	 and	 others	 "Work	 Participation	 among	 People	with	Disabilities	—	





Rosemary	 Kayess	 and	 Ben	 Fogarty	 "Rights	 and	 Dignity	 of	 Persons	 with	
Disabilities"	(2007)	32	Alternative	LJ	














Aileen	 	 McColgan	 "Cracking	 the	 Comparator	 Problem:	 Discrimination,	 'Equal'	
Treatment	and	the	Role	of	Comparator"	(2006)	11	EHRLR	650	





Gay	Moon	 and	 Robin	 Allan	 "Dignity	 Discourse	 in	Human	Rights	 Law:	 A	 Better	
Route	to	Equality?"	(2006)	11	EHRLR	610	
Secretary	 General	 United	 Nations	 "United	 Nations	 Convention	 and	 Optional	





Conor	 O’Mahony	 "There	 is	 No	 Such	 Thing	 as	 a	 Right	 to	 Dignity"	 (2012)	 10(2)	
ICON	551	




David	 	 Pettinicchio	 and	 Michelle	 Maroto	 "Employment	 Outcomes	 Among	 Men	

























Heather	 Stuart	 "Mental	 Illness	 and	 Employment	 Discrimination"	 (2006)	 19(5)	
Current	Opinion	in	Psychiatry	522	




Sarah	 Von	 Schrader,	 Valerie	 Malzer	 and	 Susanne	 Bruyère	 "Perspectives	 on	
Disability	 Disclosure:	 The	 Importance	 of	 Employer	 Practices	 and	 Workplace	
Climate"	(2014)	26	Employ	Respons	Rights	J	237	
L	 Waddington	 "Fine-Tuning	 Non-Discrimination	 Law:	 Exceptions	 and	
Justifications	 Allowing	 for	 Differential	 Treatment	 on	 the	 Ground	 of	 Disability"	
(2014)	15(1-2)	IDJL	11	
Melissa	 A.	 Waters	 "Creeping	 Monism:	 The	 Judicial	 Trend	 Toward	 Interpretive	
Incorporation	of	Human	Rights	Treaties"	(2007)	107(3)	Colum	L	Rev	628	
James	 J.	 Weisman	 "Dignity	 and	 Non-Discrimination:	 The	 Requirement	 of	










Daniel	 Mont	 Disability	 Employment	 Policy	 (Social	 Protection	 Unit,	 Human	
Development	Network,	The	World	Bank,	2004)	
International	 Labour	 Organisation	 Managing	 Disability	 in	 the	 Workplace:	 ILO	
Code	of	Practice	(International	Labour	Organisation,	2002)	
Ministry	of	 Social	Development	The	New	Zealand	Disability	Strategy	(Whakanui	
Oranga,	2001)	
Ministry	of	 Social	Development	The	New	Zealand	Disability	Strategy	(Whakanui	
Oranga,	2016)	
EEO	Trust	Employing	Disabled	People	(EEO	Trust,	Auckland,	2008)	
	
	240	
Websites	
	
Definition	of	Disability	accessed	at		
https://www.disabled-world.com/definitions/disability-disabled.php	
	
Disability	history	accessed	at	
https://www.odi.govt.nz/about-disability/history-of-disability-in-new-zealand/	
	
Dictionary.com	accessed	at		
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/facilities	
	
Human	Rights	Commission	accessed	at	
http://tracking-equality.hrc.co.nz/#/issue/discrimination	
	
http://tracking-equality.hrc.co.nz/#/indicator/complaints-in-employment-by-
grounds-of-discrimination	
	
International	Labour	Organisation	accessed	at	
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/terminate/termmain.home	
	
L&E	Global	Knowledge	Centre	accessed	at	
	http://knowledge.leglobal.org/termination-of-employment-contracts-in-
netherlands/	
	
Ministry	of	Business	Innovation	and	Employment.	Accessed	at	
https://www.employment.govt.nz/workplace-policies/employment-for-
disabled-people/disability-information-and-resources-for-employers/	
	
Ministry	of	Social	Development	accessed	at	
https://www.msd.govt.nz/about-msd-and-our-work/publications-
resources/research/welfare-reform-health-disability/working-differently-with-
people-with-health-conditions.html	
	
New	Zealand	Herald	accessed	at	
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=11982110	
	
Statistics	New	Zealand	accessed	at	
http://archive.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/income-and-
work/employment_and_unemployment/LabourMarketStatistics_MRSep17qtr.as
px	
	
http://archive.stats.govt.nz/browse_for_stats/income-and-
work/employment_and_unemployment/LabourMarketStatisticsDisability_HOTP
Jun17qtr.aspx	
	
Stuff	Nation	accessed	at	
https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/crime/101570737/access-to-justice-is-being-
denied-to-almost-all-human-rights-review-tribunal-chairman-rodger-haines	
	
	 241	
	
	
	242	
	
